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The Grand Canal (Italian: Canal Grande, Venetian: CanaÅasso) is a canal in Venice, Italy. It forms one of the major water-traffic corridors in the city. Public transport is provided by water buses (Italian: vaporetti) and private water taxis, and many tourists explore the canal by gondola.
At one end, the canal leads into the lagoon near the Santa Lucia railway station and the other end leads into Saint Mark Basin; in between, it makes a large reverse-S shape through the central districts (sestieri) of Venice. It is 3,800 m long, 30â90 m wide, with an average depth of five meters (16.5 ft).
Description
The Grand Canal in Venice, Italy, shot at night from Rialto Bridge
The banks of the Grand Canal are lined with more than 170 buildings, most of which date from the 13th to the 18th century, and demonstrate the welfare and art created by the Republic of Venice. The noble Venetian families faced huge expenses to show off their richness in suitable palazzos; this contest reveals the citizensâ pride and the deep bond with the lagoon. Amongst the many are the Palazzi Barbaro, Ca' Rezzonico, Ca' d'Oro, Palazzo Dario, Ca' Foscari, Palazzo Barbarigo and to Palazzo Venier dei Leoni, housing the Peggy Guggenheim Collection. The churches along the canal include the basilica of Santa Maria della Salute. Centuries-old traditions, such as the Historical Regatta, are perpetuated every year along the Canal.
Because most of the city's traffic goes along the Canal rather than across it, only one bridge crossed the canal until the 19th century, the Rialto Bridge. There are currently three more bridges, the Ponte degli Scalzi, the Ponte dell'Accademia, and the recent, controversial Ponte della Costituzione, designed by Santiago Calatrava, connecting the train station to Piazzale Roma, one of the few places in Venice where buses and cars can enter. As was usual in the past, people can still take a ferry ride across the canal at several points by standing up on the deck of a simple gondola called a traghetto, although this service is less common than even a decade ago.
Most of the palaces emerge from water without pavement. Consequently, one can only tour past the fronts of the buildings on the grand canal by boat.
History
The first settlements
The Grand Canal probably follows the course of an ancient river(possibly a branch of the Brenta) flowing into the lagoon. Adriatic Veneti groups already lived beside the formerly-named "Rio Businiacus" before the Roman age. They lived in stilt houses and on fishing and commerce (mainly salt). Under the rule of the Roman empire and later of the Byzantine empire the lagoon became populated and important, and in the early 9th century the doge moved his seat from Malamocco to the safer "Rivoaltus".
Increasing trade followed the doge and found in the deep Grand Canal a safe and ship accessible canal-port. Drainage reveals that the city became more compact over time: at that time the Canal was wider and flowed between small, tide-subjected islands connected by wooden bridges.
"Fondaco" houses
Along the Canal, the number of "fondaco" houses increased, buildings combining the warehouse and the merchant's residence.
A portico (the curia) covers the bank and facilitates the ships' unloading. From the portico a corridor flanked by storerooms reaches a posterior courtyard. Similarly, on the first floor a loggia as large as the portico illuminates the hall into which open the merchant's rooms. The façade is thereby divided into an airy central part and two more solid sides. A low mezzanine with offices divides the two floors.
The fondaco house often had two lateral defensive towers (torreselle), as in the Fondaco dei Turchi (13th century, heavily restored in the 19th). With the German warehouse, the Fondaco dei Tedeschi (which is also situated on the Grand Canal), it reflects the high number of foreign merchants working in Venice, where the republic supplied them with storerooms and lodging and simultaneously controlled their trading activity.
More public buildings were built along the Canal at Rialto: palaces for commercial and financial Benches (Palazzo dei Camerlenghi and Palazzo dei Dieci Savi, rebuilt after 1514 fire) and a mint. In 1181 Nicolò Barattieri constructed a pontoon bridge connecting Rialto to Mercerie area, which was later replaced by a wooden bridge with shops on it. Warehouses for flour and salt were more peripheral.
The Venetian-Byzantine style
From the Byzantine empire, goods arrived together with sculptures, friezes, columns and capitals to decorate the fondaco houses of patrician families. The Byzantine art merged with previous elements resulting in a Venetian-Byzantine style; in architecture it was characterized by large loggias with round or elongated arches and by polychrome marbles abundance.
Along the Grand Canal, these elements are well preserved in Ca' Farsetti, Ca' Loredan (both municipal seats) and Ca' da Mosto, all dating back to the 12th or 13th century. During this period Rialto had an intense building development, determining the conformation of the Canal and surrounding areas. As a matter of fact, in Venice building materials are precious and foundations are usually kept: in the subsequent restorations, existing elements will be used again, mixing the Venetian-Byzantine and the new styles (Ca' Sagredo, Palazzo Bembo). Polychromy, three-partitioned façades, loggias, diffuse openings and rooms disposition formed a particular architectural taste that continued in the future.
The Fourth Crusade, with the loot obtained from the sack of Constantinople (1204), and other historical situations, gave Venice an Eastern influence until the late 14th century.
Venetian Gothic
Venetian Gothic architecture found favor quite late, as a splendid flamboyant Gothic ("gotico fiorito") beginning with the southern façade of the Doge's Palace. The verticality and the illumination characterizing the Gothic style are found in the porticos and loggias of fondaco houses: columns get thinner, elongated arches are replaced by pointed or ogee or lobed ones. Porticos rise gently intertwining and drawing open marbles in quatrefoils or similar figures. Façades were plastered in brilliant colors.
The open marble fascias, often referred as "laces", quickly diffused along the Grand Canal. Among the 15th-century palaces still showing the original appearance are Ca' d'Oro, Palazzo Bernardo, Ca' Foscari (now housing the University of Venice), Palazzo Pisani Moretta, Palazzi Barbaro, Palazzo Cavalli-Franchetti.
Renaissance
By the start of the 15th century, Renaissance architecture motifs appear in such buildings as the Palazzo Dario and the Palazzo Corner Spinelli; the latter was designed by Mauro Codussi, pioneer of this style in Venice. Ca' Vendramin Calergi, another of his projects (now hosting the Casino), reveals a completed transition: the numerous and large windows with open marbles are round-arched and have columns in the three classical orders.
Classical architecture is more evident in Jacopo Sansovino's projects, who arrived from Rome in 1527. Along the Canal he designed Palazzo Corner and Palazzo Dolfin Manin, known for grandiosity, for the horizontal layout of the white façades and for the development around a central courtyard. Other Renaissance buildings are Palazzo Papadopoli and Palazzo Grimani di San Luca. Several palaces of this period had façades with frescoes by painters such as Il Pordenone, Tintoretto, Paolo Veronese, all of them unfortunately lost. Particularly noteworthy were the frescoes by Veronese and Zelotti on Ca Cappello, overlooking the Grand Canal at the intersection with the Rio de S. Polo.
Venetian Baroque
In 1582, Alessandro Vittoria began the construction of Palazzo Balbi (now housing the Government of Veneto), in which Baroque elements can be recognized: fashioned cornices, broken pediments, ornamental motifs.
The major Baroque architect in Venice was Baldassarre Longhena. In 1631 he began to build the magnificent Santa Maria della Salute basilica, one of the most beautiful churches in Venice and a symbol of Grand Canal. The classical layout of the façade features decorations and by many statues, the latter crowning also the refined volutes surrounding the major dome.
Longhena later designed two majestic palaces like Ca' Pesaro and Ca' Rezzonico (with many carvings and chiaroscuro effects) and Santa Maria di Nazareth church (Chiesa degli Scalzi). For various reasons the great architect did not see any of these buildings finished, and the designs for all but Santa Maria della Salute were modified after his death.
Longhena's themes recur in the two older façades of Palazzo Labia, containing a famous fresco cycle by Giambattista Tiepolo. In the Longhenian school grew Domenico Rossi (San Stae's façade, Ca' Corner della Regina) and Giorgio Massari, who later completed Ca' Rezzonico.
The 16th and 17th centuries mark the beginning of the Republic's decline, but nevertheless they saw the highest building activity on the Grand Canal. This can be partially explained by the increasing number of families (like the Labia) becoming patrician by the payment of an enormous sum to the Republic, which was then facing financial difficulties. Once these families had achieved this new status, they built themselves with impressive residences on the Canal, often inducing other families to renew theirs.
Neoclassical architecture
Neoclassical architectures along the Canal date to 18th century: during the first half was built San Simeone Piccolo, with an impressive corinthian portico, central plan and a high copper-covered dome ending in a cupola shaped as a temple. Date to the second half Massari's Palazzo Grassi.
Modern era
Ocean liner passing San Giorgio Maggiore island
After the fall of the Republic 1797, construction of housing in Venice was suspended, as symbolized by the unfinished San Marcuola and Palazzo Venier dei Leoni (housing the Peggy Guggenheim Collection). Patrician families lost their desire of self-exaltation and many of them died out. Several historical palaces were pulled down, but most of them survived and good restorations have saved their 18th century appearance. The most important are publicly owned and host institutions and museums.
Religious buildings underwent the consequences of religious orders suppression decreed by Napoleon in the Kingdom of Italy period. Many churches and monasteries were deprived of furnishings and works of art, changed their function (like Santa Maria della Carità complex, now housing the Gallerie dell'Accademia) or were demolished. The Santa Croce complex, for which the Sestiere was named, was situated in Papadopoli Gardens area; Santa Lucia complex (partially designed by Palladio) was razed to the ground to build Santa Lucia Station.
The Kingdom of Italy accession restored serenity in the city and stimulated construction along the Grand Canal respecting its beauty, often reproduced in Gothic Revival architectures like the Pescaria at Rialto.
