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More Info: www.axialracing.com/t/vehicles/rr10
The RR10 Bomber build-it-yourself kit is loaded with features allowing you to customize it and add your own electronics for the ultimate rock racer! Building on the current, successful ready-to-run model, this kit version includes a wide variety of desirable option parts that deliver next level performance and durability. Hard anodized aluminum suspension links, hard anodized aluminum steering links, long travel rear sway bar, hardened steel universal axles allowing up to 50 degrees of steering, aluminum lower link plates, and King adjustable machined aluminum shocks, all riding on sticky BFGoodrich® Baja T/A® KR2 tires wrapped around 2.2 Walker Evans Racing beadlock wheels.
FEATURES:
HARD ANODIZED MACHINED ALUMINUM THREADED LINKS:
The upper and lower suspension links as well as the steering tie rod and drag link are machined from aluminum to reduce flex and provide precise control over the roughest terrain. The tubes are threaded at both ends for easy assembly and they use larger and stronger M4 hardware.
HARD ANODIZED MACHINED ALUMINUM STEERING LINKS:
Our machined aluminum steering links give you more precise steering feel and response to help keep your rig pointed in the right direction. They’re hard anodized and use larger and stronger M4 hardware for durability.
LONG TRAVEL REAR SWAY BAR:
The pursuit of horsepower and the ability to put the power to the ground is one of the main aspects of offroad racing. This unique torsion bar design with long pivot arms used in conjunction with the long travel suspension is designed to help control the torque twist associated with massive power. This system also helps reduce body roll and adds stability at high speeds.
UNIVERSAL AXLES:
Our universal joint axles increase steering angle to 50 degrees, that's 60% over the stock dogbone/drive cup setup. Our universals provide smoother action for a higher performing, efficient drivetrain. The universal is oversized; a design you'd see on 1/8 scale vehicles and it's made of hardened steel so it's capable of handling extreme power.
• AR60 OCP universal axle set
• Up to 50 degrees of steering
• Smooth action for an efficient drivetrain
• Oversized design for durability
• Hardened steel construction
KING ADJUSTABLE MACHINED ALUMINUM SHOCKS:
The included aluminum King Shocks feature precision machined pistons which offer smooth performance throughout the range of travel. Made to tight tolerances, these aluminum shocks feature clear coated polished aluminum bodies, machined aluminum caps and aluminum preload spacers for precision shock adjustments. The rear shocks are mounted on the links rather than at the axle, allowing for more suspension travel which is better for high speed handling.
ALUMINUM LOWER LINK PLATES:
Includes hard anodized 2mm aluminum lower link plates for added durability and stiffness of the rear 4 link suspension.
2.2 WALKER EVANS RACING BEADLOCK WHEELS:
Officially licensed Walker Evans Racing beadlock wheels dressed in an aggressive all black style and they work with most 2.2 tires. Our IFD™ (Interchangeable Face Design) wheel system makes it easy to dress it up with a new look. The wheel design allows you to vary the amount of air passing through the breather holes. You can select between having one, two or three open holes (two, four or six total) by rotating the inner (beadlock) ring. The position is locked with reassembly.
• Three piece beadlock design
• Utilizes new 2x11mm pins for added strength
• Updated plastic hub adapter to eliminate slop and capture the new 2x11mm pin
• Adjustable breather holes for fine tuning tire performance
• Compatible with most 2.2 tires
• Easy six screw disassembly
BFGOODRICH® BAJA T/A® KR2 TIRES - R35 COMPOUND:
In the full-size world of off-road racing, BFGoodrich® tires have proven to be the ‘go-to’ tire for numerous racing victories, including Randy Slawson piloting them to victory at the 2013 and 2015 King of the Hammers. Axial’s version of this tire captures the same aggressive look and provides remarkable performance on a wide variety of surfaces. This is the perfect tire for this style of vehicle due to its high level of performance and diversity.
AR60 OCP-AXLE™:
The AR60 OCP-Axle™ is constructed from high strength composite material which has a low flex rate but is not as brittle as standard glass filled nylon. The combination of our axles and a true 4-link suspension gives you optimal performance for any terrain with the look of a real 1:1 vehicle.
• Off-center pumpkin design
• Axle tubes are reinforced with a boxed-in axle truss
• High strength composite material
• Updated steering knuckles for dual shear, also eliminates secondary bolt on plate
• Updated differential cover and servo mount for a new look
WB8 HD WILDBOAR™ DRIVESHAFTS, FRONT AND REAR:
The WB8 HD driveshafts feature an updated design with a larger diameter cross pin (2x11mm) along with an M4 Screw Shaft (2mm hex drive) for added strength. A center splined slider floats between each end and features added material which reduces flex and fatigue.
• 3-piece driveshaft with strengthened slider-floater tube.
• Increased surface at the connection between the ball joints and output shaft tubes.
• 2x11mm cross pin adds 25% more surface area providing more strength for the ball joint.
• Captured cross pin design eliminates older set screw design for more durability and easy maintenance.
MULTIPLE SHOCK/LINK POINTS AND DUAL SHEAR SHOCK MOUNTS:
We've included a variety of shock mounting points for running dual shock setups and for additional suspension tuning options. On the skid plate you'll find two front upper link mount positions and three rear upper link mount positions. All shock-mounting locations are dual shear with optional secondary shock mounts allowing for dual shock setups.
REALISTIC SCALE DETAILS:
Realistic scale details include molded driver figures, three pairs of helmets, molded shock reservoirs, a fuel cell, Bomber Fabrication body panels, two full color decal sheets with enough graphics for two completely unique looks, and a fully licensed scale tube chassis.
BFGoodrich® Tires and Baja T/A® KR2 Trademarks are used under License from Michelin
Odyssey Battery trademark(s) is/are the property of EnerSys and affiliates
NOTE: Prototype shown. Some imagery may differ from the actual product. Electronics shown are not included.
Thomas Stone - Ex-Mistress
Intimate Novels 23, 1952
Universal Publishing Ad
"Love novels as you like them... different, gay, exciting!"
"4 for $1" "9 for $2" or "14 for $3"
Using the Carol Zilliacus technique, I placed thin strips of clay over a similar background. The white bands are a very thin layer of pearlescent clay.
Bora Bora (French: Bora-Bora, Tahitian: Pora Pora) is a 30.55 km2 (12 sq mi) island group in the Leeward group in the western part of the Society Islands of French Polynesia, an overseas collectivity of France in the Pacific Ocean. The main island, located about 230 kilometres (143 miles) northwest of Papeete, is surrounded by a lagoon and a barrier reef. In the center of the island are the remnants of an extinct volcano rising to two peaks, Mount Pahia and Mount Otemanu, the highest point at 727 metres (2,385 feet)
There is nothing like the glow of light through a "Red Current". Red and Black currents are members of the Gooseberry Family.
Current & Twitter Hack The Debate
photo by Scott Beale / Laughing Squid
This photo is licensed under a Creative Commons license. If you use this photo within the terms of the license or make special arrangements to use the photo, please list the photo credit as "Scott Beale / Laughing Squid" and link the credit to laughingsquid.com.
The current Truemans of Ash Vale fleet contains 7 Neoplan Tourliners, 4 Irizar i6 and 3 Irizar i4 coaches. Seen near Frimley in March 2017 is J20TRU, one of their Irizar i6 coaches dating from 2013. This coach was new YN13BWU.
Autumn
Green stones piles about her thighs
breathe sigh
laugh cry
Autumn
River sister
asks in hushes amid the rushes
her future among men
Songs
Garden love
question pools
black disk spins
electric clouds full of sin
toes curl
in a pistachio sand
her hair full of light bobbles
drops in empty hands
grooves play a vinyl tune
fingernail ride
to the crossing of a loon
licked lips speak
a whisper
a wake
over her lake
coffee in my mouth
tastes of summer
salt and skin
and the blanket
smells of winter
snow and low cold sun
her lips
felt of spring
petals and premonition
Help
water
air
up and down
drown
death merry go round
every breath catches
the beauty of the sky
the terror
of the ocean floor
Ghost
Little boys in their red coats
Run down to the river shiver
where the water is colder than ice
Brown eyes search the river
While ears hear
The river weep
it has lost something
they intone
a shaky chorus
filled with patterns
not unlike the phases of the moon
something dear
something otherworldly
their voices no longer shake
a lover perhaps
a son for certain
a boy in red dyed wool
a boy like us
caught in the current
held fast by the flow
a boy like us
and the mourn ceased then
for a time
Stones
The surface of the flow
was stone
topsy turvy
riverbed jewels
as bubbles
float and remain
Skip
flat stones
on the surface skip
trip along
expansion lines
ripples of mercy
till they reach the other
The Current River as seen from the Hwy 106 bridge near Eminence in Shannon County Missouri by Notley Hawkins Photography. Taken with a Sony ILCE-7RM2 camera with a Sony FE 24-240mm F3.5-6.3 OSS lens at ƒ/22.0 with a 0.3 second exposure at ISO 100. Processed with Adobe Lightroom CC.
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©Notley Hawkins
The Gallery in the Sun currently has two exhibits on display, please stop by and say hello!
• “Desert Dwellings"
• "DeGrazia’s Chickens"
Currently on demonstration with Whitelaws, SN09 CGX is captured in Motherwell whilst working the 253 to Coalburn.
More about this particular day here: blog.nazhamid.com/post/44240915006/queens-bath
—
Kauai, HI
02.05.2013-02.12.2013
Currently having a massive clear out of unedited photos. I'm being quite ruthless. But this one escaped the delete button.
DSC_2151-resized
Against The Current performing on the Gravity World Tour
World Cafe Live
Philadelphia, PA
November 19th, 2015
Shot for Rumored Nights Press
***DO NOT USE WITHOUT PERMISSION***
The Komodo dragon (Varanus komodoensis), also known as the Komodo monitor, is a large species of lizard found in the Indonesian islands of Komodo, Rinca, Flores, Gili Motang, and Padar. A member of the monitor lizard family Varanidae, it is the largest living species of lizard, growing to a maximum length of 3 metres in rare cases and weighing up to approximately 70 kilograms.
