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Tiffany Designs Jeans Dress Outfit [Mesh] + Lara X
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Grasses
Poaceae or Gramineae is a large and nearly ubiquitous family of monocotyledonous flowering plants known as grasses. Poaceae includes the cereal grasses, bamboos and the grasses of natural grassland and cultivated lawns and pasture. Grasses have stems that are hollow except at the nodes and narrow alternate leaves borne in two ranks. The lower part of each leaf encloses the stem, forming a leaf-sheath. With around 780 genera and around 12,000 species,[4] Poaceae are the fifth-largest plant family, following the Asteraceae, Orchidaceae, Fabaceae and Rubiaceae.[5]
Grasslands such as savannah and prairie where grasses are dominant are estimated to constitute 40.5% of the land area of the Earth, excluding Greenland and Antarctica.[6] Grasses are also an important part of the vegetation in many other habitats, including wetlands, forests and tundra. The Poaceae are the most economically important plant family, providing staple foods from domesticated cereal crops such as maize, wheat, rice, barley, and millet as well as forage, building materials (bamboo, thatch, straw) and fuel (ethanol).
Though they are commonly called "grasses", seagrasses, rushes, and sedges fall outside this family. The rushes and sedges are related to the Poaceae, being members of the order Poales, but the seagrasses are members of order Alismatales.
Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poaceae
Elizabethan Gardens History
In 1941 the Fort Raleigh National Historic Site became an official attraction for Outer Banks visitors, and just 4 years prior, the Lost Colony Outdoor drama opened within the Fort Raleigh grounds. Within years, both of these Outer Banks treasures had attracted thousands of visitors from all across the country, and in 1950, four very important Lost Colony show attendees would make their mark on Roanoke Island.
Mrs. Charles Cannon, married to a North Carolina philanthropist, Mrs. Inglis Fletcher, (also a distinguished North Carolina historian and author), and Lady and Sir Evelyn Wrench, who was the founder of the English Speaking Union, had just visited the site and had taken in an evening show. Touring the grounds beforehand, it occurred to them that a two-acre garden on the outskirts of the Fort Raleigh site could lead to additional visitors, but more importantly, could stand as a natural and cultural monument to the Lost Colonists and Sir Walter Raleigh.
They proposed the idea to the local North Carolina State Garden Club in 1951, and were met with enthusiastic agreement by its thousands of members. The initial concept was a modest one. The four original proposers as well as the Garden Club aimed to construct a simple two-acre garden that represented the typical garden of a late 1500's colonist - not a show-stopping display garden by any means, but rather a modest parcel of land that would have vegetables, grains, and other staples of a colonist's diet and lifestyle.
But the plans changed when an assisting contractor, E.W. Reinecke, told members of the Garden Club about a prestigious historical garden he was dismantling at an estate in Georgia. The statues and fountains at the location were originally to be donated to the Metropolitan Museum in New York, but Reinecke suggested that the Garden Club contact the landscape architects involved, Innocenti & Webel, to see if this arrangement could be changed.
The Garden Club followed through with the suggestion, and the members were surprised to find that the Innocenti & Webel landscapers were delighted with the idea of donating the historic statues to the site of England's first American colony. As a result, the original plan of a simple garden was revised to make way for the ancient Italian fountain and pool with balustrade, wellhead, sundial, bird baths, and stone steps and benches that the architects, as well as the original Georgia estate's owner, The Honorable John Hay Whitney, had reserved especially for the new Outer Banks garden site.
With these donations serving as an abstract guide, the Webel landscapers designed an Elizabethan Era garden, slightly revised and remodeled for present times. Ironically enough, and perhaps serving as a good omen for this new direction, construction for the gardens began on the exact date that Elizabeth II was crowned, June 2, 1953. The task was an arduous one, and it wasn't until over seven years later, on August 18th, 1960, that the gardens were officially opened to the public on Virginia Dare's 373rd birthday.
Since the gardens were first established, a number of remarkable pieces of art, statues, plant species, and even the bricks themselves have been donated to the gardens from generous benefactors around the world. As a result, the gardens are an incredible collection of the old world and the new, with ancient English blooms and local trees and shrubs, all in an incredible setting that feels miles away from modern North Carolina, despite it's quiet location tucked away on Roanoke Island.
it includes my photos from the holidays too! i'll be rolling those out soon...for now, here is a 365 shot, done on film!
oh it does my heart good.
Happy Fence Friday! Hope its a good weekend for you all!
The Florida Citrus Tower is a 226-foot-tall (69 m) structure built in 1956 in Clermont, Florida. Once the most famous landmarks of the Orlando area, it was built to allow visitors to observe the miles of orange groves surrounding it; developments in the citrus industry since its construction have left it providing a view of suburban neighborhoods today. With the antenna reaching over 500 feet (152 m) above sea level, it is the highest observation point in Florida.
In early 2015, the Citrus Tower received a new paint job, giving it a new but retro look, with an orange line going down the middle of each side.
The tower opened in 1956 after 13 months of construction. During the first several years of operation, the tower drew up to 500,000 visitors a year, thanks to its location on Highway 27 between Cypress Gardens and Silver Springs. However, in 1964 the Florida Turnpike was extended north, providing a faster route south through Central Florida. Since then, the tower has been sold several times. In 1988, a tram was built to offer visitors tours of various citrus crops. The tower was purchased in 1995 by Greg Homan.
The Citrus Tower includes a wishing well where visitors can hear their coin drop to the bottom; proceeds are donated to the Green Isle Children Ranch. At the lobby is ROOM: Valencia: a banquet facility, gift shop, and museum of the tower's history. During Christmas season, lights on the tower dance to Christmas music. Near the tower is the Presidents Hall of Fame, with wax tributes to 43 Presidents of the United States of America and a full-scale replica of the interior of the White House.
Credit for the data above is given to the following website:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida_Citrus_Tower
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clermont,_Florida
© All Rights Reserved - you may not use this image in any form without my prior permission.
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*Miepon Items*
∘ 1. Rare - Tent
-Mod/Transfer
-Includes texture change hud with 5 colors {Pink, Cream, Mint, Blue & Purple} for Interior, Exterior, Ruffles & Bows.
-Touch On/Off "door" curtain
∘ 2. Rare - Mattress
- Mod/Transfer
-Includes texture change hud with 5 colors {Pink, Cream, Mint, Blue & Purple} For Mattress, Quilt, Quilt Ruffles, Pillow 1 & Pillow 2.
-6 animations for sitting & laying
∘ 3. Outdoor Blanket
-Mod/Transfer
-decorate blanket with teddy bear face & paws cushions
∘ 4. Bug Spray
-Transfer
-Sprays particles
-Animated hold when worn
∘ 5. Smores
-Transfer
-Click to receive holdable stick with marshallow that has an animated hold
∘ 6 - 10. Cushion
-Mod/Transfer
-Pink, Cream, Mint, Blue & Purple
-5 sit animations
∘ 11. - 15. Luggage
-Mod/Transfer
-Pink, Cream, Mint, Blue & Purple
-Decor Luggage
∘ 16. Bunting
-Mod/Transfer
-4 colorful flats & Twinkle Lights
-Includes 2 sets
∘ 17. Clothesline
-Mod/Transfer
-4 hanging garments & twinkle lights
∘ 18. Movie Screen
-Mod/Transfer
-Includes a linked prim with media enabled, you can copy/paste links to watch your favorite YouTube videos
∘ 19. Firefly Net
-Mod/Transfer
-Wearable accessory with animated "swinging" hold
∘ 20. Fireflies
-Mod/Transfer
-slow rotating animation when rezzed
-includes 2 sets
∘ 21. Firefly Habitat
-Mod/Transfer
-Mushroom shaped firefly habitat decor
∘ 22. - 26. Sleeping Bags
-Mod/Transfer
-Pink, Cream, Mint, Blue & Purple
-3 sleep/lay poses
_______________________________________________
*Fatpack Items*
-Everything! But copyable, no transfer.
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*Demo Items*
A visual "Demo" of each piece will be rezzed out at the {Ribbons} Mainstore Demo Area to look at, and test the furniture poses.
Available at Roselline Event; June 25th 2024
Layers include a .jpg of the Google Earth generated globe which is inverted, stretched and manipulated in 3 other layers, ripples from an M. C. Escher print and a stunning photo by a Professor Andrew Davidhazy from Rochester, NY. described on a few of the 80, 000+ references to him on Google as modest, talented, a great teacher and a ghost expert for photography. I have just licensed my work on line with the Creative Commons. Their icon lets people know that they can use your work for non-commercial reasons if they attribute it to you; they can make derivatives but they have to share-alike. Of course the challenge with Goggle Images is some of the most striking images available are difficult to track down in terms of authorship because there are already so many derivatives. This was the case with this drop of water by this stellar professor who continues to do astounding work. I left a comment on his web blog but I re-entered it three times before I realized he had wisely included an administrator's block for unedited entries. It may take him ages to even check his comments. When he does he will find to his annoyance in his busy life, that I've inadvertently left three. As I do more research on simplifying the Creative Commons for the commoner I will be tracing this at my WordPress blog.
An Inuit friend reminded me that for the global perspective for many Inuit of Canada is from a circumpolar point of view. In honour of my Inuit friends and students from time to time I view the earth through their lens. So I have geotagged this to the north east of Baffin Island, perhaps somewhere near Pond Inlet. Hello to the family of Julia and Ernie! Their family photo with their children all wearing traditional clothing was taken when they visited you in Pond Inlet is on the walls of our home on Vancouver Island.
This image was reworked and uploaded to Flynn-Burhoe. 2007. "Ripple Effects: Wave Algorithm." Speechless.
I believe I uploaded this image to Flickr on October 22, 2006. By January 2009 25 people tagged this image as a favorite and it had been viewed 45,989 times. Because it was one of the earlier images I posted in my Flickr account, and since then I have continued to add more, once it hit the magic number of 200 images, this one and many others are no longer visible on my photostream. However, since it is well-tagged and has been highlighted and used by others through the Creative Commons Licensing, it is still being found through searches!
The more recent revised version is still available on my Flickr photostream.
I know a pro account would bring these missing images back into the photo stream, but I do not want to take the risk of album deletions, etc. And my cyber experiment has been with open source and free accounts.
28/04/16 #1214. Every day we see these guys loading their trucks oh so high with pine straw collected from the forest on the lower slopes of Mount Teide. I'm not sure what they do with it though.
Includes 10 minifigures: Finael, Orion, Nynia, 2 Ardun soldiers, Vorash, Rothut, and 3 Ustokal warriors
Ex Stockholm Tramways Park Royal (H43/28D) Leyland Atlantean LPDR1/1. Early in 1966, Leyland won a most prestigious order, worth £2,500,000 against fierce world-wide competition. Stockholm Tramways decided to withdraw 400 older buses rather convert them to the Swedish change over from left-hand rule of the road to the standard Continental right-hand rule on 1st September 1967. Following Leyland supplying a prototype Park Royal bodied modified Leyland Panther PSUR1.1R demonstrator, Stockholm Tramways placed an handsome order for 200 Park Royal (B39D) bodied Panthers and 50 Park Royal (H43/28D) bodied Atlanteans. Which were delivered on time.
The Atlanteans were a special built chassis to a length of 36ft. 4 1/2in and powered by a Leyland 0.680 engine producing 165bhp and driving through a Voith fully-automatic torque convertor gearbox with push button controls. Other features include air suspension, power assisted steering, roof level exhaust discharge and a spring handbrake. The Park Royal body featured dual doorways and twin staircases, and were the largest buses built in Britain at the time, and the largest buses built by Park Royal, who faced problems in getting the completed buses out of their factory due to lack of space.
I purchased this slide from the late Geoffrey Morant with full copyright.
The Blue Tit (Cyanistes caeruleus), often simply called "blue tit," is a small and colorful bird belonging to the family Paridae, which includes tits, chickadees, and titmice.
Scientific classification: Cyanistes caeruleus
Kingdom: Animalia
Phylum: Chordata
Class: Aves
Order: Passeriformes
Family: Paridae
Genus: Cyanistes
Species: C. caeruleus
Physical Description:
Size: Blue Tits are small birds, measuring around 10 to 12 centimeters (4 to 4.7 inches) in length.
Weight: They typically weigh between 9 to 12 grams (0.3 to 0.4 ounces).
Coloration: They have vibrant blue and yellow plumage, with blue wings and tail, a yellow belly, and a distinctive blue cap on the head. The intensity of their colors can vary among individuals and populations.
Distribution: Blue Tits are native to Europe and parts of North Africa and Asia. They are widespread throughout their range.
Habitat: They inhabit a variety of wooded and shrubby areas, including forests, woodlands, parks, gardens, and urban areas. They are adaptable birds and can thrive in diverse habitats.
Diet: Blue Tits are primarily insectivorous, feeding on insects, caterpillars, spiders, and other invertebrates. They also consume seeds, nuts, berries, and occasionally feed on small fruits.
Foraging: They are agile and acrobatic birds, often seen hopping from branch to branch while foraging for food. They may also visit bird feeders, particularly during the winter months.
Breeding: Blue Tits typically breed from late April to June. They nest in tree holes, nest boxes, or other suitable cavities. The female lays a clutch of eggs (usually around 7 to 14 eggs) and incubates them for about two weeks. Both parents participate in feeding the chicks until they fledge, which usually occurs around 16 to 22 days after hatching.