Reverse bokeh because generally you will see bokeh in the background, but I put it in the foreground and kept background sharp
FILE PAI
Paulista Avenida Interativa
Paulista Interactive Avenue
ESPAÇO FIESP
Lawrence Malstaf - Shrink 01995 - Bélgica Belgium
Christoph Haag, Martin Rumori, Franziska Windisch & Ludwig Zeller - Open Circuit - Alemanha | Germany
Alessandro Ludovico & Paolo Cirio - Face to Facebook - Reino Unido | United Kingdom
Coletivo COLETORES: Toni William, Flávio Camargo, Daniela Cordeiro & Karina Marques - Máquina/Brinquedo - Brasil | Brazil
Eduardo Omine - Fragments In Curved Air - Brasil | Brazil
Elie Zananiri, Hugues Bruyère & Mathieu Léger - Peptone - Canadá | Canada
Esther Hunziker - DUMP - Suíça | Switzerland
Julian Jaramillo Arango - The Happy Cube - Brasil | Brazil
Lauren McCarthy - Conversacube - Estados Unidos | United States
NaJa & deOstos (Project Team: Ricardo de Ostos, Nannette Jackowski, Manuel Jimenez, Thomas Sicouri) - Ectoplasmatic Housing - Reino Unido | United Kingdom
PirarucuDuo: Fernando Visockis & Thiago Parizi - Acusmograma - Brasil | Brazil
Rafaël Rozendaal - Towards and Beyond.com - Holanda | Netherlands
Ricardo Iglesias García - Surveillance Cameras: they are alive! - Espanha | Spain
Tamás Waliczky - Marionettes - Hungria | Hungary
Yoshi Akai - Heart 'n' Beat (Biorhythm Synthesizer) - Japão | Japan
FNAC
Arnt Jensen - LIMBO - Dinamarca | Denmark
Gaijin Games - BIT TRIP BEAT - Estados Unidos | United States
Mediatronic - Monsters Probably Stole My Princess - Reino Unido | United Kingdom
METRÔ TRIANON-MASP
Rafaël Rozendaal - Carnal Fury.com - Holanda | Netherlands
Rafaël Rozendaal - Hot Doom.com - Holanda | Netherlands
Rafaël Rozendaal - Hybrid Moment.com - Holanda | Netherlands
Rafaël Rozendaal - Jello time.com - Holanda | Netherlands
Rafaël Rozendaal - The Persistence of Sadness.com - Holanda | Netherlands
MASP
Rejane Cantoni & Leonardo Crescenti - Solo - Brasil | Brazil
LIVRARIA CULTURA
Arnt Jensen - Limbo - Dinamarca | Denmark
Daniela Arrais & Luiza Voll - Invente um sorriso - Brasil | Brazil
Ricardo Barreto, Maria Hsu & AMUDI - feelMe - Brasil | Brazil
That Game Company: Jenova Chen - flOw - Estados Unidos | United States
CINE LIVRARIA CULTURA
Matthias Hoegg - August - Inglaterra | England
Andrew Ruhemann & Shaun Tan - The Lost Thing - Austrália / Australia
Animatório - Neomorphus - Brasil | Brazil
Bertrand Bey & Pierre Ducos - La Détente - França | France
Birdo Studio: Luciana Eguti, Paulo Muppet & Amir Admoni - Monkey Joy - Brasil | Brazil
Coala Filmes: Cesar Cabral - Tempestade - Brasil | Brazil
Fábio Yamaji - O Divino, de repente - Brasil | Brazil
Max Loubaresse, Marc Bouyer & Anthony Vivien - Salesman Pete - França | France
INSTITUTO CERVANTES
*Instalações | Installations:
Andreas muk Haider - skia - Áustria | Austria
Tim Coe - A Perfect Face - Áustria | Austria
*Anima+:
8-Bits Team: Valere Amirault, Jean Delaunay, Sarah Laufer & Benjamin Mattern - 8-Bits - França | France
Alan Becker - Animator Vs Animation - Estados Unidos | United States
Alessandro Novelli - The Alphabet - Itália | Italy
Alexander Gellner - 1 Minute Puberty - Alemanha | Germany
Andrew Huang - The Gloaming - Estados Unidos | United States
Ben Thomas & Leo Bridle - Train of Thought - Inglaterra | England
Birdo Studio: Luciana Eguti & Paulo Muppet - Bonequinha do Papai - Brasil | Brazil
Birdo Studio: Luciana Eguti & Paulo Muppet - Caixa - Brasil | Brazil
Birdo Studio: Luciana Eguti, Paulo Muppet & Allan Sieber - Animadores - Brasil | Brazil
Birdo Studio: Luciana Eguti, Paulo Muppet & Jimmy Leroy - Pequeno Cidadão - Brasil | Brazil
Brendan Angelides & Cyriak Harris - Eskmo - Estados Unidos | United States
Christopher Alender - Eye of The Storm - Estados Unidos | United States
Coala Filmes: Cesar Cabral - Dossiê Rê Bordosa - Brasil | Brazil
Dante Zaballa & Matias Vigliano - The Head - Argentina | Argentina
David O’Reilly - Please Say Something - Irlanda e Alemanha | Ireland and Germany
David O’Reilly - The External World - Irlanda e Alemanha | Ireland and Germany
David Wilson - Japanese Popstars “Let Go” - Inglaterra | England
Dominik Käser, Martin-Sebastian Senn, Mario Deuss, Niloy J. Mitra & Mark Pauly - Silhouettes of Jazz - Estados Unidos | United States
Esteban Diácono - Ólafur Arnalds - Ljósið - Argentina | Argentina
Fábio Yamagi & Denis Kamioka ‘Cisma’ - Photocopy Romance - Brasil | Brazil
Fernando Sanches - Xixi no Banho - Brasil | Brazil
Gabrielle Lissot, Pierre Lippens, Laurent Jaffier & Nicolas Deprez - Tous Des Monstres (All Monsters) - França | France
Guilherme Marcondes - Tyger - Brasil | Brazil
Guillermo Madoz - Head Honcho - Argentina | Argentina
Hi-Sim - Jump - Inglaterra | England
Home de Caramel - Alone Together - Espanha | Spain
Jasmin Lai - Brave - Estados Unidos e Tailândia | United States and Thailand
Jason Wishnow - Oedipus - Inglaterra | England
Jean-Paul Frenay - Artificial Paradise, Inc - Bélgica e França | Belgium and France
Joanna Lurie - Tree’s Migration - França | France
Joaquin Baldwin - Sebastian's Voodoo - Estados Unidos | United States
Joaquin Baldwin - The Windmill Farmer - Estados Unidos | United States
Ken Turner - TIM - Canadá | Canada
Lee Tao - Seedling - Canadá / Canada
Lemeh42 - Wool & Water - Itália / Italy
Leszek Plichta - Dreammaker - Polônia e Alemanha | Polland and Germany
Malcolm Sutherland - Bout - Canadá | Canada
Malcolm Sutherland - Umbra - Canadá | Canada
Marc Silver - There Are No Others - Inglaterra | England
Marlies van der wel - Protest Flatness - Holanda | Netherlands
Martin Piana - LUMI - Argentina | Argentina
Martin Woutisseth - Stanley Kubrick, a filmography - França | France
Matatoro Team: Mauro Carraro, Raphaël Calamote & Jérémy Pasquet - Matatoro - França | France
Matthias Hoegg - August - Inglaterra | England
Matthias Hoegg - Thrusday - Inglaterra | England
Max Hattler - SPIN - Inglaterra | England
Meindbender Animation Studio - The Pirate - Suécia | Sweden
Michael Paul Young - The Interpretation - Estados Unidos | United States
Michal Socha - Chick - Polônia | Polland
Michal Socha - Koncert - Polônia | Polland
Mr McFly - Baseball - França | France
MUSCLEBEAVER: Tobias Knipf & Andreas Kronbeck - How your money works - Alemanha | Germany
Napatsawan Chirayukool - What makes your day? - Tailândia e Inglaterra | Thailand and England
Pahnl - Nowhere near here - Inglaterra | England
Peppermelon TV - Advanced Beauty - Inglaterra e Estados Unidos | England and Unites States
Peppermelon TV - First - Inglaterra e Estados Unidos | England and Unites States
Peppermelon TV - Target - Friends with you - Inglaterra e Estados Unidos | England and Unites States
Robert Seidel - Vellum - Alemanha | Germany
Rogier van der Zwaag Nobody Beats The Drum - Grindin - Holanda | Netherlands
Ross Phillips - 5 Second Projects ( Ballons) - Inglaterra | England
Ross Phillips - 5 Second Projects ( Reverse) - Inglaterra | England
Sasha Belyaev - The Rite of Youth - Letônia | Latvia
Scott Pagano - Pororoca - Estados Unidos | United States
Scott Pagano - Trust In The 'M' Machine - Estados Unidos | United States
Serene Teh - Parkour - Cingapura | Singapore
Stephen Irwin - Black Dog's Progress - Inglaterra | England
Stephen Irwin - Horse Glue - Inglaterra | England
Sylvain Marc - Cocotte Minute - França | France
Sylvain Marc - Fertilizer Soup - França | France
Tanya Aydostian - L'autre - França | France
Taylor Price - Hunt - Canadá e Estados Unidos | Canada and United States
Treat Studios - E4 - Inglaterra | England
Veronika Obertová - Viliam - Eslováquia | Slovakia
Wesley Rodrigues - Pinga com Saquê - Brasil | Brazil
Zach Cohen - The Chair Not Taken - Itália | Italy
Andrew Ruhemann & Shaun Tan - The Lost Thing - Austrália / Australia
Animatório - Neomorphus - Brasil | Brazil
Bertrand Bey & Pierre Ducos - La Détente - França | France
Birdo Studio: Luciana Eguti, Paulo Muppet & Amir Admoni - Monkey Joy - Brasil | Brazil
Coala Filmes: Cesar Cabral - Tempestade - Brasil | Brazil
Fábio Yamaji - O Divino, de repente - Brasil | Brazil
Max Loubaresse, Marc Bouyer & Anthony Vivien - Salesman Pete - França | France
*Game:
Colibri Games - The Tiny Bang Story - Rússia | Russia
*Maquinemas | Machinimas:
Tom Jantol - Brief Encounter - Croácia / Croatia
Tom Jantol - Dear Fairy - Croácia | Croatia
Tom Jantol - Duel - Croácia | Croatia