Their unusually large size has been attributed to island gigantism, since no other carnivorous animals fill the niche on the islands where they live. However, recent research suggests the large size of Komodo dragons may be better understood as representative of a relict population of very large varanid lizards that once lived across Indonesia and Australia, most of which, along with other megafauna, died out after the Pleistocene. Fossils very similar to V. komodoensis have been found in Australia dating to greater than 3.8 million years ago, and its body size remained stable on Flores, one of the handful of Indonesian islands where it is currently found, over the last 900,000 years, "a time marked by major faunal turnovers, extinction of the island's megafauna, and the arrival of early hominids by 880 ka [kiloannums]."
As a result of their size, these lizards dominate the ecosystems in which they live. Komodo dragons hunt and ambush prey including invertebrates, birds, and mammals. It has been claimed that they have a venomous bite; there are two glands in the lower jaw which secrete several toxic proteins. The biological significance of these proteins is disputed, but the glands have been shown to secrete an anticoagulant. Komodo dragon group behaviour in hunting is exceptional in the reptile world. The diet of big Komodo dragons mainly consists of deer, though they also eat considerable amounts of carrion. Komodo dragons also occasionally attack humans in the area of West Manggarai Regency where they live in Indonesia.
Mating begins between May and August, and the eggs are laid in September. About 20 eggs are deposited in abandoned megapode nests or in a self-dug nesting hole. The eggs are incubated for seven to eight months, hatching in April, when insects are most plentiful. Young Komodo dragons are vulnerable and therefore dwell in trees, safe from predators and cannibalistic adults. They take 8 to 9 years to mature, and are estimated to live up to 30 years.
Komodo dragons were first recorded by Western scientists in 1910. Their large size and fearsome reputation make them popular zoo exhibits. In the wild, their range has contracted due to human activities, and they are listed as vulnerable by the IUCN. They are protected under Indonesian law, and a national park, Komodo National Park, was founded to aid protection efforts.
ETYMOLOGY
The Komodo dragon is also known as the Komodo monitor or the Komodo Island monitor in scientific literature, although this is not very common. To the natives of Komodo Island, it is referred to as ora, buaya darat (land crocodile), or biawak raksasa (giant monitor).
EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY
The evolutionary development of the Komodo dragon started with the Varanus genus, which originated in Asia about 40 million years ago and migrated to Australia. Around 15 million years ago, a collision between Australia and Southeast Asia allowed the varanids to move into what is now the Indonesian archipelago, extending their range as far east as the island of Timor. The Komodo dragon was believed to have differentiated from its Australian ancestors 4 million years ago. However, recent fossil evidence from Queensland suggests the Komodo dragon evolved in Australia before spreading to Indonesia. Dramatic lowering of sea level during the last glacial period uncovered extensive stretches of continental shelf that the Komodo dragon colonized, becoming isolated in their present island range as sea levels rose afterwards.
DESCRIPTION
In the wild, an adult Komodo dragon usually weighs around 70 kg, although captive specimens often weigh more. According to the Guinness Book of World Records, an average adult male will weigh 79 to 91 kg and measure 2.59 m, while an average female will weigh 68 to 73 kg and measure 2.29 m. The largest verified wild specimen was 3.13 m long and weighed 166 kg, including undigested food. The Komodo dragon has a tail as long as its body, as well as about 60 frequently replaced, serrated teeth that can measure up to 2.5 cm in length. Its saliva is frequently blood-tinged, because its teeth are almost completely covered by gingival tissue that is naturally lacerated during feeding. This creates an ideal culture for the bacteria that live in its mouth. It also has a long, yellow, deeply forked tongue. Komodo dragon skin is reinforced by armoured scales, which contain tiny bones called osteoderms that function as a sort of natural chain-mail. This rugged hide makes Komodo dragon skin poorly suited for making into leather.
SENSES
As with other Varanids, Komodo dragons have only a single ear bone, the stapes, for transferring vibrations from the tympanic membrane to the cochlea. This arrangement means they are likely restricted to sounds in the 400 to 2,000 hertz range, compared to humans who hear between 20 and 20,000 hertz. It was formerly thought to be deaf when a study reported no agitation in wild Komodo dragons in response to whispers, raised voices, or shouts. This was disputed when London Zoological Garden employee Joan Proctor trained a captive specimen to come out to feed at the sound of her voice, even when she could not be seen.
The Komodo dragon can see objects as far away as 300 m, but because its retinas only contain cones, it is thought to have poor night vision. The Komodo dragon is able to see in color, but has poor visual discrimination of stationary objects.
The Komodo dragon uses its tongue to detect, taste, and smell stimuli, as with many other reptiles, with the vomeronasal sense using the Jacobson's organ, rather than using the nostrils. With the help of a favorable wind and its habit of swinging its head from side to side as it walks, a Komodo dragon may be able to detect carrion from 4–9.5 km away. It only has a few taste buds in the back of its throat. Its scales, some of which are reinforced with bone, have sensory plaques connected to nerves to facilitate its sense of touch. The scales around the ears, lips, chin, and soles of the feet may have three or more sensory plaques.
BEHAVIOUR AND ECOLOGY
The Komodo dragon prefers hot and dry places, and typically lives in dry, open grassland, savanna, and tropical forest at low elevations. As an ectotherm, it is most active in the day, although it exhibits some nocturnal activity. Komodo dragons are solitary, coming together only to breed and eat. They are capable of running rapidly in brief sprints up to 20 km/h, diving up to 4.5 m, and climbing trees proficiently when young through use of their strong claws. To catch out-of-reach prey, the Komodo dragon may stand on its hind legs and use its tail as a support. As it matures, its claws are used primarily as weapons, as its great size makes climbing impractical.
For shelter, the Komodo dragon digs holes that can measure from 1–3 m wide with its powerful forelimbs and claws. Because of its large size and habit of sleeping in these burrows, it is able to conserve body heat throughout the night and minimize its basking period the morning after. The Komodo dragon hunts in the afternoon, but stays in the shade during the hottest part of the day. These special resting places, usually located on ridges with cool sea breezes, are marked with droppings and are cleared of vegetation. They serve as strategic locations from which to ambush deer.
DIET
Komodo dragons are carnivores. Although they eat mostly carrion, they will also ambush live prey with a stealthy approach. When suitable prey arrives near a dragon's ambush site, it will suddenly charge at the animal and go for the underside or the throat. It is able to locate its prey using its keen sense of smell, which can locate a dead or dying animal from a range of up to 9.5 km. Komodo dragons have been observed knocking down large pigs and deer with their strong tails.
Komodo dragons eat by tearing large chunks of flesh and swallowing them whole while holding the carcass down with their forelegs. For smaller prey up to the size of a goat, their loosely articulated jaws, flexible skulls, and expandable stomachs allow them to swallow prey whole. The vegetable contents of the stomach and intestines are typically avoided. Copious amounts of red saliva the Komodo dragons produce help to lubricate the food, but swallowing is still a long process (15–20 minutes to swallow a goat). A Komodo dragon may attempt to speed up the process by ramming the carcass against a tree to force it down its throat, sometimes ramming so forcefully, the tree is knocked down. To prevent itself from suffocating while swallowing, it breathes using a small tube under the tongue that connects to the lungs. After eating up to 80% of its body weight in one meal, it drags itself to a sunny location to speed digestion, as the food could rot and poison the dragon if left undigested for too long. Because of their slow metabolism, large dragons can survive on as little as 12 meals a year. After digestion, the Komodo dragon regurgitates a mass of horns, hair, and teeth known as the gastric pellet, which is covered in malodorous mucus. After regurgitating the gastric pellet, it rubs its face in the dirt or on bushes to get rid of the mucus, suggesting, like humans, it does not relish the scent of its own excretions.
The largest animals eat first, while the smaller ones follow a hierarchy. The largest male asserts his dominance and the smaller males show their submission by use of body language and rumbling hisses. Dragons of equal size may resort to "wrestling". Losers usually retreat, though they have been known to be killed and eaten by victors.
The Komodo dragon's diet is wide-ranging, and includes invertebrates, other reptiles (including smaller Komodo dragons), birds, bird eggs, small mammals, monkeys, wild boar, goats, deer, horses, and water buffalo. Young Komodos will eat insects, eggs, geckos, and small mammals. Occasionally, they consume humans and human corpses, digging up bodies from shallow graves. This habit of raiding graves caused the villagers of Komodo to move their graves from sandy to clay ground and pile rocks on top of them to deter the lizards. The Komodo dragon may have evolved to feed on the extinct dwarf elephant Stegodon that once lived on Flores, according to evolutionary biologist Jared Diamond.
The Komodo dragon drinks by sucking water into its mouth via buccal pumping (a process also used for respiration), lifting its head, and letting the water run down its throat.
