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Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, HE Lindiwe Sisulu visiting the Maseru Bridge Border, and met with the His Majecsty King Letsie III. [Photo: DIRCO]
Shown here is an image from the Virginia Council on Human Relations, on display in the Nancy Marshall Gallery, located just outside the Special Collections Research Center on the first floor of Swem Library at the College of William & Mary. This exhibit is part of "From Fights to Rights: The Long Road to a More Perfect Union," Swem Library's project to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Civil War and the 50th anniversary of the Civil Rights Movement. The exhibit is on display from October 17, 2011 through April 15, 2012.
The following are transcriptions of the label text presented in this case:
The Virginia Council of Human Relations (VCHR) was a bi-racial organization that worked to foster communication and improve relations between blacks and whites. It worked through a state-wide organization and established local groups to support educational programs, school desegregation, fair employment practices, and other issues of the day. The VCHR was an affiliate of the Atlanta-based Southern Regional Council, which began forming state and local Human Relations Councils to bring together black and white citizens as it worked for the implementation of the Brown v. Board of Education decision. The VCHR was active from the mid-1950s through the mid-1960s.
Local Councils
The Virginia Council on Human Relations' (VCHR) local organizations played an important role in the group's operations. Local councils from Northern Virginia to Tidewater to Charlottesville and beyond provided communities with channels for discussion and action and thus helped to increase the overall membership of the VCHR. Local councils also hosted prominent speakers and social events, as well as more informal gatherings for individuals to share experiences and strategies on matters such as integrating workplaces.
Excerpt from Deborah Straszheim, “City Girl Wary Of Dark Woods In Small Town,” Daily Press 29 April 1999
Rubye DeWitt was a city girl; she certainly wasn't wise to the ways of a place like Williamsburg in 1953. The woods were so dark she was afraid to stay home alone.
[Rubye DeWitt’s] husband, Dee, had just landed a job with Colonial Williamsburg as assistant
director of employment. He was one of the first blacks to hold an administrative job there, and Rubye knew CW was more enlightened than most
employers. That was another thing about moving that scared her; the further south you went, the worse it was for blacks.
[…]
Meanwhile, Rubye DeWitt's husband made strides at Colonial Williamsburg. Harold DeWitt was hired before integration, but he was able to get Colonial Williamsburg to hire black employees as bus drivers and as projectionists in the information center, his wife said. In many ways, Colonial Williamsburg and the College of William and Mary attracted a more cosmopolitan group to Williamsburg than most cities had at that time, she said. By the time DeWitt retired, he was director of employment.
Then there were the shops that began to serve blacks. Rubye DeWitt remembers Mr. Hickman, the man who bought Binn's clothing store from two old ladies. When he bought the store, there was a clause in the contract that blacks were not to be served there, DeWitt said. Mr. Hickman took it to court.
"And once the thing cleared the court, he sent us letters. Inviting us, personally, you know, to come and shop. And we did."
"He made it into a very stylish, fashionable type store. ... It was a wonderful store. He treated all of his customers the same way, and he treated all of his customers like he was really, really happy to have them as customer."
Portrait of Harold O. DeWitt, former Director of Personnel for Colonial Williamsburg
Image # 1965-GR-0520
Courtesy of Colonial Williamsburg Foundation
Obituary, Daily Press, 28 September 1990
Harold O. DeWitt, 78, a retired Colonial Williamsburg executive, died Wednesday, Sept. 26, in a Medical College of Virginia Hospital in Richmond.
Mr. DeWitt retired from Colonial Williamsburg Foundation as director of employment in 1978 after 26 years of service. He was a member of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission under Govs. Robb and Baliles. In 1950, as a member of the Urban
League, he made a study of black firefighters in the South, which was published in The New York Times, resulting in Richmond's first hiring of black firefighters.
In the early 1960s, Mr. DeWitt was instrumental in persuading the Rockefeller family to donate land
what would become Quarterpath Park to provide a
safe place for black children to swim. He also
initiated project Shoe Bank which served the needs
of indigent children in Williamsburg, James City and York Schools.Mr. DeWitt also served as a
Williamsburg representative on the Williamsburg- James City County School Board.
A native of New York City, he had been a Peninsula resident since 1953. Mr. DeWitt was a member of St. Martin's Episcopal Church, where he served in the vestry, on the Usher Board, and as a Sunday school teacher. He was a life member of the Capitol
District Foundation of Kiwanis International and
past club director of Williamsburg Kiwanis. He was
a member of American Rose Society and the Peninsula Rose Society, a United Way officer. He was also
Omega Man of the Year for the Phi Phi Chapter of
Omega Psi Phi Fraternity. Mr. DeWitt graduated from Virginia State University, and attended Hope College in Michigan. He also attended Columbia University.
Survivors include his wife, Rubye M. DeWitt; and a sister, Katherine McDermott of Coram, N.Y.
Williamsburg Local Chapter
The Williamsburg chapter of the Virginia Council on Human Relations joined the state-wide group in 1962 and grew out of the Williamsburg Area Interracial Study Group, which was founded in the late 1950s. A number of William & Mary faculty were members, including historian Richard Sherman and his wife Hanni, historian Thad Tate, and architect Robert Ames. Members of the Williamsburg council included Colonial Williamsburg director of employment Harold O. DeWitt and his wife Rubye, Clara Byrd Baker and Dr. James Blaine Blayton, for whom two of Williamsburg-James City County's elementary schools are named, and others.
The Special Collections Research Center would welcome more material and information about the Williamsburg Area Interracial Study Group and the Williamsburg local council of the VCHR. Visit or contact us for more information.
Richard B. Sherman
Professor Richard B. Sherman was a professor in the Department of History at the College of William & Mary from 1960-1994. In the memoir he wrote for his family, Learning from the Past: Memoirs of a Would-Be Historian, Sherman relates his memories of race
relations upon arriving in Williamsburg in 1960 and of the formation of the Williamsburg chapter of the Virginia Council on Human Relations (VCHR).
A letter in response to questions from a member of the VCHR provides another window into race relations in Williamsburg in the early 1960s.
Colonial Echo
The College of William & Mary yearbook, the Colonial Echo, has been digitized by Swem Library and all volumes from 1899-1995 are available from the W&M Digital Archive at digitalarchive.wm.edu/colonialecho/.
Searching for a copy of the yearbook from your William & Mary years? Contact University Archivist Amy Schindler at acschi@wm.edu or 757-221-3090 to inquire if copies are available.
Unless otherwise indicated, all material is from the Virginia Council of Human Relations Records, Special Collections Research Center, Swem Library.
From the Special Collections Research Center, Earl Gregg Swem Library at the College of William and Mary. See swem.wm.edu/scrc/ for further information and assistance
Israel Hayom Forum for Israel-US Relations
U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley and Special Representative for International Negotiations Jason Greenblatt participate in the Israel Hayom Forum for Israel-U.S. Relations in Jerusalem.
