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افكارنا هي التي تنتج احاسيسنا واحاسيسنا هي التي تنتج سلوكياتنا وسلوكياتنا هي التي تحدد انجازاتنا عظيمة او تافهه ............فلو اردت ان تحدث تغيير جذري في نفسك عليك الانتباه لما يدور في عقلك من افكار واحذر لما تقوله لنفس وما تقوله للاخرين وما يقوله الاخرين لك واستمر في تخيل نفسك وانت على قمة المجد........^_^
دبي ..1431 هـ
Letter on reverse penned on the 2.12.1916 and addressed to the author's sister, the widow Schöttler in Bochum in Westphalia. Einheitsstempel: 81. Res.-Pionier-Komp. Postage cancelled the same day (79. Reserve Division).
Armed with a mixture of Karabiner 98AZ, Gewehr 91 and Karabiner 88, Pioniere from Reserve-Pionier-Kompanie Nr. 81 attend an assault course.
The stamp on reverse - „Aus militärischen Gründen verzogert“ - translates to "Delayed for military reasons".
An old-fashioned address book with a modern look and feel. Covered with the signature Orla Kiely multi-stem pattern, this 6" x 8.5" hard-bound address book features 160 address pages, A-Z printed + die cut index tabs, and four pages of replacement address stickers {for that friend who seems to change addresses every other month}.
Remembering seeing this handwritten recipe addressed by Nabokov to Maxime de la Falaise for her cooking book at the NYPL ( New York Public Library).
"Boil water in a saucepan (bubbles mean it is boiling!). Take two eggs (for one person) out of the refrigerator. Hold them under the hot tap water to make them ready for what awaits them. Place each in a pan, one after theother, and let them slip soundlessly into the (boiling) water. Consult your wristwatch. Stand over them with a spoon preventing them (they are apt to roll) from knocking against the damned side of the pan. If, however, an egg cracks in the water (now bubbling like mad) and starts to disgorge a cloud of white stuff like a medium in an old fashioned seance, fish it out and throw it away. Take another and be more careful. After 200 seconds have passed, or, say, 240 (taking interruptions into account), start scooping the eggs out. Place them, round end up, in two egg cups. With a small spoon tap-tap in a circle and hen pry open the lid of the shell. Have some salt and buttered bread (white) ready. Eat."
I recently visited that very PA Dutch Amish farm were this egg came from. For a historical review of the sickness mess we are in, see these comments.
www.flickr.com/groups/learn_composition_by_example/discus...
Letter generously translated by Xiphophilos; penned in Wahn on the 7.11.1914 and addressed to his sister, Fräulein Fr. Hörstemeier in Herford. Postage cancelled the same day at the Wahn Schiessplatz.
7am - Coffee and milk.
11.30am - Peas with bacon.
3.30pm - Coffee and milk.
6.30pm - Tea with rum and sausage.
Schießplatz Wahn was a sizable military facility located south of Cologne. It was so large it hosted an artillery firing range as well as an airfield „Artilleriefliegerstation Wahn“.
VICOSA - a Post Office located in South Vancouver, British Columbia.
One new Post Office has been opened in South Vancouver, is be known as VICOSA, and is to be under the Vancouver Post Office jurisdiction. It will be served every day in the week except Sunday, at the same time as the Janes Road Post Office.
(The Greater Vancouver Chinook newspaper - 3 May 1913 -- A NEW POST OFFICE in South Vancouver has been christened "VICOSA" by the Dominion postal powers that be. The name is pretty and euphonious, but will it "help any" towards better mail distribution?
The VICOSA Post Office was fist located in "Jackson & Bowes Grocers" store at the corner of 52nd and Victoria Road in South Vancouver. The address was 6602 Victoria Drive in South Vancouver. The Postmaster was Harold Tasman Jackson and his business partner was Joseph Alfred Bowes.
The VICOSA Post Office was established - 1 May 1913 - it became VANCOUVER SUB 28 - 1 May 1922 and closed in 1972.
LINK to a list of the Postmasters who served at the VICOSA Post Office - recherche-collection-search.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/home/record... and the VANCOUVER SUB OFFICE No. 28 - recherche-collection-search.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/home/record...
When this postcard entered the postal system at VICOSA the Postmaster was Harold Tasman Jackson - he served as Postmaster from - 1 May 1913 to - 5 July 1920.
Harold Tasman Jackson
(b. 6 October 1884 in Hobart, Tasmania, Australia - d. 17 September 1922 at age 37 in South Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada) - occupations - Storekeeper / Postmaster - LINK to his newspaper obituary - www.newspapers.com/article/vancouver-daily-world-obituary...
His wife - Ethel Mary / May / Marie (nee Britton) Jackson
(b. 27 March 1884 in New Norfolk, Tasmania, Australia - d. ?)
His grocery business partner - Joseph Alfred Bower
(b. 10 September 1886 in Durham, County Durham, England – d. 27 September 1946 at age 60 in Vancouver, British Columbia) - LINK to his Find a Grave site - www.findagrave.com/memorial/179071252/joseph-alfred-bowes - LINK to his newspaper obituary - www.newspapers.com/article/the-vancouver-sun-obituary-for...
- sent from - / NEW WESTMINSTER, B.C / DEC 24 / 5 30 PM / 1914 / - machine cancel
- arrived at - / VICOSA / DE 25 / 14 / B.C. / - split ring arrival backstamp - this split ring hammer (A1-1) was proofed - 23 April 1913 - (RF E now is classified as RF D).
Message on postcard reads: Wishing you a very happy Xmas - E. J. Rowling
Elizabeth Jane Rowling
(b. 24 August 1874 in Vancouver, British Columbia - d. 22 November 1961 at age 87 in Surrey, British Columbia / New Westminster, British Columbia) - occupation - housekeeper - she never married - LINK to her death certificate - search-collections.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/Image/Genealogy/b5...
Addressed to: Miss McNab / Vicosa / B.C.
This is the royal balcony from where the Mughal emperor's would address their audience.
The Lahore Fort, locally referred to as Shahi Qila (Urdu: شاهی قلعہ ) is citadel of the city of Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan. It is located in the northwestern corner of the Walled City of Lahore. The trapezoidal composition is spread over 20 hectares. Origins of the fort go as far back as antiquity, however, the existing base structure was built during the reign of Mughal emperor Akbar (1556-1605), and was regularly upgraded by subsequent rulers,having thirteen gates in all.[1]. Thus the fort manifests the rich traditions of the entire Mughal architecture.[2] Some of the famous sites inside the fort include: Sheesh Mahal, Alamgiri Gate, Naulakha pavilion, and Moti Masjid. In 1981, the fort was inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site along with the Shalimar Gardens (Lahore).
The origins of Lahore Fort are obscure and are traditionally based on various myths.[3] However, during the excavation carried out in 1959 by the Department of Archaeology, in front of Diwan-e-Aam, a gold coin of Mahmood of Ghazni dated A.H. 416 (1025 A.D.) was found at a depth of 7.62 metres from the level of the lawns. Cultural layers continued to a further depth of 5 metres, giving strong indications that people had lived here, long before the conquest of Lahore by Mahmood in 1021 A.D.[4] Further mention of the fort is traceable to Shahab-ud-din Muhammad Ghuri's successive invasions of Lahore from 1180 to 1186 A.D.
[edit] Timeline
Location of Fort along the Walled City of LahoreIt cannot be said with certainty when the Lahore Fort was originally constructed or by whom, since this information is lost to history, possibly forever. However, evidence found in archaeological digs gives strong indications that it was built long before 1025 A.D
1241 A.D. - Destroyed by Mongols.
1267 A.D. - Rebuilt by Sultan Ghiyas ud din Balban.
1398 A.D. - Destroyed again, by Amir Tamir's army.
1421 A.D. - Rebuilt in mud by Sultan Mubark Shah Syed.
1432 A.D. - The fort is occupied by Shaikh Ali of Kabul who makes repairs to the damages inflicted on it by Shaikha Khokhar.
1566 A.D. - Rebuilt by Mughal emperor Akbar, in solid brick masonry on its earlier foundations. Also perhaps, its area was extended towards the river Ravi, which then and up to about 1849 A.D., used to flow along its fortification on the north. Akbar also built Doulat Khana-e-Khas-o-Am, the famous Jharoka-e-Darshan (Balcony for Royal Appearance), Masjidi Gate etc.
1618 A.D. - Jehangir adds Doulat Khana-e-Jehangir
1631 A.D. - Shahjahan builds Shish Mahal (Mirror Palace).
1633 A.D. - Shahjahan builds Khawabgah (a dream place or sleeping area), Hamam (bath ), Khilwat Khana (retiring room), and Moti Masjid (Pearl Mosque).[5]
1645 A.D. - Shahjahan builds Diwan-e-Khas (Hall of Special Audience).
1674 A.D. - Aurangzeb adds the massively fluted Alamgiri Gate.
(Sometime during) 1799-1839 A.D. - The outer fortification wall on the north with the moat, the marble athdera, Havaeli Mai Jindan and Bara Dari Raja Dhiyan Singh were constructed by Ranjit Singh, Sikh ruler from 1799-1839 A.D.
1846 A.D. - Occupied by the British.
1927 A.D. - The British hand over the Fort to the Department of Archaeology after demolishing a portion of the fortification wall on the south and converting it into a stepped form thus defortifying the fort.
The strategic location of Lahore city between the Mughal territories and the strongholds of Kabul, Multan, and Kashmir required the dismantling of the old mud-fort and fortification with solid brick masonry.[6] The strcucture is dominated by Persian influence that deepened with the successive refurbishments by subsequent emperors.[7] The fort is clearly divided into two sections: first the administrative section, which is well connected with main entrances, and comprises larger garden areas and Diwan-e-Aam for royal audiences. The second - a private and concealed residential section - is divided into courts in the northern part, accessible through 'elephant gate'. It also contains Shish Mahal (Hall of Mirrors of Mirror Palace), and spacious bedrooms and smaller gardens.[8] On the outside, the walls are decorated with blue Persian kashi tiles. The original entrance faces the Maryam Zamani Mosque, whereas the larger Alamgiri Gate opens to the Hazuri Bagh through to the majestic Badshahi Mosque.[9]
This painting was done for the Purity & Pollution Exhibition in collaboration with the Moving Ethos Modern Dance Group. It is a diptych in acrylics describing the destruction caused by pollution.