SALIVA
Auffenberg described the Komodo dragon as having septic pathogens in its saliva (he described the saliva as "reddish and copious"), specifically the bacteria E. coli, Staphylococcus sp., Providencia sp., Proteus morgani, and P. mirabilis. He noted, while these pathogens can be found in the mouths of wild Komodo dragons, they disappear from the mouths of captive animals, due to cleaner diets and the use of antibiotics. This was verified by taking mucous samples from the external gum surfaces of the upper jaws of two freshly captured individuals. Saliva samples were analyzed by researchers at the University of Texas, who found 57 strains of bacteria growing in the mouths of three wild Komodo dragons, including Pasteurella multocida. The rapid growth of these bacteria was noted by Fredeking: "Normally it takes about three days for a sample of P. multocida to cover a Petri dish; ours took eight hours. We were very taken aback by how virulent these strains were". This study supported the observation that wounds inflicted by the Komodo dragon are often associated with sepsis and subsequent infections in prey animals. How the Komodo dragon is unaffected by these virulent bacteria remains a mystery.Research in 2013 suggested that the bacteria in the mouths of komodo dragons are ordinary and similar to those found in other carnivores. They actually have surprisingly good mouth hygiene. As Bryan Fry put it: "After they are done feeding, they will spend 10 to 15 minutes lip-licking and rubbing their head in the leaves to clean their mouth... Unlike people have been led to believe, they do not have chunks of rotting flesh from their meals on their teeth, cultivating bacteria." The observation of prey dying of sepsis would then be explained by the natural instinct of water buffalos, who are not native to the islands where the Komodo dragon lives, to run into water when attacked. The warm, feces filled water would then cause the infections. The study used samples from 16 captive dragons (10 adults and six neonates) from three U.S. zoos.
VENOM
In late 2005, researchers at the University of Melbourne speculated the perentie (Varanus giganteus), other species of monitors, and agamids may be somewhat venomous. The team believes the immediate effects of bites from these lizards were caused by mild envenomation. Bites on human digits by a lace monitor (V. varius), a Komodo dragon, and a spotted tree monitor (V. scalaris) all produced similar effects: rapid swelling, localized disruption of blood clotting, and shooting pain up to the elbow, with some symptoms lasting for several hours.
In 2009, the same researchers published further evidence demonstrating Komodo dragons possess a venomous bite. MRI scans of a preserved skull showed the presence of two glands in the lower jaw. The researchers extracted one of these glands from the head of a terminally ill specimen in the Singapore Zoological Gardens, and found it secreted several different toxic proteins. The known functions of these proteins include inhibition of blood clotting, lowering of blood pressure, muscle paralysis, and the induction of hypothermia, leading to shock and loss of consciousness in envenomated prey. As a result of the discovery, the previous theory that bacteria were responsible for the deaths of Komodo victims was disputed.
Kurt Schwenk, an evolutionary biologist at the University of Connecticut, finds the discovery of these glands intriguing, but considers most of the evidence for venom in the study to be "meaningless, irrelevant, incorrect or falsely misleading". Even if the lizards have venom-like proteins in their mouths, Schwenk argues, they may be using them for a different function, and he doubts venom is necessary to explain the effect of a Komodo dragon bite, arguing that shock and blood loss are the primary factors.
Other scientists such as Washington State University's Biologist Kenneth V. Kardong and Toxicologists Scott A. Weinstein and Tamara L. Smith, have stated that this allegation of venom glands "has had the effect of underestimating the variety of complex roles played by oral secretions in the biology of reptiles, produced a very narrow view of oral secretions and resulted in misinterpretation of reptilian evolution". According to these scientists "reptilian oral secretions contribute to many biological roles other than to quickly dispatch prey". These researchers concluded that, "Calling all in this clade venomous implies an overall potential danger that does not exist, misleads in the assessment of medical risks, and confuses the biological assessment of squamate biochemical systems".
REPRODUCTION
Mating occurs between May and August, with the eggs laid in September. During this period, males fight over females and territory by grappling with one another upon their hind legs, with the loser eventually being pinned to the ground. These males may vomit or defecate when preparing for the fight. The winner of the fight will then flick his long tongue at the female to gain information about her receptivity. Females are antagonistic and resist with their claws and teeth during the early phases of courtship. Therefore, the male must fully restrain the female during coitus to avoid being hurt. Other courtship displays include males rubbing their chins on the female, hard scratches to the back, and licking. Copulation occurs when the male inserts one of his hemipenes into the female's cloaca. Komodo dragons may be monogamous and form "pair bonds", a rare behavior for lizards. Female Komodos lay their eggs from August to September and may use several types of locality; in one study, 60% laid their eggs in the nests of orange-footed scrubfowl (a moundbuilder or megapode), 20% on ground level and 20% in hilly areas. The females make many camouflage nests/holes to prevent other dragons from eating the eggs. Clutches contain an average of 20 eggs, which have an incubation period of 7–8 months. Hatching is an exhausting effort for the neonates, which break out of their eggshells with an egg tooth that falls off soon after. After cutting themselves out, the hatchlings may lie in their eggshells for hours before starting to dig out of the nest. They are born quite defenseless and are vulnerable to predation. Sixteen youngsters from a single nest were on average 46.5 cm long and weighed 105.1 grams. Young Komodo dragons spend much of their first few years in trees, where they are relatively safe from predators, including cannibalistic adults, as juvenile dragons make up 10% of their diets. The habit of cannibalism may be advantageous in sustaining the large size of adults, as medium-sized prey on the islands is rare. When the young approach a kill, they roll around in fecal matter and rest in the intestines of eviscerated animals to deter these hungry adults. Komodo dragons take approximately three to five years to mature, and may live for up to 50 years.
PARTHENOGENESIS
A Komodo dragon at London Zoo named Sungai laid a clutch of eggs in late 2005 after being separated from male company for more than two years. Scientists initially assumed she had been able to store sperm from her earlier encounter with a male, an adaptation known as superfecundation. On 20 December 2006, it was reported that Flora, a captive Komodo dragon living in the Chester Zoo in England, was the second known Komodo dragon to have laid unfertilized eggs: she laid 11 eggs, and seven of them hatched, all of them male. Scientists at Liverpool University in England performed genetic tests on three eggs that collapsed after being moved to an incubator, and verified Flora had never been in physical contact with a male dragon. After Flora's eggs' condition had been discovered, testing showed Sungai's eggs were also produced without outside fertilization. On 31 January 2008, the Sedgwick County Zoo in Wichita, Kansas, became the first zoo in the Americas to document parthenogenesis in Komodo dragons. The zoo has two adult female Komodo dragons, one of which laid about 17 eggs on 19–20 May 2007. Only two eggs were incubated and hatched due to space issues; the first hatched on 31 January 2008, while the second hatched on 1 February. Both hatchlings were males.
Komodo dragons have the ZW chromosomal sex-determination system, as opposed to the mammalian XY system. Male progeny prove Flora's unfertilized eggs were haploid (n) and doubled their chromosomes later to become diploid (2n) (by being fertilized by a polar body, or by chromosome duplication without cell division), rather than by her laying diploid eggs by one of the meiosis reduction-divisions in her ovaries failing. When a female Komodo dragon (with ZW sex chromosomes) reproduces in this manner, she provides her progeny with only one chromosome from each of her pairs of chromosomes, including only one of her two sex chromosomes. This single set of chromosomes is duplicated in the egg, which develops parthenogenetically. Eggs receiving a Z chromosome become ZZ (male); those receiving a W chromosome become WW and fail to develop, meaning that only males are produced by parthenogenesis in this species.
It has been hypothesized that this reproductive adaptation allows a single female to enter an isolated ecological niche (such as an island) and by parthenogenesis produce male offspring, thereby establishing a sexually reproducing population (via reproduction with her offspring that can result in both male and female young). Despite the advantages of such an adaptation, zoos are cautioned that parthenogenesis may be detrimental to genetic diversity.
HISTORY
DISCOVERY BY THE WESTERN WORLD
Komodo dragons were first documented by Europeans in 1910, when rumors of a "land crocodile" reached Lieutenant van Steyn van Hensbroek of the Dutch colonial administration. Widespread notoriety came after 1912, when Peter Ouwens, the director of the Zoological Museum at Bogor, Java, published a paper on the topic after receiving a photo and a skin from the lieutenant, as well as two other specimens from a collector. The first two live Komodo dragons to arrive in Europe were exhibited in the Reptile House at London Zoo when it opened in 1927. Joan Beauchamp Procter made some of the earliest observations of these animals in captivity and she demonstrated the behaviour of one of these animals at a Scientific Meeting of the Zoological Society of London in 1928. The Komodo dragon was the driving factor for an expedition to Komodo Island by W. Douglas Burden in 1926. After returning with 12 preserved specimens and 2 live ones, this expedition provided the inspiration for the 1933 movie King Kong. It was also Burden who coined the common name "Komodo dragon." Three of his specimens were stuffed and are still on display in the American Museum of Natural History.
STUDIES
The Dutch, realizing the limited number of individuals in the wild, outlawed sport hunting and heavily limited the number of individuals taken for scientific study. Collecting expeditions ground to a halt with the occurrence of World War II, not resuming until the 1950s and 1960s, when studies examined the Komodo dragon's feeding behavior, reproduction, and body temperature. At around this time, an expedition was planned in which a long-term study of the Komodo dragon would be undertaken. This task was given to the Auffenberg family, who stayed on Komodo Island for 11 months in 1969. During their stay, Walter Auffenberg and his assistant Putra Sastrawan captured and tagged more than 50 Komodo dragons. The research from the Auffenberg expedition would prove to be enormously influential in raising Komodo dragons in captivity. Research after that of the Auffenberg family has shed more light on the nature of the Komodo dragon, with biologists such as Claudio Ciofi continuing to study the creatures.
CONSERVATION
The Komodo dragon is a vulnerable species and is on the IUCN Red List. There are approximately 4,000 to 5,000 living Komodo dragons in the wild. Their populations are restricted to the islands of Gili Motang (100), Gili Dasami (100), Rinca (1,300), Komodo (1,700), and Flores (perhaps 2,000). However, there are concerns that there may presently be only 350 breeding females. To address these concerns, the Komodo National Park was founded in 1980 to protect Komodo dragon populations on islands including Komodo, Rinca, and Padar. Later, the Wae Wuul and Wolo Tado Reserves were opened on Flores to aid with Komodo dragon conservation.