A good panoramic view of China’s recent development and its current rejection of the democracy model for its own governance, by former Singapore ambassador to the UN, Kishore Mahbubani:
Columbia Professor Jeffrey Sachs on the Covid vaccines, New World Order, global leadership and multilateralism:
Former U.S. Ambassador Max Baucus on Speaker Nancy Pelosi's Taiwan trip:
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The Foreign Affairs article below is typical American, full of obligatory and unsubstantiated propaganda spread by the West even though it's not all complimentary about the U.S. The fact is China has alleviated extreme poverty; millions of Chinese tourists have visited overseas with hundreds of thousands of students attended various universities in the West without a single individual seeking political asylum. If China were as repressive as the West describes, wouldn't these tourists and students seek political asylum while abroad? There have been no proven evidence of any mistreatment of Uyghurs inside China. If as many as 2 million Uyghurs were incarcerated, surely, the West can show us satellite photos of these humongous prison camps, right? The fact is an overwhelming majority of the people in China believe their country is heading the right direction.
worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/freedom-index-...
In this 2022 freedom Index, Hong Kong ranks #30, ahead of South Korea (31) France (34) and Singapore (48).
When President Jimmy Carter established diplomatic relationship with China in 1978, he agreed to the Shanghai Communiqué which reads, among others, "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China."
The author fails to disclose that Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen unwillingness to accept the 1992 Consensus is one of main reasons for Mainland China's treatment of her.
www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-trap-us-foreign-policy...
The China Trap
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Perilous Logic of Zero-Sum Competition
By Jessica Chen Weiss
Competition with China has begun to consume U.S. foreign policy. Seized with the challenge of a near-peer rival whose interests and values diverge sharply from those of the United States, U.S. politicians and policymakers are becoming so focused on countering China that they risk losing sight of the affirmative interests and values that should underpin U.S. strategy. The current course will not just bring indefinite deterioration of the U.S.-Chinese relationship and a growing danger of catastrophic conflict; it also threatens to undermine the sustainability of American leadership in the world and the vitality of American society and democracy at home.
There is, of course, good reason why a more powerful China has become the central concern of policymakers and strategists in Washington (and plenty of other capitals). Under President Xi Jinping especially, Beijing has grown more authoritarian at home and more coercive abroad. It has brutally repressed Uyghurs in Xinjiang, crushed democratic freedoms in Hong Kong, rapidly expanded its conventional and nuclear arsenals, aggressively intercepted foreign military aircraft in the East and South China Seas, condoned Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and amplified Russian disinformation, exported censorship and surveillance technology, denigrated democracies, worked to reshape international norms—the list could go on and will likely only get longer, especially if Xi secures a third five-year term and further solidifies his control later this year.
Yet well-warranted alarm risks morphing into a reflexive fear that could reshape American policy and society in counterproductive and ultimately harmful ways. In attempting to craft a national strategy suited to a more assertive and more powerful China, Washington has struggled to define success, or even a steady state, short of total victory or total defeat, that both governments could eventually accept and at a cost that citizens, businesses, and other stakeholders would be willing to bear. Without a clear sense of what it seeks or any semblance of a domestic consensus on how the United States should relate to the world, U.S. foreign policy has become reactive, spinning in circles rather than steering toward a desired destination.
To its credit, the Biden administration has acknowledged that the United States and its partners must provide an attractive alternative to what China is offering, and it has taken some steps in the right direction, such as multilateral initiatives on climate and hunger. Yet the instinct to counter every Chinese initiative, project, and provocation remains predominant, crowding out efforts to revitalize an inclusive international system that would protect U.S. interests and values even as global power shifts and evolves. Even with the war in Ukraine claiming considerable U.S. attention and resources, the conflict’s broader effect has been to intensify focus on geopolitical competition, reinforced by Chinese-Russian convergence.
Leaders in both Washington and Beijing claim to want to avoid a new Cold War. The fact is that their countries are already engaged in a global struggle. The United States seeks to perpetuate its preeminence and an international system that privileges its interests and values; China sees U.S. leadership as weakened by hypocrisy and neglect, providing an opening to force others to accept its influence and legitimacy. On both sides, there is growing fatalism that a crisis is unavoidable and perhaps even necessary: that mutually accepted rules of fair play and coexistence will come only after the kind of eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation that characterized the early years of the Cold War—survival of which was not guaranteed then and would be even less assured now.
Even in the absence of a crisis, a reactive posture has begun to drive a range of U.S. policies. Washington frequently falls into the trap of trying to counter Chinese efforts around the world without appreciating what local governments and populations want. Lacking a forward-looking vision aligned with a realistic assessment of the resources at its disposal, it struggles to prioritize across domains and regions. It too often compromises its own broader interests as fractious geopolitics make necessary progress on global challenges all but impossible. The long-term risk is that the United States will be unable to manage a decades-long competition without falling into habits of intolerance at home and overextension abroad. In attempting to out-China China, the United States could undermine the strengths and obscure the vision that should be the basis for sustained American leadership.
The lodestar for a better approach must be the world that the United States seeks: what it wants, rather than what it fears. Whether sanctions or tariffs or military moves, policies should be judged on the basis of whether they further progress toward that world rather than whether they undermine some Chinese interest or provide some advantage over Beijing. They should represent U.S. power at its best rather than mirroring the behavior it aims to avert. And rather than looking back nostalgically at its past preeminence, Washington must commit, with actions as well as words, to a positive-sum vision of a reformed international system that includes China and meets the existential need to tackle shared challenges.
That does not mean giving up well-calibrated efforts to deter Chinese aggression, enhance resilience against Chinese coercion, and reinforce U.S. alliances. But these must be paired with meaningful discussions with Beijing, not only about crisis communications and risk reduction but also about plausible terms of coexistence and the future of the international system—a future that Beijing will necessarily have some role in shaping. An inclusive and affirmative global vision would both discipline competition and make clear what Beijing has to lose. Otherwise, as the relationship deteriorates and the sense of threat grows, the logic of zero-sum competition will become even more overwhelming, and the resulting escalatory spiral will undermine both American interests and American values. That logic will warp global priorities and erode the international system. It will fuel pervasive insecurity and reinforce a tendency toward groupthink, damaging the pluralism and civic inclusion that are the bedrock of liberal democracy. And if not altered, it will perpetuate a vicious cycle that will eventually bring catastrophe.
THE INEVITABLE RIVALRY?
In Washington, the standard account for why the relationship has gotten so bad is that China changed: in the past decade or two, Beijing has stopped “biding its time,” becoming more repressive at home and assertive abroad even while continuing to take advantage of the relationships and institutions that have enabled China’s economic growth.
That change is certainly part of the story, and it is as much a product of China’s growing clout as of Xi’s way of using that clout. But a complete account must also acknowledge corresponding changes in U.S. politics and policy as the United States has reacted to developments in China. Washington has met Beijing’s actions with an array of punitive actions and protective policies, from tariffs and sanctions to restrictions on commercial and scientific exchanges. In the process, the United States has drifted further from the principles of openness and nondiscrimination that have long been a comparative advantage while reinforcing Beijing’s conviction that the United States will never tolerate a more powerful China. Meanwhile, the United States has wavered in its support for the international institutions and agreements that have long structured global interdependence, driven in part by consternation over China’s growing influence within the international system.
The more combative approach, on both sides, has produced a mirroring dynamic. While Beijing believes that only through protracted struggle will Americans be persuaded to coexist with a strong China, Washington believes that it must check Chinese power and influence to defend U.S. primacy. The result is a downward spiral, with each side’s efforts to enhance its security prompting the other to take further steps to enhance its own.