Social Structure: Blue Tits are generally social birds and may form mixed-species flocks, especially during the non-breeding season. They communicate using a variety of vocalizations, including calls and songs.
IUCN Red List Status: Least Concern. Blue Tits have a large and stable population, and their range extends over a significant geographic area. However, local populations may face threats from habitat loss, pollution, and predation.
Cultural Significance:
Blue Tits are beloved by birdwatchers and are commonly featured in art, literature, and folklore across their range.
They are also important in controlling insect populations, making them beneficial to ecosystems and agriculture.
Overall, the Blue Tit is a charming and adaptable bird known for its vibrant colors, agile behavior, and melodious songs.
I've captured some unforgettable moments with my camera, and I hope you feel the same joy viewing these images as I did while shooting them.
Thank you so much for visiting my gallery, whether you leave a comment, add it to your favorites, or simply take a moment to look around. Your support means a lot to me, and I wish you good luck and beautiful light in all your endeavors.
© All rights belong to R.Ertuğ. Please refrain from using these images without my express written permission. If you are interested in purchasing or using them, feel free to contact me via Flickr mail.
Lens - With Nikon TC 14E II - hand held or Monopod and definitely SPORT VR on. Aperture is f8 and full length. All my images have been converted from RAW to JPEG.
I started using Nikon Cross-Body Strap or Monopod on long walks. Here is my Carbon Monopod details : Gitzo GM2542 Series 2 4S Carbon Monopod - Really Right Stuff MH-01 Monopod Head with Standard Lever - Really Right Stuff LCF-11 Replacement Foot for Nikon AF-S 500mm /5.6E PF Lense -
Your comments and criticism are very valuable.
Thanks for taking the time to stop by and explore :)
I encountered this Blue Tit early in the morning and observed it through my small binoculars. I managed to capture this intriguing pose with a shutter speed of 1/640. Its focused demeanor and acrobatic stances are captivating to witness; sometimes, I observe them listening attentively. During this season, they are busy and incredibly active, hastily collecting materials for their nests. The pair I observed divides the labor and coordinates their efforts. The male gathers the necessary materials and brings them to the nest, while the female likely tends to the nest materials for minutes at a time. I believe the female will begin incubating soon. Judging by its stance and expression, I'm inclined to believe it's a male! I found it fascinating and couldn't resist sharing it. I hope you enjoy it as much as I did.
The Blue Tit (Cyanistes caeruleus), often simply called "blue tit," is a small and colorful bird belonging to the family Paridae, which includes tits, chickadees, and titmice.
Scientific classification: Cyanistes caeruleus
Kingdom: Animalia
Phylum: Chordata
Class: Aves
Order: Passeriformes
Family: Paridae
Genus: Cyanistes
Species: C. caeruleus
Physical Description:
Size: Blue Tits are small birds, measuring around 10 to 12 centimeters (4 to 4.7 inches) in length.
Weight: They typically weigh between 9 to 12 grams (0.3 to 0.4 ounces).
Coloration: They have vibrant blue and yellow plumage, with blue wings and tail, a yellow belly, and a distinctive blue cap on the head. The intensity of their colors can vary among individuals and populations.
Distribution: Blue Tits are native to Europe and parts of North Africa and Asia. They are widespread throughout their range.
Habitat: They inhabit a variety of wooded and shrubby areas, including forests, woodlands, parks, gardens, and urban areas. They are adaptable birds and can thrive in diverse habitats.
Diet: Blue Tits are primarily insectivorous, feeding on insects, caterpillars, spiders, and other invertebrates. They also consume seeds, nuts, berries, and occasionally feed on small fruits.
Foraging: They are agile and acrobatic birds, often seen hopping from branch to branch while foraging for food. They may also visit bird feeders, particularly during the winter months.
Breeding: Blue Tits typically breed from late April to June. They nest in tree holes, nest boxes, or other suitable cavities. The female lays a clutch of eggs (usually around 7 to 14 eggs) and incubates them for about two weeks. Both parents participate in feeding the chicks until they fledge, which usually occurs around 16 to 22 days after hatching.
Social Structure: Blue Tits are generally social birds and may form mixed-species flocks, especially during the non-breeding season. They communicate using a variety of vocalizations, including calls and songs.
IUCN Red List Status: Least Concern. Blue Tits have a large and stable population, and their range extends over a significant geographic area. However, local populations may face threats from habitat loss, pollution, and predation.
Cultural Significance:
Blue Tits are beloved by birdwatchers and are commonly featured in art, literature, and folklore across their range.
They are also important in controlling insect populations, making them beneficial to ecosystems and agriculture.
Overall, the Blue Tit is a charming and adaptable bird known for its vibrant colors, agile behavior, and melodious songs.
I've captured some unforgettable moments with my camera, and I hope you feel the same joy viewing these images as I did while shooting them.
Thank you so much for visiting my gallery, whether you leave a comment, add it to your favorites, or simply take a moment to look around. Your support means a lot to me, and I wish you good luck and beautiful light in all your endeavors.
© All rights belong to R.Ertuğ. Please refrain from using these images without my express written permission. If you are interested in purchasing or using them, feel free to contact me via Flickr mail.
Lens - With Nikon TC 14E II - hand held or Monopod and definitely SPORT VR on. Aperture is f8 and full length. All my images have been converted from RAW to JPEG.
I started using Nikon Cross-Body Strap or Monopod on long walks. Here is my Carbon Monopod details : Gitzo GM2542 Series 2 4S Carbon Monopod - Really Right Stuff MH-01 Monopod Head with Standard Lever - Really Right Stuff LCF-11 Replacement Foot for Nikon AF-S 500mm /5.6E PF Lense -
Your comments and criticism are very valuable.
Thanks for taking the time to stop by and explore :)
Graffitiwear - 3-piece set includes the combined top and bra, plus overalls and sandals with a HUD of 12 textures (4 tops, 4 overalls, 4 sandals).
> Maiteya
> Freya
> Isis
> Venus
> Physique
> Hourglass
> Tonic Curvy
> Tonic Fine
marketplace.secondlife.com/p/Graffitiwear-Saturday-Outfit...
★ Includes: Antennae, Mane, Wings (Bento & Animesh)
★ (8) Skin & Ears appliers BOM [EVOX & SLUV] (buy separately)
Exclusive offer in the mainstore
Now visit the mainstore:maps.secondlife.com/secondlife/Golden%20Leaf/191/175/3739
Onlookers include Yellow Chair Guy on the Left and Green Cactus Guy on the Right. The whole scene was pretty strange, I tell you.
(DSCN4564Pink&blueflickrballsyellowchaircactusflickr010417)
Includes teams from Wagner/Bon Homme, Britton-Hecla, Vermillion, Stanley County and West Central. Permission granted for journalism outlets and educational purposes. Not for commercial use. Must be credited. Photo courtesy of South Dakota Public Broadcasting.
©2021 SDPB
Dahlia is a genus of bushy, tuberous, herbaceous perennial plants native to Mexico. A member of the Asteraceae (or Compositae), dicotyledonous plants, related species include the sunflower, daisy, chrysanthemum, and zinnia. There are 42 species of dahlia, with hybrids commonly grown as garden plants. Flower forms are variable, with one head per stem; these can be as small as 2 in diameter or up to 1 ft ("dinner plate"). This great variety results from dahlias being octoploids—that is, they have eight sets of homologous chromosomes, whereas most plants have only two. In addition, dahlias also contain many transposons—genetic pieces that move from place to place upon an allele—which contributes to their manifesting such great diversity.
The stems are leafy, ranging in height from as low as 12 in to more than 6–8 ft. The majority of species do not produce scented flowers or cultivars. Like most plants that do not attract pollinating insects through scent, they are brightly colored, displaying most hues, with the exception of blue.
The dahlia was declared the national flower of Mexico in 1963. The tubers were grown as a food crop by the Aztecs, but this use largely died out after the Spanish Conquest. Attempts to introduce the tubers as a food crop in Europe were unsuccessful.
Volunteer Park is a 48.3-acre park in the Capitol Hill neighborhood of Seattle, Washington, USA.
Volunteer Park was acquired by the city of Seattle for $2,000 in 1876 from J.M. Colman. In 1885 it was designated a cemetery, but two years later it was named "Lake View Park," and Lake View Cemetery was developed on an adjacent plot of land. The park then became known as "City Park." In 1901, it was renamed "Volunteer Park" to honor the volunteers who served in the Spanish–American War. J. Willis Sayre, a Seattle theatre critic, journalist, and historian, who had fought in the war, had actively lobbied local officials to rename this park. From 1904 to 1909, the Olmsted Brothers prepared formal plans for the park.
The park includes a conservatory (a designated city landmark), completed in 1912; a water tower with an observation deck, built by the Water Department in 1906, a fenced-off reservoir; the dramatic Art Deco building of the Seattle Asian Art Museum (a designated city landmark); a statue of William Henry Seward; a memorial to Judge Thomas Burke; and a sculpture, Black Sun, by Isamu Noguchi (colloquially referred to as "The Doughnut") around which a scenic view of the Seattle skyline that prominently includes the Space Needle can be seen, as well as several meadows and picnic tables. The wading pool is operational in the summer months and operated daily from 11 a.m. to 8 p.m.
Volunteer Park is also well known for its extensive dahlia garden in season. There are also Koi ponds at the park which contain fish during the summer months.
Blog #007
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Sunny's Photo Studio
Pose: All I Want For Christmas
Kiosk: Sexy Girls - A - H - (1 - 5)
Taxi: maps.secondlife.com/secondlife/Sunny%20Photo%20Studio/126...
A Winter Wonderland on Mill and Truleigh Hill today due to an overnight hoar frost. Some of crystal growths, clinging to branches and fences were over an inch long.
Sat. 2nd June 1984 1Z38 - 'The Midland Executive' railtour
A rather excellent railtour that managed to include scheduled stops at Derby and Crewe for the two works open days :)
A rather sad view of one of the short-lived prototype Advanced Passenger Trains (APTs) making an unusual sight at Crewe Works. By 1984, the units were already soon to be withdrawn and scrapped - as chance would have it, this DTS Sc48103 was saved and put together with an assortment of other coaches to form a preserved unit at Crewe Heritage Centre - on the site of Crewe Works! Note the burnt-out 'Roarer' parked next door!
Something new for 2023...Sound & Vision on SoundCloud - more memories from a mis-spent youth 😎
A rather rare recording of what must have been the last operational Advanced Passenger Train (APT-P) unit that I managed to capture on tape on 14th Oct 1986. The unit had arrived at Crewe station from the north on a test train, near the end of its working life, and I managed to get my trusty 'Boom Box' set up in time to record it for posterity, as it slid out of the station and into the sidings of Crewe Electric Depot (CE). Not the most exciting of my railway tapes, but pretty rare nevertheless :)
Just checking my original notebooks, and I noted the entire unit as follows: 370006 (Sc48106) - Sc48602 - Sc49006 - Sc49002 - Sc48603 - Sc48404 - (Sc48103) 370003. The unit departed around 17.30. Visit here for the authentic sound of an APT-P: soundcloud.com/sound-vision-10193594/apt-p-advanced-passe...
Advanced Passenger Train
British Rail's Class 370 tilting trains, also referred to as APT-P (meaning Advanced Passenger Train Prototype), were the pre-production Advanced Passenger Train units. Unlike the earlier experimental gas-turbine APT-E unit, these units were powered by 25 kV AC overhead electrification and were used on the West Coast Main Line between London Euston and Glasgow Central. The APT-P is the most powerful domestic train to have operated in Britain, the eight traction motors fitted to the two central Motor Cars giving a total output of 8,000 horsepower (6,000 kW). This enabled the train to set the UK rail speed record of 162.2 miles per hour (261.0 km/h) in December 1979, a record that stood for 23 years until broken by a Eurostar Class 373 on the newly completed High Speed 1.
The APT-P was unveiled to the public on 7 June 1978 but by 1981 the trains were still under test and undergoing modifications. After Margaret Thatcher's arrival at 10 Downing Street, in 1979, the project was facing the possibility of cancellation, and so BR management decided to put the prototypes into service, with the first runs along the London-Glasgow route finally taking place in December 1981. However, the result was a media circus when every problem large or small received front-page coverage and the entire project derided as an example of BR's incompetence. The trains were quickly withdrawn from service again by the end of the month, to the great amusement of the press. The problems were eventually solved and the trains quietly reintroduced in 1984 with much greater success. However, by this time the competing High Speed Train (HST), powered by a conventional diesel engine and lacking the APT's tilt and performance, had gone through development and testing at a rapid rate and was now forming the backbone of BR's Inter City passenger services. All support for the APT project collapsed as anyone in authority distanced themselves from what was being derided as a failure. The three APT-Ps ran for just over a year before being withdrawn again over the winter of 1985/6. One set was retained and continued to be used for testing into 1986. Two of the three sets were broken up, and parts of the third were eventually sent to the National Railway Museum where it joined the APT-E.
