Chassis were built by Büssing-NAG in Leipzig-Wahren, while armoured bodies were provided by Deutsche Edelstahlwerke of Krefeld and turrets by Daimler Benz in Berlin-Marienfelde and Schichau of Elbing, with engines from Ringhoffer-Tatra-Werke AG of Nesseldorf. The first and possibly best known version to reach frontline service was the Sd.Kfz. 234/2 ‘Puma’. It had a horseshoe-shaped turret armed with a 5cm L/60 gun, which had originally been developed for the VK 16.02 Leopard light tank which never made into production. Even though it was a dedicated reconnaissance vehicle, the armament made it possible to defend the vehicle effectively and even take on light armored vehicles. The Sd.Kfz. 234/2 was produced from late 1943 to mid-1944 and replaced in production by the second version, the Sd.Kfz. 234/1, which was less complex and easier to build. It had a simpler open turret and was armed only with a light 2 cm KwK 38 gun (in the so-called Hängelafette 38). It was manufactured from mid-1944 to early 1945 and became the standard reconnaissance vehicle in this period.

Other versions were derived from the Sd.Kfz. 234, too. The Sd.Kfz. 234/3, produced simultaneously with the 234/1, served as a support for the lightly armed reconnaissance vehicles with more firepower. It had an open-topped superstructure, too, but carried a short-barreled 7.5cm K51 L/24 gun. This gun was intended primarily for use against soft targets, but when using a hollow charge shell, the penetration power exceeded that of the 5cm L/60 gun. This variant was produced until late 1944, before switching production to the 234/4. This version replaced the L/24 gun with the 7.5cm L/46 PaK 40 and was primarily another attempt to increase the mobility of this anti-tank gun and not a reconnaissance vehicle. It was not very successful, though: the heavy weapon stretched the light 234 chassis to its limits and only a very limited ammunition load of just twelve rounds could be carried on board due to lack of storage space. This variant was manufactured from the end of 1944 on only in limited numbers.

In mid-1945 another reconnaissance variant appeared, the Sd.Kfz. 234/5. It was a kind of hybrid between the earlier 234/1 and 234/2 variants, combining the light armament with a fully closed turret that offered the crew better protection from enemy fire and climatic conditions. The origins of the Sd.Kfz. 234/5 remain a little unclear – in fact, this variant started as a field conversion of a handful of Sd.Kfz. 234/2s in Hungary in mid-1944, which were retrofitted in field workshops with turrets from damaged Panzer-Spähwagen (neue Art) II ‘Luchs’ (also known as ‘Panzer II Ausf. L’, ‘Sd.Kfz. 123 mit 2-cm-KwK 38’ and VK 13.03 during the vehicle’s development phase). This simple combination of existing components turned out to be so effective and popular among the crews that it was quickly ordered into production.

Both chassis and turret remained unchanged, with a maximum armor of 30 mm (1.18 in), but the small turret with its light weapon (which had been adapted from a 20 mm anti-aircraft gun with a higher rate of fire than earlier guns of this type) reduced the overall weight to a little under 11 tons. This, and a slightly more powerful variant of the Tatra 103 V12 diesel engine, raised the vehicle’s top speed by 10 km/h (6 mph). In service the Sd.Kfz. 234/5 was generally known as ‘Puma II’ and the frontline units frequently modified their vehicles.

Among these field updates were commander cupolas, transplanted from damaged Panzer III and IV and sometimes outfitted with a mount for a light Fla-MG (anti-aircraft machine gun), as well as more effective exhaust mufflers for a reduced noise signature. Additional thin, spaced armor plates were sometimes bolted to the hull and/or to the turret front to better protect the vehicle from armor-piercing weapons, esp. against rounds from Russian 14.5 mm tank rifles. Makeshift wire mesh shields against hollow charges, similar to heavier Thoma shields on battle tanks, were occasionally added, too, as well as smoke dischargers, mounted to the turret sides or to the vehicle’s front. Night vision devices (Infrarot-Nachtsichtgerät F.G. 1250 or F.G. 1252) were fitted when available, and some late-production Sd.Kfz. 234/5s had a 140 cm (55 in) Telemeter KDO 44 stereoscopic rangefinder/telescope integrated into the turret, protruding from it on both sides. Vehicles that were almost exclusively operated on roads frequently had the wheels of the 2nd axle removed in order to reduce overall weight, rolling resistance and save precious rubber/tires.

Since production could not meet the operational units’ demand the Sd.Kfz. 234/5s were issued very selectively to Panzerspähwagen companies of the Panzer Aufklärung battalions. They were operated alongside other Sd.Kfz. 234 versions and Panzer II, III and 38(t) Spähpanzer versions to provide artillery, AA and AT support. The Puma IIs were mostly given to veteran crews and equipped primarily Panzerdivision units operating in Russia, even though a few were sent to the Western front, too.