In explaining growing U.S.-Chinese tensions, some scholars point to structural shifts in the balance of power. Graham Allison has written of “the Thucydides trap”: the notion that when a rising state challenges an established power, a war for hegemony frequently results. Yet a focus on capabilities alone has trouble accounting for the twists and turns in U.S.-Chinese relations, which are also driven by shifting perceptions of threat, opportunity, and purpose. Following President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing, Washington came to view China as a strategic partner in containing the Soviet Union. And as the post–Cold War era dawned, U.S. policymakers began hedging against growing Chinese military power even while seeking to encourage the country’s economic and political liberalization through greater integration.
Throughout this period, Chinese leaders saw a strategic opportunity to prioritize China’s development in a stable international environment. They opened the country’s doors to foreign investment and capitalist practices, seeking to learn from foreign expertise while periodically campaigning against “spiritual pollution” and “bourgeois liberalization.” Despite occasional attempts to signal resolve, including during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis and after the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, Chinese leaders largely adhered to the former leader Deng Xiaoping’s lying-low strategy to avoid triggering the sense of threat that could precipitate efforts to strangle China’s rise.
If there is a year that marked an inflection point in China’s approach to the world, it is not 2012, when Xi came to power, but 2008. The global financial crisis prompted Beijing to discard any notion that China was the student and the United States the teacher when it came to economic governance. And the Beijing Olympics that year were meant to mark China’s arrival on the world stage, but much of the world was focused instead on riots in Tibet, which Chinese officials chalked up to outside meddling, and on China’s subsequent crackdown. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became increasingly fixated on the idea that foreign forces were intent on thwarting China’s rise.
In the years that followed, the halting movement toward liberalization went into reverse: the party cracked down on the teaching of liberal ideas and the activities of foreign nongovernmental organizations, crushed pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and built a sprawling surveillance state and system of internment camps in Xinjiang—all manifestations of a broader conception of “national security,” animated by fears of unrest. Internationally, China gave up any semblance of strategic humility. It became more assertive in defending its territorial and maritime claims (along the Indian border, in the East and South China Seas, and with regard to Taiwan). Having surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, it began wielding its economic power to compel deference to CCP interests. It ramped up development of military capabilities that could counter U.S. intervention in the region, including expanding its once limited nuclear arsenal. The decision to develop many of these capabilities predated Xi, but it was under his leadership that Beijing embraced a more coercive and intolerant approach.
As it registered China’s growing capabilities and willingness to use them, Washington increased its hedging. The Obama administration announced that it would “pivot” to Asia, and even as Washington sought a constructive role for China in the international system, the pace of China’s rise quickly outstripped U.S. willingness to grant it a correspondingly significant voice. With Donald Trump’s election as president, Washington’s assessment became especially extreme: a Marxist-Leninist regime was, in Trump’s telling, out to “rape” the United States, dominate the world, and subvert democracy. In response, the Trump administration started a trade war, began to talk of “decoupling” the U.S. and Chinese economies, and launched a series of initiatives aimed at countering Chinese influence and undermining the CCP. In speeches, senior U.S. officials hinted at regime change, calling for steps to “empower the Chinese people” to seek a different form of government and stressing that “Chinese history contains another path for China’s people.”
The Biden administration has stopped any talk of regime change in China and coordinated its approach closely with allies and partners, a contrast with Trump’s unilateralism. But it has at the same time continued many of its predecessor’s policies and endorsed the assessment that China’s growing influence must be checked. Some lines of effort, such as the Justice Department’s China Initiative, which sought to prosecute intellectual property theft and economic espionage, have been modified. But others have been sustained, including tariffs, export controls, and visa restrictions, or expanded, such as sanctions against Chinese officials and companies. In Congress, meanwhile, ever more vehement opposition to China may be the sole thing that Democrats and Republicans can agree on, though even this shared concern has produced only limited agreement (such as recent legislation on domestic semiconductor investments) on how the United States should compete.
Over five decades, the United States tried a combination of engagement and deterrence to bring China into an international system that broadly sustains U.S. interests and values. American policymakers knew well that their Chinese counterparts were committed to defending CCP rule, but Washington calculated that the world would be less dangerous with China inside rather than outside the system. That bet largely succeeded—and is still better than the alternative. Yet many in Washington always hoped for, and to varying degrees sought to promote, China’s liberal evolution as well. China’s growing authoritarianism has thus fed the narrative of a comprehensive U.S. policy failure, and the focus on correcting that failure has entrenched Beijing’s insecurity and belief that the United States and its allies will not accept China as a superpower.
Now, both countries are intent on doing whatever is necessary to demonstrate that any move by the other will not go unmet. Both U.S. and Chinese decision-makers believe that the other side respects only strength and interprets restraint as weakness. At this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, China’s defense minister, General Wei Fenghe, pledged to “fight to the very end” over Taiwan a day after meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.
TELL ME HOW THIS ENDS
Where the current trajectory leads is clear: a more dangerous and less habitable world defined by an ever-present risk of confrontation and crisis, with preparation for conflict taking precedence over tackling common challenges.
Most policymakers, at least those in Washington, are not seeking a crisis between the United States and China. But there is growing acceptance that a crisis is more or less inevitable. Its consequences would be enormous. Even if both sides want to avoid war, crises by definition offer little time for response amid intense public scrutiny, making it difficult to find pathways to deescalation. Even the limited application of force or coercion could set in motion an unpredictable set of responses across multiple domains—military, economic, diplomatic, informational. As leaders maneuver to show resolve and protect their domestic reputations, a crisis could prove very difficult to contain.
Taiwan is the most likely flash point, as changes in both Taipei and Beijing have increasingly put the island at the center of U.S.-Chinese tensions. Demographic and generational shifts in Taiwan, combined with China’s crackdown in Hong Kong, have heightened Taiwan’s resistance to the idea of Beijing’s control and made peaceful unification seem increasingly fanciful. After Taiwan’s traditionally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency in 2016, Beijing took a hard line against the new president, Tsai Ing-wen, despite her careful efforts to avoid moves toward formal independence. Cross strait channels of communication shut down, and Beijing relied on increasingly coercive measures to punish and deter what it perceived as incremental moves toward Taiwan’s permanent separation.
In response, the United States increased military patrols in and around the Taiwan Strait, loosened guidelines for interacting with Taiwanese officials, broadened U.S. declaratory policy to emphasize support for Taiwan, and continued to advocate for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including the United Nations. Yet many well-intentioned U.S. efforts to support the island and deter China have instead fueled Beijing’s sense of urgency about the need to send a shot across the bow to deter steadily growing U.S.-Taiwanese ties.
Even with an official U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” on whether the United States would intervene in the event of an attack on Taiwan, Chinese military planners expect U.S. involvement. Indeed, the anticipated difficulty of seizing Taiwan while also holding the United States at bay has long underpinned deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. But many U.S. actions intended to bolster the island’s ability to resist coercion have been symbolic rather than substantive, doing more to provoke than deter Beijing. For example, the Trump administration’s efforts to upend norms around U.S. engagement with Taiwan—in August 2020, Secretary for Health and Human Services Alex Azar became the highest-ranking cabinet member to visit Taiwan since full normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations in 1979—prompted China to send combat aircraft across the center line of the Taiwan Strait, ignoring an unofficial guardrail that had long served to facilitate safe operations in the waterway. Intrusions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) have become a frequent means for Beijing to register displeasure with growing U.S. support. In October 2021, Chinese intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ hit a new high—93 aircraft over three days—in response to nearby U.S.-led military exercises.