Due to ongoing technical problems with the pre-production units, and a lack of cash or political will to take the project forward, the planned APT-S (Advanced Passenger Train Squadron Service) production-series units were never built, but the project did influence the design of the later InterCity 225 sets designed for the East Coast Main Line electrification. The influence is strongest with the Class 91 locos which took many features from the APT powercars. The technology was later sold to Fiat Ferroviaria and used for improving their second generation Pendolino trains which are used worldwide, including on the West Coast Main Line as the Class 390. More info here: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Passenger_Train
Units were numbered 370001-370006 (plus two spare cars labelled 370007 and were formed as follows:
48101 - 48107 - Driving Trailer Second
48201-48206 - Trailer Second
48401-48406 - Trailer Restaurant Second Buffet
48301-48306 - Trailer Unclassified
48501-48506 - Trailer First
48601-48607 - Trailer Brake First
49001-49006 - Non-Driving Motor
Taken with a Zenith TTL SLR camera and standard lens. Scanned from the original negative with no digital restoration
You can see a random selection of my railway photos here on Flickriver: www.flickriver.com/photos/themightyhood/random/
The Pied-billed Grebe is a species of the grebe family of water birds. Since the Atitlán grebe has become extinct, it is the sole extant member of the genus Podilymbus.The Pied-billed Grebe is small, stocky, and short-necked. It is 31–38 centimeters (12–15 in) in length, it has a wingspan of 45–62 cm (18–24 in) and weighs 253–568 grams (8.9–20.0 oz). It is usually brown or gray in color. It has a short, blunt chicken-like bill, which in summer is encircled by a broad black band (hence the name). It is the only grebe that does not show a white wing patch in flight. The sexes are monomorphic (meaning no sexual dimorphism). Pied-billed Grebes feed mainly on aquatic invertebrates, and also on small fish and amphibians (frogs, tadpoles). Pied-billed Grebes have been shown to eat their own feathers to aid in digestion (prevent injury from small bones). The pied-billed grebe is primarily found in ponds throughout the Americas. Other names of this grebe include American dabchick, dabchick, Carolina grebe, devil-diver, dive-dapper, dipper, hell-diver, pied-billed dabchick, pied-bill, thick-billed grebe, and water witch.
The Pied-billed Grebe is a common and widespread winter
resident in Florida but is uncommon and local as a breeder.
This diving bird breeds from Canada to southern Argentina and in the Greater and Lesser Antilles.
I found this one along Heron Hideout at Circle B Bar Reserve in Polk County, Florida.
Includes Teams from Wagner/Bon Homme, Britton-Hecla, Vermillion, Stanley County and West Central. Permission granted for journalism outlets and educational purposes. Not for commercial use. Must be credited. Photo courtesy of South Dakota Public Broadcasting.
©2021 SDPB
Notable architectural features include the conspicuous columns, the horseshoe-shaped arches, and the innumerable murqarnas embellishing the ceilings. The dome, arches and walls give a grand ambiance to the mosque. The first-class sound system is discreetly hidden. The ablution room and a vast public hammam are in the basement, with its own entrance. Tadelakt, a plastering technique which adds egg yolks and black soap into mixed plaster, was used in the hammam baths
Taken @Casablanca, Morocco, North Africa
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Includes: A hud with 10 latex colors & 2 colors for strings
- Slink Physics, Slink Hourglass, Maitreya, TMP
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maps.secondlife.com/secondlife/LUXORY%20NORTH/107/26/22
marketplace.secondlife.com/p/Sexy-Princess-Abigail-Linger...
Includes teams from Deuel, Hot Springs, Madison, Parkston/Ethan/Hanson/Mt. Vernon. Permission granted for journalism outlets and educational purposes. Not for commercial use. Must be credited. Photo courtesy of South Dakota Public Broadcasting.
©2021 SDPB
Tiffany Designs Ameya Dress {Mesh} + Lara X
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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palace_of_Westminster
The Palace of Westminster, also known as the Houses of Parliament, is the seat of the two houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom—the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The Palace lies on the north bank of the River Thames[note 1] in the London borough of the City of Westminster, close to the government buildings of Whitehall.
The palace contains around 1,100 rooms, 100 staircases and 5 kilometres (3 mi) of corridors. Although the building mainly dates from the 19th century, remaining elements of the original historic buildings include Westminster Hall, used today for major public ceremonial events such as lyings in state, and the Jewel Tower.
Control of the Palace of Westminster and its precincts was for centuries exercised by the Queen's representative, the Lord Great Chamberlain. By agreement with the Crown, control passed to the two Houses in 1965. Certain ceremonial rooms continue to be controlled by the Lord Great Chamberlain.
After a fire in 1834, the present Houses of Parliament were built over the next 30 years. They were the work of the architect Sir Charles Barry (1795–1860) and his assistant Augustus Welby Pugin (1812–52). The design incorporated Westminster Hall and the remains of St Stephen's Chapel.
The Old Palace
The Palace of Westminster site was strategically important during the Middle Ages, as it was located on the banks of the River Thames. Buildings have occupied the site since at least Saxon times.[citation needed] Known in medieval times as Thorney Island, the site may have been first-used for a royal residence by Canute the Great (reigned 1016–35). St Edward the Confessor, the penultimate Saxon monarch of England, built a royal palace on Thorney Island just west of the City of London at about the same time as he built Westminster Abbey (1045–50). Thorney Island and the surrounding area soon became known as Westminster (a contraction of the words West Minster). After the Norman Conquest in 1066, King William I established himself at the Tower of London, but later moved to Westminster.[citation needed] Neither the buildings used by the Saxons nor those used by William I survive. The oldest existing part of the Palace (Westminster Hall) dates from the reign of William I's successor, King William II.
The Palace of Westminster was the monarch's principal residence in the late Medieval period. The predecessor of Parliament, the Curia Regis (Royal Council), met in Westminster Hall (although it followed the King when he moved to other palaces). The Model Parliament, the first official Parliament of England, met in the Palace in 1295;[1] almost all subsequent Parliaments have met there.
The Jewel Tower was built approximately in 1365 to house the treasures of King Edward III.[2]
Westminster remained the monarch's chief London residence until a fire destroyed part of the complex in 1512.[citation needed] In 1530, King Henry VIII acquired York Palace from Thomas Cardinal Wolsey,[3] a powerful minister who had lost the King's favour. Renaming it the Palace of Whitehall, Henry used it as his principal residence. Although Westminster officially remained a royal palace, it was used by the two Houses of Parliament and as a law court.
Because it was originally a royal residence, the Palace included no purpose-built chambers for the two Houses. Important state ceremonies were held in the Painted Chamber. The House of Lords originally met in the Queen's Chamber, a modest Medieval hall at the south end of the complex. In later years the Upper House met in the larger White Chamber, which had formerly housed the Court of Requests; the expansion of the Peerage by King George III during the 18th century necessitated the move as the original chamber could not accommodate the increased number of peers.
The House of Commons, which did not have a chamber of its own, sometimes held its debates in the Chapter House of Westminster Abbey. The Commons acquired a permanent home at the Palace in the form of St Stephen's Chapel during the reign of Edward VI. The Chantries Act 1547 (passed as a part of the Protestant Reformation) dissolved the religious order of the Canons of St Stephen's,[citation needed] among other institutions; thus, the building became available for the Commons' use. Alterations were made to St Stephen's Chapel for the convenience of the Lower House. Sir Christopher Wren was commissioned to carry out major work on the chapel in the late 17th century. During these works the chapel's clerestory was removed and its Gothic interiors concealed behind oak panelling. More seating was added over the years to accommodate the new MPs created by the Acts of Union with Scotland (1707) and Ireland (1800), including an upper-level gallery.
The palace complex was substantially remodelled by Sir John Soane during the early 19th century. The medieval House of Lords chamber, which had been the target of the failed Gunpowder Plot of 1605, was demolished as part of this work in order to create a new ceremonial entrance at the southern end of the palace. The original undercroft where Guy Fawkes was discovered guarding the barrels of gunpowder was also lost during the reconstruction. Soane's work at the palace included new law courts adjoining Westminster Hall and a new Members' entrance to St. Stephen's Chapel.
Fire and reconstruction
J. M. W. Turner watched the fire of 1834 and painted several canvases depicting it, including The Burning of the Houses of Lords and Commons (1835).
On 16 October 1834, a fire broke out in the Palace[1] after a stove used to destroy the Exchequer's stockpile of tally sticks ignited panelling in the Lords Chamber. In the resulting conflagration both houses of Parliament were destroyed along with most of the other buildings in the palace complex. Westminster Hall was saved largely due to heroic firefighting efforts. The Jewel Tower, the crypt of St Stephen's Chapel and the cloisters were the only other parts of the palace to survive.
At one stage, King William IV considered converting Buckingham Palace, which was being renovated at the time, into the new Houses of Parliament.[4]
A Royal Commission was appointed to study the rebuilding of the Palace and a heated public debate over the proposed styles ensued. The neo-Classical design, similar to that of the White House and the federal Capitol in the United States, was popular at the time, but had connotations of revolution and republicanism, whereas Gothic design embodied conservative values. The Commission announced in June 1835 that "the style of the buildings would be either Gothic or Elizabethan".[5]
In 1836, after studying 97 rival proposals, the Royal Commission chose Charles Barry's plan for a Gothic-style palace. The foundation stone was laid in 1840;[6] the Lords Chamber was completed in 1847, and the Commons Chamber in 1852 (at which point Barry received a knighthood). Although most of the work had been carried out by 1860, construction was not finished until a decade afterwards. Barry (whose own architectural style was more classical than Gothic) relied heavily on Augustus Pugin for the sumptuous and distinctive Gothic interiors, including wallpapers, carvings, stained glass and furnishings, like the royal thrones and canopies.
During the Second World War, the Palace of Westminster was hit fourteen times by bombs (see The Blitz). The worst of these was on 10 May 1941, when the Commons Chamber was destroyed and three people were killed.[7] The chamber was re-built under the architect Giles Gilbert Scott in a similar but more austere style; the work was completed in 1950.[1]
As the need for office space in the Palace increased, Parliament acquired office space in the nearby Norman Shaw Building in 1975,[8] and more recently in the custom-built Portcullis House, completed in 2000. This increase has now allowed all MPs to have their own office facilities.[1]
Exterior
Sir Charles Barry's collaborative design for the Palace of Westminster uses the Perpendicular Gothic style, which was popular during the 15th century and returned during the Gothic revival of the 19th century. Barry was a classical architect, but he was aided by the Gothic architect Augustus Pugin. Westminster Hall, which was built in the 11th century and survived the fire of 1834, was incorporated in Barry's design. Pugin was displeased with the result of the work, especially with the symmetrical layout designed by Barry; he famously remarked, "All Grecian, sir; Tudor details on a classic body".[9]
Stonework
The stonework of the building was originally Anston, a sand-coloured magnesian limestone quarried in the village of Anston in South Yorkshire.[10] The stone, however, soon began to decay due to pollution and the poor quality of some of the stone used. Although such defects were clear as early as 1849, nothing was done for the remainder of the 19th century. During the 1910s, however, it became clear that some of the stonework had to be replaced.
In 1928 it was deemed necessary to use Clipsham Stone, a honey-coloured limestone from Rutland, to replace the decayed Anston. The project began in the 1930s but was halted due to the Second World War, and completed only during the 1950s. By the 1960s pollution had once again begun to take its toll. A stone conservation and restoration programme to the external elevations and towers began in 1981, and ended in 1994.[11] The House Authorities have since been undertaking the external restoration of the many inner courtyards, a task due to continue until approximately 2010.
Towers
Sir Charles Barry's Palace of Westminster includes several towers. The tallest is the 98.5-metre (323 ft)[10] Victoria Tower, a square tower at the south-western end of the Palace. It was named after the reigning monarch at the time of the reconstruction of the Palace, Queen Victoria; today, it is home to the Parliamentary Archives. Atop the Victoria Tower is an iron flagstaff, from which either the Royal Standard (if the Sovereign is present in the Palace) or the Union Flag is flown. At the base of the tower is the Sovereign's Entrance to the Palace, used by the monarch whenever entering the Palace of Westminster for the State Opening of Parliament or for any other official ceremony.
Over the middle of the Palace, immediately above the Central Lobby, stands the octagonal Central Tower. At 91.4 metres (300 ft),[10] it is the shortest of the Palace's three principal towers. Unlike the other towers, the Central Tower culminates in a spire, and was designed as a high-level air intake.
At the north end of the Palace is the most famous of the towers, the Clock Tower, commonly known as Big Ben after its main bell. The Clock Tower is 96.3 metres (316 ft)[10] tall. Pugin's drawings for the tower were the last work he did for Barry. The Clock Tower houses a large, four-faced clock—the Great Clock of Westminster—also designed by Pugin. The tower also houses five bells, which strike the Westminster Chimes every quarter hour. The largest and most famous of the bells is Big Ben (officially The Great Bell of Westminster), which strikes the hour. This is the third-heaviest bell in England, weighing 13.8 tonnes (13.6 long tons).[10] Although Big Ben properly refers only to the bell, it is colloquially applied to the whole tower. A light, called the Ayrton Light, is located at the top of the Clock Tower. The Ayrton Light is lit when either the House of Commons or the House of Lords is sitting after dark. The light takes its name from Thomas Ayrton, the first Commissioner of Works who installed a gas lamp in the tower soon after it was built in 1885. It was installed at the request of Queen Victoria, so she could see from Buckingham Palace whether the members were "at work".
A small tower, St. Stephen's Tower, is positioned at the front of the Palace, between Westminster Hall and Old Palace Yard, and contains the main entrance to the House of Commons at its base, known as St. Stephen's Entrance.[12] Other towers include Speaker's and Chancellor's Towers, at the north and south ends of the building's river front respectively.[13] They are named after the presiding officers of the two Houses of Parliament at the time of the Palace's reconstruction, the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Lord High Chancellor.
