● Technique Black Card

● Adobe Photoshop 7.0 ME

 

I learned this on Scott Kelby's Wednesday Guest Blog. It's a technique used by a guy named Calvin Hollywood, which turns out to be a really hilarious name for some German dude who sounds even more hilarious in the video on the post. But anyway, that's another story. Some of his stuff is a little overdone for my tastes, but I do like the manner in which he brings out the details in a photo. Obviously, he's working with a much more professional setup than me, so his lighting and stuff is spot on, whereas the shot above is just some natural light coming from the window. Still, I liked how this turned out, so I thought I'd use it as a tutorial example.

 

Decluttr to see details

 

First, I cropped the original image below to a square, and added just a bit of exposure to it in LR2. Then I transferred it into CS4 and did the following:

 

1. Control/Command-J to duplicate the background Layer.

 

2. Set this layer's blending mode to "Vivid Light". The shot will look pretty dark now.

 

3. Go to Image>Adjustments>Invert or just use Control/Command-I. This will look really funky.

 

4. Go to Filter>Blur>Surface Blur and adjust radius and threshold to your liking. This is weird because you'd think that blurring the image would not be what you want to do, but it works, trust me. Be careful with the threshold so that you don't see too much "halo-ing" around the edges of your subject.

 

5. Once the image is blurred, it will look really odd. However, now press SHIFT+ALT+CONTROL/COMMAND and the letter E. This will create a new layer with all of your work so far combined. Change the Blending Mode to "Overlay".

 

6. Now here's the key: Delete the first duplicate layer you made and you will now see the results of the enhancements. Pretty cool, isn't it?

 

Well, if you did it right anyway...haha.

 

Let me know if you try it, i'd love to see what you can get out of it if you like it :)

Using my arch technique, but with 1x1 plates w/ tooth

Sorry for the lack of uploads, but I'm a kind of person who builds something maybe once a month.

 

I was segregating parts, and when I connected a few of those black pieces together, I realised, that it would make a wonderful tree trunk. What do you think about this technique?

(sorry for the dust)

Here is a new set of LEGO ideas and techniques, made with LDD

I'm sure you'll find a use to this idea

I tried to make the explanation readable thanks to the colors as if we had a tutorial

 

Do not forget to watch the album with all the right techniques on your right =>

 

Find all my creations on Flickr group « News LEGO Techniques ».

This Flickr group includes:

 

- Ideas for new LEGO pieces

- Techniques for assembling bricks

- Tutorials for making accessories, objects, etc.

A sturdy triangle made with three 1x2 bricks with clip.

 

This one is quite versatile. I've used this technique in a couple of mocs: here to construct a triangular tunnel, and here to create the underlying structure of a partial icosahedron.

1. The Mind-Body Problem and the History of Dualism

1.1 The Mind-Body Problem

The mind-body problem is the problem: what is the relationship between mind and body? Or alternatively: what is the relationship between mental properties and physical properties?

Humans have (or seem to have) both physical properties and mental properties. People have (or seem to have)the sort of properties attributed in the physical sciences. These physical properties include size, weight, shape, colour, motion through space and time, etc. But they also have (or seem to have) mental properties, which we do not attribute to typical physical objects These properties involve consciousness (including perceptual experience, emotional experience, and much else), intentionality (including beliefs, desires, and much else), and they are possessed by a subject or a self. Physical properties are public, in the sense that they are, in principle, equally observable by anyone. Some physical properties – like those of an electron – are not directly observable at all, but they are equally available to all, to the same degree, with scientific equipment and techniques. The same is not true of mental properties. I may be able to tell that you are in pain by your behaviour, but only you can feel it directly. Similarly, you just know how something looks to you, and I can only surmise. Conscious mental events are private to the subject, who has a privileged access to them of a kind no-one has to the physical. The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between these two sets of properties. The mind-body problem breaks down into a number of components. The ontological question: what are mental states and what are physical states? Is one class a subclass of the other, so that all mental states are physical, or vice versa? Or are mental states and physical states entirely distinct?