This action-reaction cycle, driven by mutually reinforcing developments in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, is accelerating the deterioration of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. In recent months, Chinese official rhetoric has become increasingly threatening, using phrases that have historically signaled China’s intent to escalate. “Whoever plays with fire will get burnt,” Xi has repeatedly told U.S. President Joe Biden. In May, after Biden implied an unconditional commitment to defend Taiwan, rather than simply expressing the longstanding U.S. obligation to provide the island with the military means to defend itself and to maintain the U.S. capacity to resist any use of force, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stressed that Beijing “will take firm actions to safeguard its sovereignty and security interests.”
Although Beijing continues to prefer peaceful unification, it is coming to believe that coercive measures may be necessary to halt moves toward Taiwan’s permanent separation and compel steps toward unification, particularly given the Chinese perception that Washington’s support for Taiwan is a means to contain China. Even if confidence in China’s military and economic trajectory leads Beijing to believe that “time and momentum” remain on its side, political trends in Taiwan and in the United States make officials increasingly pessimistic about prospects for peaceful unification. Beijing has not set a timetable for seizing Taiwan and does not appear to be looking for an excuse to do so. Still, as the political scientist Taylor Fravel has shown, China has used force when it thinks its claims of sovereignty are being challenged. High-profile symbolic gestures of U.S. support for Taiwan are especially likely to be construed as an affront that must be answered. (As of this writing, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the first trip by a U.S. speaker of the house since 1997, has prompted Chinese warnings that “the Chinese military will never sit idly by,” followed by unprecedently threatening military exercises and missile tests around Taiwan.)
As both the United States and Taiwan head into presidential elections in 2024, party politics could prompt more efforts to push the envelope on Taiwan’s political status and de jure independence. It is far from clear whether Tsai’s successor as president will be as steadfast as she has been in resisting pressure from strident advocates of independence. Even under Tsai, there have been troubling signs that DPP leaders are not content with the status quo despite its popularity with voters. DPP leaders have lobbied Washington to refrain from making statements that the United States does not support Taiwan independence. In March, Taipei’s representative office in Washington gave former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo a hefty honorarium to visit Taiwan, where he called on the United States to offer the island “diplomatic recognition as a free and sovereign country.”
The risk of a fatal collision in the air or at sea is also rising outside the Taiwan Strait. With the Chinese and U.S. militaries operating in proximity in the East and South China Seas, both intent on demonstrating their willingness to fight, pilots and operators are employing dangerous tactics that raise the risk of an inadvertent clash. In 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided with a U.S. reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea, killing the Chinese pilot and leading to the 11-day detention of the U.S. crew. After initial grandstanding, the Chinese worked to head off a full-blown crisis, even cracking down on displays of anti-Americanism in the streets. It is much harder to imagine such a resolution today: the desire to display resolve and avoid showing weakness would make it exceedingly difficult to defuse a standoff.
THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD
Even if the two sides can avoid a crisis, continuation of the current course will reinforce geopolitical divisions while inhibiting cooperation on global problems. The United States is increasingly focused on rallying countries around the world to stand against China. But to the extent that a coalition to counter China forms, especially given the ideological framing that both the Trump and Biden administrations have adopted, that coalition is unlikely to include the range of partners that might stand to defend universal laws and institutions. “Asian countries do not want to be forced to choose between the two,” Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong wrote of China and the United States in these pages in 2020. “And if either attempts to force such a choice—if Washington tries to contain China’s rise or Beijing seeks to build an exclusive sphere of influence in Asia—they will begin a course of confrontation that will last decades and put the long-heralded Asian century in jeopardy.”
The current approach to competition is also likely to strengthen the alignment between China and Russia. The Biden administration has managed to deter Chinese military assistance to Russia in Ukraine, and China has mostly complied with sanctions, demonstrating that there are in fact limits to Beijing and Moscow’s “no limits” partnership. But so long as the two governments share a belief that they cannot be secure in a U.S.-led system, they will continue to deepen their cooperation. In the months since the invasion of Ukraine, they have carried out joint military patrols in the Pacific Ocean and worked to develop alternatives to the U.S.-controlled financial system.
Ultimately, Chinese-Russian relations will be shaped by how Beijing weighs its need to resist the United States against its need to preserve ties to international capital and technology that foster growth. China’s alignment with Russia is not historically determined: there is an ongoing high-level debate within Beijing over how close to get to Moscow, with the costs of full-fledged alignment producing consternation among some Chinese analysts. Yet unless Washington can credibly suggest that Beijing will see strategic benefits, not only strategic risks, from distancing itself from Moscow, advocates of closer Chinese-Russian cooperation will continue to win the argument.
Growing geopolitical tension also crowds out progress on common challenges, regardless of the Biden administration’s desire to compartmentalize certain issues. Although U.S. climate envoy John Kerry has made some headway on climate cooperation with China, including a joint declaration at last year’s climate summit in Glasgow, progress has been outweighed by acrimony in areas where previous joint efforts had borne fruit, including counternarcotics, nonproliferation, and North Korea. On both sides, too many policymakers fear that willingness to cooperate will be interpreted as a lack of resolve.
Such tensions are further eroding the already weak foundations of global governance. It is not clear how much longer the center of the international rules-based order can hold without a broad-based effort at its renewal. But as Beijing has grown more concerned that the United States seeks to contain or roll back its influence—by, for example, denying it a greater say in international economic governance—the more it has invested in alternative institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Meanwhile, China’s engagement with the multilateral system is increasingly aimed at discrediting U.S. leadership within it. Even though Beijing has not exactly demonstrated fealty to many of the principles it claims to support, the divide between the haves and have-nots has allowed it to cast the United States as protecting the privileges of a minority of powerful states. At the United Nations, Beijing and Washington too often strive to undercut each other’s initiatives, launching symbolic battles that require third countries to choose between the two.
Last but far from least, a fixation on competition brings costs and dangers in the United States. Aggressive U.S. efforts to protect research security, combined with increased attacks against Asian Americans, are having a chilling effect on scientific research and international collaboration and are jeopardizing the appeal of the United States as a magnet for international talent. A 2021 survey by the American Physical Society found that 43 percent of international physics graduate students and early career scientists in the United States considered the country unwelcoming; around half of international early career scientists in the United States thought the government’s approach to research security made them less likely to stay there over the long term. These effects are particularly pronounced among scientists of Chinese descent. A recent study by the Asian American Scholar Forum found that 67 percent of faculty of Chinese origin (including naturalized citizens and permanent residents) reported having considered leaving the United States.
As the United States has sought to shield itself from Chinese espionage, theft, and unfair trading practices, it has often insisted on reciprocity as a precondition for commercial, educational, and diplomatic exchanges with Beijing. But strict reciprocity with an increasingly closed system like China’s comes at a cost to the United States’ comparative advantage: the traditional openness, transparency, and equal opportunity of its society and economy, which drive innovation, productivity, and scientific progress.
The climate of insecurity and fear is also having pernicious effects on democracy and the quality of public debate about China and U.S. policy. The desire to avoid appearing “soft” on China permeates private and public policy discussions. The result is an echo chamber that encourages analysts, bureaucrats, and officials to be politically rather than analytically correct. When individuals feel the need to out-hawk one another to protect themselves and advance professionally, the result is groupthink. A policy environment that incentivizes self-censorship and reflexive positioning forecloses pluralistic debate and a vibrant marketplace for ideas, ingredients critical to the United States’ national competitiveness.