Grounds
There are a number of small gardens surrounding the Palace of Westminster. Victoria Tower Gardens is open as a public park along the side of the river south of the palace. Black Rod's Garden (named after the office of Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod) is closed to the public and is used as a private entrance. Old Palace Yard, in front of the Palace, is paved over and covered in concrete security blocks (see security below). Cromwell Green (also on the frontage, and in 2006 enclosed by hoardings for the construction of a new visitor centre), New Palace Yard (on the north side) and Speaker's Green (directly north of the Palace) are all private and closed to the public. College Green, opposite the House of Lords, is a small triangular green commonly used for television interviews with politicians.
Interior
The Palace of Westminster includes over 1,100 rooms, 100 staircases and 4.8 kilometres (3 mi) of passageways.[10] The building includes four floors; the ground floor includes offices, dining rooms and bars. The "first floor" (known as the principal floor) houses the main rooms of the Palace, including the Chambers, the lobbies and the libraries. The Robing Room, the Royal Gallery, the Prince's Chamber, the Lords Chamber, the Peers' Lobby, the Central Lobby, the Members' Lobby and the Commons Chamber all lie in a straight line on this floor, from south to north, in the order noted. (Westminster Hall lies to a side at the Commons end of the Palace.) The top-two floors are used for committee rooms and offices.
Formerly, the Palace was controlled by the Lord Great Chamberlain,[citation needed] as it was (and formally remains) a royal residence. In 1965, however, it was decided that each House should control its own rooms;[citation needed] the Speakers now exercise control on behalf of their respective Houses. The Lord Great Chamberlain retains custody of certain ceremonial rooms.
Lords Chamber
The Chamber of the House of Lords is located in the southern part of the Palace of Westminster. The lavishly decorated room measures 13.7 by 24.4 metres (45 by 80 ft).[10] The benches in the Chamber, as well as other furnishings in the Lords' side of the Palace, are coloured red. The upper part of the Chamber is decorated by stained glass windows and by six allegorical frescoes representing religion, chivalry and law.
At the south end of the Chamber are the ornate gold Canopy and Throne; although the Sovereign may theoretically occupy the Throne during any sitting, he or she attends only the State Opening of Parliament. Other members of the Royal Family who attend the State Opening use Chairs of State next to the Throne. In front of the Throne is the Woolsack, a backless and armless red cushion stuffed with wool, representing the historical importance of the wool trade. The Woolsack is used by the officer presiding over the House (the Lord Speaker since 2006, but historically the Lord Chancellor or a deputy). The House's mace, which represents royal authority, is placed on the back of the Woolsack. In front of the Woolsack are the Judges' Woolsack, a larger red cushion occupied by the Law Lords during the State Opening, and the Table of the House, at which the clerks sit.
Members of the House occupy red benches on three sides of the Chamber. The benches on the Lord Speaker's right form the Spiritual Side and those to his left form the Temporal Side. The Lords Spiritual (archbishops and bishops of the established Church of England) all occupy the Spiritual Side. The Lords Temporal (nobles) sit according to party affiliation: members of the Government party sit on the Spiritual Side, while those of the Opposition sit on the Temporal Side. Some peers, who have no party affiliation, sit on the benches in the middle of the House opposite the Woolsack; they are accordingly known as cross-benchers.
The Lords Chamber is the site of important ceremonies, the most important of which is the State Opening of Parliament, which occurs at the beginning of each annual parliamentary session. The Sovereign, seated on the Throne, delivers the Speech from the Throne, outlining the Government's legislative agenda for the forthcoming parliamentary session. The Commons do not enter the Lords' debating floor; instead, they watch the proceedings from beyond the Bar of the House, just inside the door. A similar ceremony is held at the end of a parliamentary session; the Sovereign, however, does not normally attend, and is instead represented by a group of Lords Commissioners.
Commons Chamber
The Chamber of the House of Commons is at the northern end of the Palace of Westminster; it was opened in 1950 after the Victorian chamber had been destroyed in 1941 and re-built under the architect Giles Gilbert Scott. The Chamber measures 14 by 20.7 metres (46 by 68 ft)[10] and is far more austere than the Lords Chamber; the benches, as well as other furnishings in the Commons side of the Palace, are coloured green. Members of the public are forbidden to sit on the red benches, which are reserved for members of the House of Lords. Other parliaments in Commonwealth nations, including those of India, Canada and Australia, have copied the colour scheme under which the Lower House is associated with green, and the Upper House with red.
At the north end of the Chamber is the Speaker's Chair, a present to Parliament from the Commonwealth of Australia. The current British Speaker's Chair is an exact copy of the Speaker's Chair given to Australia, by the House of Commons, on the celebration of Australia's Parliamentary opening. In front of the Speaker's Chair is the Table of the House, at which the clerks sit, and on which is placed the Commons' ceremonial mace. The dispatch boxes, which front-bench Members of Parliament (MPs) often lean on or rest notes on during Questions and speeches, are a gift from New Zealand. There are green benches on either side of the House; members of the Government party occupy benches on the Speaker's right, while those of the Opposition occupy benches on the Speaker's left. There are no cross-benches as in the House of Lords. The Chamber is relatively small, and can accommodate only 427 of the 646 Members of Parliament[14]—during Prime Minister's Questions and in major debates MPs stand at either end of the House.
By tradition, the British Sovereign does not enter the Chamber of the House of Commons. The last monarch to do so was King Charles I, in 1642. The King sought to arrest five Members of Parliament on charges of high treason, but when he asked the Speaker, William Lenthall, if he had any knowledge of the whereabouts of these individuals, Lenthall famously replied: "May it please your Majesty, I have neither eyes to see nor tongue to speak in this place but as the House is pleased to direct me, whose servant I am here."[15]
The two red lines on the floor of the House of Commons are 2.5 metres (8 ft 2 in)[10] apart, which, by (probably apocryphal) tradition, is intended to be just over two sword-lengths. Protocol dictates that MPs may not cross these lines when speaking. Historically, this was to prevent disputes in the House from devolving into duels. If a Member of Parliament steps over this line while giving a speech he or she will be lambasted by opposition Members. This is a possible origin for the expression "to toe the line".
Westminster Hall
Westminster Hall, the oldest existing part of the Palace of Westminster, was erected in 1097,[16] at which point it was the largest hall in Europe, though it was subsequently overtaken by the Palais de la Cité in Paris (1301-6) and a hall in Padua of similar date.[17] The roof was probably originally supported by pillars, giving three aisles, but during the reign of King Richard II, this was replaced by a hammerbeam roof by the royal carpenter Hugh Herland, "the greatest creation of medieval timber architecture", which allowed the original three aisles to be replaced with a single huge open space, with a dais at the end. Richard's architect Henry Yevele left the original dimensions, refacing the walls, with fifteen life-size statues of kings placed in niches.[18] The rebuilding had been begun by Henry III in 1245, but had by Richard's time been dormant for over a century.
Westminster Hall has the largest clearspan medieval roof in England, measuring 20.7 by 73.2 metres (68 by 240 ft).[10] Despite an Essex legend that the oak timber came from woods in Thundersley, Essex, it is known that the original roof was constructed with Irish black oak from County Galway and the chestnut roof timberwork was framed in 1395 at Farnham in Surrey, 56 kilometres (35 mi) south-west of London.[19] Accounts record the large number of wagons and barges which delivered the jointed timbers to Westminster for assembly.[20]
Westminster Hall has served numerous functions. It was primarily used for judicial purposes, housing three of the most important courts in the land: the Court of King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of Chancery. In 1875, these courts were amalgamated into the High Court of Justice,[21] which continued to meet in Westminster Hall until it moved to the Royal Courts of Justice in 1882.[22] In addition to regular courts, Westminster Hall also housed important trials, including impeachment trials and the state trials of King Charles I at the end of the English Civil War, Sir William Wallace, Sir Thomas More, John Cardinal Fisher, Guy Fawkes, the Earl of Strafford, the rebel Scottish Lords of the 1715 and 1745 uprisings, and Warren Hastings.
Westminster Hall has also served ceremonial functions. From the twelfth century to the nineteenth, coronation banquets honouring new monarchs were held here. The last coronation banquet was that of King George IV, held in 1821;[23] his successor, William IV, abandoned the idea because he deemed it too expensive. The Hall has been used for lyings-in-state during state and ceremonial funerals. Such an honour is usually reserved for the Sovereign and for their consorts; the only non-royals to receive it in the twentieth century were Frederick Sleigh Roberts, 1st Earl Roberts (1914) and Sir Winston Churchill (1965). The most recent lying-in-state was that of Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother in 2002.
The two Houses have presented ceremonial Addresses to the Crown in Westminster Hall on important public occasions. For example, Addresses were presented at Elizabeth II's Silver Jubilee (1977) and Golden Jubilee (2002), the 300th anniversary of the Glorious Revolution (1988), and the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War (1995).
Under reforms made in 1999, the House of Commons uses the Grand Committee Room next to Westminster Hall as an additional debating chamber. (Although it is not part of the main hall, the room is usually spoken of as such.) The room is shaped like an elongated horseshoe; it stands in contrast with the main Chamber, in which the benches are placed opposite each other. This pattern is meant to reflect the non-partisan nature of the debates held in Westminster Hall. Westminster Hall sittings occur thrice each week; controversial matters are not usually discussed.
Other Rooms
There are several other important rooms that lie on the first floor of the Palace. At the extreme southern end of the Palace is the Robing Room, the room in which the Sovereign prepares for the State Opening of Parliament by donning official robes and wearing the Imperial State Crown. Paintings by William Dyce in the Robing Room depict scenes from the legend of King Arthur. Immediately next to the Robing Room is the Royal Gallery, which is sometimes used by foreign dignitaries who wish to address both Houses. The walls are decorated by two enormous paintings by Daniel Maclise: "The Death of Nelson" (depicting Lord Nelson's demise at the Battle of Trafalgar) and "The Meeting of Wellington and Blücher" (showing the Duke of Wellington meeting Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher at the Battle of Waterloo).
To the immediate south of the Lords Chamber is the Prince's Chamber, a small anteroom used by members of the Lords. The Prince's Chamber is decorated with paintings of members of the Tudor dynasty by Richard Burchett and his pupils, and features a marble statue of Queen Victoria. To the immediate north of the Lords Chamber is the Peers' Lobby, where Lords informally discuss or negotiate matters during sittings of the House.
The centrepiece of the Palace of Westminster is the octagonal Central Lobby, which lies immediately beyond the Peers' Lobby. The lobby, which lies directly below the Central Tower, is adorned with statues of statesmen and with mosaics representing the United Kingdom's constituent nations' patron saints: St George for England, St Andrew for Scotland, St David for Wales and St Patrick for Ireland.[note 2] Constituents may meet their Members of Parliament in the Central Lobby. Beyond the Central Lobby, next to the Commons Chamber, lies the Members' Lobby, in which Members of Parliament hold discussions or negotiations. The Members' Lobby contains statues of several former Prime Ministers, including David Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Clement Attlee and Margaret Thatcher.
There are two suites of libraries on the Principal Floor, overlooking the river, for the House of Lords Library and House of Commons Library.
The Palace of Westminster also includes state apartments for the presiding officers of the two Houses. The official residence of the Speaker stands at the northern end of the Palace; the Lord Chancellor's apartments are at the southern end. Each day, the Speaker and Lord Speaker take part in formal processions from their apartments to their respective Chambers.[24][25]
There are 19 bars and restaurants in the Palace of Westminster,[26] many of which never close while the House is sitting. There is also a gymnasium, and even a hair salon; the rifle range closed in the 1990s.[27] Parliament also has a souvenirs shop, where items on sale range from House of Commons key-rings and china to House of Commons Champagne.
Security
The Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod oversees security for the House of Lords, and the Serjeant at Arms does the same for the House of Commons. These officers, however, have primarily ceremonial roles outside the actual chambers of their respective Houses. Security is the responsibility of the Palace of Westminster Division of the Metropolitan Police, the police force for the Greater London area. Tradition still dictates that only the Serjeant at Arms may enter the Commons chamber armed.
With rising concern about the possibility of a lorry full of explosives being driven into the building, a series of concrete blocks was placed in the roadway in 2003.[28] On the river, an exclusion zone extending 70 metres (77 yd) from the bank exists, which no vessels are allowed to enter.[29]
Despite recent security breaches, members of the public continue to have access to the Strangers' Gallery (public gallery) in the House of Commons. Visitors pass through metal detectors and their possessions are scanned. Police from the Palace of Westminster Division of the Metropolitan Police, supported by some armed police from the Diplomatic Protection Group, are always on duty in and around the Palace.
Under a provision of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, it has been illegal since 1 August 2005 to hold a protest, without the prior permission of the Metropolitan Police, within a designated area extending approximately one kilometre (0.6 mi) around the Palace.[30]
Eating, drinking and smoking
The Palace has accumulated many rules and traditions over the centuries. Smoking has not been allowed in the chambers of the House of Lords and the Commons since the 17th century.[38] As a result, Members may take snuff instead and the doorkeepers still keep a snuff-box for this purpose. Despite persistent media rumours, it has not been possible to smoke anywhere inside the Palace since 2005.[39] Members may not eat or drink in the chamber; the exception to this rule is the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who may have an alcoholic drink while delivering the Budget statement.[40]
Dress code
Hats must not be worn (although they formerly were when a point of order was being raised),[41] and Members may not wear military decorations or insignia. Members are not allowed to have their hands in their pockets—Andrew Robathan was heckled by opposing MPs for doing this on 19 December 1994.[42] Swords may not be worn in the Palace, and each MP has a loop of ribbon in the cloakroom for storing weapons.