Tom Jantol- The Remake - Croácia | Croatia
Tom Jantol- Wizard of OS: the fish incident - Croácia | Croatia
METRÔ VILA MADALENA
Alex May & Rudolf Kremers - Eufloria - Reino Unido | United Kingdom
Alexander Bruce - Hazard: The Journey of Life - Austrália | Australia
Christoffer Hedborg - Toys - Suécia | Sweden
Paolo Pedercini / Molleindustria - "Every Day The Same Dream" - Estados Unidos e Itália | United States and Italy
Richard E Flanagan / Phosfiend Systems - FRACT - Canadá | Canada
METRÔ CONSOLAÇÃO
Soraya Braz e Fábio Fon - Via Invisível - Brasil | Brazil
METRÔ BRIGADEIRO
Soraya Braz e Fábio Fon - Via Invisível - Brasil | Brazil
CENTRO CULTURAL SÃO PAULO
*Workshop:
Claudia González & Christian Oyarzún - Open Source Generative Electronic Music Devices – Chile | Chile
Cristiano Rosa - DIY Together – Brasil | Brazil
Hye Yeon Nam & Carl DiSalvo - Huggable Nature, Community Workshop – Estados Unidos | United States
Ricardo Palmieri -VideoMapping e Realidade Expandida | VideoMapping and Expanded Reality – Brasil | Brazil
*Symposium:
19.07.2011
André Rangel - Portugal | Portugal
Metacriação e composição algorítmica: Reflexões sobre a distância entre o criador e o público | Meta-creation and algorithmic composition - Reflections on the distance from the creator to the audience
Ali Miharbi - Turquia | Turkey
Top-down X Bottom-up: Obras recentes | Top-down vs. Bottom-up: Recent Works
Eric Siu - Honk Kong e Japão | Hong Kong and Japan
Corpo dirigido pela mídia: Massagem de karaokê | Media Driven Body: Karaoke Massage
Ben Jack - Nova Zelândia | New Zealand
Cérebros, computadores e emergência: Mágica mental em um mundo digital | Brains, computers and emergence: Mental magic in a digital world
Kazushi Mukaiyama - Japão | Japan
IJIROS
Mesa Redonda | Round Table
Daniel Gonzalez Xavier (coordenação e mediação | coordination and mediation) Brasil | Brazil; Fernando Velázquez - Montevidéu-Uruguai; Milton Sogabe - Brasil | Brazil; Miguel de Castro Perez - Brasil | Brazil; Ricardo Palmieri - Brasil | Brazil; Vanessa Fort - Brasil | Brazil
Processos mistos de criação e gestão de práticas artísticas, tecnológicas e culturais: Uma aproximação aos Encontros AVLAB e outros modelos de gestão compartilhada e em constante trânsito físico/online | Mixed processes of creation and management of artistic, technological and cultural practices: An approach to the AVLAB Meetings and other shared and in constant physical/online transit management models
20.07.2011
Andreas muk Haider - Áustria | Austria
Skia
Hye Yeon Nam - Coréia e Estados Unidos | Korea and United States
Por favor, sorria | Please Smile
Julian Jaramillo Arango - Brasil | Brazil
O Cubo Feliz | The Happy Cube
Matt Roberts - Estados Unidos | United States
Quem está no controle? Criando arte com dados em tempo real e interação do usuário | Who is in control? Creating art using real-time data and user interaction
Ricardo Iglesias García - Espanha | Spain
Arte, robôs e câmeras de vigilância | Art, robots and surveillance cameras
Mesa Redonda | Round Table
Ana Carla Fonseca (Garimpo de Soluções) Brasil | Brazil; Expedito Araújo (Vivo EnCena) Brasil | Brazil; Laura Corrêa (ItsNoon) Brasil | Brazil; Piatã Stoklos Kignel (Banco Santander) Brasil | Brazil
Economia Criativa | Creative Economy
21.07.2011
Sergio Roclaw Basbaum - Brasil | Brazil
Percepção e experiência em ambientes digitais: tecnoestese e infocognição | Perception and experience in digital environments: tecnoaesthesis and infocognition
Eduardo Patrício - Brasil | Brazil
Desenvolvimento de Instrumentos Musicais Digitais como atividade composicional | Development of musical instruments as a compositional activity
Giuliano Obici - Brasil | Brazil
Lanhouse e seus devires | LAN houses and their devires
Claudia Paulina González Godoy - Chile | Chile
Arte, Hardware Aberto e Cultura DIY | Art, Open Hardware and DIY Culture
Douglas Easterly - Nova Zelândia e Estados Unidos | New Zealand and United States
Escapando ao solipsismo: Inteligência Artificial, design de jogos | Escaping Solipsism: Artificial Intelligence, Game Design
Victoria Messi - Argentina | Argentina
Anti Utopia: Arte Eletrônica na América Latina | Anti Utopia: Electronic Art in Latin America
Gabriela Previdello - Brasil | Brazil
Fluxo da informação na contemporaneidade: a memória reordenada nas estruturas do FILE Arquivo | Contemporary information flow: the reordered memory on FILE Archive structures
Mesa Redonda | Round Table
Eliane Weizmann (coordenação e mediação | coordination and mediation) Brasil | Brazil; Alessandro Ludovico (neural) Itália | Italy; Alexandre Matias (Editor do caderno de cultura digital do jornal O Estado de S. Paulo) Brasil | Brazil; Régine Debatty (we make money not art) Bélgica | Belgium; Victoria Messi (El Pez Eléctrico) Argentina | Argentina
Jornalismo Cultural | Cultural Journalism
22.07.2011
Fernando Macedo - Brasil | Brazil
"Música para fala e trinta minutos", por PirarucuDuo | "Music for speech and 30 minutes" by Pirarucu Duo
Eduardo Omine - Brasil | Brazil
Fragmentos em ar curvo | Fragments in curved air
Christian Oyarzún Roa - Chile | Chile
G: Representações e reformulações do global de uma perspectiva meridional | G: representations and reformulations of the global from a South view
Karla Schuch Brunet - Brasil | Brazil
Geografias do Mar # Ilhas | Geographies of the Sea # Islands
Rachel Zuanon Dias / Geraldo Lima - Brasil | Brazil
Desenhando biointerfaces usáveis para jogar: o BioBodyGame e o NeuroBodyGame | Geographies of the Sea # Islands
Mesa Redonda | Round Table
Franklin Lee (AA) (coordenação e mediação | coordination and mediation); Anne Save de Beaurecueil (SUBdV) >; Robert Smith Stuart (Kokkugia); Sandro Tubertini (BDSP); Thiago Mundim (AA)
Coreografando Arquitetura Computacional | Choreographing Computational Architecture
Reverse mounting lens for macro shooting.
50mm f1.4 lens on 58mm Canon mounting macro reverse ring, all mounted in reverse mode on macro 12mm keno tube (macro ring).
:-)
pic taken with PowerShot G5.
Sorry for dusty environment ...
BRAINTREE -- Cardinal Seán P. O'Malley presented 116 Cheverus Award Medals to laypersons, deacons and religious during a 3 p.m. Vespers service yesterday on the Feast of Christ the King, at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Boston's South End.
First presented in 2008 at the celebration to mark the conclusion of the archdiocese's bicentennial year, the annual award recognizes Catholics for their dedicated service to the Church. The medal is named for the archdiocese's first bishop, Jean-Louis Lefebvre de Cheverus, who led the diocese from 1808 until his return to France in 1824. Bishop Cheverus died in 1836 as the Archbishop of Bordeaux.
The oval-shaped medal is made of sterling silver and bears a likeness of Bishop Cheverus based on the Gilbert Stuart portrait. On the reverse side is Bishop Cheverus' coat of arms.
The medal recipients are chosen for their service to the Church and God's people. Most recipients are nominated by their pastor, forwarded by their area vicar and approved by their regional bishop and Cardinal O'Malley. Some recipients are personally selected by Cardinal O'Malley.
Each year, one-third of the parishes of the archdiocese are asked to nominate a parishioner. The criteria given to pastors is that the nominee should be a lay person who has served the parish well over an extended period of time and has done so in a quiet, unassuming and, perhaps, unrecognized fashion.
Also, each of the regional bishops is asked to nominate a religious and a deacon from his region with similar qualifications. The Central Ministries of the archdiocese also make nominations from among religious, deacons and lay persons who serve on archdiocesan committees or lead important ministries.
With this year's group of recipients the total number of individuals and couples who have been named Cheverus medalists stands at 726. There were 93 recipients in 2013, 121 in 2012, 97 in 2011, 98 in 2010 and 133 in 2009. There were 68 awardees in 2008.
Friends and family members of the honorees are welcome to attend the service at the cathedral. The presence of the pastor and a delegation of parishioners is also encouraged to help underscore the parish's appreciation for the service of the honoree.