Komodo dragons avoid encounters with humans. Juveniles are very shy and will flee quickly into a hideout if a human comes closer than about 100 metres. Older animals will also retreat from humans from a shorter distance away. If cornered, they will react aggressively by gaping their mouth, hissing, and swinging their tail. If they are disturbed further, they may start an attack and bite. Although there are anecdotes of unprovoked Komodo dragons attacking or preying on humans, most of these reports are either not reputable or caused by defensive bites. Only a very few cases are truly the result of unprovoked attacks by abnormal individuals, which lost their fear towards humans.
Volcanic activity, earthquakes, loss of habitat, fire, loss of prey due to poaching, tourism, and illegal poaching of the dragons themselves have all contributed to the vulnerable status of the Komodo dragon. Under Appendix I of CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species), commercial trade of skins or specimens is illegal.
On Padar, a former population of the Komodo dragon became extinct, of which the last individuals were seen in 1975. It is widely assumed that the Komodo dragon died out on Padar after a strong decline of the populations of large ungulate prey, for which poaching was most likely responsible.
IN CAPTIVITY
Komodo dragons have long been great zoo attractions, where their size and reputation make them popular exhibits. They are, however, rare in zoos because they are susceptible to infection and parasitic disease if captured from the wild, and do not readily reproduce. As of May 2009, there were 13 European, 2 African, 35 North American, 1 Singaporean, and 2 Australian institutions that kept Komodo dragons.
The first Komodo dragons were displayed at London Zoo in 1927. A Komodo dragon was exhibited in 1934 at the National Zoo in Washington, D.C., but it lived for only two years. More attempts to exhibit Komodo dragons were made, but the lifespan of these animals was very short, averaging five years in the National Zoological Park. Studies done by Walter Auffenberg, which were documented in his book The Behavioral Ecology of the Komodo Monitor, eventually allowed for more successful managing and reproducing of the dragons in captivity.
A variety of behaviors have been observed from captive specimens. Most individuals are relatively tame within a short time, and are capable of recognizing individual humans and discriminating between familiar keepers. Komodo dragons have also been observed to engage in play with a variety of objects, including shovels, cans, plastic rings, and shoes. This behavior does not seem to be "food-motivated predatory behavior".
Even seemingly docile dragons may become unpredictably aggressive, especially when the animal's territory is invaded by someone unfamiliar. In June 2001, a Komodo dragon seriously injured Phil Bronstein, the then husband of actress Sharon Stone, when he entered its enclosure at the Los Angeles Zoo after being invited in by its keeper. Bronstein was bitten on his bare foot, as the keeper had told him to take off his white shoes and socks, which the keeper stated could potentially excite the Komodo dragon as they were the same color as the white rats the zoo fed the dragon. Although he escaped, Bronstein needed to have several tendons in his foot reattached surgically.
IN POPULARE CULTURE
Komodo dragons are used as a main theme in Komodo (1999), Curse of the Komodo (2004) and Komodo vs. Cobra (2005).
The comedy team of Bob and Ray performed a popular sketch entitled "The Komodo Dragon Expert."
The plot of the 1990 film, The Freshman, involves a university freshman, an aging mobster and a Komodo dragon.
In the 2012 James Bond film Skyfall, one of the Chinese henchmen in a casino that Bond visits in Macau is overtaken, dragged off and presumably killed by a Komodo dragon.
WIKIPEDIA
Kit consist of NEX-5N, Tamron 18-200 f/3.5-6.3, Sony 10-18 f/4, Sony 50 f/1.8, and Sigma 30 f/2.8 along with EVF, Ext Mic, Half-Case, 62mm filters, Joby wrist strap, and Crumpler $5 Mill bag
A good panoramic view of China’s recent development and its current rejection of the democracy model for its own governance, by former Singapore ambassador to the UN, Kishore Mahbubani:
Columbia Professor Jeffrey Sachs on the Covid vaccines, New World Order, global leadership and multilateralism:
Former U.S. Ambassador Max Baucus on Speaker Nancy Pelosi's Taiwan trip:
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The Foreign Affairs article below is typical American, full of obligatory and unsubstantiated propaganda spread by the West even though it's not all complimentary about the U.S. The fact is China has alleviated extreme poverty; millions of Chinese tourists have visited overseas with hundreds of thousands of students attended various universities in the West without a single individual seeking political asylum. If China were as repressive as the West describes, wouldn't these tourists and students seek political asylum while abroad? There have been no proven evidence of any mistreatment of Uyghurs inside China. If as many as 2 million Uyghurs were incarcerated, surely, the West can show us satellite photos of these humongous prison camps, right? The fact is an overwhelming majority of the people in China believe their country is heading the right direction.
worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/freedom-index-...
In this 2022 freedom Index, Hong Kong ranks #30, ahead of South Korea (31) France (34) and Singapore (48).
When President Jimmy Carter established diplomatic relationship with China in 1978, he agreed to the Shanghai Communiqué which reads, among others, "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China."
The author fails to disclose that Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen unwillingness to accept the 1992 Consensus is one of main reasons for Mainland China's treatment of her.
www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-trap-us-foreign-policy...
The China Trap
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Perilous Logic of Zero-Sum Competition
By Jessica Chen Weiss
Competition with China has begun to consume U.S. foreign policy. Seized with the challenge of a near-peer rival whose interests and values diverge sharply from those of the United States, U.S. politicians and policymakers are becoming so focused on countering China that they risk losing sight of the affirmative interests and values that should underpin U.S. strategy. The current course will not just bring indefinite deterioration of the U.S.-Chinese relationship and a growing danger of catastrophic conflict; it also threatens to undermine the sustainability of American leadership in the world and the vitality of American society and democracy at home.
There is, of course, good reason why a more powerful China has become the central concern of policymakers and strategists in Washington (and plenty of other capitals). Under President Xi Jinping especially, Beijing has grown more authoritarian at home and more coercive abroad. It has brutally repressed Uyghurs in Xinjiang, crushed democratic freedoms in Hong Kong, rapidly expanded its conventional and nuclear arsenals, aggressively intercepted foreign military aircraft in the East and South China Seas, condoned Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and amplified Russian disinformation, exported censorship and surveillance technology, denigrated democracies, worked to reshape international norms—the list could go on and will likely only get longer, especially if Xi secures a third five-year term and further solidifies his control later this year.
Yet well-warranted alarm risks morphing into a reflexive fear that could reshape American policy and society in counterproductive and ultimately harmful ways. In attempting to craft a national strategy suited to a more assertive and more powerful China, Washington has struggled to define success, or even a steady state, short of total victory or total defeat, that both governments could eventually accept and at a cost that citizens, businesses, and other stakeholders would be willing to bear. Without a clear sense of what it seeks or any semblance of a domestic consensus on how the United States should relate to the world, U.S. foreign policy has become reactive, spinning in circles rather than steering toward a desired destination.
To its credit, the Biden administration has acknowledged that the United States and its partners must provide an attractive alternative to what China is offering, and it has taken some steps in the right direction, such as multilateral initiatives on climate and hunger. Yet the instinct to counter every Chinese initiative, project, and provocation remains predominant, crowding out efforts to revitalize an inclusive international system that would protect U.S. interests and values even as global power shifts and evolves. Even with the war in Ukraine claiming considerable U.S. attention and resources, the conflict’s broader effect has been to intensify focus on geopolitical competition, reinforced by Chinese-Russian convergence.
Leaders in both Washington and Beijing claim to want to avoid a new Cold War. The fact is that their countries are already engaged in a global struggle. The United States seeks to perpetuate its preeminence and an international system that privileges its interests and values; China sees U.S. leadership as weakened by hypocrisy and neglect, providing an opening to force others to accept its influence and legitimacy. On both sides, there is growing fatalism that a crisis is unavoidable and perhaps even necessary: that mutually accepted rules of fair play and coexistence will come only after the kind of eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation that characterized the early years of the Cold War—survival of which was not guaranteed then and would be even less assured now.
Even in the absence of a crisis, a reactive posture has begun to drive a range of U.S. policies. Washington frequently falls into the trap of trying to counter Chinese efforts around the world without appreciating what local governments and populations want. Lacking a forward-looking vision aligned with a realistic assessment of the resources at its disposal, it struggles to prioritize across domains and regions. It too often compromises its own broader interests as fractious geopolitics make necessary progress on global challenges all but impossible. The long-term risk is that the United States will be unable to manage a decades-long competition without falling into habits of intolerance at home and overextension abroad. In attempting to out-China China, the United States could undermine the strengths and obscure the vision that should be the basis for sustained American leadership.
The lodestar for a better approach must be the world that the United States seeks: what it wants, rather than what it fears. Whether sanctions or tariffs or military moves, policies should be judged on the basis of whether they further progress toward that world rather than whether they undermine some Chinese interest or provide some advantage over Beijing. They should represent U.S. power at its best rather than mirroring the behavior it aims to avert. And rather than looking back nostalgically at its past preeminence, Washington must commit, with actions as well as words, to a positive-sum vision of a reformed international system that includes China and meets the existential need to tackle shared challenges.
That does not mean giving up well-calibrated efforts to deter Chinese aggression, enhance resilience against Chinese coercion, and reinforce U.S. alliances. But these must be paired with meaningful discussions with Beijing, not only about crisis communications and risk reduction but also about plausible terms of coexistence and the future of the international system—a future that Beijing will necessarily have some role in shaping. An inclusive and affirmative global vision would both discipline competition and make clear what Beijing has to lose. Otherwise, as the relationship deteriorates and the sense of threat grows, the logic of zero-sum competition will become even more overwhelming, and the resulting escalatory spiral will undermine both American interests and American values. That logic will warp global priorities and erode the international system. It will fuel pervasive insecurity and reinforce a tendency toward groupthink, damaging the pluralism and civic inclusion that are the bedrock of liberal democracy. And if not altered, it will perpetuate a vicious cycle that will eventually bring catastrophe.
THE INEVITABLE RIVALRY?