From the World War II internment of Japanese Americans to the McCarthyism of the 1950s to hate crimes against Muslim and Sikh Americans after September 11, U.S. history is replete with examples of innocent Americans caught in the crossfire of exaggerated fears of the “enemy within.” In each case, overreaction did as much as or more than the adversary to undermine U.S. democracy and unity. Although the Biden administration has condemned anti-Asian hate and stressed that policy must target behavior rather than ethnicity, some government agencies and U.S. politicians have continued to imply that an individual’s ethnicity and ties to family abroad are grounds for heightened scrutiny.
BEFORE CATASTROPHE
If the United States and Soviet Union could arrive at détente, there is no reason that Washington and Beijing cannot do so as well. Early in the Cold War, President John F. Kennedy, hailing the need to “make the world safe for diversity,” stressed that “our attitude is as essential as theirs.” He warned Americans “not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.”
Even while making clear that Beijing will pay a high price if it resorts to force or other forms of coercion, Washington must present China with a real choice. Deterrence requires that threats be paired with assurances. To that end, U.S. policymakers should not be afraid of engaging directly with their Chinese counterparts to discuss terms on which the United States and China could coexist, including mutual bounds on competition. It was relatively easy for Americans to imagine coexistence with a China thought to be on a one-way path of liberalization. The United States and its partners now have the harder task of imagining coexistence with an authoritarian superpower, finding a new basis for bilateral interaction that focuses on shaping outward behavior rather than changing China’s domestic system.
The most pressing need relates to Taiwan, where the United States must bolster deterrence while also clarifying that its “one China” policy has not changed. This means ensuring that Beijing knows how costly a crisis over Taiwan would be, putting at risk its broader development and modernization objectives—but also that if it refrains from coercive action, neither Washington nor Taipei will exploit the opportunity to push the envelope further. While Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other senior officials have affirmed that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence, other actions by the administration (especially Biden’s repeated statements suggesting an end to “strategic ambiguity”) have sown doubt.
While helping bolster Taiwan’s resilience to Chinese coercion, Washington should avoid characterizing Taiwan as a vital asset for U.S. interests. Such statements feed Beijing’s belief that the United States seeks to “use Taiwan to contain China,” as China’s ambassador to Washington put it in May. The United States should instead make clear its abiding interest in a peaceful process for resolving cross-strait differences rather than in a particular outcome. And as they highlight the costs Beijing can expect if it escalates its coercive campaign against Taiwan, U.S. policymakers should also stress to Taipei that unilateral efforts to change Taiwan’s political status, including calls for de jure independence, U.S. diplomatic recognition, or other symbolic steps to signal Taiwan’s permanent separation from China, are counterproductive.
These steps will be necessary but not sufficient to pierce the growing fatalism regarding a crisis, given Beijing’s hardening belief that the United States seeks to contain China and will use Taiwan to that end. To put a floor beneath the collapsing U.S.-China relationship will require a stronger effort to establish bounds of fair competition and a willingness to discuss terms of coexistence. Despite recent meetings and calls, senior U.S. officials do not yet have regular engagements with their counterparts that would facilitate such discussions. These discussions should be coordinated with U.S. allies and partners to prevent Beijing from trying to drive a wedge between the United States and others in Europe and Asia. But Washington should also forge a common understanding with its allies and partners around potential forms of coexistence with China.
Skeptics may say that there is no reason for the leadership in Beijing to play along, given its triumphalism and distrust. These are significant obstacles, but it is worth testing the proposition that Washington can take steps to stabilize escalating tensions without first experiencing multiple crises with a nuclear-armed competitor. There is reason to believe that Beijing cares enough about stabilizing relations to reciprocate. Despite its claim that the “East is rising and the West is declining,” China remains the weaker party, especially given its uncertain economic trajectory. Domestic challenges have typically tended to restrain China’s behavior rather than, as some Western commentators have speculated, prompting risky gambles. The political scientist Andrew Chubb has shown that when Chinese leaders have faced challenges to their legitimacy, they have acted less assertively in areas such as the South China Sea.
Because Beijing and Washington are loath to make unilateral concessions, fearing that they will be interpreted as a sign of weakness at home and by the other side, détente will require reciprocity. Both sides will have to take coordinated but unilateral steps to head off a militarized crisis. For example, a tacit understanding could produce a reduction in Chinese and U.S. operations in and around the Taiwan Strait, lowering the temperature without signaling weakness. Military operations are necessary to demonstrate that the United States will continue to fly and sail wherever international law allows, including the Taiwan Strait. But ultimately, the United States’ ability to deter and Taiwan’s ability to defend against an attempt at armed unification by Beijing have little to do with whether the U.S. military transits the Taiwan Strait four, eight, 12, or 24 times a year.
In the current atmosphere of distrust, words must be matched by actions. In his November 2021 virtual meeting with Biden, Xi said, “We have patience and will strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with utmost sincerity and efforts.” But Beijing’s actions since have undercut its credibility in Taipei and in Washington. Biden likewise told Xi that the United States does not seek a new Cold War or want to change Beijing’s system. Yet subsequent U.S. actions (including efforts to diversify supply chains away from China and new visa restrictions on CCP officials) have undermined Washington’s credibility among not just leaders in Beijing but also others in the region. It does not help that some administration officials continue to invoke Cold War parallels.
To bolster its own credibility, the Biden administration should also do more to preempt charges of hypocrisy and double standards. Consider U.S. policy to combat digital authoritarianism: Washington has targeted Chinese surveillance technology firms more harshly than similar companies based in the United States, Israel, and other Western democracies.
THE WORLD THAT OUGHT TO BE
So far, the Biden administration’s order-building efforts have centered on arrangements that exclude China, such as the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Although officials have been careful to insist that these initiatives are not targeted at any one country, there is little sign of any corresponding effort to negotiate Beijing’s role in the international or regional order. At the margins, there have been some signs that inclusive groupings can still deliver. (The World Trade Organization has struck agreements on fishing subsidies and COVID-19 vaccines.) But if investments in narrower, fit-for-purpose coalitions continue to take priority over broader, inclusive agreements and institutions, including those in which China and the United States both have major roles to play, geopolitical tensions will break rather than reinvigorate the international system.
Renewing U.S. leadership will also require doing more to address criticism that a U.S.-led order means “rules for thee but not for me.” Clear and humble acknowledgment of instances where the United States has violated the UN Charter, such as the invasion of Iraq, would be an important step to overcoming that resentment. And Washington must deliver value for citizens in developing countries, whether on COVID-19, climate, hunger, or technology, rather than simply urging them not to work with China. At home, Washington must work to rebuild bipartisan support for U.S. engagement with the international system.
As the United States reimagines its domestic and international purpose, it should do so on its own terms, not for the sake of besting China. Yet fleshing out an inclusive, affirmative vision of the world it seeks would also be a first step toward clarifying the conditions under which the United States would welcome or accept Chinese initiatives rather than reflexively opposing them. The countries’ divergent interests and values would still result in the United States opposing many of Beijing’s activities, but that opposition would be accompanied by a clear willingness to negotiate the terms of China’s growing influence. The United States cannot cede so much influence to Beijing that international rules and institutions no longer reflect U.S. interests and values. But the greater risk today is that overzealous efforts to counter China’s influence will undermine the system itself through a combination of paralysis and the promotion of alternate arrangements by major powers.