Forms of address
Members may not refer to each other by name and use either "my honourable friend" (if a member of the same party) or "the honourable lady/gentleman" (for members from other parties); alternatively, "the honourable member for [the constituency]" is used. Members of the Privy Council are referred to as "the right honourable". Barrister MPs are entitled to be styled "my learned friend" or "the learned lady/gentleman".
In the House of Lords, members are referred to as "the noble lord/lady", or "my noble friend".
Other traditions
No animals may enter the Palace of Westminster, with the exception of guide dogs for the blind;[38] sniffer dogs and police horses are also allowed on the grounds.[43]
Speeches may not be read out during debate, although notes may be referred to. Similarly, the reading of newspapers is not allowed. Visual aids are discouraged in the chamber.[44]
Applause is not normally allowed in the Lords and Commons. Some notable exceptions to this were when Robin Cook gave his resignation speech in 2003,[45], when Prime Minister Tony Blair appeared for the last time at Prime Minister's Questions and when Speaker Michael Martin gave his leaving speech on 17 June 2009.[46]
It is a convention that MPs do not discuss the Sovereign nor use the name of the monarch as a point of debate without prior permission from the Speaker. This comes from 19th-century constitutionalist Erskine May, who said, "the irregular use of the Queen's name to influence a decision of the House is unconstitutional in principle and inconsistent with the independence of Parliament ... Any attempt to use her name in debate to influence the judgement of Parliament is immediately checked and censured." Vincent Cable was reprimanded for breaking this convention during a session of Prime Minister's Questions in 2008.[47]
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1. The Mind-Body Problem and the History of Dualism
1.1 The Mind-Body Problem
The mind-body problem is the problem: what is the relationship between mind and body? Or alternatively: what is the relationship between mental properties and physical properties?
Humans have (or seem to have) both physical properties and mental properties. People have (or seem to have)the sort of properties attributed in the physical sciences. These physical properties include size, weight, shape, colour, motion through space and time, etc. But they also have (or seem to have) mental properties, which we do not attribute to typical physical objects These properties involve consciousness (including perceptual experience, emotional experience, and much else), intentionality (including beliefs, desires, and much else), and they are possessed by a subject or a self. Physical properties are public, in the sense that they are, in principle, equally observable by anyone. Some physical properties – like those of an electron – are not directly observable at all, but they are equally available to all, to the same degree, with scientific equipment and techniques. The same is not true of mental properties. I may be able to tell that you are in pain by your behaviour, but only you can feel it directly. Similarly, you just know how something looks to you, and I can only surmise. Conscious mental events are private to the subject, who has a privileged access to them of a kind no-one has to the physical. The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between these two sets of properties. The mind-body problem breaks down into a number of components. The ontological question: what are mental states and what are physical states? Is one class a subclass of the other, so that all mental states are physical, or vice versa? Or are mental states and physical states entirely distinct?
The causal question: do physical states influence mental states? Do mental states influence physical states? If so, how?
Different aspects of the mind-body problem arise for different aspects of the mental, such as consciousness, intentionality, the self. The problem of consciousness: what is consciousness? How is it related to the brain and the body? The problem of intentionality: what is intentionality? How is it related to the brain and the body? The problem of the self: what is the self? How is it related to the brain and the body? Other aspects of the mind-body problem arise for aspects of the physical. For example:
The problem of embodiment: what is it for the mind to be housed in a body? What is it for a body to belong to a particular subject?
The seemingly intractable nature of these problems have given rise to many different philosophical views.
Materialist views say that, despite appearances to the contrary, mental states are just physical states. Behaviourism, functionalism, mind-brain identity theory and the computational theory of mind are examples of how materialists attempt to explain how this can be so. The most common factor in such theories is the attempt to explicate the nature of mind and consciousness in terms of their ability to directly or indirectly modify behaviour, but there are versions of materialism that try to tie the mental to the physical without explicitly explaining the mental in terms of its behaviour-modifying role. The latter are often grouped together under the label ‘non-reductive physicalism’, though this label is itself rendered elusive because of the controversial nature of the term ‘reduction’.
Idealist views say that physical states are really mental. This is because the physical world is an empirical world and, as such, it is the intersubjective product of our collective experience.
Dualist views (the subject of this entry) say that the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other. For the various forms that dualism can take and the associated problems, see below.
In sum, we can say that there is a mind-body problem because both consciousness and thought, broadly construed, seem very different from anything physical and there is no convincing consensus on how to build a satisfactorily unified picture of creatures possessed of both a mind and a body.
Other entries which concern aspects of the mind-body problem include (among many others): behaviorism, consciousness, eliminative materialism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, identity theory, intentionality, mental causation, neutral monism, and physicalism.
1.2 History of dualism
In dualism, ‘mind’ is contrasted with ‘body’, but at different times, different aspects of the mind have been the centre of attention. In the classical and mediaeval periods, it was the intellect that was thought to be most obviously resistant to a materialistic account: from Descartes on, the main stumbling block to materialist monism was supposed to be ‘consciousness’, of which phenomenal consciousness or sensation came to be considered as the paradigm instance.
The classical emphasis originates in Plato’s Phaedo. Plato believed that the true substances are not physical bodies, which are ephemeral, but the eternal Forms of which bodies are imperfect copies. These Forms not only make the world possible, they also make it intelligible, because they perform the role of universals, or what Frege called ‘concepts’. It is their connection with intelligibility that is relevant to the philosophy of mind. Because Forms are the grounds of intelligibility, they are what the intellect must grasp in the process of understanding. In Phaedo Plato presents a variety of arguments for the immortality of the soul, but the one that is relevant for our purposes is that the intellect is immaterial because Forms are immaterial and intellect must have an affinity with the Forms it apprehends (78b4–84b8). This affinity is so strong that the soul strives to leave the body in which it is imprisoned and to dwell in the realm of Forms. It may take many reincarnations before this is achieved. Plato’s dualism is not, therefore, simply a doctrine in the philosophy of mind, but an integral part of his whole metaphysics.
One problem with Plato’s dualism was that, though he speaks of the soul as imprisoned in the body, there is no clear account of what binds a particular soul to a particular body. Their difference in nature makes the union a mystery.
Aristotle did not believe in Platonic Forms, existing independently of their instances. Aristotelian forms (the capital ‘F’ has disappeared with their standing as autonomous entities) are the natures and properties of things and exist embodied in those things. This enabled Aristotle to explain the union of body and soul by saying that the soul is the form of the body. This means that a particular person’s soul is no more than his nature as a human being. Because this seems to make the soul into a property of the body, it led many interpreters, both ancient and modern, to interpret his theory as materialistic. The interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind – and, indeed, of his whole doctrine of form – remains as live an issue today as it was immediately after his death (Robinson 1983 and 1991; Nussbaum 1984; Rorty and Nussbaum, eds, 1992). Nevertheless, the text makes it clear that Aristotle believed that the intellect, though part of the soul, differs from other faculties in not having a bodily organ. His argument for this constitutes a more tightly argued case than Plato’s for the immateriality of thought and, hence, for a kind of dualism. He argued that the intellect must be immaterial because if it were material it could not receive all forms. Just as the eye, because of its particular physical nature, is sensitive to light but not to sound, and the ear to sound and not to light, so, if the intellect were in a physical organ it could be sensitive only to a restricted range of physical things; but this is not the case, for we can think about any kind of material object (De Anima III,4; 429a10–b9). As it does not have a material organ, its activity must be essentially immaterial.
It is common for modern Aristotelians, who otherwise have a high view of Aristotle’s relevance to modern philosophy, to treat this argument as being of purely historical interest, and not essential to Aristotle’s system as a whole. They emphasize that he was not a ‘Cartesian’ dualist, because the intellect is an aspect of the soul and the soul is the form of the body, not a separate substance. Kenny (1989) argues that Aristotle’s theory of mind as form gives him an account similar to Ryle (1949), for it makes the soul equivalent to the dispositions possessed by a living body. This ‘anti-Cartesian’ approach to Aristotle arguably ignores the fact that, for Aristotle, the form is the substance.
These issues might seem to be of purely historical interest. But we shall see in below, in section 4.5, that this is not so.
The identification of form and substance is a feature of Aristotle’s system that Aquinas effectively exploits in this context, identifying soul, intellect and form, and treating them as a substance. (See, for example, Aquinas (1912), Part I, questions 75 and 76.) But though the form (and, hence, the intellect with which it is identical) are the substance of the human person, they are not the person itself. Aquinas says that when one addresses prayers to a saint – other than the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is believed to retain her body in heaven and is, therefore, always a complete person – one should say, not, for example, ‘Saint Peter pray for us’, but ‘soul of Saint Peter pray for us’. The soul, though an immaterial substance, is the person only when united with its body. Without the body, those aspects of its personal memory that depend on images (which are held to be corporeal) will be lost.(See Aquinas (1912), Part I, question 89.)
The more modern versions of dualism have their origin in Descartes’ Meditations, and in the debate that was consequent upon Descartes’ theory. Descartes was a substance dualist. He believed that there were two kinds of substance: matter, of which the essential property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it thinks. Descartes’ conception of the relation between mind and body was quite different from that held in the Aristotelian tradition. For Aristotle, there is no exact science of matter. How matter behaves is essentially affected by the form that is in it. You cannot combine just any matter with any form – you cannot make a knife out of butter, nor a human being out of paper – so the nature of the matter is a necessary condition for the nature of the substance. But the nature of the substance does not follow from the nature of its matter alone: there is no ‘bottom up’ account of substances. Matter is a determinable made determinate by form. This was how Aristotle thought that he was able to explain the connection of soul to body: a particular soul exists as the organizing principle in a particular parcel of matter.
The belief in the relative indeterminacy of matter is one reason for Aristotle’s rejection of atomism. If matter is atomic, then it is already a collection of determinate objects in its own right, and it becomes natural to regard the properties of macroscopic substances as mere summations of the natures of the atoms.
Although, unlike most of his fashionable contemporaries and immediate successors, Descartes was not an atomist, he was, like the others, a mechanist about the properties of matter. Bodies are machines that work according to their own laws. Except where there are minds interfering with it, matter proceeds deterministically, in its own right. Where there are minds requiring to influence bodies, they must work by ‘pulling levers’ in a piece of machinery that already has its own laws of operation. This raises the question of where those ‘levers’ are in the body. Descartes opted for the pineal gland, mainly because it is not duplicated on both sides of the brain, so it is a candidate for having a unique, unifying function.
The main uncertainty that faced Descartes and his contemporaries, however, was not where interaction took place, but how two things so different as thought and extension could interact at all. This would be particularly mysterious if one had an impact view of causal interaction, as would anyone influenced by atomism, for whom the paradigm of causation is like two billiard balls cannoning off one another.
Various of Descartes’ disciples, such as Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche, concluded that all mind-body interactions required the direct intervention of God. The appropriate states of mind and body were only the occasions for such intervention, not real causes. Now it would be convenient to think that occasionalists held that all causation was natural except for that between mind and body. In fact they generalized their conclusion and treated all causation as directly dependent on God. Why this was so, we cannot discuss here.
Descartes’ conception of a dualism of substances came under attack from the more radical empiricists, who found it difficult to attach sense to the concept of substance at all. Locke, as a moderate empiricist, accepted that there were both material and immaterial substances. Berkeley famously rejected material substance, because he rejected all existence outside the mind. In his early Notebooks, he toyed with the idea of rejecting immaterial substance, because we could have no idea of it, and reducing the self to a collection of the ‘ideas’ that constituted its contents. Finally, he decided that the self, conceived as something over and above the ideas of which it was aware, was essential for an adequate understanding of the human person. Although the self and its acts are not presented to consciousness as objects of awareness, we are obliquely aware of them simply by dint of being active subjects. Hume rejected such claims, and proclaimed the self to be nothing more than a concatenation of its ephemeral contents.
In fact, Hume criticised the whole conception of substance for lacking in empirical content: when you search for the owner of the properties that make up a substance, you find nothing but further properties. Consequently, the mind is, he claimed, nothing but a ‘bundle’ or ‘heap’ of impressions and ideas – that is, of particular mental states or events, without an owner. This position has been labelled bundle dualism, and it is a special case of a general bundle theory of substance, according to which objects in general are just organised collections of properties. The problem for the Humean is to explain what binds the elements in the bundle together. This is an issue for any kind of substance, but for material bodies the solution seems fairly straightforward: the unity of a physical bundle is constituted by some form of causal interaction between the elements in the bundle. For the mind, mere causal connection is not enough; some further relation of co-consciousness is required. We shall see in 5.2.1 that it is problematic whether one can treat such a relation as more primitive than the notion of belonging to a subject.
One should note the following about Hume’s theory. His bundle theory is a theory about the nature of the unity of the mind. As a theory about this unity, it is not necessarily dualist. Parfit (1970, 1984) and Shoemaker (1984, ch. 2), for example, accept it as physicalists. In general, physicalists will accept it unless they wish to ascribe the unity to the brain or the organism as a whole. Before the bundle theory can be dualist one must accept property dualism, for more about which, see the next section.