Cheverus Award recipients 2014
Ms. Tete Adeleke, Sacred Hearts, Malden
Ms. Ana Gladys Amaya, Hispanic Community/Sacred Heart, Roslindale
Ms. Rosemary Angeramo, St. Adelaide, Peabody
Mrs. Dona Bacco, St. Rose of Lima, Topsfield
Mr. Alfred Belanger, St. Mary, Plymouth
Mr. Robert Berlo, St. Mary, Quincy
Mrs. Mary Blasi, St. Kateri Tekakwitha, Plymouth
Mrs. Jolyne Boyle St. Mary Star of the Sea, Beverly
Sister Patricia Boyle, CSJ, Pastoral Center Ministries
Mrs. Patricia Buckjune, Our Lady of Grace, Pepperell
Mr. Joseph Burke, St. Bernadette, Randolph
Mrs. Mary Caruso, St. Benedict Parish, Somerville
Mrs. Patricia Chevalier, St. John the Evangelist, N. Chelmsford
Mr. David (Dung) Chi Ngo, Vietnamese Community/Sacred Hearts, Malden
Sister Elizabeth Clarke, SHCJ, North Region
Brother David K. Coakley, OSB, South Region
Sister Mary Pedro Conway, SMSM, Archdiocese of Boston
Mrs. Florence Cranshaw, St. Theresa of Lisieux, Sherborn
Mr. Paul Francis Creegan Sr., St. Margaret of Scotland, Lowell
Ms. Helen Cross, Patronage of St. Joseph, Somerville
Ms. Kathleen E. Crozier, Our Lady of Victories, Boston
Sister Ellen Dabrieo, Brazilian Community/St. John the Baptist, Peabody
Mrs. Kelly Damon, St. Thecla, Pembroke
Mrs. Audanette David, Haitian Community/St. Matthew, Dorchester
Mr. James Davidson, Holy Ghost Parish, Whitman
Mr. Victor DeLeon, St. Mary of the Assumption, Lawrence
Mrs. Maria Della Porta, St. Leonard of Port Maurice, (Sacred Heart Church)
Ms. Claire Detora, Archdiocese of Boston
Mr. Nellio DiTullio, St. Joseph, Quincy
Ms. Doris DiTullio, St. Anthony of Padua, Everett
Mrs. Joan Donnelly, St. Marguerite D'Youville, Dracut
Mr. Timothy Donovan, St. Jerome, Weymouth
Mrs. Concetta Donovan, Our Lady Star of the Sea, Marblehead
Ms. Marie Aurore Dorcely, Haitian Community/St. Anne, Somerville
Mr. Daniel Falvey, Blessed Sacrament, Walpole
Ms. Janet A. Farrell, St. Cecilia, Ashland
Mr. and Mrs. Kevin and Lynne Feeney, St. Raphael, Medford
Ms. Donna Felzani, St. Anthony Padua, Revere
Ms. Joan Ferguson, St. Bridget, Maynard
Mr. Fernando Fernandez-Arellano, Our Lady of the Assumption, East Boston
Deacon Marcio O. Fonseca, Central Region/St. Mark, Dorchester
Mr. James Fowkes, St. Bridgid, South Boston
Dr. David Gabriel, St. Thomas the Apostle, Salem/Peabody (Posthumous)
Mr. Edio Galvez, Hispanic Community/St. Columbkille, Brighton
Mr. and Mrs. David and Kathleen Gannon, St. Richard of Chichester, Danvers
Ms. Phyllis Giordano, Society of St. James/St. Stephen, Boston
Mrs. Francis H. Girard, St. Theresa of Lisieux, Sherborn
Mr. Mel Gouthro, St. Mary, Wrentham
Ms. Ann Grady, St. Mary of the Angels, Roxbury
Brother Robert Green, CFX, North Region
Deacon James Greer, Pastoral Center Ministries
Ms. Doreen Gulledge, St. Peter, Cambridge
Mr. Richard Howard, St. Agnes, Reading
Ms. Jean Hunt, St. Ann, Dorchester (Neponset)
Brother John R. Jaskowiak, OFM , Central Region
Mr. Robert D. Keefe, St. Anthony Shrine, Boston
Ms. Ann J. Kleponis, St. Peter (Lithuanian Parish), South Boston
Mr. William L. Lajuenesse, St. Matthias, Marlborough
Mr. Richard LaPorte, Archdiocese of Boston
Ms. Margaret LaRoche, Our Lady Help of Christians, Newton
Ms. Pilar Latorre, Archdiocese of Boston
Mr. Robert J. Lavoie, St. John the Evangelist, Hopkington
Mr. William Lawless, St. John the Baptist, Quincy
Mr. Derryl Lawrence, St. Peter, Plymouth
Sister Mary Joan Lofgren, CSJ, South Region
Dr. Francis Lombardo, St. Eulalia, Winchester
Ms. Anne M. Lynch, Our Lady of Lourdes, Jamaica Plain
Mr. William MacDonald, St. Mary, Georgetown
Ms. Mary Magner, St. Thomas Aquinas, Nahant
Mrs. Ellie Martin, St. Dorothy, Wilmington
Ms. Mary Mc Ginn, St. John the Evangelist, Swampscott
Mr. John McClellan, St. James, Stoughton
Sister Maureen McDonough, OCarm/F, West Region
Mr. William "Skip" Miller, St. Vincent de Paul, South Boston
Sister Virginia Mulhern, SDNdeN, Central Region
Mr. Hung Nguyen, St. Mary, Randolph
Ms. Mary O'Rourke, St. Brendan, Dorchester
Mrs. Maribelle Ortiz, Hispanic Community/St. Patrick, Brockton
Mr. Remo Palomba, St. Thomas Aquinas, Jamaica Plain
Mrs. Anne Paradis, St. Augustine, Andover
Deacon John W. Pepi, St. Bridget, Maynard
Mrs. Jane B. Piacentini, St. George, Framingham
Mr. Wayne Pickles, Corpus Christi, Lawrence
Mr. Lee Pimentel, St. Francis of Assisi, Dracut
Mr. Joseph Puleo, St. Florence, Wakefield
Deacon Luis Rivera, North Region
Ms. Suzanne Robotham, St. Joseph, Belmont
Mr. Paul Roche, St. Bonaventure, Manomet
Ms. Susan Rudolph, St. John the Evangelist, Cambridge
Mrs. Carolyn N. Ryan, Sacred Heart, Weymouth
Deacon Kenneth N. Ryan, South Region
Mrs. Rose Shea, Cheverus Centennial School, Malden
Mr. Joseph Shubster, Holy Name, West Roxbury
Mrs. Katia Silva, Immaculate Conception, Stoughton
Ms. Angela Siraco, Our Lady of the Assumption
Mr. Don Soule, St. Martha, Plainville
Mrs. Patricia Souza, Brazilian Community/St. Anthony, Somerville
Ms. Patricia Strumm, Gate of Heaven, South Boston
Mr. John K. Sullivan, St. Gregory, Dorchester
Sister Margaret L. Sullivan, CSJ, Pastoral Center Ministries
Mr. Kam Sylvestre, Our Lady of Grace, Chelsea/Everett
Mr. Walter Symolon, St. Francis Xavier, Weymouth
Ms. Ida Toro, St. Patrick, Watertown
Mr. Paul Tousignant, St. Rita, Lowell
Ms. Mary Ellen Valeri, St. Pius V, Lynn
Ms. Mercedes Vazquez, St. Christopher, Dorchester
Mrs. Josephine Vendetti, Sacred Heart of Jesus, Cambridge
Dr. Miriam Vincent, St. Leonard of Port Maurice, Boston
Ms. Rachel Voiland, St. Lucy, Methuen
Mr. Lloyd Wajda, Archdiocese of Boston
Sister Agnes Wan, St. Joseph, Boston
Mr. Donald Wark, St. Anne, Salem
Mr. Arthur Whittemore, Department of Youth Services
Mr. John Wilhelm, St. Paul, Hamilton/Wenham
Mr. Benjamin A. Williams, St. Ann, West Bridgewater
Mr. Stephen Zrike Sr., St. Jude, Norfolk
Photos by George Martell - BCDS, Archdiocese of Boston 2014
A good panoramic view of China’s recent development and its current rejection of the democracy model for its own governance, by former Singapore ambassador to the UN, Kishore Mahbubani:
Columbia Professor Jeffrey Sachs on the Covid vaccines, New World Order, global leadership and multilateralism:
Former U.S. Ambassador Max Baucus on Speaker Nancy Pelosi's Taiwan trip:
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The Foreign Affairs article below is typical American, full of obligatory and unsubstantiated propaganda spread by the West even though it's not all complimentary about the U.S. The fact is China has alleviated extreme poverty; millions of Chinese tourists have visited overseas with hundreds of thousands of students attended various universities in the West without a single individual seeking political asylum. If China were as repressive as the West describes, wouldn't these tourists and students seek political asylum while abroad? There have been no proven evidence of any mistreatment of Uyghurs inside China. If as many as 2 million Uyghurs were incarcerated, surely, the West can show us satellite photos of these humongous prison camps, right? The fact is an overwhelming majority of the people in China believe their country is heading the right direction.
worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/freedom-index-...
In this 2022 freedom Index, Hong Kong ranks #30, ahead of South Korea (31) France (34) and Singapore (48).
When President Jimmy Carter established diplomatic relationship with China in 1978, he agreed to the Shanghai Communiqué which reads, among others, "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China."
The author fails to disclose that Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen unwillingness to accept the 1992 Consensus is one of main reasons for Mainland China's treatment of her.
www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-trap-us-foreign-policy...
The China Trap
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Perilous Logic of Zero-Sum Competition
By Jessica Chen Weiss
Competition with China has begun to consume U.S. foreign policy. Seized with the challenge of a near-peer rival whose interests and values diverge sharply from those of the United States, U.S. politicians and policymakers are becoming so focused on countering China that they risk losing sight of the affirmative interests and values that should underpin U.S. strategy. The current course will not just bring indefinite deterioration of the U.S.-Chinese relationship and a growing danger of catastrophic conflict; it also threatens to undermine the sustainability of American leadership in the world and the vitality of American society and democracy at home.
There is, of course, good reason why a more powerful China has become the central concern of policymakers and strategists in Washington (and plenty of other capitals). Under President Xi Jinping especially, Beijing has grown more authoritarian at home and more coercive abroad. It has brutally repressed Uyghurs in Xinjiang, crushed democratic freedoms in Hong Kong, rapidly expanded its conventional and nuclear arsenals, aggressively intercepted foreign military aircraft in the East and South China Seas, condoned Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and amplified Russian disinformation, exported censorship and surveillance technology, denigrated democracies, worked to reshape international norms—the list could go on and will likely only get longer, especially if Xi secures a third five-year term and further solidifies his control later this year.
Yet well-warranted alarm risks morphing into a reflexive fear that could reshape American policy and society in counterproductive and ultimately harmful ways. In attempting to craft a national strategy suited to a more assertive and more powerful China, Washington has struggled to define success, or even a steady state, short of total victory or total defeat, that both governments could eventually accept and at a cost that citizens, businesses, and other stakeholders would be willing to bear. Without a clear sense of what it seeks or any semblance of a domestic consensus on how the United States should relate to the world, U.S. foreign policy has become reactive, spinning in circles rather than steering toward a desired destination.
To its credit, the Biden administration has acknowledged that the United States and its partners must provide an attractive alternative to what China is offering, and it has taken some steps in the right direction, such as multilateral initiatives on climate and hunger. Yet the instinct to counter every Chinese initiative, project, and provocation remains predominant, crowding out efforts to revitalize an inclusive international system that would protect U.S. interests and values even as global power shifts and evolves. Even with the war in Ukraine claiming considerable U.S. attention and resources, the conflict’s broader effect has been to intensify focus on geopolitical competition, reinforced by Chinese-Russian convergence.