In Washington, the standard account for why the relationship has gotten so bad is that China changed: in the past decade or two, Beijing has stopped “biding its time,” becoming more repressive at home and assertive abroad even while continuing to take advantage of the relationships and institutions that have enabled China’s economic growth.
That change is certainly part of the story, and it is as much a product of China’s growing clout as of Xi’s way of using that clout. But a complete account must also acknowledge corresponding changes in U.S. politics and policy as the United States has reacted to developments in China. Washington has met Beijing’s actions with an array of punitive actions and protective policies, from tariffs and sanctions to restrictions on commercial and scientific exchanges. In the process, the United States has drifted further from the principles of openness and nondiscrimination that have long been a comparative advantage while reinforcing Beijing’s conviction that the United States will never tolerate a more powerful China. Meanwhile, the United States has wavered in its support for the international institutions and agreements that have long structured global interdependence, driven in part by consternation over China’s growing influence within the international system.
The more combative approach, on both sides, has produced a mirroring dynamic. While Beijing believes that only through protracted struggle will Americans be persuaded to coexist with a strong China, Washington believes that it must check Chinese power and influence to defend U.S. primacy. The result is a downward spiral, with each side’s efforts to enhance its security prompting the other to take further steps to enhance its own.
In explaining growing U.S.-Chinese tensions, some scholars point to structural shifts in the balance of power. Graham Allison has written of “the Thucydides trap”: the notion that when a rising state challenges an established power, a war for hegemony frequently results. Yet a focus on capabilities alone has trouble accounting for the twists and turns in U.S.-Chinese relations, which are also driven by shifting perceptions of threat, opportunity, and purpose. Following President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing, Washington came to view China as a strategic partner in containing the Soviet Union. And as the post–Cold War era dawned, U.S. policymakers began hedging against growing Chinese military power even while seeking to encourage the country’s economic and political liberalization through greater integration.
Throughout this period, Chinese leaders saw a strategic opportunity to prioritize China’s development in a stable international environment. They opened the country’s doors to foreign investment and capitalist practices, seeking to learn from foreign expertise while periodically campaigning against “spiritual pollution” and “bourgeois liberalization.” Despite occasional attempts to signal resolve, including during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis and after the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, Chinese leaders largely adhered to the former leader Deng Xiaoping’s lying-low strategy to avoid triggering the sense of threat that could precipitate efforts to strangle China’s rise.
If there is a year that marked an inflection point in China’s approach to the world, it is not 2012, when Xi came to power, but 2008. The global financial crisis prompted Beijing to discard any notion that China was the student and the United States the teacher when it came to economic governance. And the Beijing Olympics that year were meant to mark China’s arrival on the world stage, but much of the world was focused instead on riots in Tibet, which Chinese officials chalked up to outside meddling, and on China’s subsequent crackdown. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became increasingly fixated on the idea that foreign forces were intent on thwarting China’s rise.
In the years that followed, the halting movement toward liberalization went into reverse: the party cracked down on the teaching of liberal ideas and the activities of foreign nongovernmental organizations, crushed pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and built a sprawling surveillance state and system of internment camps in Xinjiang—all manifestations of a broader conception of “national security,” animated by fears of unrest. Internationally, China gave up any semblance of strategic humility. It became more assertive in defending its territorial and maritime claims (along the Indian border, in the East and South China Seas, and with regard to Taiwan). Having surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, it began wielding its economic power to compel deference to CCP interests. It ramped up development of military capabilities that could counter U.S. intervention in the region, including expanding its once limited nuclear arsenal. The decision to develop many of these capabilities predated Xi, but it was under his leadership that Beijing embraced a more coercive and intolerant approach.
As it registered China’s growing capabilities and willingness to use them, Washington increased its hedging. The Obama administration announced that it would “pivot” to Asia, and even as Washington sought a constructive role for China in the international system, the pace of China’s rise quickly outstripped U.S. willingness to grant it a correspondingly significant voice. With Donald Trump’s election as president, Washington’s assessment became especially extreme: a Marxist-Leninist regime was, in Trump’s telling, out to “rape” the United States, dominate the world, and subvert democracy. In response, the Trump administration started a trade war, began to talk of “decoupling” the U.S. and Chinese economies, and launched a series of initiatives aimed at countering Chinese influence and undermining the CCP. In speeches, senior U.S. officials hinted at regime change, calling for steps to “empower the Chinese people” to seek a different form of government and stressing that “Chinese history contains another path for China’s people.”
The Biden administration has stopped any talk of regime change in China and coordinated its approach closely with allies and partners, a contrast with Trump’s unilateralism. But it has at the same time continued many of its predecessor’s policies and endorsed the assessment that China’s growing influence must be checked. Some lines of effort, such as the Justice Department’s China Initiative, which sought to prosecute intellectual property theft and economic espionage, have been modified. But others have been sustained, including tariffs, export controls, and visa restrictions, or expanded, such as sanctions against Chinese officials and companies. In Congress, meanwhile, ever more vehement opposition to China may be the sole thing that Democrats and Republicans can agree on, though even this shared concern has produced only limited agreement (such as recent legislation on domestic semiconductor investments) on how the United States should compete.
Over five decades, the United States tried a combination of engagement and deterrence to bring China into an international system that broadly sustains U.S. interests and values. American policymakers knew well that their Chinese counterparts were committed to defending CCP rule, but Washington calculated that the world would be less dangerous with China inside rather than outside the system. That bet largely succeeded—and is still better than the alternative. Yet many in Washington always hoped for, and to varying degrees sought to promote, China’s liberal evolution as well. China’s growing authoritarianism has thus fed the narrative of a comprehensive U.S. policy failure, and the focus on correcting that failure has entrenched Beijing’s insecurity and belief that the United States and its allies will not accept China as a superpower.
Now, both countries are intent on doing whatever is necessary to demonstrate that any move by the other will not go unmet. Both U.S. and Chinese decision-makers believe that the other side respects only strength and interprets restraint as weakness. At this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, China’s defense minister, General Wei Fenghe, pledged to “fight to the very end” over Taiwan a day after meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.
TELL ME HOW THIS ENDS
Where the current trajectory leads is clear: a more dangerous and less habitable world defined by an ever-present risk of confrontation and crisis, with preparation for conflict taking precedence over tackling common challenges.
Most policymakers, at least those in Washington, are not seeking a crisis between the United States and China. But there is growing acceptance that a crisis is more or less inevitable. Its consequences would be enormous. Even if both sides want to avoid war, crises by definition offer little time for response amid intense public scrutiny, making it difficult to find pathways to deescalation. Even the limited application of force or coercion could set in motion an unpredictable set of responses across multiple domains—military, economic, diplomatic, informational. As leaders maneuver to show resolve and protect their domestic reputations, a crisis could prove very difficult to contain.
Taiwan is the most likely flash point, as changes in both Taipei and Beijing have increasingly put the island at the center of U.S.-Chinese tensions. Demographic and generational shifts in Taiwan, combined with China’s crackdown in Hong Kong, have heightened Taiwan’s resistance to the idea of Beijing’s control and made peaceful unification seem increasingly fanciful. After Taiwan’s traditionally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency in 2016, Beijing took a hard line against the new president, Tsai Ing-wen, despite her careful efforts to avoid moves toward formal independence. Cross strait channels of communication shut down, and Beijing relied on increasingly coercive measures to punish and deter what it perceived as incremental moves toward Taiwan’s permanent separation.
In response, the United States increased military patrols in and around the Taiwan Strait, loosened guidelines for interacting with Taiwanese officials, broadened U.S. declaratory policy to emphasize support for Taiwan, and continued to advocate for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including the United Nations. Yet many well-intentioned U.S. efforts to support the island and deter China have instead fueled Beijing’s sense of urgency about the need to send a shot across the bow to deter steadily growing U.S.-Taiwanese ties.
Even with an official U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” on whether the United States would intervene in the event of an attack on Taiwan, Chinese military planners expect U.S. involvement. Indeed, the anticipated difficulty of seizing Taiwan while also holding the United States at bay has long underpinned deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. But many U.S. actions intended to bolster the island’s ability to resist coercion have been symbolic rather than substantive, doing more to provoke than deter Beijing. For example, the Trump administration’s efforts to upend norms around U.S. engagement with Taiwan—in August 2020, Secretary for Health and Human Services Alex Azar became the highest-ranking cabinet member to visit Taiwan since full normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations in 1979—prompted China to send combat aircraft across the center line of the Taiwan Strait, ignoring an unofficial guardrail that had long served to facilitate safe operations in the waterway. Intrusions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) have become a frequent means for Beijing to register displeasure with growing U.S. support. In October 2021, Chinese intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ hit a new high—93 aircraft over three days—in response to nearby U.S.-led military exercises.
This action-reaction cycle, driven by mutually reinforcing developments in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, is accelerating the deterioration of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. In recent months, Chinese official rhetoric has become increasingly threatening, using phrases that have historically signaled China’s intent to escalate. “Whoever plays with fire will get burnt,” Xi has repeatedly told U.S. President Joe Biden. In May, after Biden implied an unconditional commitment to defend Taiwan, rather than simply expressing the longstanding U.S. obligation to provide the island with the military means to defend itself and to maintain the U.S. capacity to resist any use of force, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stressed that Beijing “will take firm actions to safeguard its sovereignty and security interests.”
Although Beijing continues to prefer peaceful unification, it is coming to believe that coercive measures may be necessary to halt moves toward Taiwan’s permanent separation and compel steps toward unification, particularly given the Chinese perception that Washington’s support for Taiwan is a means to contain China. Even if confidence in China’s military and economic trajectory leads Beijing to believe that “time and momentum” remain on its side, political trends in Taiwan and in the United States make officials increasingly pessimistic about prospects for peaceful unification. Beijing has not set a timetable for seizing Taiwan and does not appear to be looking for an excuse to do so. Still, as the political scientist Taylor Fravel has shown, China has used force when it thinks its claims of sovereignty are being challenged. High-profile symbolic gestures of U.S. support for Taiwan are especially likely to be construed as an affront that must be answered. (As of this writing, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the first trip by a U.S. speaker of the house since 1997, has prompted Chinese warnings that “the Chinese military will never sit idly by,” followed by unprecedently threatening military exercises and missile tests around Taiwan.)