A crisis in the history of dualism came, however, with the growing popularity of mechanism in science in the nineteenth century. According to the mechanist, the world is, as it would now be expressed, ‘closed under physics’. This means that everything that happens follows from and is in accord with the laws of physics. There is, therefore, no scope for interference in the physical world by the mind in the way that interactionism seems to require. According to the mechanist, the conscious mind is an epiphenomenon (a notion given general currency by T. H. Huxley 1893): that is, it is a by-product of the physical system which has no influence back on it. In this way, the facts of consciousness are acknowledged but the integrity of physical science is preserved. However, many philosophers found it implausible to claim such things as the following; the pain that I have when you hit me, the visual sensations I have when I see the ferocious lion bearing down on me or the conscious sense of understanding I have when I hear your argument – all have nothing directly to do with the way I respond. It is very largely due to the need to avoid this counterintuitiveness that we owe the concern of twentieth century philosophy to devise a plausible form of materialist monism. But, although dualism has been out of fashion in psychology since the advent of behaviourism (Watson 1913) and in philosophy since Ryle (1949), the argument is by no means over. Some distinguished neurologists, such as Sherrington (1940) and Eccles (Popper and Eccles 1977) have continued to defend dualism as the only theory that can preserve the data of consciousness. Amongst mainstream philosophers, discontent with physicalism led to a modest revival of property dualism in the last decade of the twentieth century. At least some of the reasons for this should become clear below.
2. Varieties of Dualism: Ontology
There are various ways of dividing up kinds of dualism. One natural way is in terms of what sorts of things one chooses to be dualistic about. The most common categories lighted upon for these purposes are substance and property, giving one substance dualism and property dualism. There is, however, an important third category, namely predicate dualism. As this last is the weakest theory, in the sense that it claims least, I shall begin by characterizing it.
2.1 Predicate dualism
Predicate dualism is the theory that psychological or mentalistic predicates are (a) essential for a full description of the world and (b) are not reducible to physicalistic predicates. For a mental predicate to be reducible, there would be bridging laws connecting types of psychological states to types of physical ones in such a way that the use of the mental predicate carried no information that could not be expressed without it. An example of what we believe to be a true type reduction outside psychology is the case of water, where water is always H2O: something is water if and only if it is H2O. If one were to replace the word ‘water’ by ‘H2O’, it is plausible to say that one could convey all the same information. But the terms in many of the special sciences (that is, any science except physics itself) are not reducible in this way. Not every hurricane or every infectious disease, let alone every devaluation of the currency or every coup d’etat has the same constitutive structure. These states are defined more by what they do than by their composition or structure. Their names are classified as functional terms rather than natural kind terms. It goes with this that such kinds of state are multiply realizable; that is, they may be constituted by different kinds of physical structures under different circumstances. Because of this, unlike in the case of water and H2O, one could not replace these terms by some more basic physical description and still convey the same information. There is no particular description, using the language of physics or chemistry, that would do the work of the word ‘hurricane’, in the way that ‘H2O’ would do the work of ‘water’. It is widely agreed that many, if not all, psychological states are similarly irreducible, and so psychological predicates are not reducible to physical descriptions and one has predicate dualism. (The classic source for irreducibility in the special sciences in general is Fodor (1974), and for irreducibility in the philosophy of mind, Davidson (1971).)
2.2 Property Dualism
Whereas predicate dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of predicates in our language, property dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of property out in the world. Property dualism can be seen as a step stronger than predicate dualism. Although the predicate ‘hurricane’ is not equivalent to any single description using the language of physics, we believe that each individual hurricane is nothing but a collection of physical atoms behaving in a certain way: one need have no more than the physical atoms, with their normal physical properties, following normal physical laws, for there to be a hurricane. One might say that we need more than the language of physics to describe and explain the weather, but we do not need more than its ontology. There is token identity between each individual hurricane and a mass of atoms, even if there is no type identity between hurricanes as kinds and some particular structure of atoms as a kind. Genuine property dualism occurs when, even at the individual level, the ontology of physics is not sufficient to constitute what is there. The irreducible language is not just another way of describing what there is, it requires that there be something more there than was allowed for in the initial ontology. Until the early part of the twentieth century, it was common to think that biological phenomena (‘life’) required property dualism (an irreducible ‘vital force’), but nowadays the special physical sciences other than psychology are generally thought to involve only predicate dualism. In the case of mind, property dualism is defended by those who argue that the qualitative nature of consciousness is not merely another way of categorizing states of the brain or of behaviour, but a genuinely emergent phenomenon.
2.3 Substance Dualism
There are two important concepts deployed in this notion. One is that of substance, the other is the dualism of these substances. A substance is characterized by its properties, but, according to those who believe in substances, it is more than the collection of the properties it possesses, it is the thing which possesses them. So the mind is not just a collection of thoughts, but is that which thinks, an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial states. Properties are the properties of objects. If one is a property dualist, one may wonder what kinds of objects possess the irreducible or immaterial properties in which one believes. One can use a neutral expression and attribute them to persons, but, until one has an account of person, this is not explanatory. One might attribute them to human beings qua animals, or to the brains of these animals. Then one will be holding that these immaterial properties are possessed by what is otherwise a purely material thing. But one may also think that not only mental states are immaterial, but that the subject that possesses them must also be immaterial. Then one will be a dualist about that to which mental states and properties belong as well about the properties themselves. Now one might try to think of these subjects as just bundles of the immaterial states. This is Hume’s view. But if one thinks that the owner of these states is something quite over and above the states themselves, and is immaterial, as they are, one will be a substance dualist.
Substance dualism is also often dubbed ‘Cartesian dualism’, but some substance dualists are keen to distinguish their theories from Descartes’s. E. J. Lowe, for example, is a substance dualist, in the following sense. He holds that a normal human being involves two substances, one a body and the other a person. The latter is not, however, a purely mental substance that can be defined in terms of thought or consciousness alone, as Descartes claimed. But persons and their bodies have different identity conditions and are both substances, so there are two substances essentially involved in a human being, hence this is a form of substance dualism. Lowe (2006) claims that his theory is close to P. F. Strawson’s (1959), whilst admitting that Strawson would not have called it substance dualism.
3. Varieties of Dualism: Interaction
If mind and body are different realms, in the way required by either property or substance dualism, then there arises the question of how they are related. Common sense tells us that they interact: thoughts and feelings are at least sometimes caused by bodily events and at least sometimes themselves give rise to bodily responses. I shall now consider briefly the problems for interactionism, and its main rivals, epiphenomenalism and parallelism.
3.1 Interactionism
Interactionism is the view that mind and body – or mental events and physical events – causally influence each other. That this is so is one of our common-sense beliefs, because it appears to be a feature of everyday experience. The physical world influences my experience through my senses, and I often react behaviourally to those experiences. My thinking, too, influences my speech and my actions. There is, therefore, a massive natural prejudice in favour of interactionism. It has been claimed, however, that it faces serious problems (some of which were anticipated in section 1).
The simplest objection to interaction is that, in so far as mental properties, states or substances are of radically different kinds from each other, they lack that communality necessary for interaction. It is generally agreed that, in its most naive form, this objection to interactionism rests on a ‘billiard ball’ picture of causation: if all causation is by impact, how can the material and the immaterial impact upon each other? But if causation is either by a more ethereal force or energy or only a matter of constant conjunction, there would appear to be no problem in principle with the idea of interaction of mind and body.
Even if there is no objection in principle, there appears to be a conflict between interactionism and some basic principles of physical science. For example, if causal power was flowing in and out of the physical system, energy would not be conserved, and the conservation of energy is a fundamental scientific law. Various responses have been made to this. One suggestion is that it might be possible for mind to influence the distribution of energy, without altering its quantity. (See Averill and Keating 1981). Another response is to challenge the relevance of the conservation principle in this context. The conservation principle states that ‘in a causally isolated system the total amount of energy will remain constant’. Whereas ‘[t]he interactionist denies…that the human body is an isolated system’, so the principle is irrelevant (Larmer (1986), 282: this article presents a good brief survey of the options). This approach has been termed conditionality, namely the view that conservation is conditional on the physical system being closed, that is, that nothing non-physical is interacting or interfering with it, and, of course, the interactionist claims that this condition is, trivially, not met. That conditionality is the best line for the dualist to take, and that other approaches do not work, is defended in Pitts (2019) and Cucu and Pitts (2019). This, they claim, makes the plausibility of interactionism an empirical matter which only close investigation on the fine operation of the brain could hope to settle. Cucu, in a separate article (2018), claims to find critical neuronal events which do not have sufficient physical explanation.This claim clearly needs further investigation.
Robins Collins (2011) has claimed that the appeal to conservation by opponents of interactionism is something of a red herring because conservation principles are not ubiquitous in physics. He argues that energy is not conserved in general relativity, in quantum theory, or in the universe taken as a whole. Why then, should we insist on it in mind-brain interaction?
Most discussion of interactionism takes place in the context of the assumption that it is incompatible with the world’s being ‘closed under physics’. This is a very natural assumption, but it is not justified if causal overdetermination of behaviour is possible. There could then be a complete physical cause of behaviour, and a mental one. The strongest intuitive objection against overdetermination is clearly stated by Mills (1996: 112), who is himself a defender of overdetermination.
For X to be a cause of Y, X must contribute something to Y. The only way a purely mental event could contribute to a purely physical one would be to contribute some feature not already determined by a purely physical event. But if physical closure is true, there is no feature of the purely physical effect that is not contributed by the purely physical cause. Hence interactionism violates physical closure after all.
Mills says that this argument is invalid, because a physical event can have features not explained by the event which is its sufficient cause. For example, “the rock’s hitting the window is causally sufficient for the window’s breaking, and the window’s breaking has the feature of being the third window-breaking in the house this year; but the facts about prior window-breakings, rather than the rock’s hitting the window, are what cause this window-breaking to have this feature.”
The opponent of overdetermination could perhaps reply that his principle applies, not to every feature of events, but to a subgroup – say, intrinsic features, not merely relational or comparative ones. It is this kind of feature that the mental event would have to cause, but physical closure leaves no room for this. These matters are still controversial.
The problem with closure of physics may be radically altered if physical laws are indeterministic, as quantum theory seems to assert. If physical laws are deterministic, then any interference from outside would lead to a breach of those laws. But if they are indeterministic, might not interference produce a result that has a probability greater than zero, and so be consistent with the laws? This way, one might have interaction yet preserve a kind of nomological closure, in the sense that no laws are infringed. Because it involves assessing the significance and consequences of quantum theory, this is a difficult matter for the non-physicist to assess. Some argue that indeterminacy manifests itself only on the subatomic level, being cancelled out by the time one reaches even very tiny macroscopic objects: and human behaviour is a macroscopic phenomenon. Others argue that the structure of the brain is so finely tuned that minute variations could have macroscopic effects, rather in the way that, according to ‘chaos theory’, the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in China might affect the weather in New York. (For discussion of this, see Eccles (1980), (1987), and Popper and Eccles (1977).) Still others argue that quantum indeterminacy manifests itself directly at a high level, when acts of observation collapse the wave function, suggesting that the mind may play a direct role in affecting the state of the world (Hodgson 1988; Stapp 1993).
3.2 Epiphenomenalism
If the reality of property dualism is not to be denied, but the problem of how the immaterial is to affect the material is to be avoided, then epiphenomenalism may seem to be the answer. According to this theory, mental events are caused by physical events, but have no causal influence on the physical. I have introduced this theory as if its point were to avoid the problem of how two different categories of thing might interact. In fact, it is, at best, an incomplete solution to this problem. If it is mysterious how the non-physical can have it in its nature to influence the physical, it ought to be equally mysterious how the physical can have it in its nature to produce something non-physical. But that this latter is what occurs is an essential claim of epiphenomenalism. (For development of this point, see Green (2003), 149–51). In fact, epiphenomenalism is more effective as a way of saving the autonomy of the physical (the world as ‘closed under physics’) than as a contribution to avoiding the need for the physical and non-physical to have causal commerce.
There are at least three serious problems for epiphenomenalism. First, as I indicated in section 1, it is profoundly counterintuitive. What could be more apparent than that it is the pain that I feel that makes me cry, or the visual experience of the boulder rolling towards me that makes me run away? At least one can say that epiphenomenalism is a fall-back position: it tends to be adopted because other options are held to be unacceptable.
The second problem is that, if mental states do nothing, there is no reason why they should have evolved. This objection ties in with the first: the intuition there was that conscious states clearly modify our behaviour in certain ways, such as avoiding danger, and it is plain that they are very useful from an evolutionary perspective.
Frank Jackson (1982) replies to this objection by saying that it is the brain state associated with pain that evolves for this reason: the sensation is a by-product. Evolution is full of useless or even harmful by-products. For example, polar bears have evolved thick coats to keep them warm, even though this has the damaging side effect that they are heavy to carry. Jackson’s point is true in general, but does not seem to apply very happily to the case of mind. The heaviness of the polar bear’s coat follows directly from those properties and laws which make it warm: one could not, in any simple way, have one without the other. But with mental states, dualistically conceived, the situation is quite the opposite. The laws of physical nature which, the mechanist says, make brain states cause behaviour, in no way explain why brain states should give rise to conscious ones. The laws linking mind and brain are what Feigl (1958) calls nomological danglers, that is, brute facts added onto the body of integrated physical law. Why there should have been by-products of that kind seems to have no evolutionary explanation.