Leaders in both Washington and Beijing claim to want to avoid a new Cold War. The fact is that their countries are already engaged in a global struggle. The United States seeks to perpetuate its preeminence and an international system that privileges its interests and values; China sees U.S. leadership as weakened by hypocrisy and neglect, providing an opening to force others to accept its influence and legitimacy. On both sides, there is growing fatalism that a crisis is unavoidable and perhaps even necessary: that mutually accepted rules of fair play and coexistence will come only after the kind of eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation that characterized the early years of the Cold War—survival of which was not guaranteed then and would be even less assured now.
Even in the absence of a crisis, a reactive posture has begun to drive a range of U.S. policies. Washington frequently falls into the trap of trying to counter Chinese efforts around the world without appreciating what local governments and populations want. Lacking a forward-looking vision aligned with a realistic assessment of the resources at its disposal, it struggles to prioritize across domains and regions. It too often compromises its own broader interests as fractious geopolitics make necessary progress on global challenges all but impossible. The long-term risk is that the United States will be unable to manage a decades-long competition without falling into habits of intolerance at home and overextension abroad. In attempting to out-China China, the United States could undermine the strengths and obscure the vision that should be the basis for sustained American leadership.
The lodestar for a better approach must be the world that the United States seeks: what it wants, rather than what it fears. Whether sanctions or tariffs or military moves, policies should be judged on the basis of whether they further progress toward that world rather than whether they undermine some Chinese interest or provide some advantage over Beijing. They should represent U.S. power at its best rather than mirroring the behavior it aims to avert. And rather than looking back nostalgically at its past preeminence, Washington must commit, with actions as well as words, to a positive-sum vision of a reformed international system that includes China and meets the existential need to tackle shared challenges.
That does not mean giving up well-calibrated efforts to deter Chinese aggression, enhance resilience against Chinese coercion, and reinforce U.S. alliances. But these must be paired with meaningful discussions with Beijing, not only about crisis communications and risk reduction but also about plausible terms of coexistence and the future of the international system—a future that Beijing will necessarily have some role in shaping. An inclusive and affirmative global vision would both discipline competition and make clear what Beijing has to lose. Otherwise, as the relationship deteriorates and the sense of threat grows, the logic of zero-sum competition will become even more overwhelming, and the resulting escalatory spiral will undermine both American interests and American values. That logic will warp global priorities and erode the international system. It will fuel pervasive insecurity and reinforce a tendency toward groupthink, damaging the pluralism and civic inclusion that are the bedrock of liberal democracy. And if not altered, it will perpetuate a vicious cycle that will eventually bring catastrophe.
THE INEVITABLE RIVALRY?
In Washington, the standard account for why the relationship has gotten so bad is that China changed: in the past decade or two, Beijing has stopped “biding its time,” becoming more repressive at home and assertive abroad even while continuing to take advantage of the relationships and institutions that have enabled China’s economic growth.
That change is certainly part of the story, and it is as much a product of China’s growing clout as of Xi’s way of using that clout. But a complete account must also acknowledge corresponding changes in U.S. politics and policy as the United States has reacted to developments in China. Washington has met Beijing’s actions with an array of punitive actions and protective policies, from tariffs and sanctions to restrictions on commercial and scientific exchanges. In the process, the United States has drifted further from the principles of openness and nondiscrimination that have long been a comparative advantage while reinforcing Beijing’s conviction that the United States will never tolerate a more powerful China. Meanwhile, the United States has wavered in its support for the international institutions and agreements that have long structured global interdependence, driven in part by consternation over China’s growing influence within the international system.
The more combative approach, on both sides, has produced a mirroring dynamic. While Beijing believes that only through protracted struggle will Americans be persuaded to coexist with a strong China, Washington believes that it must check Chinese power and influence to defend U.S. primacy. The result is a downward spiral, with each side’s efforts to enhance its security prompting the other to take further steps to enhance its own.
In explaining growing U.S.-Chinese tensions, some scholars point to structural shifts in the balance of power. Graham Allison has written of “the Thucydides trap”: the notion that when a rising state challenges an established power, a war for hegemony frequently results. Yet a focus on capabilities alone has trouble accounting for the twists and turns in U.S.-Chinese relations, which are also driven by shifting perceptions of threat, opportunity, and purpose. Following President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing, Washington came to view China as a strategic partner in containing the Soviet Union. And as the post–Cold War era dawned, U.S. policymakers began hedging against growing Chinese military power even while seeking to encourage the country’s economic and political liberalization through greater integration.
Throughout this period, Chinese leaders saw a strategic opportunity to prioritize China’s development in a stable international environment. They opened the country’s doors to foreign investment and capitalist practices, seeking to learn from foreign expertise while periodically campaigning against “spiritual pollution” and “bourgeois liberalization.” Despite occasional attempts to signal resolve, including during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis and after the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, Chinese leaders largely adhered to the former leader Deng Xiaoping’s lying-low strategy to avoid triggering the sense of threat that could precipitate efforts to strangle China’s rise.
If there is a year that marked an inflection point in China’s approach to the world, it is not 2012, when Xi came to power, but 2008. The global financial crisis prompted Beijing to discard any notion that China was the student and the United States the teacher when it came to economic governance. And the Beijing Olympics that year were meant to mark China’s arrival on the world stage, but much of the world was focused instead on riots in Tibet, which Chinese officials chalked up to outside meddling, and on China’s subsequent crackdown. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became increasingly fixated on the idea that foreign forces were intent on thwarting China’s rise.
In the years that followed, the halting movement toward liberalization went into reverse: the party cracked down on the teaching of liberal ideas and the activities of foreign nongovernmental organizations, crushed pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and built a sprawling surveillance state and system of internment camps in Xinjiang—all manifestations of a broader conception of “national security,” animated by fears of unrest. Internationally, China gave up any semblance of strategic humility. It became more assertive in defending its territorial and maritime claims (along the Indian border, in the East and South China Seas, and with regard to Taiwan). Having surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, it began wielding its economic power to compel deference to CCP interests. It ramped up development of military capabilities that could counter U.S. intervention in the region, including expanding its once limited nuclear arsenal. The decision to develop many of these capabilities predated Xi, but it was under his leadership that Beijing embraced a more coercive and intolerant approach.
As it registered China’s growing capabilities and willingness to use them, Washington increased its hedging. The Obama administration announced that it would “pivot” to Asia, and even as Washington sought a constructive role for China in the international system, the pace of China’s rise quickly outstripped U.S. willingness to grant it a correspondingly significant voice. With Donald Trump’s election as president, Washington’s assessment became especially extreme: a Marxist-Leninist regime was, in Trump’s telling, out to “rape” the United States, dominate the world, and subvert democracy. In response, the Trump administration started a trade war, began to talk of “decoupling” the U.S. and Chinese economies, and launched a series of initiatives aimed at countering Chinese influence and undermining the CCP. In speeches, senior U.S. officials hinted at regime change, calling for steps to “empower the Chinese people” to seek a different form of government and stressing that “Chinese history contains another path for China’s people.”
The Biden administration has stopped any talk of regime change in China and coordinated its approach closely with allies and partners, a contrast with Trump’s unilateralism. But it has at the same time continued many of its predecessor’s policies and endorsed the assessment that China’s growing influence must be checked. Some lines of effort, such as the Justice Department’s China Initiative, which sought to prosecute intellectual property theft and economic espionage, have been modified. But others have been sustained, including tariffs, export controls, and visa restrictions, or expanded, such as sanctions against Chinese officials and companies. In Congress, meanwhile, ever more vehement opposition to China may be the sole thing that Democrats and Republicans can agree on, though even this shared concern has produced only limited agreement (such as recent legislation on domestic semiconductor investments) on how the United States should compete.
Over five decades, the United States tried a combination of engagement and deterrence to bring China into an international system that broadly sustains U.S. interests and values. American policymakers knew well that their Chinese counterparts were committed to defending CCP rule, but Washington calculated that the world would be less dangerous with China inside rather than outside the system. That bet largely succeeded—and is still better than the alternative. Yet many in Washington always hoped for, and to varying degrees sought to promote, China’s liberal evolution as well. China’s growing authoritarianism has thus fed the narrative of a comprehensive U.S. policy failure, and the focus on correcting that failure has entrenched Beijing’s insecurity and belief that the United States and its allies will not accept China as a superpower.
Now, both countries are intent on doing whatever is necessary to demonstrate that any move by the other will not go unmet. Both U.S. and Chinese decision-makers believe that the other side respects only strength and interprets restraint as weakness. At this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, China’s defense minister, General Wei Fenghe, pledged to “fight to the very end” over Taiwan a day after meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.
TELL ME HOW THIS ENDS
Where the current trajectory leads is clear: a more dangerous and less habitable world defined by an ever-present risk of confrontation and crisis, with preparation for conflict taking precedence over tackling common challenges.
Most policymakers, at least those in Washington, are not seeking a crisis between the United States and China. But there is growing acceptance that a crisis is more or less inevitable. Its consequences would be enormous. Even if both sides want to avoid war, crises by definition offer little time for response amid intense public scrutiny, making it difficult to find pathways to deescalation. Even the limited application of force or coercion could set in motion an unpredictable set of responses across multiple domains—military, economic, diplomatic, informational. As leaders maneuver to show resolve and protect their domestic reputations, a crisis could prove very difficult to contain.
Taiwan is the most likely flash point, as changes in both Taipei and Beijing have increasingly put the island at the center of U.S.-Chinese tensions. Demographic and generational shifts in Taiwan, combined with China’s crackdown in Hong Kong, have heightened Taiwan’s resistance to the idea of Beijing’s control and made peaceful unification seem increasingly fanciful. After Taiwan’s traditionally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency in 2016, Beijing took a hard line against the new president, Tsai Ing-wen, despite her careful efforts to avoid moves toward formal independence. Cross strait channels of communication shut down, and Beijing relied on increasingly coercive measures to punish and deter what it perceived as incremental moves toward Taiwan’s permanent separation.
In response, the United States increased military patrols in and around the Taiwan Strait, loosened guidelines for interacting with Taiwanese officials, broadened U.S. declaratory policy to emphasize support for Taiwan, and continued to advocate for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including the United Nations. Yet many well-intentioned U.S. efforts to support the island and deter China have instead fueled Beijing’s sense of urgency about the need to send a shot across the bow to deter steadily growing U.S.-Taiwanese ties.