The causal question: do physical states influence mental states? Do mental states influence physical states? If so, how?

Different aspects of the mind-body problem arise for different aspects of the mental, such as consciousness, intentionality, the self. The problem of consciousness: what is consciousness? How is it related to the brain and the body? The problem of intentionality: what is intentionality? How is it related to the brain and the body? The problem of the self: what is the self? How is it related to the brain and the body? Other aspects of the mind-body problem arise for aspects of the physical. For example:

 

The problem of embodiment: what is it for the mind to be housed in a body? What is it for a body to belong to a particular subject?

The seemingly intractable nature of these problems have given rise to many different philosophical views.

 

Materialist views say that, despite appearances to the contrary, mental states are just physical states. Behaviourism, functionalism, mind-brain identity theory and the computational theory of mind are examples of how materialists attempt to explain how this can be so. The most common factor in such theories is the attempt to explicate the nature of mind and consciousness in terms of their ability to directly or indirectly modify behaviour, but there are versions of materialism that try to tie the mental to the physical without explicitly explaining the mental in terms of its behaviour-modifying role. The latter are often grouped together under the label ‘non-reductive physicalism’, though this label is itself rendered elusive because of the controversial nature of the term ‘reduction’.

 

Idealist views say that physical states are really mental. This is because the physical world is an empirical world and, as such, it is the intersubjective product of our collective experience.

 

Dualist views (the subject of this entry) say that the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other. For the various forms that dualism can take and the associated problems, see below.

 

In sum, we can say that there is a mind-body problem because both consciousness and thought, broadly construed, seem very different from anything physical and there is no convincing consensus on how to build a satisfactorily unified picture of creatures possessed of both a mind and a body.

 

Other entries which concern aspects of the mind-body problem include (among many others): behaviorism, consciousness, eliminative materialism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, identity theory, intentionality, mental causation, neutral monism, and physicalism.

 

1.2 History of dualism

In dualism, ‘mind’ is contrasted with ‘body’, but at different times, different aspects of the mind have been the centre of attention. In the classical and mediaeval periods, it was the intellect that was thought to be most obviously resistant to a materialistic account: from Descartes on, the main stumbling block to materialist monism was supposed to be ‘consciousness’, of which phenomenal consciousness or sensation came to be considered as the paradigm instance.

 

The classical emphasis originates in Plato’s Phaedo. Plato believed that the true substances are not physical bodies, which are ephemeral, but the eternal Forms of which bodies are imperfect copies. These Forms not only make the world possible, they also make it intelligible, because they perform the role of universals, or what Frege called ‘concepts’. It is their connection with intelligibility that is relevant to the philosophy of mind. Because Forms are the grounds of intelligibility, they are what the intellect must grasp in the process of understanding. In Phaedo Plato presents a variety of arguments for the immortality of the soul, but the one that is relevant for our purposes is that the intellect is immaterial because Forms are immaterial and intellect must have an affinity with the Forms it apprehends (78b4–84b8). This affinity is so strong that the soul strives to leave the body in which it is imprisoned and to dwell in the realm of Forms. It may take many reincarnations before this is achieved. Plato’s dualism is not, therefore, simply a doctrine in the philosophy of mind, but an integral part of his whole metaphysics.

 

One problem with Plato’s dualism was that, though he speaks of the soul as imprisoned in the body, there is no clear account of what binds a particular soul to a particular body. Their difference in nature makes the union a mystery.