The ZSU’62’s roots were laid down just after WWII with the ZSU-57-2. The first prototype (Objekt 500) was completed in the summer of 1950, production began in 1955. The vehicle was built using a modified chassis of the new T-54 tank and was armed with two S-68 57 mm cannons – at the time the most powerful guns mounted in an anti-aircraft system. The modification of the chassis included reducing the road wheels per side to four and using lighter armor. The ZSU-57-2 was powered by a V-54 12-cylinder diesel engine providing 520 hp. Despite the weight of 28 tons, thanks to the strong engine, the maximum speed was 50 km/h. With a fuel load of 850 liters, the operational range was 420 km.

Each cannon had a (theoretical) rate of fire of 240 rounds per minute with a muzzle velocity of 1,000 m/s. Maximum horizontal range was 12 km (with an effective range against ground targets of up to 4 km / 2.5 miles), maximum vertical range was 8.8 km (with a maximum effective vertical range of 4.5 km / 14,750 ft). The effective range, when used against flying targets, was 6 km. Armor-piercing rounds were able to penetrate 110 mm armor at 500 m or 70 mm armor at 2,000 m (at 90° impact angle).

Rate of fire was 120 RPM, but this was only a theoretical number, because each gun was fed with separate four-shot magazines so that only bursts and no continuous fire was possible. Both fragmentation and armor-piercing ammunition were available. The ZSU-57-2’s total ammunition load was 300 rounds, with 176 rounds being stored inside the turret and the remaining in the hull. To efficiently operate the vehicle, six crew members were needed: commander, gunner, loader, driver, and two sight adjusters.

The ZSU-57-2 had serious firepower that could easily destroy any aerial target but had many issues. The greatest weaknesses were the lack of modern range-finding and radar equipment, the impossibility of engaging targets at night or while on the move, the lack of protection for its crew (being open-topped), and low ammunition count. Nevertheless, more than 2.000 ZSU-57-2s were eventually built. While many would be sold to other Warsaw Pact countries, like East Germany, Romania, and Poland, its service within the Soviet Army was limited, because of its many operational deficiencies.

This led in 1957 to a new SPAAG program for the Soviet Army and initiated the development of the ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", the ZSU-37-2 "Yenisei" and a new ZSU-57-2 “Kama” (all baptized after Russian rivers) with the outlook to replace the original ZSU-57-2 by the mid to late Sixties. These vehicles were intended for AA defense of military facilities, troops, and mechanized columns on the march. “Shilka” was intended for close range defense (esp. against low-flying attack helicopters) while the more powerful guns of "Yenisei" and “Kama” were judged to be effective at covering the inner dead-zone of Soviet surface-to-air missile systems between 1.000 and 6.000 m altitude, with a focus on attack aircraft and more heavily armored targets.

All designs were based on existing tracked chassis’ and featured completely enclosed turrets as well as a proven radar system, the RPK-2 "Tobol" radar (NATO designator: "Gun Dish"). The ZSU-37-2 was soon dropped in favor of the higher firepower and range of the 57mm guns, so that both “Shilka” and “Kama” entered the hardware stage at Omsk Works No. 174.

However, “Kama” lagged behind the “Shilka” development because several technical and conceptual problems had to be solved. For instance, even though the armament still consisted of two proven S-68 cannon, the weapons’ mount had to be developed new to fit into the enclosed cast turret. To save space, both weapons were now mounted directly side-by-side. Their feeding system was furthermore changed from magazines to belts, what considerably improved the SPAAG’s firepower and now allowed continuous fire at a higher rate of fire of 150 RPM per gun. For sufficient flexibility, a belt-switching mechanism allowed to choose between two different ammunition supplies: each gun had supplies of 220 and 35 rounds, normally occupied with HE fragmentation and armor-piercing tracer (AP-T) shells, respectively, against aerial and armored ground targets. Changing between the two feeds just took a couple of seconds.

The twin S-68s were recoil-operated and the whole mount (without feeding mechanism) weighed 4,500 kg. The guns had a recoil of between 325 and 370 mm, and each air-cooled gun barrel, fitted with a muzzle brake, was 4365 mm long (76.6 calibers). The weapons could be elevated or depressed between −5° and +80° at a speed of between 0.3° and 32° per second, while the turret could traverse 360° at a speed of between 0.2° and 52° per second. Drive was from a direct current electric motor and universal hydraulic speed gears.

The “Kama” crew numbered four: driver (in the hull), commander, gunner and radar operator (all in the turret). The heavy guns, their ammunition supply and the radar system had to be housed in a turret, together with decent armor, and this resulted in a considerable volume and weight (a single 57 mm projectile alone already weighed 2.8 kg). Several layouts were tested, but weight and volume of the systems made it impossible to mate the “Kama” turret on the T-54/55 chassis, which was available in ample numbers for conversions. The limiting factor was the T-54/55’s relatively small turret bearing diameter.