Even with an official U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” on whether the United States would intervene in the event of an attack on Taiwan, Chinese military planners expect U.S. involvement. Indeed, the anticipated difficulty of seizing Taiwan while also holding the United States at bay has long underpinned deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. But many U.S. actions intended to bolster the island’s ability to resist coercion have been symbolic rather than substantive, doing more to provoke than deter Beijing. For example, the Trump administration’s efforts to upend norms around U.S. engagement with Taiwan—in August 2020, Secretary for Health and Human Services Alex Azar became the highest-ranking cabinet member to visit Taiwan since full normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations in 1979—prompted China to send combat aircraft across the center line of the Taiwan Strait, ignoring an unofficial guardrail that had long served to facilitate safe operations in the waterway. Intrusions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) have become a frequent means for Beijing to register displeasure with growing U.S. support. In October 2021, Chinese intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ hit a new high—93 aircraft over three days—in response to nearby U.S.-led military exercises.
This action-reaction cycle, driven by mutually reinforcing developments in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, is accelerating the deterioration of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. In recent months, Chinese official rhetoric has become increasingly threatening, using phrases that have historically signaled China’s intent to escalate. “Whoever plays with fire will get burnt,” Xi has repeatedly told U.S. President Joe Biden. In May, after Biden implied an unconditional commitment to defend Taiwan, rather than simply expressing the longstanding U.S. obligation to provide the island with the military means to defend itself and to maintain the U.S. capacity to resist any use of force, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stressed that Beijing “will take firm actions to safeguard its sovereignty and security interests.”
Although Beijing continues to prefer peaceful unification, it is coming to believe that coercive measures may be necessary to halt moves toward Taiwan’s permanent separation and compel steps toward unification, particularly given the Chinese perception that Washington’s support for Taiwan is a means to contain China. Even if confidence in China’s military and economic trajectory leads Beijing to believe that “time and momentum” remain on its side, political trends in Taiwan and in the United States make officials increasingly pessimistic about prospects for peaceful unification. Beijing has not set a timetable for seizing Taiwan and does not appear to be looking for an excuse to do so. Still, as the political scientist Taylor Fravel has shown, China has used force when it thinks its claims of sovereignty are being challenged. High-profile symbolic gestures of U.S. support for Taiwan are especially likely to be construed as an affront that must be answered. (As of this writing, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the first trip by a U.S. speaker of the house since 1997, has prompted Chinese warnings that “the Chinese military will never sit idly by,” followed by unprecedently threatening military exercises and missile tests around Taiwan.)
As both the United States and Taiwan head into presidential elections in 2024, party politics could prompt more efforts to push the envelope on Taiwan’s political status and de jure independence. It is far from clear whether Tsai’s successor as president will be as steadfast as she has been in resisting pressure from strident advocates of independence. Even under Tsai, there have been troubling signs that DPP leaders are not content with the status quo despite its popularity with voters. DPP leaders have lobbied Washington to refrain from making statements that the United States does not support Taiwan independence. In March, Taipei’s representative office in Washington gave former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo a hefty honorarium to visit Taiwan, where he called on the United States to offer the island “diplomatic recognition as a free and sovereign country.”
The risk of a fatal collision in the air or at sea is also rising outside the Taiwan Strait. With the Chinese and U.S. militaries operating in proximity in the East and South China Seas, both intent on demonstrating their willingness to fight, pilots and operators are employing dangerous tactics that raise the risk of an inadvertent clash. In 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided with a U.S. reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea, killing the Chinese pilot and leading to the 11-day detention of the U.S. crew. After initial grandstanding, the Chinese worked to head off a full-blown crisis, even cracking down on displays of anti-Americanism in the streets. It is much harder to imagine such a resolution today: the desire to display resolve and avoid showing weakness would make it exceedingly difficult to defuse a standoff.
THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD
Even if the two sides can avoid a crisis, continuation of the current course will reinforce geopolitical divisions while inhibiting cooperation on global problems. The United States is increasingly focused on rallying countries around the world to stand against China. But to the extent that a coalition to counter China forms, especially given the ideological framing that both the Trump and Biden administrations have adopted, that coalition is unlikely to include the range of partners that might stand to defend universal laws and institutions. “Asian countries do not want to be forced to choose between the two,” Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong wrote of China and the United States in these pages in 2020. “And if either attempts to force such a choice—if Washington tries to contain China’s rise or Beijing seeks to build an exclusive sphere of influence in Asia—they will begin a course of confrontation that will last decades and put the long-heralded Asian century in jeopardy.”
The current approach to competition is also likely to strengthen the alignment between China and Russia. The Biden administration has managed to deter Chinese military assistance to Russia in Ukraine, and China has mostly complied with sanctions, demonstrating that there are in fact limits to Beijing and Moscow’s “no limits” partnership. But so long as the two governments share a belief that they cannot be secure in a U.S.-led system, they will continue to deepen their cooperation. In the months since the invasion of Ukraine, they have carried out joint military patrols in the Pacific Ocean and worked to develop alternatives to the U.S.-controlled financial system.
Ultimately, Chinese-Russian relations will be shaped by how Beijing weighs its need to resist the United States against its need to preserve ties to international capital and technology that foster growth. China’s alignment with Russia is not historically determined: there is an ongoing high-level debate within Beijing over how close to get to Moscow, with the costs of full-fledged alignment producing consternation among some Chinese analysts. Yet unless Washington can credibly suggest that Beijing will see strategic benefits, not only strategic risks, from distancing itself from Moscow, advocates of closer Chinese-Russian cooperation will continue to win the argument.
Growing geopolitical tension also crowds out progress on common challenges, regardless of the Biden administration’s desire to compartmentalize certain issues. Although U.S. climate envoy John Kerry has made some headway on climate cooperation with China, including a joint declaration at last year’s climate summit in Glasgow, progress has been outweighed by acrimony in areas where previous joint efforts had borne fruit, including counternarcotics, nonproliferation, and North Korea. On both sides, too many policymakers fear that willingness to cooperate will be interpreted as a lack of resolve.
Such tensions are further eroding the already weak foundations of global governance. It is not clear how much longer the center of the international rules-based order can hold without a broad-based effort at its renewal. But as Beijing has grown more concerned that the United States seeks to contain or roll back its influence—by, for example, denying it a greater say in international economic governance—the more it has invested in alternative institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Meanwhile, China’s engagement with the multilateral system is increasingly aimed at discrediting U.S. leadership within it. Even though Beijing has not exactly demonstrated fealty to many of the principles it claims to support, the divide between the haves and have-nots has allowed it to cast the United States as protecting the privileges of a minority of powerful states. At the United Nations, Beijing and Washington too often strive to undercut each other’s initiatives, launching symbolic battles that require third countries to choose between the two.
Last but far from least, a fixation on competition brings costs and dangers in the United States. Aggressive U.S. efforts to protect research security, combined with increased attacks against Asian Americans, are having a chilling effect on scientific research and international collaboration and are jeopardizing the appeal of the United States as a magnet for international talent. A 2021 survey by the American Physical Society found that 43 percent of international physics graduate students and early career scientists in the United States considered the country unwelcoming; around half of international early career scientists in the United States thought the government’s approach to research security made them less likely to stay there over the long term. These effects are particularly pronounced among scientists of Chinese descent. A recent study by the Asian American Scholar Forum found that 67 percent of faculty of Chinese origin (including naturalized citizens and permanent residents) reported having considered leaving the United States.
As the United States has sought to shield itself from Chinese espionage, theft, and unfair trading practices, it has often insisted on reciprocity as a precondition for commercial, educational, and diplomatic exchanges with Beijing. But strict reciprocity with an increasingly closed system like China’s comes at a cost to the United States’ comparative advantage: the traditional openness, transparency, and equal opportunity of its society and economy, which drive innovation, productivity, and scientific progress.
The climate of insecurity and fear is also having pernicious effects on democracy and the quality of public debate about China and U.S. policy. The desire to avoid appearing “soft” on China permeates private and public policy discussions. The result is an echo chamber that encourages analysts, bureaucrats, and officials to be politically rather than analytically correct. When individuals feel the need to out-hawk one another to protect themselves and advance professionally, the result is groupthink. A policy environment that incentivizes self-censorship and reflexive positioning forecloses pluralistic debate and a vibrant marketplace for ideas, ingredients critical to the United States’ national competitiveness.
From the World War II internment of Japanese Americans to the McCarthyism of the 1950s to hate crimes against Muslim and Sikh Americans after September 11, U.S. history is replete with examples of innocent Americans caught in the crossfire of exaggerated fears of the “enemy within.” In each case, overreaction did as much as or more than the adversary to undermine U.S. democracy and unity. Although the Biden administration has condemned anti-Asian hate and stressed that policy must target behavior rather than ethnicity, some government agencies and U.S. politicians have continued to imply that an individual’s ethnicity and ties to family abroad are grounds for heightened scrutiny.
BEFORE CATASTROPHE
If the United States and Soviet Union could arrive at détente, there is no reason that Washington and Beijing cannot do so as well. Early in the Cold War, President John F. Kennedy, hailing the need to “make the world safe for diversity,” stressed that “our attitude is as essential as theirs.” He warned Americans “not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.”
Even while making clear that Beijing will pay a high price if it resorts to force or other forms of coercion, Washington must present China with a real choice. Deterrence requires that threats be paired with assurances. To that end, U.S. policymakers should not be afraid of engaging directly with their Chinese counterparts to discuss terms on which the United States and China could coexist, including mutual bounds on competition. It was relatively easy for Americans to imagine coexistence with a China thought to be on a one-way path of liberalization. The United States and its partners now have the harder task of imagining coexistence with an authoritarian superpower, finding a new basis for bilateral interaction that focuses on shaping outward behavior rather than changing China’s domestic system.
The most pressing need relates to Taiwan, where the United States must bolster deterrence while also clarifying that its “one China” policy has not changed. This means ensuring that Beijing knows how costly a crisis over Taiwan would be, putting at risk its broader development and modernization objectives—but also that if it refrains from coercive action, neither Washington nor Taipei will exploit the opportunity to push the envelope further. While Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other senior officials have affirmed that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence, other actions by the administration (especially Biden’s repeated statements suggesting an end to “strategic ambiguity”) have sown doubt.