As both the United States and Taiwan head into presidential elections in 2024, party politics could prompt more efforts to push the envelope on Taiwan’s political status and de jure independence. It is far from clear whether Tsai’s successor as president will be as steadfast as she has been in resisting pressure from strident advocates of independence. Even under Tsai, there have been troubling signs that DPP leaders are not content with the status quo despite its popularity with voters. DPP leaders have lobbied Washington to refrain from making statements that the United States does not support Taiwan independence. In March, Taipei’s representative office in Washington gave former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo a hefty honorarium to visit Taiwan, where he called on the United States to offer the island “diplomatic recognition as a free and sovereign country.”
The risk of a fatal collision in the air or at sea is also rising outside the Taiwan Strait. With the Chinese and U.S. militaries operating in proximity in the East and South China Seas, both intent on demonstrating their willingness to fight, pilots and operators are employing dangerous tactics that raise the risk of an inadvertent clash. In 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided with a U.S. reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea, killing the Chinese pilot and leading to the 11-day detention of the U.S. crew. After initial grandstanding, the Chinese worked to head off a full-blown crisis, even cracking down on displays of anti-Americanism in the streets. It is much harder to imagine such a resolution today: the desire to display resolve and avoid showing weakness would make it exceedingly difficult to defuse a standoff.
THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD
Even if the two sides can avoid a crisis, continuation of the current course will reinforce geopolitical divisions while inhibiting cooperation on global problems. The United States is increasingly focused on rallying countries around the world to stand against China. But to the extent that a coalition to counter China forms, especially given the ideological framing that both the Trump and Biden administrations have adopted, that coalition is unlikely to include the range of partners that might stand to defend universal laws and institutions. “Asian countries do not want to be forced to choose between the two,” Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong wrote of China and the United States in these pages in 2020. “And if either attempts to force such a choice—if Washington tries to contain China’s rise or Beijing seeks to build an exclusive sphere of influence in Asia—they will begin a course of confrontation that will last decades and put the long-heralded Asian century in jeopardy.”
The current approach to competition is also likely to strengthen the alignment between China and Russia. The Biden administration has managed to deter Chinese military assistance to Russia in Ukraine, and China has mostly complied with sanctions, demonstrating that there are in fact limits to Beijing and Moscow’s “no limits” partnership. But so long as the two governments share a belief that they cannot be secure in a U.S.-led system, they will continue to deepen their cooperation. In the months since the invasion of Ukraine, they have carried out joint military patrols in the Pacific Ocean and worked to develop alternatives to the U.S.-controlled financial system.
Ultimately, Chinese-Russian relations will be shaped by how Beijing weighs its need to resist the United States against its need to preserve ties to international capital and technology that foster growth. China’s alignment with Russia is not historically determined: there is an ongoing high-level debate within Beijing over how close to get to Moscow, with the costs of full-fledged alignment producing consternation among some Chinese analysts. Yet unless Washington can credibly suggest that Beijing will see strategic benefits, not only strategic risks, from distancing itself from Moscow, advocates of closer Chinese-Russian cooperation will continue to win the argument.
Growing geopolitical tension also crowds out progress on common challenges, regardless of the Biden administration’s desire to compartmentalize certain issues. Although U.S. climate envoy John Kerry has made some headway on climate cooperation with China, including a joint declaration at last year’s climate summit in Glasgow, progress has been outweighed by acrimony in areas where previous joint efforts had borne fruit, including counternarcotics, nonproliferation, and North Korea. On both sides, too many policymakers fear that willingness to cooperate will be interpreted as a lack of resolve.
Such tensions are further eroding the already weak foundations of global governance. It is not clear how much longer the center of the international rules-based order can hold without a broad-based effort at its renewal. But as Beijing has grown more concerned that the United States seeks to contain or roll back its influence—by, for example, denying it a greater say in international economic governance—the more it has invested in alternative institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Meanwhile, China’s engagement with the multilateral system is increasingly aimed at discrediting U.S. leadership within it. Even though Beijing has not exactly demonstrated fealty to many of the principles it claims to support, the divide between the haves and have-nots has allowed it to cast the United States as protecting the privileges of a minority of powerful states. At the United Nations, Beijing and Washington too often strive to undercut each other’s initiatives, launching symbolic battles that require third countries to choose between the two.
Last but far from least, a fixation on competition brings costs and dangers in the United States. Aggressive U.S. efforts to protect research security, combined with increased attacks against Asian Americans, are having a chilling effect on scientific research and international collaboration and are jeopardizing the appeal of the United States as a magnet for international talent. A 2021 survey by the American Physical Society found that 43 percent of international physics graduate students and early career scientists in the United States considered the country unwelcoming; around half of international early career scientists in the United States thought the government’s approach to research security made them less likely to stay there over the long term. These effects are particularly pronounced among scientists of Chinese descent. A recent study by the Asian American Scholar Forum found that 67 percent of faculty of Chinese origin (including naturalized citizens and permanent residents) reported having considered leaving the United States.
As the United States has sought to shield itself from Chinese espionage, theft, and unfair trading practices, it has often insisted on reciprocity as a precondition for commercial, educational, and diplomatic exchanges with Beijing. But strict reciprocity with an increasingly closed system like China’s comes at a cost to the United States’ comparative advantage: the traditional openness, transparency, and equal opportunity of its society and economy, which drive innovation, productivity, and scientific progress.
The climate of insecurity and fear is also having pernicious effects on democracy and the quality of public debate about China and U.S. policy. The desire to avoid appearing “soft” on China permeates private and public policy discussions. The result is an echo chamber that encourages analysts, bureaucrats, and officials to be politically rather than analytically correct. When individuals feel the need to out-hawk one another to protect themselves and advance professionally, the result is groupthink. A policy environment that incentivizes self-censorship and reflexive positioning forecloses pluralistic debate and a vibrant marketplace for ideas, ingredients critical to the United States’ national competitiveness.
From the World War II internment of Japanese Americans to the McCarthyism of the 1950s to hate crimes against Muslim and Sikh Americans after September 11, U.S. history is replete with examples of innocent Americans caught in the crossfire of exaggerated fears of the “enemy within.” In each case, overreaction did as much as or more than the adversary to undermine U.S. democracy and unity. Although the Biden administration has condemned anti-Asian hate and stressed that policy must target behavior rather than ethnicity, some government agencies and U.S. politicians have continued to imply that an individual’s ethnicity and ties to family abroad are grounds for heightened scrutiny.
BEFORE CATASTROPHE
If the United States and Soviet Union could arrive at détente, there is no reason that Washington and Beijing cannot do so as well. Early in the Cold War, President John F. Kennedy, hailing the need to “make the world safe for diversity,” stressed that “our attitude is as essential as theirs.” He warned Americans “not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.”
Even while making clear that Beijing will pay a high price if it resorts to force or other forms of coercion, Washington must present China with a real choice. Deterrence requires that threats be paired with assurances. To that end, U.S. policymakers should not be afraid of engaging directly with their Chinese counterparts to discuss terms on which the United States and China could coexist, including mutual bounds on competition. It was relatively easy for Americans to imagine coexistence with a China thought to be on a one-way path of liberalization. The United States and its partners now have the harder task of imagining coexistence with an authoritarian superpower, finding a new basis for bilateral interaction that focuses on shaping outward behavior rather than changing China’s domestic system.
The most pressing need relates to Taiwan, where the United States must bolster deterrence while also clarifying that its “one China” policy has not changed. This means ensuring that Beijing knows how costly a crisis over Taiwan would be, putting at risk its broader development and modernization objectives—but also that if it refrains from coercive action, neither Washington nor Taipei will exploit the opportunity to push the envelope further. While Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other senior officials have affirmed that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence, other actions by the administration (especially Biden’s repeated statements suggesting an end to “strategic ambiguity”) have sown doubt.
While helping bolster Taiwan’s resilience to Chinese coercion, Washington should avoid characterizing Taiwan as a vital asset for U.S. interests. Such statements feed Beijing’s belief that the United States seeks to “use Taiwan to contain China,” as China’s ambassador to Washington put it in May. The United States should instead make clear its abiding interest in a peaceful process for resolving cross-strait differences rather than in a particular outcome. And as they highlight the costs Beijing can expect if it escalates its coercive campaign against Taiwan, U.S. policymakers should also stress to Taipei that unilateral efforts to change Taiwan’s political status, including calls for de jure independence, U.S. diplomatic recognition, or other symbolic steps to signal Taiwan’s permanent separation from China, are counterproductive.
These steps will be necessary but not sufficient to pierce the growing fatalism regarding a crisis, given Beijing’s hardening belief that the United States seeks to contain China and will use Taiwan to that end. To put a floor beneath the collapsing U.S.-China relationship will require a stronger effort to establish bounds of fair competition and a willingness to discuss terms of coexistence. Despite recent meetings and calls, senior U.S. officials do not yet have regular engagements with their counterparts that would facilitate such discussions. These discussions should be coordinated with U.S. allies and partners to prevent Beijing from trying to drive a wedge between the United States and others in Europe and Asia. But Washington should also forge a common understanding with its allies and partners around potential forms of coexistence with China.