To solve this problem, the “Kama” designers chose the more modern T-62 as chassis basis. It was outwardly very similar to the former T-54/55, but it featured a 2245 mm turret ring (250 mm more than the T-54/55’s bearing) that was able to take a much bigger/wider/heavier turret than its predecessor. Furthermore, the T-62 represented the Soviet Army’s “state of the art”. The choice of the T-62 ensured many component and maintenance communalities with the operational MBT and it also meant that the “Kama” SPAAG could operate in the same environment and the same pace as the T-62. In order to save costs and development time, the T-62 chassis was taken “as is”, with the same engine and armor level as the MBT. There were only minor changes in the electric components, e. g. a more powerful generator for the radar system.

In this combination, “Kama” eventually entered tests and state acceptance trials as “Object 503”. During these tests, some final changes to layout and equipment were made; for instance, the RPK-2’s dish-shaped radome received a retractable mount that allowed the antenna to be raised higher above the turret in order to avoid clutter and to protect the antenna when the vehicle was on the move.

The tests lasted until 1963 and were successful, so that an initial batch of 100 serial production tanks was ordered the same year. In order to avoid confusion with the old ZSU-57-2 from 1955, the new tank with the same armament was pragmatically designated ZSU-62.

Alas, while production of the “Kama” turrets ran up to be mated with T-62 hulls at the Uralvagonzavod factory in Nizhny Tagil, the ZSU-62’s future had already been sealed by the fast pace of technical developments: in the meantime MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defense System) had taken the medium-range SPAAG’s place and a foot soldier could now fulfill the same mission as an expensive and bulky 40 ton tank, so that the medium range/altitude gap between the ZSU-23-4 (which had already entered service) and heavier surface-to-air missile systems would not be filled with a dedicated vehicle anymore. The ZSU-62 had become superfluous the moment it had reached the first frontline units, and large-scale production was immediately stopped.

However, the initial production run was nevertheless completed until 1967, and the ZSU-62s were primarily sent to training units, where the vehicles were – due to their turrets’ shape – nicknamed “черепаха“ (turtle).

This could have been the ZSU-62’s fate, but the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan brought it back into frontline service. Since December 1978, the Afghan government called on Soviet forces, which were introduced in the spring and summer of 1979 to provide security and to assist in the fight against the mujaheddin rebels. After the killing of Soviet technicians in Herat by rioting mobs, the Soviet government sold several Mi-24 helicopters to the Afghan military and increased the number of military advisers in the country to 3,000. In April 1979, the Afghan government requested that the USSR send 15 to 20 helicopters with their crews to Afghanistan, and on June 16, the Soviet government responded and sent a detachment of tanks, BMPs, and crews to guard the government in Kabul and to secure the Bagram and Shindand airfields. In response to this request, an airborne battalion arrived at the Bagram Air Base on July 7, and ground forces were deployed from Turkmenistan territory into northern Afghanistan, securing the supply lines.

Experience in the mountainous Afghan landscape soon made the shortcomings of standard MBTs apparent, namely their lack of gun elevation, esp. when attacking hideouts and posts in high locations. While the ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” was readily available and used against such targets, it lacked range and firepower to take out protected posts at distances more than 2.000 m away. This led to the decision to send roundabout 40 ZSU-62s to the Afghan theatre of operations, where they were primarily used against ground targets – both fortifications as well as armored and unarmored vehicles. The weapons’ precision and range proved to be valuable assets, with devastating effect, and the vehicles remained in active service until 1985 when their role was more and more taken over by helicopters and aircraft like the new Su-25. The ZSU-62 were, nevertheless, still employed for aerial airfield defense and as a deterrent against ground attacks.

The Panther was far cheaper to produce than the heavy Tiger I. Key elements of the Panther design, such as its armor, transmission, and final drive, were simplifications made to improve production rates and address raw material shortages. Despite this the overall design remain described by some as "overengineered". The Panther was rushed into combat at the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 despite numerous unresolved technical problems, leading to high losses due to mechanical failure. Most design flaws were rectified by late 1943 and early 1944, though the bombing of production plants, increasing shortages of high-quality alloys for critical components, shortage of fuel and training space, and the declining quality of crews all impacted the tank's effectiveness.

Though officially classified as a medium tank, at 44.8 metric tons the Panther was closer to a heavy tank weight and the same category as the American M26 Pershing (41.7 tons), British Churchill (40.7 tons) and the Soviet IS-2 (46 tons) heavy tanks. The Panther's weight caused logistical problems, such as an inability to cross certain bridges, otherwise the tank had a very high power-to-weight ratio which made it highly mobile.

The Panther was only used marginally outside of Germany, mostly captured or recovered vehicles, some even after the war. Japan already received in 1943 a specimen for evaluation. During March–April 1945, Bulgaria received 15 Panthers of various makes (D, A, and G variants) from captured and overhauled Soviet stocks; they only saw limited (training) service use. In May 1946, Romania received 13 Panther tanks from the USSR, too.

After the war, France was able to recover enough operable vehicles and components to equip its army and offer vehicles for sale. The French Army's 503e Régiment de Chars de Combat was equipped with a force of 50 Panthers from 1944 to 1947, in the 501st and 503rd Tank Regiments. These remained in service until they were replaced by French-built ARL 44 heavy tanks.