[FOR SALE] La Petite Madeleine dress - USD size
doll Party ver.03
Please note that most of products are used one, not brand-new product.
Mostly I really used them with great care and caution so if there's no comment, there aren't any big damages on products.
I accept only paypal.
After the payment confirmed, I'll send out shipment.
There are differences in shipping fees between regions, please mail your abstract address to get estimate of the shipping fee.
For our safety, I'll send out all the shipments through EMS from Korea.
Thank you
SOUD OUT
conahyun(at)naver.com
Krusik speaks at Belgrade protest.
The 50th 1 in 5 Million protest in Belgrade was addressed by Krusik whistleblower Aleksandar Obradovic on Saturday.
This week’s regular protest changed its starting venue with the crowd gathering in front of the Palace of Justice in a show of support to Obradovic who is in house arrest in his home town of Valjevo.
Speaking by phone, Obradovic said that everyone can overcome their fears like he did. He said that the revealed the illegal activities at the Krusik munitions plant to help others rid themselves of their fear. “If I could do it, trust me every one of you can,” he said.
Obradovic leaked documents showing that a cabinet minister’s father was involved in deals with Krusik at privileged prices with the munitions he bought for export to Saudi Arabia ending up in the hands of Islamic extremists in the Yemen.
Obradovic said he does not consider himself a hero or a measure of courage but just an ordinary man who refused to watch his company being destroyed.
Protest organizer Srdjan Markovic said that Serbia needs brave people like Obradovic who stood up and said the Emperor has no clothes.
The protesters marched from Terazije square, past the Serbian presidency building and the government headquarters - where protest organizer Tea Vukadin called the crowd to listen to an anti-war song by Serbian musician Djordje Balasevic (who suffered a serious heart attack earlier in the week) titled Just So There’s No War (Samo da Rata Ne Bude) – to the Palace of Justice where Obradovic spoke.
rs.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a544469/Krusik-whistleblower-s...
MFC Address: myfigurecollection.net/picture/564568&ref=user%3AEyeland
Picture of the day
Nov 16, 2012
Picture of the week
Nov 11, 2012 - Nov 17, 2012
Picture of the month
Nov 2012
The Manning Memorial Light, also known as the Robert H. Manning Memorial Lighthouse or Manning Light is a lighthouse located near Empire, Michigan. Mr. Manning was a longtime resident of Empire. Manning enjoyed fishing offshore, and often returned from these boat trips late at night. Wikipedia
Located in: Village Park
Address: Lake Michigan Dr, Empire, MI 49630
Height: 38′
Opened: 1990
Sometimes the simplest of things in life are the hardest things to do. Like clicking send on an email...
Today I did that twice, but those emails represented something far greater, something that has been a long, long time in the making.
One email was addressed to my colleagues (about 120 people), the other addressed to people I deal with regularly through work (another 100+). They both explained my intention go fulltime as Siân in the near future!
Having plucked-up the courage to click 'send', I then sat there weeping as a constant flow of emails and texts piled-in with messages of support, admiration and love. It was just an amazing moment.
For those interested, I have set out below my message.
Another (BIG) step forward...
Siân x
I feel now is an appropriate time to share with you all a deeply personal issue that I have wrestled with for many years, and to advise you of some changes that will take place in the not-so-distant future.
Whilst I recognise that this may well come as a shock to many of you (or maybe not?), I wish to advise you all that I am transgender and that I intend on transitioning, living full time as a female.
The last few years in particular have been very difficult for me, and you will appreciate, I hope, that this isn’t a decision I’ve taken lightly.
Until recently, I didn’t believe that I would ever have the strength to discuss openly my gender dysphoria. But of late, I have come to realise that there is a way forward for me, however to achieve that, I need to be honest about my feelings.
Getting to this stage hasn’t been easy. Since my early teenage years, I felt a deep sense of shame about my dysphoria, fearing that my life would be over if anyone were ever to find out. However, after much soul searching, of late I have come to accept my feelings, and in doing so, develop a strong sense of personal pride.
I recognise that many of you may well be struggling to comprehend why I feel the way I do and why I’ve opted to go public. The truth is really quite simple... It is about me leading the life that I want to lead, not leading the life that others want me to lead.
It’s not about drawing attention to myself. Quite the opposite actually; I want to be able to walk down the street and go about my day-to-day life un-noticed.
It’s not a hobby. And it’s not about fulfilling sexual desires.
Instead, it’s about feeling good about myself. About feeling content.
And I would hope that you all recognise those basic needs to some degree.
Over the last three years, I have made some great strides forward, initially opening-up to my family and thereafter my friends.
My family – I’m sad to say – initially struggled to accept it, with my Dad first suggesting “Why don’t you just stop doing it?” If only it were that simple…
But we’re making progress, which is great, and credit to them for finally engaging in a very difficult situation.
My friends have been wonderfully supportive and have encouraged me on my journey. And I’ve also received much-welcome support recently from those colleagues in whom I have already confided.
I’m sorry to say that I haven’t received the same level of support from the NHS. Whilst my GP has been a fantastic ally, unfortunately the rest of the system has been found wanting. To illustrate, I was referred to a Gender Identity Clinic (GIC) in Summer 2017 – so, coming up on two years ago – and suspect I’ve still got at least another 18 months to wait until my first appointment!
Clearly this is hugely frustrating, but if nothing else, illustrates the scale of gender dysphoria within society.
Having received my referral, I foresaw the GIC process as providing much needed support and guidance in helping me conclude these important life decisions. However, given the timescales involved, I came to realise that I couldn’t wait and would instead need to make decisions unassisted, based ultimately on what felt right.
A little over a year ago, I opted to start a slow transition, not least growing my hair in order to achieve a more feminine appearance. I know that a number of you have queried what’s been going on with me over recent months, so now you know!
The most important consideration in all of this are my children. Whilst I have had an initial conversation with them, until such time as they are comfortable with the new situation, I will continue to present at work as [ ], so please (for now), continue to refer to me as [ ], using the pronouns he and his.
However, ultimately, it is my intention to present fulltime as a female, going by the name of Siân (pronounced ‘Sharn’) and using the pronouns she and her. At present, I am unable to be more specific with regards timings, but at least now you know my intentions.
Clearly there are a lot of logistics still to address, but with the help of the Board and HR, I would hope these are sorted in good order. We will, of course, keep you appraised as to the next steps and when I intend to present fulltime as Siân.
I have worked with some of you for more than 15 years and recognise that these changes – as and when they materialise – may cause some confusion initially, so please don’t feel bad if you accidentally call me [ ] or mis-gender me, and please don’t treat me any differently.
One important point I’m keen to leave you with is to stress that I am – and will remain – the same person, with the same morals and the same principles. I just look a little bit different; a bit like when Marathon bars became Snickers, as a close friend once described it.
I’ve chosen to share this with you as a trusted colleague and would appreciate your discretion in this matter. I would ask that you do not share this more broadly without my permission as my children’s mother and I are trying to support our children through this change in a gradual and considered way, and I therefore trust that you will respect our wishes.
If you’re unsure on anything I’ve explained herein – whatever it may be – please do come and speak to me; believe me, I’ve answered many embarrassing questions already, so you probably won’t be the first to ask!
In the meantime, you may find the following information resources of use:
www.livescience.com/54949-transgender-definition.html - what does ‘Transgender’ mean?
www.glaad.org/transgender/allies - tips for allies of transgender people
thinkgrowth.org/how-to-support-a-trans-colleague-641f0b34... - how to support a transgender colleague
transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/Unde... - frequently asked questions about transgender people
In closing, I simply ask for your support and understanding in the coming months and years, thank you.
Kind regards
[ ]
(soon to be Siân)
1. The Mind-Body Problem and the History of Dualism
1.1 The Mind-Body Problem
The mind-body problem is the problem: what is the relationship between mind and body? Or alternatively: what is the relationship between mental properties and physical properties?
Humans have (or seem to have) both physical properties and mental properties. People have (or seem to have)the sort of properties attributed in the physical sciences. These physical properties include size, weight, shape, colour, motion through space and time, etc. But they also have (or seem to have) mental properties, which we do not attribute to typical physical objects These properties involve consciousness (including perceptual experience, emotional experience, and much else), intentionality (including beliefs, desires, and much else), and they are possessed by a subject or a self. Physical properties are public, in the sense that they are, in principle, equally observable by anyone. Some physical properties – like those of an electron – are not directly observable at all, but they are equally available to all, to the same degree, with scientific equipment and techniques. The same is not true of mental properties. I may be able to tell that you are in pain by your behaviour, but only you can feel it directly. Similarly, you just know how something looks to you, and I can only surmise. Conscious mental events are private to the subject, who has a privileged access to them of a kind no-one has to the physical. The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between these two sets of properties. The mind-body problem breaks down into a number of components. The ontological question: what are mental states and what are physical states? Is one class a subclass of the other, so that all mental states are physical, or vice versa? Or are mental states and physical states entirely distinct?
The causal question: do physical states influence mental states? Do mental states influence physical states? If so, how?
Different aspects of the mind-body problem arise for different aspects of the mental, such as consciousness, intentionality, the self. The problem of consciousness: what is consciousness? How is it related to the brain and the body? The problem of intentionality: what is intentionality? How is it related to the brain and the body? The problem of the self: what is the self? How is it related to the brain and the body? Other aspects of the mind-body problem arise for aspects of the physical. For example:
The problem of embodiment: what is it for the mind to be housed in a body? What is it for a body to belong to a particular subject?
The seemingly intractable nature of these problems have given rise to many different philosophical views.
Materialist views say that, despite appearances to the contrary, mental states are just physical states. Behaviourism, functionalism, mind-brain identity theory and the computational theory of mind are examples of how materialists attempt to explain how this can be so. The most common factor in such theories is the attempt to explicate the nature of mind and consciousness in terms of their ability to directly or indirectly modify behaviour, but there are versions of materialism that try to tie the mental to the physical without explicitly explaining the mental in terms of its behaviour-modifying role. The latter are often grouped together under the label ‘non-reductive physicalism’, though this label is itself rendered elusive because of the controversial nature of the term ‘reduction’.
Idealist views say that physical states are really mental. This is because the physical world is an empirical world and, as such, it is the intersubjective product of our collective experience.
Dualist views (the subject of this entry) say that the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other. For the various forms that dualism can take and the associated problems, see below.