While helping bolster Taiwan’s resilience to Chinese coercion, Washington should avoid characterizing Taiwan as a vital asset for U.S. interests. Such statements feed Beijing’s belief that the United States seeks to “use Taiwan to contain China,” as China’s ambassador to Washington put it in May. The United States should instead make clear its abiding interest in a peaceful process for resolving cross-strait differences rather than in a particular outcome. And as they highlight the costs Beijing can expect if it escalates its coercive campaign against Taiwan, U.S. policymakers should also stress to Taipei that unilateral efforts to change Taiwan’s political status, including calls for de jure independence, U.S. diplomatic recognition, or other symbolic steps to signal Taiwan’s permanent separation from China, are counterproductive.
These steps will be necessary but not sufficient to pierce the growing fatalism regarding a crisis, given Beijing’s hardening belief that the United States seeks to contain China and will use Taiwan to that end. To put a floor beneath the collapsing U.S.-China relationship will require a stronger effort to establish bounds of fair competition and a willingness to discuss terms of coexistence. Despite recent meetings and calls, senior U.S. officials do not yet have regular engagements with their counterparts that would facilitate such discussions. These discussions should be coordinated with U.S. allies and partners to prevent Beijing from trying to drive a wedge between the United States and others in Europe and Asia. But Washington should also forge a common understanding with its allies and partners around potential forms of coexistence with China.
Skeptics may say that there is no reason for the leadership in Beijing to play along, given its triumphalism and distrust. These are significant obstacles, but it is worth testing the proposition that Washington can take steps to stabilize escalating tensions without first experiencing multiple crises with a nuclear-armed competitor. There is reason to believe that Beijing cares enough about stabilizing relations to reciprocate. Despite its claim that the “East is rising and the West is declining,” China remains the weaker party, especially given its uncertain economic trajectory. Domestic challenges have typically tended to restrain China’s behavior rather than, as some Western commentators have speculated, prompting risky gambles. The political scientist Andrew Chubb has shown that when Chinese leaders have faced challenges to their legitimacy, they have acted less assertively in areas such as the South China Sea.
Because Beijing and Washington are loath to make unilateral concessions, fearing that they will be interpreted as a sign of weakness at home and by the other side, détente will require reciprocity. Both sides will have to take coordinated but unilateral steps to head off a militarized crisis. For example, a tacit understanding could produce a reduction in Chinese and U.S. operations in and around the Taiwan Strait, lowering the temperature without signaling weakness. Military operations are necessary to demonstrate that the United States will continue to fly and sail wherever international law allows, including the Taiwan Strait. But ultimately, the United States’ ability to deter and Taiwan’s ability to defend against an attempt at armed unification by Beijing have little to do with whether the U.S. military transits the Taiwan Strait four, eight, 12, or 24 times a year.
In the current atmosphere of distrust, words must be matched by actions. In his November 2021 virtual meeting with Biden, Xi said, “We have patience and will strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with utmost sincerity and efforts.” But Beijing’s actions since have undercut its credibility in Taipei and in Washington. Biden likewise told Xi that the United States does not seek a new Cold War or want to change Beijing’s system. Yet subsequent U.S. actions (including efforts to diversify supply chains away from China and new visa restrictions on CCP officials) have undermined Washington’s credibility among not just leaders in Beijing but also others in the region. It does not help that some administration officials continue to invoke Cold War parallels.
To bolster its own credibility, the Biden administration should also do more to preempt charges of hypocrisy and double standards. Consider U.S. policy to combat digital authoritarianism: Washington has targeted Chinese surveillance technology firms more harshly than similar companies based in the United States, Israel, and other Western democracies.
THE WORLD THAT OUGHT TO BE
So far, the Biden administration’s order-building efforts have centered on arrangements that exclude China, such as the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Although officials have been careful to insist that these initiatives are not targeted at any one country, there is little sign of any corresponding effort to negotiate Beijing’s role in the international or regional order. At the margins, there have been some signs that inclusive groupings can still deliver. (The World Trade Organization has struck agreements on fishing subsidies and COVID-19 vaccines.) But if investments in narrower, fit-for-purpose coalitions continue to take priority over broader, inclusive agreements and institutions, including those in which China and the United States both have major roles to play, geopolitical tensions will break rather than reinvigorate the international system.
Renewing U.S. leadership will also require doing more to address criticism that a U.S.-led order means “rules for thee but not for me.” Clear and humble acknowledgment of instances where the United States has violated the UN Charter, such as the invasion of Iraq, would be an important step to overcoming that resentment. And Washington must deliver value for citizens in developing countries, whether on COVID-19, climate, hunger, or technology, rather than simply urging them not to work with China. At home, Washington must work to rebuild bipartisan support for U.S. engagement with the international system.
As the United States reimagines its domestic and international purpose, it should do so on its own terms, not for the sake of besting China. Yet fleshing out an inclusive, affirmative vision of the world it seeks would also be a first step toward clarifying the conditions under which the United States would welcome or accept Chinese initiatives rather than reflexively opposing them. The countries’ divergent interests and values would still result in the United States opposing many of Beijing’s activities, but that opposition would be accompanied by a clear willingness to negotiate the terms of China’s growing influence. The United States cannot cede so much influence to Beijing that international rules and institutions no longer reflect U.S. interests and values. But the greater risk today is that overzealous efforts to counter China’s influence will undermine the system itself through a combination of paralysis and the promotion of alternate arrangements by major powers.
Finally, the United States must do much more to invest in the power of its example and to ensure that steps taken to counter China do not undermine that example by falling into the trap of trying to out-China China. Protective or punitive actions, whether military, economic, or diplomatic, should be assessed not just on the basis of whether they counter China but also on how they affect the broader system and whether they reflect fidelity to U.S. principles.
Competition cannot become an end in itself. So long as outcompeting China defines the United States’ sense of purpose, Washington will continue to measure success on terms other than on its own. Rankings are a symbolic construct, not an objective condition. If the pursuit of human progress, peace, and prosperity is the ultimate objective, as Blinken has stated, then the United States does not need to beat China in order to win.
JESSICA CHEN WEISS is the Michael J. Zak Professor of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Cornell University. She served as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State from August 2021 to July 2022. The views expressed here are her own.
Big Cypress swamp in Florida. The actual shot wasn't good, but the reversal made it work somewhat. Just something different.
129 East 19th Street, NYC
by navema
East 19th Street, between Irving Place and Third Avenue, is known as the Block Beautiful for its notable row houses of East 19th Street. The block was an informal colony for artists and writers in the 1920s and 1930s, such as author Ida Tarbell, painter Cecilia Beaux, and the sculptor Zolnay. Music critic and novelist Carl Van Vechten, lived at 151 East 19th Street and with his neighbors, painters George Bellows and Robert Chanler, threw wild parties, about which Ethyl Barrymore commented, "I went there in the evening a young girl and came away in the morning an old woman."
Frederick J. Sterner, the architect credited with starting the revival of the block in the early 20th century, lived at No. 139, which he coated with stucco and decorated with colored tiles. A few other houses on the block have similar stucco, and some have unusual artistic touches like the pair of jockey statues at No. 141 and the nuzzling giraffes above the door at No. 149.
One of Manhattan's most interesting landmarks is the picturesque stable-studio at 129 East 19th Street. Charles Moran, an importer, built a town house at 24 Gramercy Park in 1847 on a lot stretching back to the north side of 19th Street between Irving Place and Third Avenue. Moran still had not built on the 19th Street side of the lot when he sold the house in 1855 to James Couper Lord. It was Lord, an iron merchant and philanthropist, who built the two-story stable at 129 East 19th Street in 1861.
A later account stated that the building never was used as a stable, and census records for the Lords and neighboring families show no coachmen or stablemen living on their properties. There is no record of the Lord stable's appearance in the 19th century.
The first account of its 19th-century occupancy is a 1903 article in The New York Times, which attributed its diamond-paned leaded glass windows to an unidentified glass worker who occupied it for some time in the 1890's. Indeed, classified directories show that Craig F. R. Drake, "stained-glass maker," leased and occupied the building for a year, in 1899.
In 1903, a new lessee, F. Berkeley Smith, filed plans to convert what was described as a studio into a residence. Smith was trained as an architect but was apparently independently wealthy -- he summered in Paris and wrote "The Real Latin Quarter," "How Paris Amuses Itself" and other books. He had worked with the architect R.H. Robertson, and a Robertson employee, August Pauli, designed extensive interior alterations for the 19th Street house.
Smith installed fireplaces for heat -- a Bohemian touch in a time when a furnace was considered civilized -- two bedrooms, a boudoir for Mrs. Smith and a trunk room, all furnished with wooden wainscotting, antique metal lamps, furniture and art work.
A photograph taken by Joseph Byron in 1904 shows a brick stable with neo-Gothic trim, window moldings, bottle-end stained glass and other artistic touches. In 1903, The Times wrote that there was "no more picturesque exterior" in the whole city, "none so riotously gay in color" with window boxes of geraniums, evergreen shrubs, bright brass hardware, green painted brick and white trim, "an exterior that attracts the attention of the least observant passerby."
ABOUT THE BLOCK BEAUTIFUL
The picturesque little ''block beautiful' is a mixed bag of houses on 19th Street between Irving Place and Third Avenue. A variety of owners there are making changes that reflect multiple attitudes toward the individual buildings and even the block as a whole. Brick and brownstone rowhouses went up on 19th Street in the 1840's and 1850's, especially after the establishment of Gramercy Park in 1845. Although conceived as upper-class accommodations, half a century later they were simply aging housing, especially as newer districts with newer houses opened up farther north.
The usual pattern for such districts was a gentle slide into middle- and working-class housing -- Victorian gentry showed a distinct distaste for settling in anything but virgin territory. It took Frederick Sterner to reverse this trend. Born in London in the 1860's, Sterner emigrated to the United States in 1882 and practiced architecture in Colorado before coming to New York in 1906. He took an office on Fifth Avenue near 19th Street and rented space in an old house at 23 West 20th Street.