In 1946, Sweden sent a delegation to France to examine surviving specimens of German military vehicles. During their visit, the delegates found a few surviving Panthers and had one shipped to Sweden for further testing and evaluation, which continued until 1961.

However, this was not the Panther’s end of service. The last appearance by WWII German tanks on the world’s battlefields came in 1967, when Syria’s panzer force faced off against modern Israeli armor. Quite improbably, Syria had assembled a surprisingly wide collection of ex-Wehrmacht vehicles from a half-dozen sources over a decade and a half timeframe. This fleet consisted primarily of late production Panzer V, StuGIII and Jagdpanzer IVs, plus some Hummel SPAAGs and a handful Panthers. The tanks were procured from France, Spain, and Czechoslovakia, partly revamped before delivery.

All of the Panthers Syria came from Czechoslovakia. Immediately after Germany’s collapse in May 1945, the Soviet army established a staging area for surrendered German tanks at a former Wehrmacht barracks at Milovice, about 24 miles north of Prague, Czechoslovakia. By January 1946, a total of roughly 200 operational Panzer IVs and Panthers of varying versions were at this facility. Joining them was a huge cache of spare parts found at a former German tank repair depot in Teplice, along with ammunition collected from all over Czechoslovakia and the southern extremity of the Soviet occupation zone in Germany. Throughout 1946, the Czechoslovak government’s clean-up of WWII battlefields recovered more than one hundred further tank wrecks, of which 80 were pieced back together to operational status and handed over to the Czechoslovakian Army,

In early 1948, the now-nationalized CKD Works began a limited upkeep of the tanks, many of which had not had depot-level overhauls since the war. A few were rebuilt with a Czechoslovak-designed steering system, but this effort was halted due to cost. These tanks remained operational in the Czechoslovak army until the end of 1954, when sufficient T-34s were available to phase them out.

A Syrian military delegation visited Prague from 8 April – 22 April 1955. An agreement was struck for the sale, amongst other items, of 45 Panzer IVs and 15 Panthers. Despite their obsolescence the Czechoslovaks were not about to just give the tanks away and demanded payment in a ‘hard’ western currency, namely British pounds. The cost was £4,500 each (£86,000 or $112,850 in 2016 money), far above what they were probably worth militarily, especially considering the limited amount of foreign currency reserves available to the Damascus government. The deal included refurbishment, a full ammunition loadout for each, and a limited number of spare parts. Nonetheless, the deal was closed, and the tanks’ delivery started in early November 1955.

The Syrians were by that time already having dire problems keeping their French-sourced panzers operational, and in 1958, a second contract was signed with CKD Works for 15 additional Panzer IVs and 10 more Panthers, these being in lesser condition or non-operational, for use as spare parts hulks. An additional 16 refurbished Maybach engines for both types were also included in this contract, as well as more ammunition.

The refurbished Panthers for Syria had their original 7.5 cm KwK 42 L70 replaced with the less powerful Rheinmetall 7.5 cm KwK 40 L48 gun – dictated by the fact that this gun was already installed in almost all other Syrian tanks of German origin and rounds for the KwK 42 L70 were not available anymore. and the Panther’s full ammo load was 87 rounds. The KwK 40 L48 fired a standard APCBC shell at 750 m/s and could penetrate 109 mm (4.3 in) hardened steel at 1.000 m range. This was enough to take out an M4 Sherman at this range from any angle under ideal circumstances. With an APCR shell the gun was even able to penetrate 130 mm (5.1 in) of hardened steel at the same distance.

Outwardly, the gun switch was only recognizable through the shorter barrel with a muzzle brake, the German WWII-era TZF.5f gunsight was retained by the Syrians. Additionally, there were two secondary machine guns, either MG-34s or MG-42s, one coaxial with the main gun and a flexible one in a ball mount in the tank’s front glacis plate.

A few incomplete Panther hulls without turret were also outfitted with surplus Panzer IV turrets that carried the same weapon, but the exact share of them among the Syrian tanks is unknown – most probably less than five, and they were among the batch delivered in the course of the second contract from 1958.

As they had been lumped all together in Czechoslovak army service, the Syrians received a mixed bag of Panzer IV and Panther versions, many of them “half-breeds” or “Frankensteins”. Many had the bow machine gun removed, either already upon delivery or as a later field modification, and in some cases the machine gun in the turret was omitted as well.

An obvious modification of the refurbished Czech export Panthers for Syria was the installation of new, lighter road wheels. These were in fact adapted T-54 wheels from Czechoslovakian license production that had just started in 1957 - instead of revamping the Panthers’ original solid steel wheels, especially their rubberized tread surfaces, it was easier to replace them altogether, what also made spare parts logistics easier. The new wheels had almost the same diameter as the original German road wheels from WWII, and they were simply adapted to the Panther’s attachment points of the torsion bar suspension’s swing arms. Together with the lighter main gun and some other simplifications, the Syrian Panthers’ empty weight was reduced by more than 3 tonnes.