In sum, we can say that there is a mind-body problem because both consciousness and thought, broadly construed, seem very different from anything physical and there is no convincing consensus on how to build a satisfactorily unified picture of creatures possessed of both a mind and a body.
Other entries which concern aspects of the mind-body problem include (among many others): behaviorism, consciousness, eliminative materialism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, identity theory, intentionality, mental causation, neutral monism, and physicalism.
1.2 History of dualism
In dualism, ‘mind’ is contrasted with ‘body’, but at different times, different aspects of the mind have been the centre of attention. In the classical and mediaeval periods, it was the intellect that was thought to be most obviously resistant to a materialistic account: from Descartes on, the main stumbling block to materialist monism was supposed to be ‘consciousness’, of which phenomenal consciousness or sensation came to be considered as the paradigm instance.
The classical emphasis originates in Plato’s Phaedo. Plato believed that the true substances are not physical bodies, which are ephemeral, but the eternal Forms of which bodies are imperfect copies. These Forms not only make the world possible, they also make it intelligible, because they perform the role of universals, or what Frege called ‘concepts’. It is their connection with intelligibility that is relevant to the philosophy of mind. Because Forms are the grounds of intelligibility, they are what the intellect must grasp in the process of understanding. In Phaedo Plato presents a variety of arguments for the immortality of the soul, but the one that is relevant for our purposes is that the intellect is immaterial because Forms are immaterial and intellect must have an affinity with the Forms it apprehends (78b4–84b8). This affinity is so strong that the soul strives to leave the body in which it is imprisoned and to dwell in the realm of Forms. It may take many reincarnations before this is achieved. Plato’s dualism is not, therefore, simply a doctrine in the philosophy of mind, but an integral part of his whole metaphysics.
One problem with Plato’s dualism was that, though he speaks of the soul as imprisoned in the body, there is no clear account of what binds a particular soul to a particular body. Their difference in nature makes the union a mystery.
Aristotle did not believe in Platonic Forms, existing independently of their instances. Aristotelian forms (the capital ‘F’ has disappeared with their standing as autonomous entities) are the natures and properties of things and exist embodied in those things. This enabled Aristotle to explain the union of body and soul by saying that the soul is the form of the body. This means that a particular person’s soul is no more than his nature as a human being. Because this seems to make the soul into a property of the body, it led many interpreters, both ancient and modern, to interpret his theory as materialistic. The interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind – and, indeed, of his whole doctrine of form – remains as live an issue today as it was immediately after his death (Robinson 1983 and 1991; Nussbaum 1984; Rorty and Nussbaum, eds, 1992). Nevertheless, the text makes it clear that Aristotle believed that the intellect, though part of the soul, differs from other faculties in not having a bodily organ. His argument for this constitutes a more tightly argued case than Plato’s for the immateriality of thought and, hence, for a kind of dualism. He argued that the intellect must be immaterial because if it were material it could not receive all forms. Just as the eye, because of its particular physical nature, is sensitive to light but not to sound, and the ear to sound and not to light, so, if the intellect were in a physical organ it could be sensitive only to a restricted range of physical things; but this is not the case, for we can think about any kind of material object (De Anima III,4; 429a10–b9). As it does not have a material organ, its activity must be essentially immaterial.
It is common for modern Aristotelians, who otherwise have a high view of Aristotle’s relevance to modern philosophy, to treat this argument as being of purely historical interest, and not essential to Aristotle’s system as a whole. They emphasize that he was not a ‘Cartesian’ dualist, because the intellect is an aspect of the soul and the soul is the form of the body, not a separate substance. Kenny (1989) argues that Aristotle’s theory of mind as form gives him an account similar to Ryle (1949), for it makes the soul equivalent to the dispositions possessed by a living body. This ‘anti-Cartesian’ approach to Aristotle arguably ignores the fact that, for Aristotle, the form is the substance.
These issues might seem to be of purely historical interest. But we shall see in below, in section 4.5, that this is not so.
The identification of form and substance is a feature of Aristotle’s system that Aquinas effectively exploits in this context, identifying soul, intellect and form, and treating them as a substance. (See, for example, Aquinas (1912), Part I, questions 75 and 76.) But though the form (and, hence, the intellect with which it is identical) are the substance of the human person, they are not the person itself. Aquinas says that when one addresses prayers to a saint – other than the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is believed to retain her body in heaven and is, therefore, always a complete person – one should say, not, for example, ‘Saint Peter pray for us’, but ‘soul of Saint Peter pray for us’. The soul, though an immaterial substance, is the person only when united with its body. Without the body, those aspects of its personal memory that depend on images (which are held to be corporeal) will be lost.(See Aquinas (1912), Part I, question 89.)
The more modern versions of dualism have their origin in Descartes’ Meditations, and in the debate that was consequent upon Descartes’ theory. Descartes was a substance dualist. He believed that there were two kinds of substance: matter, of which the essential property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it thinks. Descartes’ conception of the relation between mind and body was quite different from that held in the Aristotelian tradition. For Aristotle, there is no exact science of matter. How matter behaves is essentially affected by the form that is in it. You cannot combine just any matter with any form – you cannot make a knife out of butter, nor a human being out of paper – so the nature of the matter is a necessary condition for the nature of the substance. But the nature of the substance does not follow from the nature of its matter alone: there is no ‘bottom up’ account of substances. Matter is a determinable made determinate by form. This was how Aristotle thought that he was able to explain the connection of soul to body: a particular soul exists as the organizing principle in a particular parcel of matter.
The belief in the relative indeterminacy of matter is one reason for Aristotle’s rejection of atomism. If matter is atomic, then it is already a collection of determinate objects in its own right, and it becomes natural to regard the properties of macroscopic substances as mere summations of the natures of the atoms.
Although, unlike most of his fashionable contemporaries and immediate successors, Descartes was not an atomist, he was, like the others, a mechanist about the properties of matter. Bodies are machines that work according to their own laws. Except where there are minds interfering with it, matter proceeds deterministically, in its own right. Where there are minds requiring to influence bodies, they must work by ‘pulling levers’ in a piece of machinery that already has its own laws of operation. This raises the question of where those ‘levers’ are in the body. Descartes opted for the pineal gland, mainly because it is not duplicated on both sides of the brain, so it is a candidate for having a unique, unifying function.
The main uncertainty that faced Descartes and his contemporaries, however, was not where interaction took place, but how two things so different as thought and extension could interact at all. This would be particularly mysterious if one had an impact view of causal interaction, as would anyone influenced by atomism, for whom the paradigm of causation is like two billiard balls cannoning off one another.
Various of Descartes’ disciples, such as Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche, concluded that all mind-body interactions required the direct intervention of God. The appropriate states of mind and body were only the occasions for such intervention, not real causes. Now it would be convenient to think that occasionalists held that all causation was natural except for that between mind and body. In fact they generalized their conclusion and treated all causation as directly dependent on God. Why this was so, we cannot discuss here.
Descartes’ conception of a dualism of substances came under attack from the more radical empiricists, who found it difficult to attach sense to the concept of substance at all. Locke, as a moderate empiricist, accepted that there were both material and immaterial substances. Berkeley famously rejected material substance, because he rejected all existence outside the mind. In his early Notebooks, he toyed with the idea of rejecting immaterial substance, because we could have no idea of it, and reducing the self to a collection of the ‘ideas’ that constituted its contents. Finally, he decided that the self, conceived as something over and above the ideas of which it was aware, was essential for an adequate understanding of the human person. Although the self and its acts are not presented to consciousness as objects of awareness, we are obliquely aware of them simply by dint of being active subjects. Hume rejected such claims, and proclaimed the self to be nothing more than a concatenation of its ephemeral contents.
In fact, Hume criticised the whole conception of substance for lacking in empirical content: when you search for the owner of the properties that make up a substance, you find nothing but further properties. Consequently, the mind is, he claimed, nothing but a ‘bundle’ or ‘heap’ of impressions and ideas – that is, of particular mental states or events, without an owner. This position has been labelled bundle dualism, and it is a special case of a general bundle theory of substance, according to which objects in general are just organised collections of properties. The problem for the Humean is to explain what binds the elements in the bundle together. This is an issue for any kind of substance, but for material bodies the solution seems fairly straightforward: the unity of a physical bundle is constituted by some form of causal interaction between the elements in the bundle. For the mind, mere causal connection is not enough; some further relation of co-consciousness is required. We shall see in 5.2.1 that it is problematic whether one can treat such a relation as more primitive than the notion of belonging to a subject.
One should note the following about Hume’s theory. His bundle theory is a theory about the nature of the unity of the mind. As a theory about this unity, it is not necessarily dualist. Parfit (1970, 1984) and Shoemaker (1984, ch. 2), for example, accept it as physicalists. In general, physicalists will accept it unless they wish to ascribe the unity to the brain or the organism as a whole. Before the bundle theory can be dualist one must accept property dualism, for more about which, see the next section.
A crisis in the history of dualism came, however, with the growing popularity of mechanism in science in the nineteenth century. According to the mechanist, the world is, as it would now be expressed, ‘closed under physics’. This means that everything that happens follows from and is in accord with the laws of physics. There is, therefore, no scope for interference in the physical world by the mind in the way that interactionism seems to require. According to the mechanist, the conscious mind is an epiphenomenon (a notion given general currency by T. H. Huxley 1893): that is, it is a by-product of the physical system which has no influence back on it. In this way, the facts of consciousness are acknowledged but the integrity of physical science is preserved. However, many philosophers found it implausible to claim such things as the following; the pain that I have when you hit me, the visual sensations I have when I see the ferocious lion bearing down on me or the conscious sense of understanding I have when I hear your argument – all have nothing directly to do with the way I respond. It is very largely due to the need to avoid this counterintuitiveness that we owe the concern of twentieth century philosophy to devise a plausible form of materialist monism. But, although dualism has been out of fashion in psychology since the advent of behaviourism (Watson 1913) and in philosophy since Ryle (1949), the argument is by no means over. Some distinguished neurologists, such as Sherrington (1940) and Eccles (Popper and Eccles 1977) have continued to defend dualism as the only theory that can preserve the data of consciousness. Amongst mainstream philosophers, discontent with physicalism led to a modest revival of property dualism in the last decade of the twentieth century. At least some of the reasons for this should become clear below.