Finally, the United States must do much more to invest in the power of its example and to ensure that steps taken to counter China do not undermine that example by falling into the trap of trying to out-China China. Protective or punitive actions, whether military, economic, or diplomatic, should be assessed not just on the basis of whether they counter China but also on how they affect the broader system and whether they reflect fidelity to U.S. principles.
Competition cannot become an end in itself. So long as outcompeting China defines the United States’ sense of purpose, Washington will continue to measure success on terms other than on its own. Rankings are a symbolic construct, not an objective condition. If the pursuit of human progress, peace, and prosperity is the ultimate objective, as Blinken has stated, then the United States does not need to beat China in order to win.
JESSICA CHEN WEISS is the Michael J. Zak Professor of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Cornell University. She served as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State from August 2021 to July 2022. The views expressed here are her own.
Israel Hayom Forum for Israel-US Relations
U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley and Special Representative for International Negotiations Jason Greenblatt participate in the Israel Hayom Forum for Israel-U.S. Relations in Jerusalem.
Grand Rapids, Michigan
(spending time with the Hammer & Hooker)
Autumn mule deer relations at Theodore Roosevelt National Park's South Unit near Medora, North Dakota early this month. (11-7-2015)
The 'Reputation Complex' is a moving combination of various factors, components and drivers that are linked in a close and complicated way. This combination brings with it, for all organizations, equal risks and opportunities – the first to be managed and the second to be exploited in the right manner.
MSLGROUP's Chief Strategy Officer Pascal Beucler shares his thoughts on the fast transformation of reputation management and what it means for our clients and for us.
Secretary of State John Kerry And Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota - After Their Meeting
FOREIGN MINISTER PATRIOTA: (Via interpreter) I was mentioning that he has a good knowledge of Portuguese in function of Mrs. Teresa Kerry. She’s also Portuguese.
But I would like to say that we had a meeting, a working meeting, this morning in this, which is the first visit of Secretary of State John Kerry to Brazil, to South America actually. He had a stopover at Bogota, which we consider to be very positive. It is our second meeting. I have kept a meeting with the Secretary of State in D.C. the past 20th of May. And moreover, the – aside from the meeting we had, we will receive him now for lunch in a short while, in which we will have also representatives from the legislative, the presidents of the foreign relation committees, as Senator Kerry has been, himself part of, also journalists, representatives from the civil society, and as all of you know, Secretary of State will be received by President Rousseff later this afternoon at the Planalto Palace.
Secretary of State John Kerry requires no presentation. He’s a known character to Brazil, a former candidate to the U.S. presidency, a senator of – from 1985-2013, president of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate between 2009-2013. And when he came to be the Secretary of State in the second term of President Obama, he is bringing with himself a commitment but several causes, which are extremely valued throughout Brazil: a commitment to sustainable development, all the agenda related to climate change, also a decisive support to the retaking of peace efforts in the Middle East, and we would like to congratulate the Secretary of State for his own efforts, which shall take us to a process within nine months’ time to be producing results.
In the last meeting this morning, we examined items in the bilateral agenda, which present, as all of you know, a robust trade and investment agenda. The U.S. are still the country with the largest stocks of investment in Brazil, the second largest partner of Brazil now with a growing deficit on the Brazilian side. We’ve also talked about that for over 30 bilateral mechanisms involving areas which go from energy to racial equality, gender equality, contact with the private sector, the universities, the civil society. Today, the United States is the largest destination of Brazilians within the Science Without Borders program. It’s 5,800 students. That is increasing every day.
Anyways, the potential of the relationship is even greater, especially now in a moment in many observers are referring to the relationship between Brazil and the U.S. as a relationship which is growing more and more. It’s getting more mature. But this maturity includes encompassing more relevant themes, especially in a moment we are about to redefine our contacts with a strategic partnership. President Obama in his letter to invite President Rousseff to visit, which will take place in October this year, referring to a strategic partnership with Brazil, President Rousseff responded with the same terminology.
At the same time, I should not forget to mention that we’re now facing a new type of challenge in our bilateral relationship. It is a challenge which has to do with wiretapping, telephone calls. And in case these challenges are not solved in a satisfactory way, we run the risk of casting a shadow of distrust on our work. We have established technical communication means, political channels are open as well. We have clarified everything that was requested. But these are not an end in themselves, so this doesn’t meet – accept the status quo. We need to discontinue practices which are an attempt to sovereignty in the relationship between the states and which can violate the individual freedoms that both of our countries are very much fond of.
Let me make it very clear that there is a broad space for us to advance. We have recently received the Secretary of Agriculture. We will receive the Secretary of Energy in a few days’ time. The mechanism with economic and commercial cooperation TECA is going to be meeting in September at the level of vice ministers. In September as well, we will have the third conference for innovation, Brazil and U.S, the working group for the scientific and technological committee. On the same theme and at the same time, we should not minimize the relevance acquired so far regarding espionage.
Within a few moments, we’ll keep on talking to Secretary Kerry in an environment which I believe is a symbol to our commitment with democracy, freedom, a good government, freedom of the press, opening with the civil society. And so this will be an occasion for us to hear a bit more of the last developments in this retaking of the peacemaking process between Israelis and Palestinians. Also, we had an opportunity to talk about Syria and other situations on my part.
As well, I shall be ready with a dispositioned and even interested of making an updated snapshot of a region, which as I have mentioned to Secretary Kerry today, I think we’re distinguished for being a space of democracy, economic growth, social justice with enough conditions which are unprecedented worldwide.
Thank you very much. Mr. Kerry.
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, bom dia. I’m happy to be here with everybody. Thank you very much. Thank you, Foreign Minister Patriota for hosting me here today. I’m very happy to be back in Brazil. I have great memories of my first trip here in 1992 to the Earth Summit in Rio, and I’m happy to be back here now and very grateful for the opportunity to continue the good dialogue that Antonio and I have had since the day we first talked on the telephone when I was appointed to this job.
Even when I came to Brazil back in 1992 for the Earth Summit, I could sense this incredible energy in Brazil, and I could feel firsthand the amazing commitment of Brazil to try to grab the future and particularly back then to address the issue, which was then even urgent, of climate change. I’m pleased to see that over the years Brazil’s commitment to environmental stewardship has continued right up until this day, and there have been very important efforts on the reduction of deforestation problems, alternative renewable energy problems, biofuels, other kinds of initiatives, but also very important, last year’s hosting of Rio+20.
And for those of us who have been involved in the challenge of climate change for all of that time, I think it was a bittersweet moment to measure 20 years, when the hopes of 20 years before we had to acknowledge had not yet been realized. So the challenge is ahead of us, for all of us, and I know that the United States has a great commitment under President Obama to take our own initiatives, not even to wait for congressional action, but to move administratively in order to do our part. I know we can continue to work with Brazil on this issue of climate, and we look forward to doing so.
Our mission is very, very clear. We need to inspire meaningful reform and action within the Major Economies Forum. We need to lead the effort to phase down hydrofluorocarbons in the Montreal Protocol. And together, Brazil and the United States need to join with other countries in an effort to negotiate a climate agreement in 2015 that is ambitious and flexible and that works for all of us.