 

Aristotle did not believe in Platonic Forms, existing independently of their instances. Aristotelian forms (the capital ‘F’ has disappeared with their standing as autonomous entities) are the natures and properties of things and exist embodied in those things. This enabled Aristotle to explain the union of body and soul by saying that the soul is the form of the body. This means that a particular person’s soul is no more than his nature as a human being. Because this seems to make the soul into a property of the body, it led many interpreters, both ancient and modern, to interpret his theory as materialistic. The interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind – and, indeed, of his whole doctrine of form – remains as live an issue today as it was immediately after his death (Robinson 1983 and 1991; Nussbaum 1984; Rorty and Nussbaum, eds, 1992). Nevertheless, the text makes it clear that Aristotle believed that the intellect, though part of the soul, differs from other faculties in not having a bodily organ. His argument for this constitutes a more tightly argued case than Plato’s for the immateriality of thought and, hence, for a kind of dualism. He argued that the intellect must be immaterial because if it were material it could not receive all forms. Just as the eye, because of its particular physical nature, is sensitive to light but not to sound, and the ear to sound and not to light, so, if the intellect were in a physical organ it could be sensitive only to a restricted range of physical things; but this is not the case, for we can think about any kind of material object (De Anima III,4; 429a10–b9). As it does not have a material organ, its activity must be essentially immaterial.

 

It is common for modern Aristotelians, who otherwise have a high view of Aristotle’s relevance to modern philosophy, to treat this argument as being of purely historical interest, and not essential to Aristotle’s system as a whole. They emphasize that he was not a ‘Cartesian’ dualist, because the intellect is an aspect of the soul and the soul is the form of the body, not a separate substance. Kenny (1989) argues that Aristotle’s theory of mind as form gives him an account similar to Ryle (1949), for it makes the soul equivalent to the dispositions possessed by a living body. This ‘anti-Cartesian’ approach to Aristotle arguably ignores the fact that, for Aristotle, the form is the substance.

 

These issues might seem to be of purely historical interest. But we shall see in below, in section 4.5, that this is not so.

 

The identification of form and substance is a feature of Aristotle’s system that Aquinas effectively exploits in this context, identifying soul, intellect and form, and treating them as a substance. (See, for example, Aquinas (1912), Part I, questions 75 and 76.) But though the form (and, hence, the intellect with which it is identical) are the substance of the human person, they are not the person itself. Aquinas says that when one addresses prayers to a saint – other than the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is believed to retain her body in heaven and is, therefore, always a complete person – one should say, not, for example, ‘Saint Peter pray for us’, but ‘soul of Saint Peter pray for us’. The soul, though an immaterial substance, is the person only when united with its body. Without the body, those aspects of its personal memory that depend on images (which are held to be corporeal) will be lost.(See Aquinas (1912), Part I, question 89.)

 

The more modern versions of dualism have their origin in Descartes’ Meditations, and in the debate that was consequent upon Descartes’ theory. Descartes was a substance dualist. He believed that there were two kinds of substance: matter, of which the essential property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it thinks. Descartes’ conception of the relation between mind and body was quite different from that held in the Aristotelian tradition. For Aristotle, there is no exact science of matter. How matter behaves is essentially affected by the form that is in it. You cannot combine just any matter with any form – you cannot make a knife out of butter, nor a human being out of paper – so the nature of the matter is a necessary condition for the nature of the substance. But the nature of the substance does not follow from the nature of its matter alone: there is no ‘bottom up’ account of substances. Matter is a determinable made determinate by form. This was how Aristotle thought that he was able to explain the connection of soul to body: a particular soul exists as the organizing principle in a particular parcel of matter.

 

The belief in the relative indeterminacy of matter is one reason for Aristotle’s rejection of atomism. If matter is atomic, then it is already a collection of determinate objects in its own right, and it becomes natural to regard the properties of macroscopic substances as mere summations of the natures of the atoms.

 

Although, unlike most of his fashionable contemporaries and immediate successors, Descartes was not an atomist, he was, like the others, a mechanist about the properties of matter. Bodies are machines that work according to their own laws. Except where there are minds interfering with it, matter proceeds deterministically, in its own right. Where there are minds requiring to influence bodies, they must work by ‘pulling levers’ in a piece of machinery that already has its own laws of operation. This raises the question of where those ‘levers’ are in the body. Descartes opted for the pineal gland, mainly because it is not duplicated on both sides of the brain, so it is a candidate for having a unique, unifying function.