The third problem concerns the rationality of belief in epiphenomenalism, via its effect on the problem of other minds. It is natural to say that I know that I have mental states because I experience them directly. But how can I justify my belief that others have them? The simple version of the ‘argument from analogy’ says that I can extrapolate from my own case. I know that certain of my mental states are correlated with certain pieces of behaviour, and so I infer that similar behaviour in others is also accompanied by similar mental states. Many hold that this is a weak argument because it is induction from one instance, namely, my own. The argument is stronger if it is not a simple induction but an ‘argument to the best explanation’. I seem to know from my own case that mental events can be the explanation of behaviour, and I know of no other candidate explanation for typical human behaviour, so I postulate the same explanation for the behaviour of others. But if epiphenomenalism is true, my mental states do not explain my behaviour and there is a physical explanation for the behaviour of others. It is explanatorily redundant to postulate such states for others. I know, by introspection, that I have them, but is it not just as likely that I alone am subject to this quirk of nature, rather than that everyone is?
For more detailed treatment and further reading on this topic, see the entry epiphenomenalism.
3.3 Parallelism
The epiphenomenalist wishes to preserve the integrity of physical science and the physical world, and appends those mental features that he cannot reduce. The parallelist preserves both realms intact, but denies all causal interaction between them. They run in harmony with each other, but not because their mutual influence keeps each other in line. That they should behave as if they were interacting would seem to be a bizarre coincidence. This is why parallelism has tended to be adopted only by those – like Leibniz – who believe in a pre-established harmony, set in place by God. The progression of thought can be seen as follows. Descartes believes in a more or less natural form of interaction between immaterial mind and material body. Malebranche thought that this was impossible naturally, and so required God to intervene specifically on each occasion on which interaction was required. Leibniz decided that God might as well set things up so that they always behaved as if they were interacting, without particular intervention being required. Outside such a theistic framework, the theory is incredible. Even within such a framework, one might well sympathise with Berkeley’s instinct that once genuine interaction is ruled out one is best advised to allow that God creates the physical world directly, within the mental realm itself, as a construct out of experience.
4. Arguments for Dualism
4.1 The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism
One category of arguments for dualism is constituted by the standard objections against physicalism. Prime examples are those based on the existence of qualia, the most important of which is the so-called ‘knowledge argument’. Because this argument has its own entry (see the entry qualia: the knowledge argument), I shall deal relatively briefly with it here. One should bear in mind, however, that all arguments against physicalism are also arguments for the irreducible and hence immaterial nature of the mind and, given the existence of the material world, are thus arguments for dualism.
The knowledge argument asks us to imagine a future scientist who has lacked a certain sensory modality from birth, but who has acquired a perfect scientific understanding of how this modality operates in others. This scientist – call him Harpo – may have been born stone deaf, but become the world’s greatest expert on the machinery of hearing: he knows everything that there is to know within the range of the physical and behavioural sciences about hearing. Suppose that Harpo, thanks to developments in neurosurgery, has an operation which finally enables him to hear. It is suggested that he will then learn something he did not know before, which can be expressed as what it is like to hear, or the qualitative or phenomenal nature of sound. These qualitative features of experience are generally referred to as qualia. If Harpo learns something new, he did not know everything before. He knew all the physical facts before. So what he learns on coming to hear – the facts about the nature of experience or the nature of qualia – are non-physical. This establishes at least a state or property dualism. (See Jackson 1982; Robinson 1982.)
There are at least two lines of response to this popular but controversial argument. First is the ‘ability’ response. According to this, Harpo does not acquire any new factual knowledge, only ‘knowledge how’, in the form of the ability to respond directly to sounds, which he could not do before. This essentially behaviouristic account is exactly what the intuition behind the argument is meant to overthrow. Putting ourselves in Harpo’s position, it is meant to be obvious that what he acquires is knowledge of what something is like, not just how to do something. Such appeals to intuition are always, of course, open to denial by those who claim not to share the intuition. Some ability theorists seem to blur the distinction between knowing what something is like and knowing how to do something, by saying that the ability Harpo acquires is to imagine or remember the nature of sound. In this case, what he acquires the ability to do involves the representation to himself of what the thing is like. But this conception of representing to oneself, especially in the form of imagination, seems sufficiently close to producing in oneself something very like a sensory experience that it only defers the problem: until one has a physicalist gloss on what constitutes such representations as those involved in conscious memory and imagination, no progress has been made.
The other line of response is to argue that, although Harpo’s new knowledge is factual, it is not knowledge of a new fact. Rather, it is new way of grasping something that he already knew. He does not realise this, because the concepts employed to capture experience (such as ‘looks red’ or ‘sounds C-sharp’) are similar to demonstratives, and demonstrative concepts lack the kind of descriptive content that allow one to infer what they express from other pieces of information that one may already possess. A total scientific knowledge of the world would not enable you to say which time was ‘now’ or which place was ‘here’. Demonstrative concepts pick something out without saying anything extra about it. Similarly, the scientific knowledge that Harpo originally possessed did not enable him to anticipate what it would be like to re-express some parts of that knowledge using the demonstrative concepts that only experience can give one. The knowledge, therefore, appears to be genuinely new, whereas only the mode of conceiving it is novel.
Proponents of the epistemic argument respond that it is problematic to maintain both that the qualitative nature of experience can be genuinely novel, and that the quality itself be the same as some property already grasped scientifically: does not the experience’s phenomenal nature, which the demonstrative concepts capture, constitute a property in its own right? Another way to put this is to say that phenomenal concepts are not pure demonstratives, like ‘here’ and ‘now’, or ‘this’ and ‘that’, because they do capture a genuine qualitative content. Furthermore, experiencing does not seem to consist simply in exercising a particular kind of concept, demonstrative or not. When Harpo has his new form of experience, he does not simply exercise a new concept; he also grasps something new – the phenomenal quality – with that concept. How decisive these considerations are, remains controversial.
4.2 The Argument from Predicate Dualism to Property Dualism
I said above that predicate dualism might seem to have no ontological consequences, because it is concerned only with the different way things can be described within the contexts of the different sciences, not with any real difference in the things themselves. This, however, can be disputed.
The argument from predicate to property dualism moves in two steps, both controversial. The first claims that the irreducible special sciences, which are the sources of irreducible predicates, are not wholly objective in the way that physics is, but depend for their subject matter upon interest-relative perspectives on the world. This means that they, and the predicates special to them, depend on the existence of minds and mental states, for only minds have interest-relative perspectives. The second claim is that psychology – the science of the mental – is itself an irreducible special science, and so it, too, presupposes the existence of the mental. Mental predicates therefore presuppose the mentality that creates them: mentality cannot consist simply in the applicability of the predicates themselves.
First, let us consider the claim that the special sciences are not fully objective, but are interest-relative.
No-one would deny, of course, that the very same subject matter or ‘hunk of reality’ can be described in irreducibly different ways and it still be just that subject matter or piece of reality. A mass of matter could be characterized as a hurricane, or as a collection of chemical elements, or as mass of sub-atomic particles, and there be only the one mass of matter. But such different explanatory frameworks seem to presuppose different perspectives on that subject matter.
This is where basic physics, and perhaps those sciences reducible to basic physics, differ from irreducible special sciences. On a realist construal, the completed physics cuts physical reality up at its ultimate joints: any special science which is nomically strictly reducible to physics also, in virtue of this reduction, it could be argued, cuts reality at its joints, but not at its minutest ones. If scientific realism is true, a completed physics will tell one how the world is, independently of any special interest or concern: it is just how the world is. It would seem that, by contrast, a science which is not nomically reducible to physics does not take its legitimation from the underlying reality in this direct way. Rather, such a science is formed from the collaboration between, on the one hand, objective similarities in the world and, on the other, perspectives and interests of those who devise the science. The concept of hurricane is brought to bear from the perspective of creatures concerned about the weather. Creatures totally indifferent to the weather would have no reason to take the real patterns of phenomena that hurricanes share as constituting a single kind of thing. With the irreducible special sciences, there is an issue of salience , which involves a subjective component: a selection of phenomena with a certain teleology in mind is required before their structures or patterns are reified. The entities of metereology or biology are, in this respect, rather like Gestalt phenomena.
Even accepting this, why might it be thought that the perspectivality of the special sciences leads to a genuine property dualism in the philosophy of mind? It might seem to do so for the following reason. Having a perspective on the world, perceptual or intellectual, is a psychological state. So the irreducible special sciences presuppose the existence of mind. If one is to avoid an ontological dualism, the mind that has this perspective must be part of the physical reality on which it has its perspective. But psychology, it seems to be almost universally agreed, is one of those special sciences that is not reducible to physics, so if its subject matter is to be physical, it itself presupposes a perspective and, hence, the existence of a mind to see matter as psychological. If this mind is physical and irreducible, it presupposes mind to see it as such. We seem to be in a vicious circle or regress.
We can now understand the motivation for full-blown reduction. A true basic physics represents the world as it is in itself, and if the special sciences were reducible, then the existence of their ontologies would make sense as expressions of the physical, not just as ways of seeing or interpreting it. They could be understood ‘from the bottom up’, not from top down. The irreducibility of the special sciences creates no problem for the dualist, who sees the explanatory endeavor of the physical sciences as something carried on from a perspective conceptually outside of the physical world. Nor need this worry a physicalist, if he can reduce psychology, for then he could understand ‘from the bottom up’ the acts (with their internal, intentional contents) which created the irreducible ontologies of the other sciences. But psychology is one of the least likely of sciences to be reduced. If psychology cannot be reduced, this line of reasoning leads to real emergence for mental acts and hence to a real dualism for the properties those acts instantiate (Robinson 2003).
4.3 The Modal Argument
There is an argument, which has roots in Descartes (Meditation VI), which is a modal argument for dualism. One might put it as follows:
It is imaginable that one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
It is conceivable that one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
It is possible one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
One’s mind is a different entity from one’s body.
The rationale of the argument is a move from imaginability to real possibility. I include (2) because the notion of conceivability has one foot in the psychological camp, like imaginability, and one in the camp of pure logical possibility and therefore helps in the transition from one to the other.
This argument should be distinguished from a similar ‘conceivability’ argument, often known as the ‘zombie hypothesis’, which claims the imaginability and possibility of my body (or, in some forms, a body physically just like it) existing without there being any conscious states associated with it. (See, for example, Chalmers (1996), 94–9.) This latter argument, if sound, would show that conscious states were something over and above physical states. It is a different argument because the hypothesis that the unaltered body could exist without the mind is not the same as the suggestion that the mind might continue to exist without the body, nor are they trivially equivalent. The zombie argument establishes only property dualism and a property dualist might think disembodied existence inconceivable – for example, if he thought the identity of a mind through time depended on its relation to a body (e.g., Penelhum 1970).
Before Kripke (1972/80), the first challenge to such an argument would have concerned the move from (3) to (4). When philosophers generally believed in contingent identity, that move seemed to them invalid. But nowadays that inference is generally accepted and the issue concerns the relation between imaginability and possibility. No-one would nowadays identify the two (except, perhaps, for certain quasi-realists and anti-realists), but the view that imaginability is a solid test for possibility has been strongly defended. W. D. Hart ((1994), 266), for example, argues that no clear example has been produced such that “one can imagine that p (and tell less imaginative folk a story that enables them to imagine that p) plus a good argument that it is impossible that p. No such counterexamples have been forthcoming…” This claim is at least contentious. There seem to be good arguments that time-travel is incoherent, but every episode of Star-Trek or Doctor Who shows how one can imagine what it might be like were it possible.
It is worth relating the appeal to possibility in this argument to that involved in the more modest, anti-physicalist, zombie argument. The possibility of this hypothesis is also challenged, but all that is necessary for a zombie to be possible is that all and only the things that the physical sciences say about the body be true of such a creature. As the concepts involved in such sciences – e.g., neuron, cell, muscle – seem to make no reference, explicit or implicit, to their association with consciousness, and are defined in purely physical terms in the relevant science texts, there is a very powerful prima facie case for thinking that something could meet the condition of being just like them and lack any connection with consciousness. There is no parallel clear, uncontroversial and regimented account of mental concepts as a whole that fails to invoke, explicitly or implicitly, physical (e.g., behavioural) states.
For an analytical behaviourist the appeal to imaginability made in the argument fails, not because imagination is not a reliable guide to possibility, but because we cannot imagine such a thing, as it is a priori impossible. The impossibility of disembodiment is rather like that of time travel, because it is demonstrable a priori, though only by arguments that are controversial. The argument can only get under way for those philosophers who accept that the issue cannot be settled a priori, so the possibility of the disembodiment that we can imagine is still prima facie open.
A major rationale of those who think that imagination is not a safe indication of possibility, even when such possibility is not eliminable a priori, is that we can imagine that a posteriori necessities might be false – for example, that Hesperus might not be identical to Phosphorus. But if Kripke is correct, that is not a real possibility. Another way of putting this point is that there are many epistemic possibilities which are imaginable because they are epistemic possibilities, but which are not real possibilities. Richard Swinburne (1997, New Appendix C), whilst accepting this argument in general, has interesting reasons for thinking that it cannot apply in the mind-body case. He argues that in cases that involve a posteriori necessities, such as those identities that need discovering, it is because we identify those entities only by their ‘stereotypes’ (that is, by their superficial features observable by the layman) that we can be wrong about their essences. In the case of our experience of ourselves this is not true.