The Czechoslovaks furthermore delivered an adapter kit to mount a Soviet-made AA DShK 12.7mm machine gun to the commander cupola. This AA mount had originally been developed after WWII for the T-34 tank, and these kits were fitted to all initial tanks of the 1955 order. Enough were delivered that some could be installed on a few of the Spanish- / French-sourced tanks, too.

It doesn’t appear that the Czechoslovaks updated the radio fit on any of the ex-German tanks, and it’s unclear if the Syrians installed modern Soviet radios. The WWII German Fu 5 radio required a dedicated operator (who also manned the bow machine gun); if a more modern system was installed not requiring a dedicated operator, this crew position could be eliminated altogether, what favored the deletion of the bow machine gun on many ex-German Syrian tanks. However, due to their more spacious hull and turret, many Panthers were apparently outfitted with a second radio set and used as command tanks – visible through a second whip antenna on the hull.

A frequent domestic Panther upgrade were side skirts to suppress dust clouds while moving and to prevent dust ingestion into the engines and clogged dust filters. There was no standardized solution, though, and solutions ranged from simple makeshift rubber skirts bolted to the tanks’ flanks to wholesale transplants from other vehicles, primarily Soviet tanks. Some Panthers also had external auxiliary fuel tanks added to their rear, in the form of two 200 l barrels on metal racks of Soviet origin. These barrels were not directly connected with the Panther’s fuel system, though, but a pump-and-hose kit was available to re-fuel the internal tanks from this on-board source in the field. When empty or in an emergency - the barrels were placed on top of the engine bay and leaking fuel quite hazardous - the barrels/tanks could be jettisoned by the crew from the inside.

Inclusive of the cannibalization hulks, Syria received a total of roughly 80 former German tanks from Czechoslovakia. However, at no time were all simultaneously operational and by 1960, usually only two or three dozen were combat-ready.

Before the Six Day War, the Syrian army was surprisingly unorganized, considering the amount of money being pumped into it. There was no unit larger than a brigade, and the whole Syrian army had a sort of “hub & spokes” system originating in Damascus, with every individual formation answering directly to the GHQ rather than a chain of command. The Panthers, Panzer IVs and StuG IIIs were in three independent tank battalions, grossly understrength, supporting the normal tank battalions of three infantry brigades (the 8th, 11th, and 19th) in the Golan Heights. The Jagdpanzer IVs were in a separate independent platoon attached to a tank battalion operating T-34s and SU-100s. How the Hummel SPGs were assigned is unknown.

The first active participation of ex-German tanks in Syrian service was the so-called “Water War”. This was not really a war but rather a series of skirmishes between Israel and Syria during the mid-1960s. With increasing frequency starting in 1964, Syria emplaced tanks on the western slope of the Golan Heights, almost directly on the border, to fire down on Israeli irrigation workers and farmers in the Galilee region. Surprisingly (considering the small number available) Syria chose the Panzer IV for this task. It had no feature making it better or worse than any other tank; most likely the Syrians felt they were the most expendable tanks in their inventory as Israeli counterfire was expected. The panzers were in defilade (dug in) and not easy to shoot back at; due to their altitude advantage.

In 1964, Syria announced plans to divert 35% of the Jordan River’s flow away from Israel, to deprive the country of drinking water. The Israelis responded that they would consider this an act of war and, true to their word, engaged the project’s workers with artillery and sniper fire. Things escalated quickly; in 1965, Israeli M4 Shermans on Israeli soil exchanged fire with the Syrian Panzer IVs above inconclusively. A United Nations peacekeeping team ordered both sides to disengage from the border for a set period of time to “cool off”, but the UN “Blue Berets” were detested and considered useless by both the Israelis and Syrians, and both sides used the lull to prepare their next move. When the cooling-off period ended, the Syrians moved Panzer IVs and now some Panthers, too, back into position. However, the IDF had now Centurion tanks waiting for them, with their fire arcs pre-planned out. The Cold War-era Centurion had heavy armor, a high-velocity 105mm gun, and modern British-made optics. It outclassed the WWII panzers in any imaginable way and almost immediately, two Syrian Panzer IVs and a Panther were destroyed. Others were abandoned by their crews and that was the end of the situation.

Syria’s participation in the Six Say War that soon followed in 1967 war was sloppy and ultimately disastrous. Israel initially intended the conflict to be limited to a preemptive strike against Egypt to forestall an imminent attack by that country, with the possibility of having to fight Syria and Jordan defensively if they responded to the operations against Egypt. The war against Egypt started on 5 June 1967. Because of the poor organization of the Syrian army, news passed down from Damascus on the fighting in the Sinai was scarce and usually outdated by the time it reached the brigade level. Many Syrian units (including the GHQ) were using civilian shortwave radios to monitor Radio Cairo which was spouting off outlandish claims of imaginary Egyptian victories, even as Israeli divisions were steamrolling towards the Suez Canal.