 

The main uncertainty that faced Descartes and his contemporaries, however, was not where interaction took place, but how two things so different as thought and extension could interact at all. This would be particularly mysterious if one had an impact view of causal interaction, as would anyone influenced by atomism, for whom the paradigm of causation is like two billiard balls cannoning off one another.

 

Various of Descartes’ disciples, such as Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche, concluded that all mind-body interactions required the direct intervention of God. The appropriate states of mind and body were only the occasions for such intervention, not real causes. Now it would be convenient to think that occasionalists held that all causation was natural except for that between mind and body. In fact they generalized their conclusion and treated all causation as directly dependent on God. Why this was so, we cannot discuss here.

 

Descartes’ conception of a dualism of substances came under attack from the more radical empiricists, who found it difficult to attach sense to the concept of substance at all. Locke, as a moderate empiricist, accepted that there were both material and immaterial substances. Berkeley famously rejected material substance, because he rejected all existence outside the mind. In his early Notebooks, he toyed with the idea of rejecting immaterial substance, because we could have no idea of it, and reducing the self to a collection of the ‘ideas’ that constituted its contents. Finally, he decided that the self, conceived as something over and above the ideas of which it was aware, was essential for an adequate understanding of the human person. Although the self and its acts are not presented to consciousness as objects of awareness, we are obliquely aware of them simply by dint of being active subjects. Hume rejected such claims, and proclaimed the self to be nothing more than a concatenation of its ephemeral contents.

 

In fact, Hume criticised the whole conception of substance for lacking in empirical content: when you search for the owner of the properties that make up a substance, you find nothing but further properties. Consequently, the mind is, he claimed, nothing but a ‘bundle’ or ‘heap’ of impressions and ideas – that is, of particular mental states or events, without an owner. This position has been labelled bundle dualism, and it is a special case of a general bundle theory of substance, according to which objects in general are just organised collections of properties. The problem for the Humean is to explain what binds the elements in the bundle together. This is an issue for any kind of substance, but for material bodies the solution seems fairly straightforward: the unity of a physical bundle is constituted by some form of causal interaction between the elements in the bundle. For the mind, mere causal connection is not enough; some further relation of co-consciousness is required. We shall see in 5.2.1 that it is problematic whether one can treat such a relation as more primitive than the notion of belonging to a subject.

 

One should note the following about Hume’s theory. His bundle theory is a theory about the nature of the unity of the mind. As a theory about this unity, it is not necessarily dualist. Parfit (1970, 1984) and Shoemaker (1984, ch. 2), for example, accept it as physicalists. In general, physicalists will accept it unless they wish to ascribe the unity to the brain or the organism as a whole. Before the bundle theory can be dualist one must accept property dualism, for more about which, see the next section.

 

A crisis in the history of dualism came, however, with the growing popularity of mechanism in science in the nineteenth century. According to the mechanist, the world is, as it would now be expressed, ‘closed under physics’. This means that everything that happens follows from and is in accord with the laws of physics. There is, therefore, no scope for interference in the physical world by the mind in the way that interactionism seems to require. According to the mechanist, the conscious mind is an epiphenomenon (a notion given general currency by T. H. Huxley 1893): that is, it is a by-product of the physical system which has no influence back on it. In this way, the facts of consciousness are acknowledged but the integrity of physical science is preserved. However, many philosophers found it implausible to claim such things as the following; the pain that I have when you hit me, the visual sensations I have when I see the ferocious lion bearing down on me or the conscious sense of understanding I have when I hear your argument – all have nothing directly to do with the way I respond. It is very largely due to the need to avoid this counterintuitiveness that we owe the concern of twentieth century philosophy to devise a plausible form of materialist monism. But, although dualism has been out of fashion in psychology since the advent of behaviourism (Watson 1913) and in philosophy since Ryle (1949), the argument is by no means over. Some distinguished neurologists, such as Sherrington (1940) and Eccles (Popper and Eccles 1977) have continued to defend dualism as the only theory that can preserve the data of consciousness. Amongst mainstream philosophers, discontent with physicalism led to a modest revival of property dualism in the last decade of the twentieth century. At least some of the reasons for this should become clear below.