2. Varieties of Dualism: Ontology
There are various ways of dividing up kinds of dualism. One natural way is in terms of what sorts of things one chooses to be dualistic about. The most common categories lighted upon for these purposes are substance and property, giving one substance dualism and property dualism. There is, however, an important third category, namely predicate dualism. As this last is the weakest theory, in the sense that it claims least, I shall begin by characterizing it.
2.1 Predicate dualism
Predicate dualism is the theory that psychological or mentalistic predicates are (a) essential for a full description of the world and (b) are not reducible to physicalistic predicates. For a mental predicate to be reducible, there would be bridging laws connecting types of psychological states to types of physical ones in such a way that the use of the mental predicate carried no information that could not be expressed without it. An example of what we believe to be a true type reduction outside psychology is the case of water, where water is always H2O: something is water if and only if it is H2O. If one were to replace the word ‘water’ by ‘H2O’, it is plausible to say that one could convey all the same information. But the terms in many of the special sciences (that is, any science except physics itself) are not reducible in this way. Not every hurricane or every infectious disease, let alone every devaluation of the currency or every coup d’etat has the same constitutive structure. These states are defined more by what they do than by their composition or structure. Their names are classified as functional terms rather than natural kind terms. It goes with this that such kinds of state are multiply realizable; that is, they may be constituted by different kinds of physical structures under different circumstances. Because of this, unlike in the case of water and H2O, one could not replace these terms by some more basic physical description and still convey the same information. There is no particular description, using the language of physics or chemistry, that would do the work of the word ‘hurricane’, in the way that ‘H2O’ would do the work of ‘water’. It is widely agreed that many, if not all, psychological states are similarly irreducible, and so psychological predicates are not reducible to physical descriptions and one has predicate dualism. (The classic source for irreducibility in the special sciences in general is Fodor (1974), and for irreducibility in the philosophy of mind, Davidson (1971).)
2.2 Property Dualism
Whereas predicate dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of predicates in our language, property dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of property out in the world. Property dualism can be seen as a step stronger than predicate dualism. Although the predicate ‘hurricane’ is not equivalent to any single description using the language of physics, we believe that each individual hurricane is nothing but a collection of physical atoms behaving in a certain way: one need have no more than the physical atoms, with their normal physical properties, following normal physical laws, for there to be a hurricane. One might say that we need more than the language of physics to describe and explain the weather, but we do not need more than its ontology. There is token identity between each individual hurricane and a mass of atoms, even if there is no type identity between hurricanes as kinds and some particular structure of atoms as a kind. Genuine property dualism occurs when, even at the individual level, the ontology of physics is not sufficient to constitute what is there. The irreducible language is not just another way of describing what there is, it requires that there be something more there than was allowed for in the initial ontology. Until the early part of the twentieth century, it was common to think that biological phenomena (‘life’) required property dualism (an irreducible ‘vital force’), but nowadays the special physical sciences other than psychology are generally thought to involve only predicate dualism. In the case of mind, property dualism is defended by those who argue that the qualitative nature of consciousness is not merely another way of categorizing states of the brain or of behaviour, but a genuinely emergent phenomenon.
2.3 Substance Dualism
There are two important concepts deployed in this notion. One is that of substance, the other is the dualism of these substances. A substance is characterized by its properties, but, according to those who believe in substances, it is more than the collection of the properties it possesses, it is the thing which possesses them. So the mind is not just a collection of thoughts, but is that which thinks, an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial states. Properties are the properties of objects. If one is a property dualist, one may wonder what kinds of objects possess the irreducible or immaterial properties in which one believes. One can use a neutral expression and attribute them to persons, but, until one has an account of person, this is not explanatory. One might attribute them to human beings qua animals, or to the brains of these animals. Then one will be holding that these immaterial properties are possessed by what is otherwise a purely material thing. But one may also think that not only mental states are immaterial, but that the subject that possesses them must also be immaterial. Then one will be a dualist about that to which mental states and properties belong as well about the properties themselves. Now one might try to think of these subjects as just bundles of the immaterial states. This is Hume’s view. But if one thinks that the owner of these states is something quite over and above the states themselves, and is immaterial, as they are, one will be a substance dualist.
Substance dualism is also often dubbed ‘Cartesian dualism’, but some substance dualists are keen to distinguish their theories from Descartes’s. E. J. Lowe, for example, is a substance dualist, in the following sense. He holds that a normal human being involves two substances, one a body and the other a person. The latter is not, however, a purely mental substance that can be defined in terms of thought or consciousness alone, as Descartes claimed. But persons and their bodies have different identity conditions and are both substances, so there are two substances essentially involved in a human being, hence this is a form of substance dualism. Lowe (2006) claims that his theory is close to P. F. Strawson’s (1959), whilst admitting that Strawson would not have called it substance dualism.
3. Varieties of Dualism: Interaction
If mind and body are different realms, in the way required by either property or substance dualism, then there arises the question of how they are related. Common sense tells us that they interact: thoughts and feelings are at least sometimes caused by bodily events and at least sometimes themselves give rise to bodily responses. I shall now consider briefly the problems for interactionism, and its main rivals, epiphenomenalism and parallelism.
3.1 Interactionism
Interactionism is the view that mind and body – or mental events and physical events – causally influence each other. That this is so is one of our common-sense beliefs, because it appears to be a feature of everyday experience. The physical world influences my experience through my senses, and I often react behaviourally to those experiences. My thinking, too, influences my speech and my actions. There is, therefore, a massive natural prejudice in favour of interactionism. It has been claimed, however, that it faces serious problems (some of which were anticipated in section 1).
The simplest objection to interaction is that, in so far as mental properties, states or substances are of radically different kinds from each other, they lack that communality necessary for interaction. It is generally agreed that, in its most naive form, this objection to interactionism rests on a ‘billiard ball’ picture of causation: if all causation is by impact, how can the material and the immaterial impact upon each other? But if causation is either by a more ethereal force or energy or only a matter of constant conjunction, there would appear to be no problem in principle with the idea of interaction of mind and body.
Even if there is no objection in principle, there appears to be a conflict between interactionism and some basic principles of physical science. For example, if causal power was flowing in and out of the physical system, energy would not be conserved, and the conservation of energy is a fundamental scientific law. Various responses have been made to this. One suggestion is that it might be possible for mind to influence the distribution of energy, without altering its quantity. (See Averill and Keating 1981). Another response is to challenge the relevance of the conservation principle in this context. The conservation principle states that ‘in a causally isolated system the total amount of energy will remain constant’. Whereas ‘[t]he interactionist denies…that the human body is an isolated system’, so the principle is irrelevant (Larmer (1986), 282: this article presents a good brief survey of the options). This approach has been termed conditionality, namely the view that conservation is conditional on the physical system being closed, that is, that nothing non-physical is interacting or interfering with it, and, of course, the interactionist claims that this condition is, trivially, not met. That conditionality is the best line for the dualist to take, and that other approaches do not work, is defended in Pitts (2019) and Cucu and Pitts (2019). This, they claim, makes the plausibility of interactionism an empirical matter which only close investigation on the fine operation of the brain could hope to settle. Cucu, in a separate article (2018), claims to find critical neuronal events which do not have sufficient physical explanation.This claim clearly needs further investigation.
Robins Collins (2011) has claimed that the appeal to conservation by opponents of interactionism is something of a red herring because conservation principles are not ubiquitous in physics. He argues that energy is not conserved in general relativity, in quantum theory, or in the universe taken as a whole. Why then, should we insist on it in mind-brain interaction?
Most discussion of interactionism takes place in the context of the assumption that it is incompatible with the world’s being ‘closed under physics’. This is a very natural assumption, but it is not justified if causal overdetermination of behaviour is possible. There could then be a complete physical cause of behaviour, and a mental one. The strongest intuitive objection against overdetermination is clearly stated by Mills (1996: 112), who is himself a defender of overdetermination.
For X to be a cause of Y, X must contribute something to Y. The only way a purely mental event could contribute to a purely physical one would be to contribute some feature not already determined by a purely physical event. But if physical closure is true, there is no feature of the purely physical effect that is not contributed by the purely physical cause. Hence interactionism violates physical closure after all.
Mills says that this argument is invalid, because a physical event can have features not explained by the event which is its sufficient cause. For example, “the rock’s hitting the window is causally sufficient for the window’s breaking, and the window’s breaking has the feature of being the third window-breaking in the house this year; but the facts about prior window-breakings, rather than the rock’s hitting the window, are what cause this window-breaking to have this feature.”
The opponent of overdetermination could perhaps reply that his principle applies, not to every feature of events, but to a subgroup – say, intrinsic features, not merely relational or comparative ones. It is this kind of feature that the mental event would have to cause, but physical closure leaves no room for this. These matters are still controversial.
The problem with closure of physics may be radically altered if physical laws are indeterministic, as quantum theory seems to assert. If physical laws are deterministic, then any interference from outside would lead to a breach of those laws. But if they are indeterministic, might not interference produce a result that has a probability greater than zero, and so be consistent with the laws? This way, one might have interaction yet preserve a kind of nomological closure, in the sense that no laws are infringed. Because it involves assessing the significance and consequences of quantum theory, this is a difficult matter for the non-physicist to assess. Some argue that indeterminacy manifests itself only on the subatomic level, being cancelled out by the time one reaches even very tiny macroscopic objects: and human behaviour is a macroscopic phenomenon. Others argue that the structure of the brain is so finely tuned that minute variations could have macroscopic effects, rather in the way that, according to ‘chaos theory’, the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in China might affect the weather in New York. (For discussion of this, see Eccles (1980), (1987), and Popper and Eccles (1977).) Still others argue that quantum indeterminacy manifests itself directly at a high level, when acts of observation collapse the wave function, suggesting that the mind may play a direct role in affecting the state of the world (Hodgson 1988; Stapp 1993).
3.2 Epiphenomenalism
If the reality of property dualism is not to be denied, but the problem of how the immaterial is to affect the material is to be avoided, then epiphenomenalism may seem to be the answer. According to this theory, mental events are caused by physical events, but have no causal influence on the physical. I have introduced this theory as if its point were to avoid the problem of how two different categories of thing might interact. In fact, it is, at best, an incomplete solution to this problem. If it is mysterious how the non-physical can have it in its nature to influence the physical, it ought to be equally mysterious how the physical can have it in its nature to produce something non-physical. But that this latter is what occurs is an essential claim of epiphenomenalism. (For development of this point, see Green (2003), 149–51). In fact, epiphenomenalism is more effective as a way of saving the autonomy of the physical (the world as ‘closed under physics’) than as a contribution to avoiding the need for the physical and non-physical to have causal commerce.