Syrian vehicles of German origin during the Six Day War were either painted overall in beige or in a dark olive drab green. Almost all had, instead of tactical number codes, the name of a Syrian soldier killed in a previous war painted on the turret in white. During the Six Day War, no national roundel was typically carried, even though the Syrian flag was sometimes painted to the turret flanks. However just as the conflict was starting, white circles were often painted onto the top sides of tanks as quick ID markings for aircraft, and some tanks had red recognition triangles added to the side areas: Syrian soldiers were notoriously trigger-happy, and the decreased camouflage effect was likely cancelled out by the reduced odds of being blasted by a comrade!

During the evening of 5 June, Syrian generals in Damascus urged the government to take advantage of the situation and mount an immediate invasion of Israel. Planning and preparation were literally limited to a few hours after midnight, and shortly after daybreak on 6 June, Syrian commanders woke up with orders to invade Israel. The three infantry brigades in the Golan, backed up by several independent battalions, were to spearhead the attack as the rest of the Syrian army mobilized.

There was no cohesion at all: Separate battalions began their advance whenever they happened to be ready to go, and brigades went forward, missing subunits that lagged behind. A platoon attempting a southern outflank maneuver tried to ford the Jordan River in the wrong spot and was washed away. According to a KGB report, at least one Syrian unit “exhibited cowardice” and ignored its orders altogether.

On 7 June, 24 hours into their attack, Syrian forces had only advanced 2 miles into Israel. On 8 June, the IDF pushed the Syrians back to the prewar border and that afternoon, Israeli units eliminated the last Egyptian forces in the Sinai and began a fast redeployment of units back into Israel. Now the Syrians were facing serious problems.

On 9 June, Israeli forces crossed into the Golan Heights. They came by the route the Syrians least expected, an arc hugging the Lebanese border. Now for the first time, Syria’s panzers (considered too slow and fragile for the attack) were encountered. The next day, 10 June 1967, was an absolute rout as the Syrians were being attacked from behind by IDF units arcing southwards from the initial advance, plus Israel’s second wave coming from the west. It was later estimated that Syria lost between 20-25% of its total military vehicle inventory in a 15-hour span on 10 June, including eight Panthers. A ceasefire was announced at midnight, ending Syria’s misadventure. Syria permanently lost the Golan Heights to Israel.

By best estimate, Syria had just five Panthers and twenty-five Panzer IVs fully operational on 6 June 1967, with maybe another ten or so tanks partially operational or at least functional enough to take into combat. Most – if not all – of the ex-French tanks were probably already out of service by 1967, conversely the entire ex-Spanish lot was in use, along with some of the ex-Czechoslovak vehicles. The conflict’s last kill was on 10 June 1967 when a Panzer IV was destroyed by an Israeli M50 Super Sherman (an M4 Sherman hull fitted with a new American engine, and a modified turret housing Israeli electronics and a high-velocity French-made 75mm gun firing HEAT rounds). Like the Centurion, the Super Sherman outclassed the Panzer IV, and the Panther only fared marginally better.

In order to save development cost and time, the vehicle was heavily based on the Spähpanzer Luchs (Lynx), a new German 8x8 amphibious reconnaissance armored fighting vehicle that had just entered Bundeswehr service in 1975. The all-wheel drive Luchs made was well armored against light weapons, had a full NBC protection system and was characterized by its extremely low-noise running. The eight large low-pressure tires had run-flat properties, and, at speeds up to about 50 km/h, all four axles could be steered, giving the relatively large vehicle a surprising agility and very good off-road performance. As a special feature, the vehicle was equipped with a rear-facing driver with his own driving position (normally the radio operator), so that the vehicle could be driven at full speed into both directions – a heritage from German WWII designs, and a tactical advantage when the vehicle had to quickly retreat from tactical position after having been detected. The original Luchs weighed less than 20 tons, was fully amphibious and could surmount water obstacles quickly and independently using propellers at the rear and the fold back trim vane at the front. Its armament was relatively light, though, a 20 mm Rheinmetall MK 20 Rh 202 gun in the turret that was effective against both ground and air targets.

The Waffenträger “Diana” used the Luchs’ hull and dynamic components as basis, and Thyssen-Henschel solved the challenge to mount a large and heavy 105 mm L7 gun with its mount on the light chassis through a minimalistic, unmanned mount and an autoloader. Avoiding a traditional manned and heavy, armored turret, a lot of weight and internal volume that had to be protected could be saved, and crew safety was indirectly improved, too. This concept had concurrently been tested in the form of the VTS1 (“Versuchsträger Scheitellafette #1) experimental tank in 1976 for the Kampfpanzer 3 development, which eventually led to the Leopard 2 MBT (which retained a traditional turret, though).

For the “Diana” test vehicle, Thyssen-Henschel developed a new low-profile turret with a very small frontal area. Two crew members, the commander (on the right side) and the gunner (to the left), were seated in/under the gun mount, completely inside of the vehicle’s hull. The turret was a very innovative construction for its time, fully stabilized and mounted the proven 105mm L7 rifled cannon with a smoke discharger. Its autoloader contained 8 rounds in a carousel magazine. 16 more rounds could be carried in the hull, but they had to be manually re-loaded into the magazine, which was only externally accessible. A light, co-axial 7,62mm machine gun against soft targets was available, too, as well as eight defensive smoke grenade mortars.