Now, obviously we have also had some moments of disagreement, and I’m sure I’ll have an occasion in the questions to be able to address some of that with you. But the United States and Brazil – I want to emphasize, rather than focus on an area of disagreement – the United States and Brazil share a remarkable and dynamic partnership. Every single day we work together to advance economic opportunity, human rights, environment protection, regional peace and security, democracy, as well as major global challenges in the Middle East and elsewhere – Syria for instance and the question of the humanitarian challenge in Syria.
The United States respects and appreciates that Brazil is one of the world’s largest free market democracies, and our partnership is only made stronger as all of the world continues to grow. The United States recognizes and welcomes and greatly appreciates the vital leadership role, the increasing leadership role, that Brazil plays on the international stage – excuse me – and that ranges from its participation in global peace initiatives to its stability operations and promotion of human rights and its efforts to try to help either promote the peace or keep the peace in certain parts of the world.
Through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, we are working with Brazil and the United Nations to build the capacity of countries to be able to contribute themselves to peacekeeping operations. Brazil has provided more than 1,400 uniformed personnel to the stabilization mission in Haiti. We’re very grateful for that. And we’re also exploring opportunities for closer collaboration on peacekeeping in Africa.
It’s fair to say that protecting universal rights is at the very heart of the shared values between Brazil and the United States. And together, we remain committed to advancing those rights and to advancing the cause of equality for all people.
The United States also supports a very vibrant and active Organization of American States, and the OAS Charter reminds us of our responsibilities to offer our citizens liberty and to create the conditions in which all people can reach their aspirations, can live their aspirations. We believe that it is important that Brazil engage fully with the OAS and use its strong voice for a hemispheric vision of democracy and fundamental freedoms.
Now, our relationship is not only rooted in shared values, it is literally strengthened every single day by our citizens. Each year thousands of people travel between the United States and Brazil, forging new ties between our countries. Student exchanges under President Rousseff’s Scientific Mobility Program, which I had the privilege of visiting this morning and sensing firsthand the amazing energy and excitement and commitment of these young people, that’s something we share in common. And together with President Rousseff’s program and President Obama’s 100,000 Strong in the Americas Initiative, we are encouraging together approaches to address the shared concerns of our young people to include social inclusion and to work towards things like environmental sustainability.
Our exchange programs also ensure that today’s generation is going to be ready to respond to the enormous challenges of tomorrow and of the future. The vibrant and the growing connection between the United States and Brazil, between our governments and our citizens, is absolutely one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century. I said to Antonio, and I believe this and I know President Obama believes this and he communicated this when he came here recently, the future belongs to young people. Our job is to lay the groundwork for them, is to provide the opportunity for them to make the most of education and of the technologies and jobs that will define the future.
So I look forward, as President Obama does, not only to growing this partnership but to finding ways to work on our common values, our common interests, and our common hopes for our peoples. And we very much look forward to welcoming President Rousseff to Washington, D.C., for her meeting and a state visit with President Obama and our country in October. And with that, I’d be happy to answer any questions.
MODERATOR: (Inaudible.)
QUESTION: (Via interpreter) Secretary Kerry, we wanted – if you could, we wanted you to speak briefly about this issue of espionage and if by any chance Brazil – the United States will stop spying on the rest, and what guarantees the U.S. Government can give if the answer is no that you’re not going to stop spying, please what will you do? Do you think you can have deteriorated or hampered this relationship with Brazil?
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, obviously, first of all, I did not think it would be a surprise if I got a question on that subject, so I wanted to have a chance to be able to share some thoughts with you, and now I’m happy to address that and other things.
But very, very important, I ask the people of Brazil – and I will answer the question very directly. But I ask the people of Brazil to stay focused on the important realities of our relationship, the bilateral relations between our countries which continue to grow stronger and stronger. We share democratic values and we share a commitment to diversity and we share a determination to improve opportunities for our people. And the U.S.-Brazil relationship has the opportunity to provide extraordinary positive global impact if we continue to work together on these kinds of issues, on the environment and science and technology and sustainable energy, nonproliferation, on access to education, on disaster management, and our strong trade ties, our strong investment ties, our energy cooperation, our sustainable development cooperation. All of these things need to remain in the forefront of people’s minds as you consider this question of the national security revelations that have upset some people and created questions in others.
Let me be crystal clear: I can’t discuss with you operational issues, but I can tell you very definitively the Congress of the United States passed on a law after 9/11 when we were attacked by al-Qaida, and we began a process of trying to understand before they attacked us what these kinds of plots might be. The executive department of our government, after a law was passed by Congress which met our legal standards and passed the muster of law, then implemented the program with the supervision of our judiciary. So all three branches of the American Government have been involved in reviewing this particular program.
Now, we have engaged with the Brazilian Government very, very directly, and I want to express my appreciation to the Foreign Minister and to Brazilian officials who have visited with us in Washington, and we are here now and we will continue to have this dialogue. And we will have this dialogue with a view to making certain that your government is in complete understanding and complete agreement with what it is that we think we must do to provide security not just for Americans but for Brazilians and for people in the world.
Over the last years, regrettably, a number of countries – a number of groups – not countries – a number of groups in the world have individually targeted not just American interests but free interests in the world. There have been bombings in many places in the world. Innocent people have lost their lives. And what the United States has been trying to do is prevent these things from happening beforehand by knowing what others might be plotting.
So I would respectfully say to everybody that the United States, as the President said last Friday, the United States gathers foreign intelligence of the type gathered by all nations in order to protect their citizens, in order to protect our citizens. And our activities are firmly based on law and they are subject to oversight by all of the branches of our government. We are convinced that our intelligence collection has positively helped us to protect our nation from a variety of threats, not only protect our nation but protect other people in the world, including Brazilians.
And so we have engaged now with the Brazilian Government, we will stay very closely engaged with the Brazilian Government, and I can promise you that President Obama is determined that the United States will live up to the highest standards both of cooperation, of transparency, and accountability, in keeping with our ability to be able to protect ourselves and to protect others in the world.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Mr. Foreign Secretary, you have said that all the South American ministers are united in condemning the alleged spying, and Brazil was asked for a formal explanation from the United States on this. What explanation have you received today? And also, you mentioned that if this situation is not resolved in a satisfactory manner that it risks perhaps more distrust in the relationship. So what are you looking for the United States to do?
FOREIGN MINISTER PATRIOTA: (Via interpreter) Well, in a summarized way I believe that you do know of the fact that ever since the first moment when these news came to be, we did get in touch with the U.S. Government by means of Ambassador Thomas Shannon here in Brasilia, and also the Embassy in D.C., and we opened dialogue channels, communication channels, both technical and political, And at the same time, there have been individual protests in Brazil and other countries in the region, as you all said, and on July 12th, a meeting by MERCOSUR adopted a decision which did instruct the countries – Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, who had subscribed – to start with the UN Secretary General taking this to the Security Council at the UN.
These demonstrations took place. They do reflect a considerable concern, and I think it’s legitimate, by the region and the international community in general, what practices which may be an attempt to the sovereignty of the very countries and to the rights of individuals. There have been demonstrations regarding the violation of human rights, especially from the High Commissioner of the UN for Human Rights, Navi Pillay.