There are at least three serious problems for epiphenomenalism. First, as I indicated in section 1, it is profoundly counterintuitive. What could be more apparent than that it is the pain that I feel that makes me cry, or the visual experience of the boulder rolling towards me that makes me run away? At least one can say that epiphenomenalism is a fall-back position: it tends to be adopted because other options are held to be unacceptable.
The second problem is that, if mental states do nothing, there is no reason why they should have evolved. This objection ties in with the first: the intuition there was that conscious states clearly modify our behaviour in certain ways, such as avoiding danger, and it is plain that they are very useful from an evolutionary perspective.
Frank Jackson (1982) replies to this objection by saying that it is the brain state associated with pain that evolves for this reason: the sensation is a by-product. Evolution is full of useless or even harmful by-products. For example, polar bears have evolved thick coats to keep them warm, even though this has the damaging side effect that they are heavy to carry. Jackson’s point is true in general, but does not seem to apply very happily to the case of mind. The heaviness of the polar bear’s coat follows directly from those properties and laws which make it warm: one could not, in any simple way, have one without the other. But with mental states, dualistically conceived, the situation is quite the opposite. The laws of physical nature which, the mechanist says, make brain states cause behaviour, in no way explain why brain states should give rise to conscious ones. The laws linking mind and brain are what Feigl (1958) calls nomological danglers, that is, brute facts added onto the body of integrated physical law. Why there should have been by-products of that kind seems to have no evolutionary explanation.
The third problem concerns the rationality of belief in epiphenomenalism, via its effect on the problem of other minds. It is natural to say that I know that I have mental states because I experience them directly. But how can I justify my belief that others have them? The simple version of the ‘argument from analogy’ says that I can extrapolate from my own case. I know that certain of my mental states are correlated with certain pieces of behaviour, and so I infer that similar behaviour in others is also accompanied by similar mental states. Many hold that this is a weak argument because it is induction from one instance, namely, my own. The argument is stronger if it is not a simple induction but an ‘argument to the best explanation’. I seem to know from my own case that mental events can be the explanation of behaviour, and I know of no other candidate explanation for typical human behaviour, so I postulate the same explanation for the behaviour of others. But if epiphenomenalism is true, my mental states do not explain my behaviour and there is a physical explanation for the behaviour of others. It is explanatorily redundant to postulate such states for others. I know, by introspection, that I have them, but is it not just as likely that I alone am subject to this quirk of nature, rather than that everyone is?
For more detailed treatment and further reading on this topic, see the entry epiphenomenalism.
3.3 Parallelism
The epiphenomenalist wishes to preserve the integrity of physical science and the physical world, and appends those mental features that he cannot reduce. The parallelist preserves both realms intact, but denies all causal interaction between them. They run in harmony with each other, but not because their mutual influence keeps each other in line. That they should behave as if they were interacting would seem to be a bizarre coincidence. This is why parallelism has tended to be adopted only by those – like Leibniz – who believe in a pre-established harmony, set in place by God. The progression of thought can be seen as follows. Descartes believes in a more or less natural form of interaction between immaterial mind and material body. Malebranche thought that this was impossible naturally, and so required God to intervene specifically on each occasion on which interaction was required. Leibniz decided that God might as well set things up so that they always behaved as if they were interacting, without particular intervention being required. Outside such a theistic framework, the theory is incredible. Even within such a framework, one might well sympathise with Berkeley’s instinct that once genuine interaction is ruled out one is best advised to allow that God creates the physical world directly, within the mental realm itself, as a construct out of experience.
4. Arguments for Dualism
4.1 The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism
One category of arguments for dualism is constituted by the standard objections against physicalism. Prime examples are those based on the existence of qualia, the most important of which is the so-called ‘knowledge argument’. Because this argument has its own entry (see the entry qualia: the knowledge argument), I shall deal relatively briefly with it here. One should bear in mind, however, that all arguments against physicalism are also arguments for the irreducible and hence immaterial nature of the mind and, given the existence of the material world, are thus arguments for dualism.
The knowledge argument asks us to imagine a future scientist who has lacked a certain sensory modality from birth, but who has acquired a perfect scientific understanding of how this modality operates in others. This scientist – call him Harpo – may have been born stone deaf, but become the world’s greatest expert on the machinery of hearing: he knows everything that there is to know within the range of the physical and behavioural sciences about hearing. Suppose that Harpo, thanks to developments in neurosurgery, has an operation which finally enables him to hear. It is suggested that he will then learn something he did not know before, which can be expressed as what it is like to hear, or the qualitative or phenomenal nature of sound. These qualitative features of experience are generally referred to as qualia. If Harpo learns something new, he did not know everything before. He knew all the physical facts before. So what he learns on coming to hear – the facts about the nature of experience or the nature of qualia – are non-physical. This establishes at least a state or property dualism. (See Jackson 1982; Robinson 1982.)
There are at least two lines of response to this popular but controversial argument. First is the ‘ability’ response. According to this, Harpo does not acquire any new factual knowledge, only ‘knowledge how’, in the form of the ability to respond directly to sounds, which he could not do before. This essentially behaviouristic account is exactly what the intuition behind the argument is meant to overthrow. Putting ourselves in Harpo’s position, it is meant to be obvious that what he acquires is knowledge of what something is like, not just how to do something. Such appeals to intuition are always, of course, open to denial by those who claim not to share the intuition. Some ability theorists seem to blur the distinction between knowing what something is like and knowing how to do something, by saying that the ability Harpo acquires is to imagine or remember the nature of sound. In this case, what he acquires the ability to do involves the representation to himself of what the thing is like. But this conception of representing to oneself, especially in the form of imagination, seems sufficiently close to producing in oneself something very like a sensory experience that it only defers the problem: until one has a physicalist gloss on what constitutes such representations as those involved in conscious memory and imagination, no progress has been made.
The other line of response is to argue that, although Harpo’s new knowledge is factual, it is not knowledge of a new fact. Rather, it is new way of grasping something that he already knew. He does not realise this, because the concepts employed to capture experience (such as ‘looks red’ or ‘sounds C-sharp’) are similar to demonstratives, and demonstrative concepts lack the kind of descriptive content that allow one to infer what they express from other pieces of information that one may already possess. A total scientific knowledge of the world would not enable you to say which time was ‘now’ or which place was ‘here’. Demonstrative concepts pick something out without saying anything extra about it. Similarly, the scientific knowledge that Harpo originally possessed did not enable him to anticipate what it would be like to re-express some parts of that knowledge using the demonstrative concepts that only experience can give one. The knowledge, therefore, appears to be genuinely new, whereas only the mode of conceiving it is novel.
Proponents of the epistemic argument respond that it is problematic to maintain both that the qualitative nature of experience can be genuinely novel, and that the quality itself be the same as some property already grasped scientifically: does not the experience’s phenomenal nature, which the demonstrative concepts capture, constitute a property in its own right? Another way to put this is to say that phenomenal concepts are not pure demonstratives, like ‘here’ and ‘now’, or ‘this’ and ‘that’, because they do capture a genuine qualitative content. Furthermore, experiencing does not seem to consist simply in exercising a particular kind of concept, demonstrative or not. When Harpo has his new form of experience, he does not simply exercise a new concept; he also grasps something new – the phenomenal quality – with that concept. How decisive these considerations are, remains controversial.
4.2 The Argument from Predicate Dualism to Property Dualism
I said above that predicate dualism might seem to have no ontological consequences, because it is concerned only with the different way things can be described within the contexts of the different sciences, not with any real difference in the things themselves. This, however, can be disputed.
The argument from predicate to property dualism moves in two steps, both controversial. The first claims that the irreducible special sciences, which are the sources of irreducible predicates, are not wholly objective in the way that physics is, but depend for their subject matter upon interest-relative perspectives on the world. This means that they, and the predicates special to them, depend on the existence of minds and mental states, for only minds have interest-relative perspectives. The second claim is that psychology – the science of the mental – is itself an irreducible special science, and so it, too, presupposes the existence of the mental. Mental predicates therefore presuppose the mentality that creates them: mentality cannot consist simply in the applicability of the predicates themselves.
First, let us consider the claim that the special sciences are not fully objective, but are interest-relative.
No-one would deny, of course, that the very same subject matter or ‘hunk of reality’ can be described in irreducibly different ways and it still be just that subject matter or piece of reality. A mass of matter could be characterized as a hurricane, or as a collection of chemical elements, or as mass of sub-atomic particles, and there be only the one mass of matter. But such different explanatory frameworks seem to presuppose different perspectives on that subject matter.
This is where basic physics, and perhaps those sciences reducible to basic physics, differ from irreducible special sciences. On a realist construal, the completed physics cuts physical reality up at its ultimate joints: any special science which is nomically strictly reducible to physics also, in virtue of this reduction, it could be argued, cuts reality at its joints, but not at its minutest ones. If scientific realism is true, a completed physics will tell one how the world is, independently of any special interest or concern: it is just how the world is. It would seem that, by contrast, a science which is not nomically reducible to physics does not take its legitimation from the underlying reality in this direct way. Rather, such a science is formed from the collaboration between, on the one hand, objective similarities in the world and, on the other, perspectives and interests of those who devise the science. The concept of hurricane is brought to bear from the perspective of creatures concerned about the weather. Creatures totally indifferent to the weather would have no reason to take the real patterns of phenomena that hurricanes share as constituting a single kind of thing. With the irreducible special sciences, there is an issue of salience , which involves a subjective component: a selection of phenomena with a certain teleology in mind is required before their structures or patterns are reified. The entities of metereology or biology are, in this respect, rather like Gestalt phenomena.
Even accepting this, why might it be thought that the perspectivality of the special sciences leads to a genuine property dualism in the philosophy of mind? It might seem to do so for the following reason. Having a perspective on the world, perceptual or intellectual, is a psychological state. So the irreducible special sciences presuppose the existence of mind. If one is to avoid an ontological dualism, the mind that has this perspective must be part of the physical reality on which it has its perspective. But psychology, it seems to be almost universally agreed, is one of those special sciences that is not reducible to physics, so if its subject matter is to be physical, it itself presupposes a perspective and, hence, the existence of a mind to see matter as psychological. If this mind is physical and irreducible, it presupposes mind to see it as such. We seem to be in a vicious circle or regress.