Now it is true that the essence of Hesperus cannot be discovered by a mere thought experiment. That is because what makes Hesperus Hesperus is not the stereotype, but what underlies it. But it does not follow that no one can ever have access to the essence of a substance, but must always rely for identification on a fallible stereotype. One might think that for the person him or herself, while what makes that person that person underlies what is observable to others, it does not underlie what is experienceable by that person, but is given directly in their own self-awareness.
This is a very appealing Cartesian intuition: my identity as the thinking thing that I am is revealed to me in consciousness, it is not something beyond the veil of consciousness. Now it could be replied to this that though I do access myself as a conscious subject, so classifying myself is rather like considering myself qua cyclist. Just as I might never have been a cyclist, I might never have been conscious, if things had gone wrong in my very early life. I am the organism, the animal, which might not have developed to the point of consciousness, and that essence as animal is not revealed to me just by introspection.
But there are vital differences between these cases. A cyclist is explicitly presented as a human being (or creature of some other animal species) cycling: there is no temptation to think of a cyclist as a basic kind of thing in its own right. Consciousness is not presented as a property of something, but as the subject itself. Swinburne’s claim that when we refer to ourselves we are referring to something we think we are directly aware of and not to ‘something we know not what’ that underlies our experience seemingly ‘of ourselves’ has powerful intuitive appeal and could only be overthrown by very forceful arguments. Yet, even if we are not referring primarily to a substrate, but to what is revealed in consciousness, could it not still be the case that there is a necessity stronger than causal connecting this consciousness to something physical? To consider this further we must investigate what the limits are of the possible analogy between cases of the water-H2O kind, and the mind-body relation.
We start from the analogy between the water stereotype – how water presents itself – and how consciousness is given first-personally to the subject. It is plausible to claim that something like water could exist without being H2O, but hardly that it could exist without some underlying nature. There is, however, no reason to deny that this underlying nature could be homogenous with its manifest nature: that is, it would seem to be possible that there is a world in which the water-like stuff is an element, as the ancients thought, and is water-like all the way down. The claim of the proponents of the dualist argument is that this latter kind of situation can be known to be true a priori in the case of the mind: that is, one can tell by introspection that it is not more-than-causally dependent on something of a radically different nature, such as a brain or body. What grounds might one have for thinking that one could tell that a priori?
The only general argument that seem to be available for this would be the principle that, for any two levels of discourse, A and B, they are more-than-causally connected only if one entails the other a priori. And the argument for accepting this principle would be that the relatively uncontroversial cases of a posteriori necessary connections are in fact cases in which one can argue a priori from facts about the microstructure to the manifest facts. In the case of water, for example, it would be claimed that it follows a priori that if there were something with the properties attributed to H2O by chemistry on a micro level, then that thing would possess waterish properties on a macro level. What is established a posteriori is that it is in fact H2O that underlies and explains the waterish properties round here, not something else: the sufficiency of the base – were it to obtain – to explain the phenomena, can be deduced a priori from the supposed nature of the base. This is, in effect, the argument that Chalmers uses to defend the zombie hypothesis. The suggestion is that the whole category of a posteriori more-than-causally necessary connections (often identified as a separate category of metaphysical necessity) comes to no more than this. If we accept that this is the correct account of a posteriori necessities, and also deny the analytically reductionist theories that would be necessary for a priori connections between mind and body, as conceived, for example, by the behaviourist or the functionalist, does it follow that we can tell a priori that consciousness is not more-than-causally dependent on the body?
It is helpful in considering this question to employ a distinction like Berkeley’s between ideas and notions. Ideas are the objects of our mental acts, and they capture transparently – ‘by way of image or likeness’ (Principles, sect. 27) – that of which they are the ideas. The self and its faculties are not the objects of our mental acts, but are captured only obliquely in the performance of its acts, and of these Berkeley says we have notions, meaning by this that what we capture of the nature of the dynamic agent does not seem to have the same transparency as what we capture as the normal objects of the agent’s mental acts. It is not necessary to become involved in Berkeley’s metaphysics in general to feel the force of the claim that the contents and internal objects of our mental acts are grasped with a lucidity that exceeds that of our grasp of the agent and the acts per se. Because of this, notions of the self perhaps have a ‘thickness’ and are permanently contestable: there seems always to be room for more dispute as to what is involved in that concept. (Though we shall see later, in 5.2.2, that there is a ‘non-thick’ way of taking the Berkeleyan concept of a notion.)
Because ‘thickness’ always leaves room for dispute, this is one of those cases in philosophy in which one is at the mercy of the arguments philosophers happen to think up. The conceivability argument creates a prima facie case for thinking that mind has no more than causal ontological dependence on the body. Let us assume that one rejects analytical (behaviourist or functionalist) accounts of mental predicates. Then the above arguments show that any necessary dependence of mind on body does not follow the model that applies in other scientific cases. This does not show that there may not be other reasons for believing in such dependence, for so many of the concepts in the area are still contested. For example, it might be argued that identity through time requires the kind of spatial existence that only body can give: or that the causal continuity required by a stream of consciousness cannot be a property of mere phenomena. All these might be put forward as ways of filling out those aspects of our understanding of the self that are only obliquely, not transparently, presented in self-awareness. The dualist must respond to any claim as it arises: the conceivability argument does not pre-empt them.......
5.2 The Unity of the Mind
Whether one believes that the mind is a substance or just a bundle of properties, the same challenge arises, which is to explain the nature of the unity of the immaterial mind. For the Cartesian, that means explaining how he understands the notion of immaterial substance. For the Humean, the issue is to explain the nature of the relationship between the different elements in the bundle that binds them into one thing. Neither tradition has been notably successful in this latter task: indeed, Hume, in the appendix to the Treatise, declared himself wholly mystified by the problem, rejecting his own initial solution (though quite why is not clear from the text).
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The breeding range includes northwest Africa, most of Europe and extends eastwards across temperate Asia to the Angara River and the southern end of Lake Baikal in Siberia. There are also a number of distinctive subspecies on the Azores, the Canary Islands and the Madeira Islands in the Atlantic Ocean. The chaffinch was introduced from Britain into several of its overseas territories in the 19th century. In New Zealand the chaffinch has colonised both the North and South Islands.
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The Milky Way is the galaxy that includes our Solar System, with the name describing the galaxy's appearance from Earth: a hazy band of light seen in the night sky formed from stars that cannot be individually distinguished by the naked eye. The term Milky Way is a translation of the Latin via lactea, from the Greek γαλακτικός κύκλος (galaktikos kýklos), meaning "milky circle." From Earth, the Milky Way appears as a band because its disk-shaped structure is viewed from within. Galileo Galilei first resolved the band of light into individual stars with his telescope in 1610. Until the early 1920s, most astronomers thought that the Milky Way contained all the stars in the Universe. Following the 1920 Great Debate between the astronomers Harlow Shapley and Heber Curtis, observations by Edwin Hubble showed that the Milky Way is just one of many galaxies.
The teapot shaped constellation low down and just above the lights of Portland is Sagittarius whicvh is one of the constellations of the zodiac and is located in the Southern celestial hemisphere. It is one of the 48 constellations listed by the 2nd-century astronomer Ptolemy and remains one of the 88 modern constellations. Its name is Latin for "archer". Sagittarius is commonly represented as a centaur pulling back a bow. It lies between Scorpius and Ophiuchus to the west and Capricornus and Microscopium to the east.
The center of the Milky Way lies in the westernmost part of Sagittarius (see Sagittarius A).
The brightest object in the sky here is Jupiter which is the fifth planet from the Sun and the largest in the Solar System. It is a gas giant with a mass more than two and a half times that of all the other planets in the Solar System combined, but slightly less than one-thousandth the mass of the Sun. Jupiter is the third brightest natural object in the Earth's night sky after the Moon and Venus. People have been observing it since prehistoric times; it was named after the Roman god Jupiter, the king of the gods, because of its observed size.
To the left of Jupiter and the second brightest object in the sky here is Saturn which is the sixth planet from the Sun and the second-largest in the Solar System, after Jupiter. It is a gas giant with an average radius of about nine and a half times that of Earth.It only has one-eighth the average density of Earth; however, with its larger volume, Saturn is over 95 times more massive.
Across the bay the Isle of Portland is a tied island, 6 kilometres (4 mi) long by 2.7 kilometres (1.7 mi) wide, in the English Channel. The southern tip, Portland Bill lies 8 kilometres (5 mi) south of the resort of Weymouth, forming the southernmost point of the county of Dorset, England. A barrier beach called Chesil Beach joins it to the mainland. The A354 road passes down the Portland end of the beach and then over the Fleet Lagoon by bridge to the mainland. The population of Portland is 12,797.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milky_Way
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sagittarius_(constellation)
Hunter Valley Gardens is in the heart of Hunter Valley wine country, located in Pokolbin, NSW, Australia. It opened in 2003 and is now open every day of the year except Christmas Day.
The gardens span across 14 hectares of land, containing 10 differently themed gardens, accommodation, a shopping village, rides/events and dining. The gardens are a popular venue in the Hunter Valley for weddings and events.
Hunter Valley Gardens is the largest display garden in the Southern Hemisphere.
Hunter valley gardens was developed and created by the Roche Group, when founder Bill Roche retired he decided that he would finally make his lifelong ambition a reality, building a garden that would be enjoyed for generations to come. Starting construction in 1999, the team of 40–50 landscape gardeners, engineers and architects completed the gardens and it was opened in October 2003 by the premier of New South Wales.
The gardens are composed of ten individually themed gardens, influenced by different locations around the world, containing both native and exotic flora . The display gardens are divided by eight kilometres of wheelchair accessible walking paths.
There are over six thousand trees, six hundred thousand shrubs and one million ground-covers populating the gardens.
The themed gardens are;-
•Border Garden- The Border Garden is designed to imitate the classic French Parterre style of garden, with surrounding manicured box hedging, intertwined with Hill's Weeping figs and European boxwood to make interesting shapes and designs. Hand-carved Indian Marble water features and statues that represent the four seasons are displayed throughout the Border Garden.
•Chinese Garden- Patrons enter the Chinese Garden by crossing green Chinese slate and walking through a traditional Moon gate which is flanked by two bronze Temple Guardians. Slow growing grass, rugged rocks and raked decorative gravels are some of the traditional elements to the garden. Some of the many featured plants include Azaleas, Camellia sasanqua, Conifer, Bamboo , Cumquats, Persimmons and Mulberries.
•Formal Garden- Influenced by garden designs of France and England, the Formal garden is one of the largest of its type in Australia. Manchurian Pear Trees border the garden with 3000 bushes of Chameleon roses, a variety of topiary and manicured lawns making up the features of the garden. A Wishing Fountain can also be found in the Formal Garden, with all the proceeds donated to charity.
•Indian Garden- The Indian Garden carries aromas of India, having Curry plants filling the garden with their scent when you enter through the 160-year-old antique Indian Gates with two bronze elephants standing guard. Paths accompanied with Lilly pilly hedges lead to a mosaic of pebbles and ground-covering plants and a garden design, containing Purple Ajuga and Variegated Dwarf Agapanthus. An Indian Tea House with traditional Indian embellishments has an area to sit allowing the visitors to view the garden and topiary elephants.
•Italian Grotto- The Italian Grotto features a statue of Saint Francis of Assisi and is lined with pink Wisterias, red Bougainvillea, lemon, orange and olive trees, lavender, and cascading Geraniums and Pelargoniums.
•Lakes Walk- The Lakes Walk is surrounded by one and a half kilometres of pathways with the waterway being lined by perennial borders, and containing the Lakes Rotunda. This garden is a common place for weddings to be held.
•Oriental Garden- Influenced by Japanese and Korean gardens , the Oriental Garden contains a two-story traditional Japanese pagoda that is surrounded by a koi pond. Zoysia Tenuifolia (Korean velvet grass) fills the garden, mounding itself around rocks and pavers.
•Rose Garden- In the shape of a corkscrew to honour the neighbouring Hunter Valley vineyards, the Rose Garden contains over 8000 roses, including: Blue Moon, Bonica, Charles De-Gaulle, Double Delight, Fragrance, Freesia and Marlena. The middle of the garden displays thirteen bronze statues of Imelda Roche and her twelve grandchildren.
•Storybook Garden- The Storybook Garden contains many statues and murals of nursery rhyme characters including Jack and Jill, Humpty Dumpty, Little Bo Peep and Alice in Wonderland.
•Sunken Garden- The Sunken Garden features a 10-meter high waterfall with a pergola on top as well as a display of evergreen and deciduous trees, shrubs, flowers and pathways surrounded with hundreds of roses
Schoenthal Monastery, first mentioned in 1145, includes one of the oldest churches in Switzerland. It is considered a showpiece of Romanesque architecture. Its western façade features ashlar masonry, a portal with a depiction of a lamb carrying a cross, and an arch supported by a lion baring its teeth on one side, and by a man on the other. The inscription on the arch reads: HIC EST RODO.
Of the murals on the inside of the church, a depiction of St. Christopher has been preserved above the gateway to the cloister dating from about 1310/20. Behind the eastern façade, fragments can be seen of an angel swinging a censer; these date from around 1430. The bell in the steeple was cast in Aarau in the 15th century. The deconsecrated monastery was used for various commercial purposes over a period of 500 years. As of 1986, the new owner had extensive renovations carried out in collaboration with the canton’s departments of archaeology and the preservation of historical monuments. The latter recommended using the traditional plaster made of slaked lime.
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