 

2. Varieties of Dualism: Ontology

There are various ways of dividing up kinds of dualism. One natural way is in terms of what sorts of things one chooses to be dualistic about. The most common categories lighted upon for these purposes are substance and property, giving one substance dualism and property dualism. There is, however, an important third category, namely predicate dualism. As this last is the weakest theory, in the sense that it claims least, I shall begin by characterizing it.

 

2.1 Predicate dualism

Predicate dualism is the theory that psychological or mentalistic predicates are (a) essential for a full description of the world and (b) are not reducible to physicalistic predicates. For a mental predicate to be reducible, there would be bridging laws connecting types of psychological states to types of physical ones in such a way that the use of the mental predicate carried no information that could not be expressed without it. An example of what we believe to be a true type reduction outside psychology is the case of water, where water is always H2O: something is water if and only if it is H2O. If one were to replace the word ‘water’ by ‘H2O’, it is plausible to say that one could convey all the same information. But the terms in many of the special sciences (that is, any science except physics itself) are not reducible in this way. Not every hurricane or every infectious disease, let alone every devaluation of the currency or every coup d’etat has the same constitutive structure. These states are defined more by what they do than by their composition or structure. Their names are classified as functional terms rather than natural kind terms. It goes with this that such kinds of state are multiply realizable; that is, they may be constituted by different kinds of physical structures under different circumstances. Because of this, unlike in the case of water and H2O, one could not replace these terms by some more basic physical description and still convey the same information. There is no particular description, using the language of physics or chemistry, that would do the work of the word ‘hurricane’, in the way that ‘H2O’ would do the work of ‘water’. It is widely agreed that many, if not all, psychological states are similarly irreducible, and so psychological predicates are not reducible to physical descriptions and one has predicate dualism. (The classic source for irreducibility in the special sciences in general is Fodor (1974), and for irreducibility in the philosophy of mind, Davidson (1971).)

 

2.2 Property Dualism

Whereas predicate dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of predicates in our language, property dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of property out in the world. Property dualism can be seen as a step stronger than predicate dualism. Although the predicate ‘hurricane’ is not equivalent to any single description using the language of physics, we believe that each individual hurricane is nothing but a collection of physical atoms behaving in a certain way: one need have no more than the physical atoms, with their normal physical properties, following normal physical laws, for there to be a hurricane. One might say that we need more than the language of physics to describe and explain the weather, but we do not need more than its ontology. There is token identity between each individual hurricane and a mass of atoms, even if there is no type identity between hurricanes as kinds and some particular structure of atoms as a kind. Genuine property dualism occurs when, even at the individual level, the ontology of physics is not sufficient to constitute what is there. The irreducible language is not just another way of describing what there is, it requires that there be something more there than was allowed for in the initial ontology. Until the early part of the twentieth century, it was common to think that biological phenomena (‘life’) required property dualism (an irreducible ‘vital force’), but nowadays the special physical sciences other than psychology are generally thought to involve only predicate dualism. In the case of mind, property dualism is defended by those who argue that the qualitative nature of consciousness is not merely another way of categorizing states of the brain or of behaviour, but a genuinely emergent phenomenon.

 

2.3 Substance Dualism

There are two important concepts deployed in this notion. One is that of substance, the other is the dualism of these substances. A substance is characterized by its properties, but, according to those who believe in substances, it is more than the collection of the properties it possesses, it is the thing which possesses them. So the mind is not just a collection of thoughts, but is that which thinks, an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial states. Properties are the properties of objects. If one is a property dualist, one may wonder what kinds of objects possess the irreducible or immaterial properties in which one believes. One can use a neutral expression and attribute them to persons, but, until one has an account of person, this is not explanatory. One might attribute them to human beings qua animals, or to the brains of these animals. Then one will be holding that these immaterial properties are possessed by what is otherwise a purely material thing. But one may also think that not only mental states are immaterial, but that the subject that possesses them must also be immaterial. Then one will be a dualist about that to which mental states and properties belong as well about the properties themselves. Now one might try to think of these subjects as just bundles of the immaterial states. This is Hume’s view. But if one thinks that the owner of these states is something quite over and above the states themselves, and is immaterial, as they are, one will be a substance dualist.