The automated L7 had a rate of fire of ten rounds per minute and could fire four types of ammunition: a kinetic energy penetrator to destroy armored vehicles; a high explosive anti-tank round to destroy thin-skinned vehicles and provide anti-personnel fragmentation; a high explosive plastic round to destroy bunkers, machine gun and sniper positions, and create openings in walls for infantry to access; and a canister shot for use against dismounted infantry in the open or for smoke charges. The rounds to be fired could be pre-selected, so that the gun was able to automatically fire a certain ammunition sequence, but manual round selection was possible at any time, too.

In order to take the new turret, the Luchs hull had to be modified. Early calculations had revealed that a simple replacement of the Luchs’ turret with the new L7 mount would have unfavorably shifted the vehicle’s center of gravity up- and forward, making it very nose-heavy and hard to handle in rough terrain or at high speed, and the long barrel would have markedly overhung the front end, impairing handling further. It was also clear that the additional weight and the rise of the CoG made amphibious operations impossible - a fate that met the upgraded Luchs recce tanks in the Eighties, too, after several accidents with overturned vehicles during wading and drowned crews. With this insight the decision was made to omit the vehicle’s amphibious capability, save weight and complexity, and to modify the vehicle’s layout considerably to optimize the weight distribution.

Taking advantage of the fact that the Luchs already had two complete driver stations at both ends, a pair of late-production hulls were set aside in 1977 and their internal layout reversed. The engine bay was now in the vehicle’s front, the secured ammunition storage was placed next to it, behind the separate driver compartment, and the combat section with the turret mechanism was located behind it. Since the VTS3s were only prototypes, only minimal adaptations were made. This meant that the driver was now located on the right side of the vehicle, while and the now-rear-facing secondary driver/radio operator station ended up on the left side – much like a RHD vehicle – but this was easily accepted in the light of cost and time savings. As a result, the gun and its long, heavy barrel were now located above the vehicle’s hull, so that the overall weight distribution was almost neutral and overall dimensions remained compact.

Both test vehicles were completed in early 1978 and field trials immediately started. While the overall mobility was on par with the Luchs and the Diana’s high speed and low noise profile was highly appreciated, the armament was and remained a source of constant concern. Shooting in motion from the Diana turned out to be very problematic, and even firing from a standstill was troublesome. The gun mount and the vehicle’s complex suspension were able to "hold" the recoil of the full-fledged 105-mm tank gun, which had always been famous for its rather large muzzle energy. But when fired, even in the longitudinal plane, the vehicle body fell heavily towards the stern, so that the target was frequently lost and aiming had to be resumed – effectively negating the benefit from the autoloader’s high rate of fire and exposing the vehicle to potential target retaliation. Firing to the side was even worse. Several attempts were made to mend this flaw, but neither the addition of a muzzle brake, stronger shock absorbers and even hydro-pneumatic suspension elements did not solve the problem. In addition, the high muzzle flames and the resulting significant shockwave required the infantry to stay away from the vehicle intended to support them. The Bundeswehr also criticized the too small ammunition load, as well as the fact that the autoloader magazine could not be re-filled under armor protection, so that the vehicle had to retreat to safe areas to re-arm and/or to adapt to a new mission profile. This inherent flaw not only put the crew under the hazards of enemy fire, it also negated the vehicle’s NBC protection – a serious issue and likely Cold War scenario. Another weak point was the Diana’s weight: even though the net gain of weight compared with the Luchs was less than 3 tons after the conversion, this became another serious problem that led to the Diana’s demise: during trials the Bundeswehr considered the possibility to airlift the Diana, but its weight (even that of the Luchs, BTW) was too much for the Luftwaffe’s biggest own transport aircraft, the C-160 Transall. Even aircraft from other NATO members, e.g. the common C-130 Hercules, could hardly carry the vehicle. In theory, equipment had to be removed, including the cannon and parts of its mount.

During the World War II, the Slovak Air force was charged with the defense of Slovak airspace, and, after the invasion of Russia, provided air cover for Slovak forces fighting against the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front. For the rest of the war the SVZ fought US Army Air Forces and Royal Air Force raids against Slovakia.