Skeptics may say that there is no reason for the leadership in Beijing to play along, given its triumphalism and distrust. These are significant obstacles, but it is worth testing the proposition that Washington can take steps to stabilize escalating tensions without first experiencing multiple crises with a nuclear-armed competitor. There is reason to believe that Beijing cares enough about stabilizing relations to reciprocate. Despite its claim that the “East is rising and the West is declining,” China remains the weaker party, especially given its uncertain economic trajectory. Domestic challenges have typically tended to restrain China’s behavior rather than, as some Western commentators have speculated, prompting risky gambles. The political scientist Andrew Chubb has shown that when Chinese leaders have faced challenges to their legitimacy, they have acted less assertively in areas such as the South China Sea.
Because Beijing and Washington are loath to make unilateral concessions, fearing that they will be interpreted as a sign of weakness at home and by the other side, détente will require reciprocity. Both sides will have to take coordinated but unilateral steps to head off a militarized crisis. For example, a tacit understanding could produce a reduction in Chinese and U.S. operations in and around the Taiwan Strait, lowering the temperature without signaling weakness. Military operations are necessary to demonstrate that the United States will continue to fly and sail wherever international law allows, including the Taiwan Strait. But ultimately, the United States’ ability to deter and Taiwan’s ability to defend against an attempt at armed unification by Beijing have little to do with whether the U.S. military transits the Taiwan Strait four, eight, 12, or 24 times a year.
In the current atmosphere of distrust, words must be matched by actions. In his November 2021 virtual meeting with Biden, Xi said, “We have patience and will strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with utmost sincerity and efforts.” But Beijing’s actions since have undercut its credibility in Taipei and in Washington. Biden likewise told Xi that the United States does not seek a new Cold War or want to change Beijing’s system. Yet subsequent U.S. actions (including efforts to diversify supply chains away from China and new visa restrictions on CCP officials) have undermined Washington’s credibility among not just leaders in Beijing but also others in the region. It does not help that some administration officials continue to invoke Cold War parallels.
To bolster its own credibility, the Biden administration should also do more to preempt charges of hypocrisy and double standards. Consider U.S. policy to combat digital authoritarianism: Washington has targeted Chinese surveillance technology firms more harshly than similar companies based in the United States, Israel, and other Western democracies.
THE WORLD THAT OUGHT TO BE
So far, the Biden administration’s order-building efforts have centered on arrangements that exclude China, such as the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Although officials have been careful to insist that these initiatives are not targeted at any one country, there is little sign of any corresponding effort to negotiate Beijing’s role in the international or regional order. At the margins, there have been some signs that inclusive groupings can still deliver. (The World Trade Organization has struck agreements on fishing subsidies and COVID-19 vaccines.) But if investments in narrower, fit-for-purpose coalitions continue to take priority over broader, inclusive agreements and institutions, including those in which China and the United States both have major roles to play, geopolitical tensions will break rather than reinvigorate the international system.
Renewing U.S. leadership will also require doing more to address criticism that a U.S.-led order means “rules for thee but not for me.” Clear and humble acknowledgment of instances where the United States has violated the UN Charter, such as the invasion of Iraq, would be an important step to overcoming that resentment. And Washington must deliver value for citizens in developing countries, whether on COVID-19, climate, hunger, or technology, rather than simply urging them not to work with China. At home, Washington must work to rebuild bipartisan support for U.S. engagement with the international system.
As the United States reimagines its domestic and international purpose, it should do so on its own terms, not for the sake of besting China. Yet fleshing out an inclusive, affirmative vision of the world it seeks would also be a first step toward clarifying the conditions under which the United States would welcome or accept Chinese initiatives rather than reflexively opposing them. The countries’ divergent interests and values would still result in the United States opposing many of Beijing’s activities, but that opposition would be accompanied by a clear willingness to negotiate the terms of China’s growing influence. The United States cannot cede so much influence to Beijing that international rules and institutions no longer reflect U.S. interests and values. But the greater risk today is that overzealous efforts to counter China’s influence will undermine the system itself through a combination of paralysis and the promotion of alternate arrangements by major powers.
Finally, the United States must do much more to invest in the power of its example and to ensure that steps taken to counter China do not undermine that example by falling into the trap of trying to out-China China. Protective or punitive actions, whether military, economic, or diplomatic, should be assessed not just on the basis of whether they counter China but also on how they affect the broader system and whether they reflect fidelity to U.S. principles.
Competition cannot become an end in itself. So long as outcompeting China defines the United States’ sense of purpose, Washington will continue to measure success on terms other than on its own. Rankings are a symbolic construct, not an objective condition. If the pursuit of human progress, peace, and prosperity is the ultimate objective, as Blinken has stated, then the United States does not need to beat China in order to win.
JESSICA CHEN WEISS is the Michael J. Zak Professor of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Cornell University. She served as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State from August 2021 to July 2022. The views expressed here are her own.
Current study piece, loosely based on a picture found on the Internet. I doubled the pattern height by mirror reversing it against itself and chose not to center it in width. In daylight it's reaaaaaally bright coloured (I'm using low cost Katia 'Capri' crochet cotton on low cost Aïda 5.4 count). And just in case you asked, 'SWDE' acronym stands for 'Société Wallone Des Eaux', the Walloon equivalent to the US 'PG&E' - only difference being : in the US hexavalent chrome was the problem and in my birthplace it was lead pipes...
+++ DISCLAIMER +++
Nothing you see here is real, even though the conversion or the presented background story might be based historical facts. BEWARE!
Some background:
NAe São Paulo is a Clemenceau-class aircraft carrier currently in service with the Brazilian Navy. São Paulo was first commissioned in 1963 by the French Navy as Foch and was transferred in 2000 to Brazil, where she became the new flagship of the Brazilian Navy. In December 2014 it was announced that São Paulo will be expected to continue active service until 2039, at which time the vessel will be nearly 80 years old.
From this carrier, the Marinha do Brasil operates its only fixed-wing aircraft, and these were initially A-4 Skyhawks. In 1997 Brazil negotiated a $70 million contract for purchase of 20 A-4KU and three TA-4KU Skyhawks from Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Skyhawks, modified A-4Ms and TA-4Js delivered in 1977, were among the last of those models built by Douglas. The Kuwaiti Skyhawks were selected by Brazil because of low flight time, excellent physical condition, and a favorable price tag. The Brazilian Navy Re-designated AF-1 and AF-1A Falcões (Hawks), the ex-Kuwaiti Skyhawks arrived in Arraial do Cabo on 5 September 1998.
Anyway, the Skyhawks' life span was limited and in 2005 the Brazilian Navy started looking for a potential replacement, while the AF-1s were to kept operational due to limited military budgets. On 14 April 2009, Brazlian aircraft manufacturer EMBRAER signed a contract to modernize 12 Skyhawks, nine AF-1s (single-seat) and three AF-1As (two-seat). This upgrade will restore the operating capacity of the Navy 1st Intercept and Attack Plane Squadron (VF-1). The program includes restoring the aircraft and their current systems, as well as implementing new avionics, radar, power production, and autonomous oxygen generating systems. The first of the 12 modified Skyhawks was delivered on 27 May 2015. EMBRAER stated that the modifications would allow the aircraft to remain operational until 2025, by which time a successor was to be fully operational.
Several replacement candidates were evaluated under Brazil's F-X2 fighter program together with the Air Force which was looking to replace its Northrop F‐5EM and Dassault Mirage 2000C aircraft. In October 2008, Brazil selected three finalists: the Dassault Rafale, the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet, and the SAAB JAS 39 Gripen. The Brazilian Air Force initially planned to procure at least 36 and possibly up to 120 aircraft later, while the Brazilian Navy was looking for 24 aircraft (20 single seater and 4 two-seaters with dual controls) until 2025.
In February 2009, SAAB submitted a tender, and on 5 January 2010, reports claimed that the final evaluation report placed the Gripen ahead of other contenders; the decisive factor was reportedly lower unit and operational costs, the most compact size and the Swedish manufacturer's willingness to accept EMBRAER as a technological partner for the aircraft's further development, especially for the navalized version.
Amid delays due to financial constraints, President Dilma Rousseff announced in December 2011 the Gripen NG's selection and the start of a joint Swedish-Brazilian joint venture called SABRA. Argentina and Ecuador were interested in procuring Gripens from or through Brazil, and Mexico and Argenitina were potential export targets for SABRA's navalized Gripen derivative that was tailored to the Marinha do Brasil's needs.
The respective SABRA aircraft was appropriately christened "Grifo" and the development of thei 4th generation fighter started immediately after closing the cooperation deal in 2011. While based on the SAAB 39, the Grifo became a very different aircraft, due to several factors. The major influence was the carrier operation capability, which called for major structural modifications and enforcements as well as special equipment like foldable wings, a strengthened landing gear, an arrester hook and a new engine that would better cope with the naval environment than the Swedish RM 12 engine, a derivative of the General Electric F404-400.
Additionally, the mission focus of air superiority with additional attack capabilities was reversed, and the need for excellent low speed handling for carrier approaches was requested.
This led to a complelety different aircraft layout, with the SAAB 39's instable canard design being changed into a conservative aircraft with conventional tailplanes. The nose section was shortened in order to provide the pilot with a better field of view, while the more powerful F414-EPE afterburning turbofan was moved slightly forward due to CG reasons, resulting in a slightly shortened rear fuselage.
A mock-up of the new aircraft for the Brazlian Navy was presented and approved in early 2012, and the government placed an official order for two prototypes. Even though the Grifo appeared like a completely different aircraft, it shared a lot of elements with the SAAB 39, so that development time and costs could be reduced to a minimum - and the first prototype, internally designated EMB 391-001, made its maiden flight in early 2013. The second aircraft followed 3 months later.
The Grifo's equipment includes an AN/APG-79 active electronically scanned array (AESA), capable of executing simultaneous air-to-air and air-to-ground attacks, and providing higher quality high-resolution ground mapping at long standoff ranges. The AESA radar can also detect smaller targets, such as inbound missiles, and can track air targets beyond the range of the aircraft's air-to-air missiles, which include the AIM-9 Sidewinder for close range and the AIM-120 AMRAAM for medium range.