We can now understand the motivation for full-blown reduction. A true basic physics represents the world as it is in itself, and if the special sciences were reducible, then the existence of their ontologies would make sense as expressions of the physical, not just as ways of seeing or interpreting it. They could be understood ‘from the bottom up’, not from top down. The irreducibility of the special sciences creates no problem for the dualist, who sees the explanatory endeavor of the physical sciences as something carried on from a perspective conceptually outside of the physical world. Nor need this worry a physicalist, if he can reduce psychology, for then he could understand ‘from the bottom up’ the acts (with their internal, intentional contents) which created the irreducible ontologies of the other sciences. But psychology is one of the least likely of sciences to be reduced. If psychology cannot be reduced, this line of reasoning leads to real emergence for mental acts and hence to a real dualism for the properties those acts instantiate (Robinson 2003).
4.3 The Modal Argument
There is an argument, which has roots in Descartes (Meditation VI), which is a modal argument for dualism. One might put it as follows:
It is imaginable that one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
It is conceivable that one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
It is possible one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
One’s mind is a different entity from one’s body.
The rationale of the argument is a move from imaginability to real possibility. I include (2) because the notion of conceivability has one foot in the psychological camp, like imaginability, and one in the camp of pure logical possibility and therefore helps in the transition from one to the other.
This argument should be distinguished from a similar ‘conceivability’ argument, often known as the ‘zombie hypothesis’, which claims the imaginability and possibility of my body (or, in some forms, a body physically just like it) existing without there being any conscious states associated with it. (See, for example, Chalmers (1996), 94–9.) This latter argument, if sound, would show that conscious states were something over and above physical states. It is a different argument because the hypothesis that the unaltered body could exist without the mind is not the same as the suggestion that the mind might continue to exist without the body, nor are they trivially equivalent. The zombie argument establishes only property dualism and a property dualist might think disembodied existence inconceivable – for example, if he thought the identity of a mind through time depended on its relation to a body (e.g., Penelhum 1970).
Before Kripke (1972/80), the first challenge to such an argument would have concerned the move from (3) to (4). When philosophers generally believed in contingent identity, that move seemed to them invalid. But nowadays that inference is generally accepted and the issue concerns the relation between imaginability and possibility. No-one would nowadays identify the two (except, perhaps, for certain quasi-realists and anti-realists), but the view that imaginability is a solid test for possibility has been strongly defended. W. D. Hart ((1994), 266), for example, argues that no clear example has been produced such that “one can imagine that p (and tell less imaginative folk a story that enables them to imagine that p) plus a good argument that it is impossible that p. No such counterexamples have been forthcoming…” This claim is at least contentious. There seem to be good arguments that time-travel is incoherent, but every episode of Star-Trek or Doctor Who shows how one can imagine what it might be like were it possible.
It is worth relating the appeal to possibility in this argument to that involved in the more modest, anti-physicalist, zombie argument. The possibility of this hypothesis is also challenged, but all that is necessary for a zombie to be possible is that all and only the things that the physical sciences say about the body be true of such a creature. As the concepts involved in such sciences – e.g., neuron, cell, muscle – seem to make no reference, explicit or implicit, to their association with consciousness, and are defined in purely physical terms in the relevant science texts, there is a very powerful prima facie case for thinking that something could meet the condition of being just like them and lack any connection with consciousness. There is no parallel clear, uncontroversial and regimented account of mental concepts as a whole that fails to invoke, explicitly or implicitly, physical (e.g., behavioural) states.
For an analytical behaviourist the appeal to imaginability made in the argument fails, not because imagination is not a reliable guide to possibility, but because we cannot imagine such a thing, as it is a priori impossible. The impossibility of disembodiment is rather like that of time travel, because it is demonstrable a priori, though only by arguments that are controversial. The argument can only get under way for those philosophers who accept that the issue cannot be settled a priori, so the possibility of the disembodiment that we can imagine is still prima facie open.
A major rationale of those who think that imagination is not a safe indication of possibility, even when such possibility is not eliminable a priori, is that we can imagine that a posteriori necessities might be false – for example, that Hesperus might not be identical to Phosphorus. But if Kripke is correct, that is not a real possibility. Another way of putting this point is that there are many epistemic possibilities which are imaginable because they are epistemic possibilities, but which are not real possibilities. Richard Swinburne (1997, New Appendix C), whilst accepting this argument in general, has interesting reasons for thinking that it cannot apply in the mind-body case. He argues that in cases that involve a posteriori necessities, such as those identities that need discovering, it is because we identify those entities only by their ‘stereotypes’ (that is, by their superficial features observable by the layman) that we can be wrong about their essences. In the case of our experience of ourselves this is not true.
Now it is true that the essence of Hesperus cannot be discovered by a mere thought experiment. That is because what makes Hesperus Hesperus is not the stereotype, but what underlies it. But it does not follow that no one can ever have access to the essence of a substance, but must always rely for identification on a fallible stereotype. One might think that for the person him or herself, while what makes that person that person underlies what is observable to others, it does not underlie what is experienceable by that person, but is given directly in their own self-awareness.
This is a very appealing Cartesian intuition: my identity as the thinking thing that I am is revealed to me in consciousness, it is not something beyond the veil of consciousness. Now it could be replied to this that though I do access myself as a conscious subject, so classifying myself is rather like considering myself qua cyclist. Just as I might never have been a cyclist, I might never have been conscious, if things had gone wrong in my very early life. I am the organism, the animal, which might not have developed to the point of consciousness, and that essence as animal is not revealed to me just by introspection.
But there are vital differences between these cases. A cyclist is explicitly presented as a human being (or creature of some other animal species) cycling: there is no temptation to think of a cyclist as a basic kind of thing in its own right. Consciousness is not presented as a property of something, but as the subject itself. Swinburne’s claim that when we refer to ourselves we are referring to something we think we are directly aware of and not to ‘something we know not what’ that underlies our experience seemingly ‘of ourselves’ has powerful intuitive appeal and could only be overthrown by very forceful arguments. Yet, even if we are not referring primarily to a substrate, but to what is revealed in consciousness, could it not still be the case that there is a necessity stronger than causal connecting this consciousness to something physical? To consider this further we must investigate what the limits are of the possible analogy between cases of the water-H2O kind, and the mind-body relation.
We start from the analogy between the water stereotype – how water presents itself – and how consciousness is given first-personally to the subject. It is plausible to claim that something like water could exist without being H2O, but hardly that it could exist without some underlying nature. There is, however, no reason to deny that this underlying nature could be homogenous with its manifest nature: that is, it would seem to be possible that there is a world in which the water-like stuff is an element, as the ancients thought, and is water-like all the way down. The claim of the proponents of the dualist argument is that this latter kind of situation can be known to be true a priori in the case of the mind: that is, one can tell by introspection that it is not more-than-causally dependent on something of a radically different nature, such as a brain or body. What grounds might one have for thinking that one could tell that a priori?
The only general argument that seem to be available for this would be the principle that, for any two levels of discourse, A and B, they are more-than-causally connected only if one entails the other a priori. And the argument for accepting this principle would be that the relatively uncontroversial cases of a posteriori necessary connections are in fact cases in which one can argue a priori from facts about the microstructure to the manifest facts. In the case of water, for example, it would be claimed that it follows a priori that if there were something with the properties attributed to H2O by chemistry on a micro level, then that thing would possess waterish properties on a macro level. What is established a posteriori is that it is in fact H2O that underlies and explains the waterish properties round here, not something else: the sufficiency of the base – were it to obtain – to explain the phenomena, can be deduced a priori from the supposed nature of the base. This is, in effect, the argument that Chalmers uses to defend the zombie hypothesis. The suggestion is that the whole category of a posteriori more-than-causally necessary connections (often identified as a separate category of metaphysical necessity) comes to no more than this. If we accept that this is the correct account of a posteriori necessities, and also deny the analytically reductionist theories that would be necessary for a priori connections between mind and body, as conceived, for example, by the behaviourist or the functionalist, does it follow that we can tell a priori that consciousness is not more-than-causally dependent on the body?
It is helpful in considering this question to employ a distinction like Berkeley’s between ideas and notions. Ideas are the objects of our mental acts, and they capture transparently – ‘by way of image or likeness’ (Principles, sect. 27) – that of which they are the ideas. The self and its faculties are not the objects of our mental acts, but are captured only obliquely in the performance of its acts, and of these Berkeley says we have notions, meaning by this that what we capture of the nature of the dynamic agent does not seem to have the same transparency as what we capture as the normal objects of the agent’s mental acts. It is not necessary to become involved in Berkeley’s metaphysics in general to feel the force of the claim that the contents and internal objects of our mental acts are grasped with a lucidity that exceeds that of our grasp of the agent and the acts per se. Because of this, notions of the self perhaps have a ‘thickness’ and are permanently contestable: there seems always to be room for more dispute as to what is involved in that concept. (Though we shall see later, in 5.2.2, that there is a ‘non-thick’ way of taking the Berkeleyan concept of a notion.)
Because ‘thickness’ always leaves room for dispute, this is one of those cases in philosophy in which one is at the mercy of the arguments philosophers happen to think up. The conceivability argument creates a prima facie case for thinking that mind has no more than causal ontological dependence on the body. Let us assume that one rejects analytical (behaviourist or functionalist) accounts of mental predicates. Then the above arguments show that any necessary dependence of mind on body does not follow the model that applies in other scientific cases. This does not show that there may not be other reasons for believing in such dependence, for so many of the concepts in the area are still contested. For example, it might be argued that identity through time requires the kind of spatial existence that only body can give: or that the causal continuity required by a stream of consciousness cannot be a property of mere phenomena. All these might be put forward as ways of filling out those aspects of our understanding of the self that are only obliquely, not transparently, presented in self-awareness. The dualist must respond to any claim as it arises: the conceivability argument does not pre-empt them.......
5.2 The Unity of the Mind
Whether one believes that the mind is a substance or just a bundle of properties, the same challenge arises, which is to explain the nature of the unity of the immaterial mind. For the Cartesian, that means explaining how he understands the notion of immaterial substance. For the Humean, the issue is to explain the nature of the relationship between the different elements in the bundle that binds them into one thing. Neither tradition has been notably successful in this latter task: indeed, Hume, in the appendix to the Treatise, declared himself wholly mystified by the problem, rejecting his own initial solution (though quite why is not clear from the text).