Among the many more or less outdated German aircraft types inherited from the Luftwaffe during the early stages of WWII was a small number of Hs 123 A-1 dive bombers. The Henschel Hs 123 was a small single-seat biplane dive bomber and close-support attack aircraft. The aircraft was designed to meet the 1933 dive bomber requirements for the reborn Luftwaffe. Both Henschel and rival Fieseler (with the Fi 98) competed for the production contract requirement, which specified a single-seat biplane dive bomber. The first prototype, the Hs 123 V1, was cleared for its maiden flight on 1 April 1935; General Ernst Udet, a World War I ace, flew it on its first public demonstration flight on 8 May 1935. The first three Henschel prototypes, with the first and third powered by 485 kW (650 hp) BMW 132A-3 engines and the second by a 574 kW (770 hp) Wright Cyclone, were tested at Rechlin in August 1936. Only the first prototype had "smooth" cowlings; from that point on, all aircraft had a tightly fitting, characteristic cowling that included 18 fairings covering the engine valves. The Henschel prototypes did away with bracing wires and although they looked slightly outdated with their single faired interplane struts and cantilever main landing gear legs attached to smaller (stub) lower wings, the Hs 123 featured an all-metal construction, clean lines and superior maneuverability. Its biplane wings were of a "sesquiplane" configuration, whereby the lower wings were significantly smaller than the top wings.

The overall performance of the Hs 123 V1 prototype prematurely eliminated any chance for the more conventional Fi 98, which was cancelled after a sole prototype had been constructed. During testing, the Hs 123 proved capable of pulling out of "near-vertical" dives; however, two prototypes subsequently crashed due to structural failures in the wings that occurred when the aircraft were tested in high-speed dives. The fourth prototype incorporated improvements to cure these problems; principally, stronger center-section struts were fitted. After it had been successfully tested, the Hs 123 was ordered into production with a 656 kW (880 hp) BMW 132Dc engine.

The Hs 123 was intended to replace the Heinkel He 50 biplane reconnaissance and dive bomber as well as acting as a "stop-gap" measure until the more modern and capable Junkers Ju 87 became available. As such, production was limited and no upgrades were considered, although an improved version, the Hs 123B, was developed by Henschel in 1938. A proposal to fit the aircraft with a more powerful 716 kW (960 hp) "K"-variant of its BMW 132 engine did not proceed beyond the prototype stage, the Hs 123 V5. The V6 prototype fitted with a similar powerplant and featuring a sliding cockpit hood was intended to serve as the Hs 123C prototype.

About 265 aircraft were produced and production of the Hs 123A ended in Autumn 1938. It was flown by the German Luftwaffe during the Spanish Civil War and the early to midpoint of World War II. At the outbreak of hostilities, Hs 123s were committed to action in the Polish Campaign. Screaming over the heads of enemy troops, the Hs 123s delivered their bombs with devastating accuracy. A frightening aspect of an Hs 123 attack was the staccato noise of its engine that a pilot could manipulate by changing rpm to create "gunfire-like" bursts. The Hs 123 proved rugged and able to take a lot of damage and still keep on flying. Operating from primitive bases close to the front lines, the type was considered by ground crews to be easy to maintain, quick to re-equip and reliable even under dire field conditions.

The Polish campaign was a success for an aircraft considered obsolete by the Luftwaffe high command. Within a year, the Hs 123 was again in action in the Blitzkrieg attacks through the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Often positioned as the Luftwaffe's most-forward based combat unit, the Hs 123s flew more missions per day than other units, and again proved their worth in the close-support role. With Ju 87s still being used as tactical bombers rather than true ground support aircraft and with no other aircraft capable of this mission in the Luftwaffe arsenal the Hs 123 was destined to continue in service for some time, although numbers were constantly being reduced by attrition.

The Hs 123 was not employed in the subsequent Battle of Britain as the English Channel proved an insuperable obstacle for the short-ranged aircraft, and the sole leftover operator, II.(Schl)/LG 2, went back to Germany to re-equip with the Messerschmitt Bf 109E fighter bomber (Jabo) variant. The Bf 109E fighter bomber was not capable of carrying any more bombs than the Hs 123. It did, however, have a greater range and was far more capable of defending itself. On the downside were the notoriously tricky taxiing, ground handling, and takeoff/landing characteristics of the Bf 109, which were exacerbated with a bomb load.

At the beginning of the Balkans Campaign, the 32 examples of the Hs 123 that had been retired after the fall of France were taken back into service and handed over to the Slovak Air Force to replace the heavy losses on the Eastern Front after combat fatigue and desertion had reduced the pilots' effectiveness. Most of Slovakia's obsolete biplanes were replaced with modern German combat aircraft, including the Messerschmitt Bf 109, so that the Hs 123s were initially regarded with distrust – but the machines proved their worth in the ensuing battles. The Slovak Hs 123s took part in the Battle of Kursk and supported ground troops, some were outfitted with locally designed ski landing gears which proved to be a very effective alternative to the Hs 123’s spatted standard landing gear which was prone to collect snow and mud and even block. After this deployment at the Russian front, the Slovak Air Force was sent back to defend Slovak home air space, primarily executed with Messerschmitt Bf 109 E and G types, Avia B-534, and some other interceptor types, also helped by Luftwaffe units active in the area.

Being confined to national borders, the Slovak Hs 123s were put in reserve and relegated to training purposes, even though they were occasionally activated to support German ground troops. From late August 1944 the remaining Hs 123s also actively took part in the suppression of the Slovak National Uprising against Germany.