The Grifo features, like the Gripen fighter, an advanced and integrated electronic warfare suite, capable of operating in an undetectable passive mode or to actively jam hostile radar; a missile approach warning system passively detects and tracks incoming missiles.
The Grifo can be tailored to specific missions through external sensor pods, e .g. for reconnaissance and target designation. These include Rafael's LITENING targeting pod, Saab's Modular Reconnaissance Pod System or Thales' Digital Joint Reconnaissance Pod. On the Brazilian Navy's request the Grifo is also designed that it can be equipped with an aerial refueling system (ARS) or "buddy store" for the refueling of other aircraft, filling the tactical airborne tanker role.
The two prototypes completed a thorough test program until summer 2015 and subsequently went on a sales tour in South America and Asia. In the meantime, serial production started at EMBRAER's Gavião Peixoto in November 2015. The first serial machines, now officially designated AF-2A, arrived at the Brazilian Navy's São Pedro da Aldeia air base where a new Intercept and Attack Plane Squadron, VF-2 'Arquieros' (Archers) was founded. The squadron became operational in April 2016 and Grifos embarked on NAe São Paulo for the first time in September 2016, serving alongside the venerable AF-1.
General characteristics:
Crew: 1
Payload: 5,300 kg (11,700 lb)
Length: 13,54 m (44 ft 4 in)
Wingspan (incl. wing tip launch rails): 8.32 m (27 ft 2 in)
Height: 4.25 m (13 ft 11 in)
Wing area: 30.0 m² (323 ft²)
Empty weight: 6,800 kg[330] (14,990 lb)
Loaded weight: 8,500 kg (18,700 lb)
Max. takeoff weight: 14,000 kg (31,000 lb)
Wheel track: 2.4 m (7 ft 10 in)
Powerplant:
1 × General Electric F414-EPE afterburning turbofan with
a dry thrust of 54 kN (12,100 lbf) and 85 kN (19,100 lbf) with afterburner
Performance:
Maximum speed: Mach 2 (2,204 km/h (1,190 kn; 1,370 mph) at high altitude
Combat radius: 800 km (497 mi, 432 nmi)
Ferry range: 3,200 km (1,983 mi) with drop tanks
Service ceiling: 15,240 m (50,000 ft)
Wing loading: 283 kg/m² (58 lb/ft²)
Thrust/weight: 0.97
Maximum g-load: +9 g
Armament:
1× 27 mm Mauser BK-27 Revolver cannon with 120 rounds
Eight hardpoints (three on each wing and two under fuselage)
for a wide range of guide and unguided ordnance of up to 14,330 lb (6.5 t)
The kit and its assembly:
The fictional Grifo is the result of a generic idea of converting a canard layout aircraft like the Saab Viggen into a conventional design. The Viggen was actually a serious candidate, but then I found an Italeri Gripen in the stash without a real purpose (it had been cheap, though), and with Brazil's real world procurement as background, the more conservative Grifo was born.
I wanted to use as many OOB Gripen parts as possible, and there are actually only a few external donations involved – with the outlook of converting further Gripens this way. You never know… ;)
Work started with the wings, which were cut off of the fuselage shell. Having the landing gear retract into the fuselage (much like the X-29) is a convenient detail of the Gripen, making the wing transplantation easier than on a Viggen where the wells have to be moved, too.
The original canard attachment points were faired over/hidden. The pointed Gripen nose with its pitot was cut off and replaced by a shorter, more stocky nose tip - from an F-4 Phantom II IIRC. Once the fuselage was completed, the wings were mounted, closer to the air intakes. This went smoothly, only some gaps on the undersides had to be filled.
Once the wings were in place I had to make a decision concerning the stabilizers. Despite the plan to use as many OOB parts as possible I found the OOB canards to be too sharply swept and considered several donation options.
I eventually settled for the most unique option: the stabilizers are actually main wings from a (rather malformed) Italeri/Dragon 1:200 F-117 that comes as a set with the B-2 bomber. A part of the F-117’s fuselage flank was cut off and taken over to the Grifo, too, so that these create ‘muscular’ bulges.
The stabilizers were mounted on scratched consoles/trailing wing root extensions that were somewhat inspired by the F-16’s tail design – putting the stabilizers directly onto the fuselage would have looked awkward, and with this solution I was able to extend the Gripen’s BWB-design all along the fuselage. As a side effect these consoles also offered a plausible place for rearward chaff dispensers.
The rear fuselage was shortened by 3mm, too – through the shorter nose and the wings further forward, the rest of the aircraft looked rather tail-heavy. While 3mm does not sound much, it helped with overall proportions.
The cannon fairing and the OOB pylons were taken over, as well as the cockpit interior. For carrier operations, several details were added, though: folding wing mechanism seams were engraved on the wings and an arrester hook with a fairing added under the tail section, flanked by new stabilizer fins.
The landing gear was basically taken OOB, too, but lengthened with styrene inserts for a higher stance: the main struts are now 2mm longer, while the front strut is 3mm taller. The latter was reversed, so that a catapult hook could be added to the front side, and slightly bigger wheels were mounted, too, so that the Grifo now has a rather stalky stance with a nose-up attitude. Simple, but effective!
The Sidewinders were taken OOB while the pair of AGM-84 Harpoon comes from Italeri’s 1:72 NATO weapons set.
Painting and markings:
I used the contemporary AF-1 paint scheme in three shades of grey as benchmark. These are FS 36187 (RAF Ocean Grey), FS 36307 (Flint Grey) and FS 36515 (Canadian Voodoo Grey) - sourced from a painting guide from Brazilian decal manufacturer FCM and backed by other knowledgeable sources from the region, too. And while the Ocean Grey appears a bit dark, I think that overall the colors are authentic. All paints are Modelmaster enamels.
After basic painting a light black ink wash was applied and panels highlighted through dry-brushing with lighter tones.
The cockpit interior was painted in Neutral Grey (FS 36173), while the landing gear became all-white.
The Brazilian Navy markings had to be improvised - there are 1:72 AF-1 decals available, but either not obtainable or prohibitively expensive - or both. Therefore I rather improvised, with basic Brazilian Navy markings from a vintage FCM Decal sheet for various Brazilian aircraft.
The respective roundels and codes actually belong to helicopters, and I had to wing it somehow. Unfortunately, the old FCM decals turned out to be ...old. Brittle and very delicate, application was already messy and they did not adhere well to the model. To make matters worse the acrylic varnish turned cloudy, so that a lot of paintwork repair had to be done - not helping much with a satisfactory kit finish. :(
Another interesting conversion – I am amazed how purposeful the Grifo looks. It reminds me with its high stance of a modern A-4 Skyhawk (what it somehow is), and there’s also some Super Étendard in it, esp. in the profile? At some point before painting it also had a somewhat Chinese look - maybe because the top view and the wing planform reminds of the classic MiG-21…? The wings might have been placed 3-4mm further backwards, since it is always difficult to judge proportions while work is still, but the Grifo looks convincingly like a real aircraft (model).
Aeronaves bonita! :D
Part of a new display going up in our junior high library. I need to get a display up quickly and found inspiration on Flicker! Thanks so much, Flickries … Flickrers ... uh, Flickrites. Whatever Flickr users are called, thanks.
May 29, 2023 - "The skyline of downtown Columbus has been transformed with this monumental artwork by internationally recognized sculptor Janet Echelman. "Current" is a stunning, ephemeral, sky-high sculpture that will inspire wonder and imagination in all who see it. As it dances gracefully in the wind, this awe-inspiring work of art will become an emblem of Columbus’ culture and innovation.
The design and installation of "Current" was funded by Jeff Edwards. He has graciously donated the work to the Museum. We will oversee the care and maintenance of the sculpture as part of our permanent collection." Previous description of "Current" from a Facebook post by the Columbus Museum of Art.
Article about "Current" including its mean can be found here: dispatch-oh.newsmemory.com/?publink=04d385aae_134abf4
The leading edge of a denser turbidity current as it intrudes into less dense clean water. The edge develops a pattern of lobes and clefts due to an instability.
See
www.physics.utoronto.ca/~nonlin/turbidity/turbidity.html
Photo by Jerome Neufeld
The Luxury of being yourself
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We tend to celebrate light in our pictures. Understanding how light interacts with the camera is paramount to the work we do. The temperature, intensity and source of light can wield different photography effect on the same subject or scene; add ISO, aperture and speed, the camera, the lens type, focal length and filters…the combination is varied ad multi-layered and if you know how to use them all, you will come to appreciate that all lights are useful, even those surrounded by a lot of darkness.
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This Current Batch Was taken Within 10 Rushed Seconds (Not Accounting For Window Glare That Could have been avoided in a less hurried status)... I had walked into the VIP Lounge Of Delta Airlines As I had noticed such a Gorgeous Window Opportunity... I was subsequently chased out of the Delta VIP Lounge by the "Host" Gatekeeper Who Didn't Understand that I did not seek the VIP Free Food Buffet... I Give All Credit For The Imperfections To The Skilled Delta VIP Lounge Gatekeeper...
My Non-VIP Flights On Delta were two of the best air travels that I ever had (pre-pandemic), but I will always remember That "Host" With The Most... Before the flights with Delta I had asked for permissions to photograph during the trip, and I received a nice form letter (probably dispatched while they were laughing their heads off)
my current desktop, wall paper (downloaded from the DC comics website) and various shite on there. As you can see, I do line my icons up in an anally retentive fashion. Res is 1440x 900. Equally strange.
Aerial view showing a footbridge, looks to be the bridge over the Current River near Trowbridge Falls.
One of a set of slides taken for the Thunder Bay Park System Master Plan project, developed in 1972, prepared by Brauer & Associates.
Accession 2012-11 #021
For more information about Thunder Bay's history, visit www.thunderbay.ca/archives