And as a matter of fact, this clarification process, as I have mentioned, it’s not an end in itself. What we do consider is that the United States will never find a better partner in the fight against international terrorism and several other threats to homeland security as they are taking forth in a transparent way. International partnerships, when they’re done fully transparently, they do strengthen the trust. And when there is a lack of knowledge or lack of information on the country they may weaken this trust, so what we want to avoid from happening.
SECRETARY KERRY: Can I just add, if I may, to that? We’re not surprised and we’re not upset that Brazil would ask questions. Absolutely understandable. And Brazil is owed answers with respect to those questions, and they will get them. And we will work together very positively to make certain that this question, these issues, do not get in the way of all the other things that we talked about. And we will guarantee that Brazil and other countries will understand exactly what we’re doing, why and how, and we will work together to make sure that whatever is done in a way that respects our friends and our partners, and that is what we’re going to achieve.
QUESTION: (Via interpreter) Flavia (inaudible) Sao Paulo. Let me change the subject here a little. I would like to know if the topic regarding the issue on some visas in – to Brazilians, did you two talk about it? And is there a deadline for the waiver of the visa, or exception from a visa? And if the visit – President Rousseff to D.C. in October can be decided on her trip coming October?
FOREIGN MINISTER PATRIOTA: (Via interpreter) Well, briefly I mentioned that there are several initiatives and also meetings that are programmed for the next few months, which are included within those prospective preparation of the state visit to the U.S.
In one of the works that we’re going to be developing will be exactly this issue of exempting the visas to Brazilians. As you all know, there is a proposal which is known as the Global Entry – in English – which is being discussed between the two sides, and I understand that the last counterproposal of Brazil of a language to accommodate a few of the issues we have over here is under exam right now. And a declaration can be agreed upon in September, coming September, in which we’ll then have a text during her visit. So we do consider that. In this term, progress has been encouraging, satisfactory, and we will have some results soon to come.
Now related to the elimination or the exemption of the visa itself is a more complex issue, which we’ll need more time for discussion.
SECRETARY KERRY: Let me just say that we are – is that on? Yes. We’re committed to as vast a visa application processing process as possible. And we’re very proud that we have streamlined our operations over the course of the last year. We very much want to see more Brazilians coming to the United States for business, for tourism, for study, visiting friends, relatives, and so forth. So it’s very much in our interest to facilitate this.
Last year, we processed about one million visa requests all across Brazil, and we have managed to make the appointment times – the wait for those visas is down to either five days or under – less than five days. We have spent millions of dollars to upgrade our facilities in order to try to make this happen more effectively, and we’re going to be opening new consulates in Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre. So we’re moving as much as we can to facilitate this.
And finally, we want to continue to consult very closely with Brazil in order to make sure we have legal statutory requirements that have to be met to allow for a reciprocal free visa travel under the visitors program. And we hope to get there. I’m confident we can, but we just need to continue to work together. But I promise you, we welcome as many people to come and visit and be able to move freely back and forth as is possible, and I’m confident we’ll get to the day when we have an open visa program.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, we understand that earlier today you spoke with Prime Minister Netanyahu, including presumably about the settlements, which by some counts have reached 3,100 new or advancing units appeared in recent days. What can you tell us about that conversation and your message to the Prime Minister? Have you had a similar conversation with President Abbas? Are the Palestinians still on board for the peace talks? And finally, what would you say to those who say that the Israelis are doing this – they’re playing along with their initiative – but that they’re really too divided to make the hard decisions for peace? Thank you.
SECRETARY KERRY: No. Well, I – thank you. It’s a very appropriate question. It’s timely, obviously. Yes, I did speak with Prime Minister Netanyahu this morning, and I, first of all, conveyed to him my hopes for his speedy recovery. As you know, he’s just had surgery, and he’s dealing with these issues in the middle of that, and I can tell you that’s obviously not easy.
We had a very frank and open, direct discussion about the question of settlements. Let me make it clear: The policy of the United States of America with respect to all settlements is that they are illegitimate, and we oppose settlements taking place at any time, not just the time of the peace process.
But – here’s the but – that said, Prime Minister Netanyahu was completely upfront with me and with President Abbas that he would be announcing some additional building that would take place in places that will not affect the peace map, that will not have any impact on the capacity to have a peace agreement. That means that it is building within the so-called blocs in areas that many people make a presumption – obviously not some Palestinians or others – will be part of Israel in the future. He has specifically agreed not to disturb what might be the potential for peace going forward.
Now, we still believe it would be better not to be doing it, but there are realities within life in Israel that also have to be taken into account here going forward. President Abbas understood that coming into these talks. That’s why these talks are pressed into this time period of nine months. That’s why we all understand there is urgency, as I said yesterday, to getting to the discussion of borders and security. If you resolve the borders of Israel – and you can only do that also resolving the security issues for Israel – you have resolved any questions about settlements, because then you know what is in Israel and what is not. And so the sooner we get to that discussion the better.
I will be talking to President Abbas today. We have a call scheduled for later. And he is committed to continue to come to this negotiation, because he believes the negotiation is what will ultimately resolve this issue, not a temporary decision or restraint. So we will continue to work this very, very closely with Israelis and we will continue to work it very closely with Palestinians. And our hope is that we get to the real issues on which we ought to be focusing, which are the final status settlement – the final status issues. And I’m very hopeful we will get there very, very soon.
FOREIGN MINISTER PATRIOTA: (Via interpreter) Just briefly, at the same time that we support the efforts of Secretary Kerry and we are bringing up to the table the Israeli and Palestinian negotiation, we do – we do – we are against the Palestinian settlements, which are done against the UN Security Council resolutions, and they do represent a violation of the international law. We do consider that this kind of fact will not contribute for creating a propitious environment for the understandings of the whole international community, and Brazil specifically would love to see coming at the end of this nine month period time upon which negotiators will be working.
Let me also mention that I have encouraged Secretary Kerry to give more relief to the participation of the civil society in Israel and the Palestine along this peacemaking process. I was well impressed when I visited the region last year in October and when I saw that in the – among the civil society on both ends there are voices that are quite committed to peace and they do convey messages which are a bit different from the ones we’re used to seeing. These messages are in repudiation of violence and consumed facts and the establishment of settlements, which are not favorable for the understanding for peace.
SECRETARY KERRY: That’s it. Okay.
FOREIGN MINISTER PATRIOTA: (Via interpreter) Thank you.
# # #
August 13, 2013
Itamaraty Palace
Brasilia, Brazil
Wrexham County Borough Council Mayor making ceremony for Cllr Andy Williams and Deputy Mayor Cllr Rob Walsh
Wrexham County Borough Council Mayor making ceremony for Cllr Andy Williams and Deputy Mayor Cllr Rob Walsh
Wrexham County Borough Council Mayor making ceremony for Cllr Andy Williams and Deputy Mayor Cllr Rob Walsh
Students of local Eschenbach schools toured the training area and got to see it from the height of Bleidorn Tower hill, 22 July 2015. Photos by Gerald Morgenstern.
BCA Automotive PF13 WBD (formerly Stobart Bethan Jayne) leads WS Transportation 6x271 Eastbound on the M4 at Lower Earley.
Wrexham County Borough Council Mayor making ceremony for Cllr Andy Williams and Deputy Mayor Cllr Rob Walsh