✧･ﾟ: *✧･ﾟ:*Addressing the Council*:･ﾟ✧*:･ﾟ✧
Deciding Mamas fate, after she forgot to feed us AGAIN..
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Schebek Palace - the seat of the CERGE-EI institution
Address: Politických vězňů 936/7, Prague 1-New Town
Year: 1870–1872
Architects: Vojtěch Ignác Ullmann
One of the most beautiful neo-renaissance palaces in Prague still boasts luxurious luxury interiors, which have often served as a faithful backdrop for foreign film productions.
Its importance has always been linked to banking and economics. Today, the palace falls under national cultural protection and houses two leading scientific institutions that proudly continue the tradition of Schebek Palace as a center of economic education.
openhousepraha.cz/schebkuv-palac-sidlo-instituce-cerge-ei/
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Schebek Palace (Czech: Schebkův palác), otherwise known as "The House of the Angel", is a neo-renaissance building located at Politických vězňů 7, čp. 936/II, in New Town, Prague 1. It is protected as a cultural monument in the Czech Republic. [1][2]
Prior to the construction of the current Palace, the building lot was occupied by an orphanage. It was sold to two railway magnates, Jan Schebek and František Ringhoffer, in 1868.[3][4] Jan Schebek then commissioned architect Vojtěch Ignác Ullmann to design the current building. Ullmann's designs were inspired by renaissance Rome, and the building was constructed between 1870 and 1872.
Originally designed to be three stories tall, additional floors have been added since the original construction. The building has four wings, with a rectangular courtyard in its center. Of special note are its ceiling murals by Viktor Barvitius, sculptures by Josef Wagner, and the building's marble staircase which leads to the first floor's main reception rooms.[5]
The Schebek family owned the building for 18 years before selling it to the Austro-Hungarian Bank, where it became the headquarters of the Prague branch of the bank. Following World War I, the building became the headquarters of The Banking Office of the Ministry of Finance in 1919, which was later transformed into the National Bank of Czechoslovakia in 1926. The bank owned the building until 1963, when it was taken over by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (CSAS).[5]
Currently the building houses the Center for Economics Research and Graduate Education – Economics Institute (CERGE-EI), and it is owned by a unit of the Czech Academy of Sciences.
This is a real photo postcard addressed on the other side to Mr. Sam Ekey, Warren, Pa., R.D. #4, and postmarked in Warren, Pa., on March 31, 1913.
Handwritten message: "Warren, Pa., 3/30, 1913. Dear Brother, Wm. Kopf would like to have his posts Saturday. If you need the money take it, 12½¢ each. Frank needs about 10 7 fts. Maybe we can give Henderson his and give Frank Henderson's from last year [meaning, as far as I can understand, that "Henderson" is going to get the fence posts originally intended for "Frank," and Frank is going to receive his ten seven-foot fence posts from among the ones that they prepared for Henderson last year]. Everything OK. Norman has the mumps. He is at home on the farm. E.E."
It's likely that "E.E." was Emil Ekey (1886-1976), who was writing to older brother, Sam Ekey (1881-1965). "Frank" may have been Frank A. Ekey (1868-1959), another brother. A quick search didn't yield any information regarding the other individuals--William Kopf, Henderson, and Norman--that Emil mentions.
The flooded street was the result of the Great Flood of 1913, which "occurred between March 23 and March 26, after major rivers in the central and eastern United States flooded from runoff and several days of heavy rain." I assume that the photo shows a street in Warren, which is located in northeastern Pennsylvania at the confluence of the Allegheny River and Conewango Creek.
The license plate on the car in the photo is no. "23801, Penna., 1913," and the man in the driver's seat is looking back at the photographer. Beyond the automobile there are three people--one of them only visible through the vehicle's windshield--wading through the floodwaters. To the left of the threesome is a mailbox stranded by the water, and to its left are two individuals standing in the doorway of a building.
A mailman wearing waders and holding a mailbag is standing in the water on the right-hand side of the photo. Perhaps he was headed over to the mailbox to collect the mail.
Emil didn't mention the flood in the note he wrote to his brother. I wonder if either of them knew any of the people in the photo. It would also be interesting to know who the photographer was.
A cars and trucks photo for the Vintage Photos Theme Park.
The 'The Address Downtown Burj Dubai' is a super tall skyscraper rising 306 meters (1,004 feet) alongside the Dubai Mall, the Old Town, and the Burj Dubai Lake in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. This hotel and residential tower contains a total of 63 floors. The tower is another supertall structure in the massive development named Downtown Burj Dubai, which includes the centerpiece supertall building, the Burj Dubai. The tower was topped out in April 2008, becoming the 6th-tallest building in Dubai and the 36th-tallest in the world. In September 2008, the tower was completed.
Canon 7D + Sigma 10-20 | This is not HDR
If you want to know how I took this shot: michaelrcruz.com/?p=338
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- Ex Bill Robinson cover purchased February 1989 from Lee Auctions...
ISLE PIERRE - the community of Isle Pierre is located in central British Columbia, about 35 kilometers west of Prince George, along the Nechako River. It’s named for a rocky island in the river’s rapids. Isle Pierre was first settled by homesteaders from Saskatchewan in the 1920s. Today, the company Canadian Forest Products operates a sawmill in the town. The Nechako River’s coastal plains offer year-round activities, while a number of historic sites can be found in the area.
ISLE PIERRE Post Office was opened - 16 November 1928, in association with the nearby island. Post office closed - 9 March 1957.
LINK to a list of the Postmasters who served at the ISLE PIERRE Post Office - recherche-collection-search.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/home/record...
- sent from - / ISLE PIERRE / MR 2 / 43 / B.C. / - split ring cancel - this split ring hammer (A1-1) was proofed - 15 September 1928 - (RF D). (4 strikes)
Cross-border sixteen-cent rate (six cents airmail for first ounce, plus ten cents registration) in use July 1, 1934 to March 31, 1943 - / R / Isle Pierre, B.C. / No. (675) / - registered boxed marking in magenta ink.
- via - / PRINCE GEORGE / MR 2 / 43 / B.C. / - cds transit backstamp.
- via - / EDM. & PR. GEO. R.P.O. / 198 / MR 2 / 43 / No. 4 / - rpo transit backstamp - (Ludlow W-43 / RF 130)
- via - / VANCOUVER / MR 4 / 43 / B.C. / - cds transit backstamp
Foreign Exchange Control Board sticker tied by boxed (MOTO) - / VANCOUVER, / MAR 5 1943 / B.C. / - in magenta ink (2 strikes)
- via - / SEATTLE, WASH. TERMINAL A / MAR / 5 / 1943 / REGISTRATION / - double ring transit backstamp in purple ink.
- arrived at - / LOS ANGELES (STA. S.) / MAR / 8 / 1943 / REGISTERED / - double ring arrival backstamp in purple ink.
- arrived at - / LOS ANGELES, CALIF, (TERMINAL ANNEX.) / MAR / 8 / 1943 / REGISTERED / - double ring arrival in purple ink (not shown above).
ISLE PIERRE - a farming and logging community, twenty miles west of Prince George, British Columbia, on the Nechako River and the northern C.N.R. line. Site of the last spike on the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway in 1914. Named in French for a rocky island in the river.
- sent by - J. C. Townsend / Reid Lake - B.C. / Canada
Jennie May (nee Chandler) Townsend
(b. 1888 in Millston, Jackson, Wisconsin, USA - d. 1970)
Her husband - Joseph Whitfield Townsend
(b. 6 April 1885 in North Shield, Northumberland, England - d. 8 July 1953 at age 68 in Prince George) - occupations - farmer, well driller. LINK to his death certificate - search-collections.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/Image/Genealogy/38...
Addressed to: Edwin J. Dingle, / 2nd Street at Hobart Blvd. / Los Angeles, California, / U.S.A.
Edwin John Dingle (b. April 6, 1881 - d. January 28, 1972 at age 90) was an English journalist, publisher, author, and mystical guru. Dingle was born in Cornwall but orphaned at just 9. He studied to become a journalist, moving to Singapore in 1900 to cover the Far East. He traveled extensively in China and was involved with the early days of publishing in Shanghai. From Shanghai and Singapore, he also published several early maps of China, Shanghai, the The New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China, and several books on the history of China. In 1910, Dingle traveled to Tibet, where he reportedly studied under a Tibetan 'spiritual master' and Lama. On his return from Tibet, he witnessed the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, observing events in both Wuhan and Shanghai, as well as the brutal attacks on Hankou and Hanyang. After some 21 years in China, Dingle relocated to Oakland California, where he lived in seclusion meditating and practicing his own version of Pranayama in pursuit of mystical powers, extrasensory perception, and spiritual development. There Dingle founded the Institute of Mentalphysics in 1933-34, styling himself President and Preceptor Emeritus. The institute was well financed and hired the famed architect Frank Lloyd Wright to design a near 400-acre campus in Joshua Tree. At the institute he called himself by his adopted Chinese name, Ding Le Mei (丁乐梅). Dingle died in 1972 in California. LINK to an advertisement for his Church - www.newspapers.com/clip/117850944/dr-dingle/
KEITHLEY CREEK is a ghost town located in the Cariboo region of British Columbia. The town is situated near southwest end of Cariboo Lake, north of Quesnel.
KEITHLEY CREEK, named after its discoverer ‘Doc’ Keithley, was one of the first major placer deposits of the Cariboo gold rush found in July 1860 and mining operations continued until 1998. Production from Keithley Creek was estimated at 275,000 ounces. Barkerville became the centre of the historic Cariboo gold rush following the 1861-1862 discoveries on Lightning Creek, Williams Creek and the surrounding area.
- from 1908 "Lovell's Gazetteer of the Dominion of Canada" - KEITHLEY CREEK, a post settlement In the District of Cariboo, B.C., 120 miles from Ashcroft, on the C.P.R. It contains 2 stores, 1 hotel, and has a Weekly mall. Mining is the chief industry. All provisions are brought on animals' backs, having no roads, the nearest being 70 miles away. The population in 1908 was 85.
(from - Wrigley's 1918 British Columbia directory) - KEITHLEY CREEK - a post office and mining settlement on Cariboo Lake, at mouth of Keithley Creek, 20 miles northeast of Quesnel Forks, in Cariboo Provincial Electoral District. Reached by pack trail from Quesnel Forks, which is the nearest telegraph office, and distant 175 miles from Clinton, the nearest G. T. P. Railway point. The population in 1918 was 20. Local resources: Placer and quartz mining.