Casting about for a place to build his own house, Sterner was discouraged by high land prices in more desirable areas farther north, and then determined to make over a house to his own taste closer to the business section of town. He bought an old brick house at 139 East 19th Street and gave it what became his signature touch -- a coat of tinted stucco, shutters, decorative ironwork and a projecting tile roof. Sterner carefully used old brick and polychromed tile panels to give his design an informal, handmade character -- the direct opposite of the showy limestone town houses that were still in favor farther uptown.
On a block of aging brick and brownstone, the effect was dazzling, something like Bob Dylan's shift from scruffy folk music to electric guitar in the 1960's. Sterner used inventive and brilliantly colored tile work around the doorway of 139 East 19th Street -- even the tiled planters are still miraculously intact. Sterner's example attracted others interested in a slightly bohemian location, among them Joseph B. Thomas, a banker and polo player, who had the architect redo 135 East 19th Street into a picturesque Gothic house.
But Sterner bought more houses on the block and, also working with other owners, gradually spread his delicate Mediterranean style to at least eight of them, enough so that the Sterner style quickly became the dominant character and was even imitated by other designers. In 1911 House Beautiful praised Sterner's work and added, ''Why does anyone build a city house when a remodeled one can be made so fascinating?''
Harriet Gillespie, writing in American Homes and Gardens in 1914, described 19th Street as a ''block beautiful,'' a term that had been in general use since the turn of the century, when reformers first considered how to stabilize aging neighborhoods.
Working for Thomas, Sterner also designed the dramatic half-timbered apartment house at 132 East 19th Street. Completed in 1911, it was soon home to the muckraking author Ida Tarbell, the society painter Cecilia Beaux and the stockbroker Chester Dale, who was then beginning to assemble his great art collection. The architect's brother, the painter Albert Sterner, also lived at No. 132.
THE painter George Bellows took over an old house at 146 East 19th Street, adding an attic studio, and the painter-muralist Robert Winthrop Chanler had a studio at No. 147; perhaps it was he who added the surprising colored panel over the doorway of two giraffes, with necks intertwined.
Writing in The New York Times in 1921, Helen Lowrey, a reporter, firmly credited Sterner with the idea of the picturesque ''Italian'' front and the entire idea of reviving older neighborhoods for upper-class occupancy. By that time developments at Turtle Bay, Sutton Place and other areas had spread Sterner's ideas widely.
In 1914 Sterner moved up to 63d Street between Lexington and Third Avenues and repeated the block beautiful process there, finally building his own magnificent house at the southwest corner of 65th Street and Lexington. In 1925 he moved to London, and never practiced again in New York; he died in Rome in 1931.
Gradually East 19th Street between Irving and Third became the block beautiful, as other efforts faded away, and it was included in the Landmarks Preservation Commission's Gramercy Park Historic District, designated in 1966. Many minor changes have been made to the houses, both before and after landmark designation. The Thomas residence, now owned by Oleg Cassini, is unchanged, but the stucco-front Sterner houses have lost many of their distinctive elements -- in some cases shutters have been removed, in others the pastel colors have been toned down. Some previous owner destroyed Sterner's distinctive tile and brick entryway at 145 East 19th Street, and in 1992 Lee Ann Jaffee, working with the architect Richard Ayotte, decided to substitute a nominally Greek revival doorway, but the effect does not reverse the earlier dilution of the house's character.
Next door, at 147 East 19th Street, someone has chopped away at the two giraffes to put in an electrical conduit.
At 143 East 19th Street Lynn Wagenknecht has one of the few intact mid-century houses, and her architect, Thomas Tsue, has been restoring that building to its original character.
On the south side of the block other architects are more in evidence. In 1924 the architect Frank Forster stripped the mid-19th-century brownstone at 142 and gave it a neat Dutch door and supremely intelligent ironwork. Despite an extensive interior alteration, the front has been left lovingly unrestored by the new owners. Cicognani Kalla Architects designed the recent alteration, and Pietro Cicognani says ''there's some beauty in being anonymous.'' And at 128 East 19th Street, an unidentified designer put some trim Art Moderne ironwork up on the house of the late Lincoln Kirstein, co-founder of the New York City Ballet, probably after Kirstein bought it in 1953.
At the apartment house at 132 East 19th Street, now a co-op, the board has just finished replacing the four stone spheres on the pillars in front, and Jonathan Foster, the board president, says that they are gradually restoring the entire front to Sterner's original designs.
ABOUT GRAMERCY PARK
The area which is now Gramercy Park was once in the middle of a swamp. In 1831 Samuel B. Ruggles, a developer and advocate of open space, proposed the idea for the park due to the northward growth of Manhattan. He bought the property, which was then a farm called "Gramercy Farm", from James Duane, a descendant of Peter Stuyvesant. Ruggles developed the property: he landscaped it, drainied the swamp, and caused about a million horsecart loads of earth to be moved. He then laid out "Gramercy Square", deeding possession of the square to the owners of the 60 parcels of land he had plotted to surround it, and sought tax-exempt status for the park, which the Board of Alderman granted in 1832. It was the second private square created in the city, after Hudson Square, also known as St. John's Park, which was laid out by the parish of Trinity Church. Numbering of the lots began at #1 on the northwest corner, on Gramercy Park West, and continued counter-clockwise: south down Gramercy Park West, then west to east along Gramercy Park South (East 20th Street), north up Gramercy Park East, and finally east to west along Gramercy Park North (East 21st Street). Landscaping and construction of Gramcery Park occured between 1833 and 1844.
At #34 and #36 Gramercy Park (East) are two of New York's first apartment buildings, designed in 1883 and 1905. Elsewhere in the neighborhood, nineteenth century brownstones and carriage houses abound, though the 1920s brought the onset of tenant apartments and skyscrapers to the area.
On September 20, 1966, a part of the Gramercy Park neighborhood was designated an historic district, and extended in 1988. The district was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1980.
Notable residents:
*James Harper – #4: an original resident, 1847-1869, Mayor of New York from 1844–1845 and one of the founders of the Harper publishing firm.
*Samuel J. Tilden – #15: New York Governor and 1876 Presidential Candidate whose house (a Victorian Gothic mansion), a National Historic Landmark, is now the National Arts Club.
Edwin Booth – #16: famed Shakespearean actor, founded the Players Club. The brother of John Wilkes Booth, the assassin of Abraham Lincoln. In the center of Gramercy Park is a statue in his honor.
John Barrymore – #36: star of stage and screen.
Daniel Chester French – #36: sculptor responsible for the seated figure of Lincoln at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.
Alfred Ringling – #36: who founded the Ringling Brothers Circus.
Stanford White – an architect, who renovated The Players Club, lived where the Gramercy Park Hotel is now located.
James Cagney – the actor once lived in one of the buildings on Gramercy Park South (East 20th Street).
I should mention that I only made one quarter of this image and then digitally mirrored it. This is the reversed version, putting the opposite corner in the center. I remember the first time I was taught how to make a curve with straight lines in math class somewhere near the end of public school. (grade 7 maybe) It blew my mind and I've been doodling them ever since. (It;s in the center of this image, all the squares that make a curved diamond)
Winters grey sky.
This is a water reflection that's been flipped over and a couple of light textures blended in to give it a painted look for sliders Sunday. It is not Fathers day here for a few weeks but Happy Fathers day to my northern hemisphere friends.
HSS
'Bentley the racing bear quickly looked behind him before throwing the Connaught single seater into reverse.
"Reverse" theme for Illustration Friday
see the trial sketches here
On the reverse,
Smaller ones
From right to left-
Shirley Mae Charles Le
Lee, and Betty jean
Mary Lou isn't in
"I've often said there's nothing better for the inside of a man than the outside of a horse."
-Ronald Reagan
This is how it's going to go down, folks. Each week, starting this Saturday, I will post a certain picture to the group. This picture will be of a tablescrap-esque item with hidden innards. Your challenge each week you choose to participate will be to figure out how it's built, and privately show or explain to me your solution. The catches:
• There may be -- and often will be -- more than one correct solution. As long as you achieve the same result, it's acceptable.
• I will put limitations on how each one may be built (e.g., "no headlight bricks")
You will have a week (until the next Friday night) to reverse-engineer mine and present to me the results. I will keep a running tally of everyone who enters, and at the end of each cycle I will award one point to each person who correctly builds the item, as well as reveal my own solution.
I will give a follow-up question to everyone who solves the original; solving this gains you an extra point!
There is no one "best" solution to many of these; and as such, everyone who solves an item correctly earns a point, no matter who else solves it, who solves it first, or how exactly it's solved. Every solution must be approved by myself, of course, to prevent any irrelevant entries.
Prizes:
1st place: A small assortment of custom parts made by L.D.M., a microtank, and a small set (small set TBD).
2nd place: The pure pride that comes from having beaten nearly everyone else.
There's no need to sign up. You could enter every week, every other week, or only once; the more you enter, though, the more points you could get! It's entirely your choice each cycle.
Be prepared!
I saw a guy on the bus talking on his phone like this, so had to do it to both explain it to others and try it myself (not in public).
Lots of pictures on Flickr from 180 degrees of this shot. Benson Hall Farm, Paddy Lane, Kendal, LA8
I don't need to get wet to take these shots - one through my lounge window in LA9.
My solution to the Reverse-Engineering Contest IV Week 3 challenge
www.flickr.com/photos/ltdemartinet/16773339758/
See my blog at www.brickpile.com
Auf der Fahrt von Wanfried nach Mühlhausen – Juli 1929
On the journey from Wanfried to Mühlhausen – July 1929
a trial of using double lens reverse macro technique for microphotography on a cross section of a plant root.
55-250IS@250mm on 500D body with 18-55IS@18mm reverse mounted. This was mounted above an old microscope (with viewing optics removed) to use the mount and light for lighting and micro adjustement of focus. Shake is a major issue and this set up requires alot of light, so even with the microscope illumination, i used both lenses wide open, ISO 6400, Av with -1Ev for 1/320s exposure.
lens set up gives a calculated magnification of 250/18=13.8x. On a canon APS-C 1.6x crop factor this gives a FOV of approximately 1.6mm. After softening and noise, resolution is a little shy of the micrometer range.
Reversed lens macro. Bought this solely to photograph it. I'm guessing it tastes like broccoli since it smells like it.
Taken with a 24mm reversed onto extension tubes. A hinged hot shoe allows the flash to lean out over the stack. A DIY snoot fires the light in front of the lens.