The KEITHLEY - CREEK Post Office (first opening) was established - 1 July 1873 - it closed - 1 October 1877. The Post Office (second opening) re-opened - 1 May 1884 and closed - 18 September 1968.
LINK to a list of the Postmasters who worked at the KEITHLEY CREEK Post Office - central.bac-lac.gc.ca/.redirect?app=posoffposmas&id=2...
sent from - / KEITHLEY CREEK / MR 30 / 46 / B.C. / - split ring cancel (second opening) - this split ring hammer (A1-1) was not listed in the Proof Book - it was most likely proofed c. 1885 - (RF C).
- sent by - O. J. Easson / River View Ranch / Likely, B.C.
Oliver James Easson
(b. 14 August 1911 in Avonlea, Saskatchewan - d. 10 December 1979 at age 68 in Richmond, B.C.) - LINK to his death certificate - search-collections.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/Image/Genealogy/ba...
His wife - Joan (nee Way) Easson
(b. 10 October 1912 in Innisfree, Alberta - d. 21 October 1992 at age 80 in Vancouver, B.C.) - they were married - 14 May 1942 in Vancouver, British Columbia - LINK to their marriage certificate - search-collections.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/Image/Genealogy/46... - LINK to her death certificate - search-collections.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/Image/Genealogy/70...
LIKELY is a small rural community in the Cariboo Region, nestled in the foothills of the Cariboo Mountains. This area played a significant role in the Cariboo Gold Rush of 1859 when rough-edged boom towns like Quesnel Forks, Cedar City, and Keithley Creek had overnight populations in the thousands, predating Barkerville.
Addressed to - Superintendent (Richard Claxton Palmer) / Dominion Experimental Station / Summerland, B.C.
In 1932 R.C. Palmer was appointed as the third superintendent of the farm until his untimely death in 1953. Reacting to the changing needs of the era, several programs were discontinued under his leadership. Most notably the swine program, tobacco investigation, and poultry program. LINK to the complete article - static1.squarespace.com/static/5995f4e96b8f5b9ef7c7355f/t...
Richard "Dick" Claxton Palmer
(b. 13 January 1897 in Victoria, British Columbia - d. 26 March 1953 at age 56 in Summerland, British Columbia) - occupation - Horticulturist - LINK to his death certificate - search-collections.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/Image/Genealogy/95...
LINK to his - Personnel Records from the First World War - www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/military-heritage/first-wo... - He served in England and France.
Clipped from - The Province newspaper - Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada - 27 March 1953 - BETTER FRUIT HIS AIM - Summerland's Chief Dick Palmer Dies, 56 - Richard Claxton Palmer, chief of the Summerland Experimental Station, one of British Columbia's most respected agriculturists, died suddenly in his office at the farm Thursday. He was 56. He was the son of R. M. Palmer, prominent Vancouver Island farmer, and a deputy minister of agriculture for B.C. The elder Palmer was classed as B.C.'s first horticulturist, and built for his own enjoyment, a lavish arboretum on the slopes of Cowichan Bay. Dick Palmer was born in Victoria. He graduated from UBC in 1921 and won the Governor-General's medal for general proficiency. He was awarded his MSA degree in 1923. Later, he received his doctorate in science. Before attending the university, he had served in the armed services during World War One. At his graduation he was appointed assistant superintendent at the Summerland station. He was a member of the UBC Senate from 1948 to 1951; a past-president of Summerland Rotary Club and adviser to many of the horticultural groups in the area. Dr. Palmer is survived by his wife, Marjorie, who graduated from UBC in 1921; and two sons, Richard and John, both students at UBC. A brother is in charge of an Ontario agricultural station. His mother lives on Vancouver Island, and a sister in Vancouver.
His wife - Marjorie Crawford (nee Mathieson) Palmer
(b. 14 November 1899 in Pembroke, Renfrew, Ontario, Canada - d. 6 January 1985 at age 85 in Kelowna, British Columbia) - they were married - 8 July 1924 in Vancouver, B.C. - LINK to their marriage certificate - search-collections.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/Image/Genealogy/08... - LINK to her death certificate - search-collections.royalbcmuseum.bc.ca/Image/Genealogy/68...
- arrived at - / SUMMERLAND / PM / AP 8 / 46 / B.C. / - cds arrival backstamp
This series of Photographs documents our visit to the Atlanta Botanical Garden. This Photograph shows a pedestrian Bridge and it's Support Structure. The area near the entrance is quite hilly; the various paths go up and down and cross over and under several Bridges. The series of Paths in this area is called the Canopy Walk and passes through the Cascades Garden.
The Georgia Botanical Garden is located at 1911 Sweetbay Dr, Gainesville, GA 30501, but uses the Mailing Address of 1345 Piedmont Ave NE, Atlanta, GA 30309. The City of Gainesville is the County Seat of Halls County, Georgia. The Botanical Garden encompasses 30 Acres in the Atlanta Metropolitan Area (Midtown Atlanta).
Further Information about the Georgia Botanical Garden Can be found at:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlanta_Botanical_Garden
In June 2018, my wife & I attended a Family Wedding at the Hilton Garden Inn, 275 Baker Street NW in Atlanta, Georgia. One end the hallway on the on the 13 Floor (they call it Floor PH) gave me a Great View of the CSX Tracks, while the other end of the hallway gave me a great view of the Skyview Ferris Wheel across the street from Centennial Olympic Park.
Since we were in Atlanta for several days, we had some time to visit the Atlanta Botanical Gardens, which which were located approx 3.2 Miles from our Hotel.
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"On the day of Pentecost Peter stood up with the Eleven and addressed the crowd in a loud voice: ‘Men of Israel, listen to what I am going to say: Jesus the Nazarene was a man commended to you by God by the miracles and portents and signs that God worked through him when he was among you, as you all know. This man, who was put into your power by the deliberate intention and foreknowledge of God, you took and had crucified by men outside the Law. You killed him, but God raised him to life, freeing him from the pangs of Hades; for it was impossible for him to be held in its power since, as David says of him:
I saw the Lord before me always,
for with him at my right hand nothing can shake me.
So my heart was glad
and my tongue cried out with joy;
my body, too, will rest in the hope
that you will not abandon my soul to Hades
nor allow your holy one to experience corruption.
You have made known the way of life to me,
you will fill me with gladness through your presence.
‘Brothers, no one can deny that the patriarch David himself is dead and buried: his tomb is still with us. But since he was a prophet, and knew that God had sworn him an oath to make one of his descendants succeed him on the throne, what he foresaw and spoke about was the resurrection of the Christ: he is the one who was not abandoned to Hades, and whose body did not experience corruption. God raised this man Jesus to life, and all of us are witnesses to that. Now raised to the heights by God’s right hand, he has received from the Father the Holy Spirit, who was promised, and what you see and hear is the outpouring of that Spirit.’"
– Acts 2:14,22-33, which is the 1st reading for Easter Monday.
Mosaic from the church of St Francis of Assisi in New York City.
In his Farewell Address to the nation in 1796, President George Washington warned Americans to not think among party lines, to be bigger than that. Washington wanted to serve only four years, but the rancor between Alexander Hamilton (Federalist) and Thomas Jefferson (Democratic-Republican) in his cabinet was so bad that he found himself having to serve another four years as U.S. President to calm the waters and give America a firmer foundation. As he left office, Washington warned Americans to beware of the tribalism and populism that political parties unleashed. Exacerbating sectional differences (e.g. North and South, farm and city), political parties serve not the nation but themselves. They divide the social fabric within the country for their own gain. America's first President warned that parties could encroach and erode democratic systems. Unlike the new Republic, they weren't built to check despotism, even when competing with each other. In other words, a party wants to win power. Institutionally, it would not mind finally having a despot rule the country in perpetuity as long as the ruler was its despot.
Below is what President George Washington said to the nation.
—
"I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party, generally.
This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but, in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy.
The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries, which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of Public Liberty.
Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind, (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight,) the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.
It serves always to distract the Public Councils, and enfeeble the Public Administration. It agitates the Community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.
There is an opinion, that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the Government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of Liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in Governments of a Monarchical cast, Patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in Governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And, there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.
It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution, in those intrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the Guardian of the Public Weal against invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our country and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way, which the constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for, though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit, which the use can at any time yield.”
Address: 8-14 rue Cortot in Paris 18th - Montmartre district
The museum was founded and opened in 1960
It was built in the seventeenth century as the Bel Air House and is the oldest building in Montmartre.
It served as a residence and meeting place for many artists including Auguste Renoir, Suzanne Valadon and Émile Bernard, who held their studios here, as well as the fauve artists Emile Othon Friesz and Raoul Dufy.
yesterday the philippines was in a semi emotional situation as the newly elected president of the philippines, rodrigo duterte, delivers his first state of the nation address (SONA). as in all previous presidential SONAS there were demonstrations both friendly, to celebrate this inaugural address, as well as, unfriendly, to make the new administration aware of government's shortcomings. there were police and security everywhere to maintain peace and order. despite a brief rain shower the demonstration and rally were orderly and finished, incident free, around 7pm last night
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Dame Vivienne Westwood addressing activists and a small number of journalists attending a protest picnic in Parliament Square to celebrate Julian Assange's 50th birthday party. Assange's youngest son seems to be checking out the cake. Assange continues to be held at Britain's high security Belmarsh Prison alongside terrorists and criminals convicted of serious violent offences.
For much of his time in prison, he has been kept in solitary and denied the right to books - something which even mass murderers are normally allowed - and also refused visits and discussions about his case with his lawyers. He faces an extradition hearing to the United States.
The case against Assange has all but collapsed, but there has been very little coverage of these recent developments in the corporate media
In an interview broadcast on RT in 2020, Noam Chomsky pointed out that Assange had to be silenced because he had 'committed the crime of letting the population know what they have the right to know."
Historian Professor Stuart Macintyre AO addresses the Rotary Club of Moreland Australia Day Breakfast at the Coburg Civic Centre.
Using an Arduino to write programs to an 8x8 WS2812B LED array. For those who don't know, LEDs like the WS2812B actually contain 3 LEDS and a controller chip. The LEDs, one red, one blue and one green, can be turned on with varying degrees of brightness to act like pixels in a screen, creating any color you want. The programming possibilities are endless.