 

Substance dualism is also often dubbed ‘Cartesian dualism’, but some substance dualists are keen to distinguish their theories from Descartes’s. E. J. Lowe, for example, is a substance dualist, in the following sense. He holds that a normal human being involves two substances, one a body and the other a person. The latter is not, however, a purely mental substance that can be defined in terms of thought or consciousness alone, as Descartes claimed. But persons and their bodies have different identity conditions and are both substances, so there are two substances essentially involved in a human being, hence this is a form of substance dualism. Lowe (2006) claims that his theory is close to P. F. Strawson’s (1959), whilst admitting that Strawson would not have called it substance dualism.

 

3. Varieties of Dualism: Interaction

If mind and body are different realms, in the way required by either property or substance dualism, then there arises the question of how they are related. Common sense tells us that they interact: thoughts and feelings are at least sometimes caused by bodily events and at least sometimes themselves give rise to bodily responses. I shall now consider briefly the problems for interactionism, and its main rivals, epiphenomenalism and parallelism.

 

3.1 Interactionism

Interactionism is the view that mind and body – or mental events and physical events – causally influence each other. That this is so is one of our common-sense beliefs, because it appears to be a feature of everyday experience. The physical world influences my experience through my senses, and I often react behaviourally to those experiences. My thinking, too, influences my speech and my actions. There is, therefore, a massive natural prejudice in favour of interactionism. It has been claimed, however, that it faces serious problems (some of which were anticipated in section 1).

 

The simplest objection to interaction is that, in so far as mental properties, states or substances are of radically different kinds from each other, they lack that communality necessary for interaction. It is generally agreed that, in its most naive form, this objection to interactionism rests on a ‘billiard ball’ picture of causation: if all causation is by impact, how can the material and the immaterial impact upon each other? But if causation is either by a more ethereal force or energy or only a matter of constant conjunction, there would appear to be no problem in principle with the idea of interaction of mind and body.

 

Even if there is no objection in principle, there appears to be a conflict between interactionism and some basic principles of physical science. For example, if causal power was flowing in and out of the physical system, energy would not be conserved, and the conservation of energy is a fundamental scientific law. Various responses have been made to this. One suggestion is that it might be possible for mind to influence the distribution of energy, without altering its quantity. (See Averill and Keating 1981). Another response is to challenge the relevance of the conservation principle in this context. The conservation principle states that ‘in a causally isolated system the total amount of energy will remain constant’. Whereas ‘[t]he interactionist denies…that the human body is an isolated system’, so the principle is irrelevant (Larmer (1986), 282: this article presents a good brief survey of the options). This approach has been termed conditionality, namely the view that conservation is conditional on the physical system being closed, that is, that nothing non-physical is interacting or interfering with it, and, of course, the interactionist claims that this condition is, trivially, not met. That conditionality is the best line for the dualist to take, and that other approaches do not work, is defended in Pitts (2019) and Cucu and Pitts (2019). This, they claim, makes the plausibility of interactionism an empirical matter which only close investigation on the fine operation of the brain could hope to settle. Cucu, in a separate article (2018), claims to find critical neuronal events which do not have sufficient physical explanation.This claim clearly needs further investigation.

 

Robins Collins (2011) has claimed that the appeal to conservation by opponents of interactionism is something of a red herring because conservation principles are not ubiquitous in physics. He argues that energy is not conserved in general relativity, in quantum theory, or in the universe taken as a whole. Why then, should we insist on it in mind-brain interaction?

 

Most discussion of interactionism takes place in the context of the assumption that it is incompatible with the world’s being ‘closed under physics’. This is a very natural assumption, but it is not justified if causal overdetermination of behaviour is possible. There could then be a complete physical cause of behaviour, and a mental one. The strongest intuitive objection against overdetermination is clearly stated by Mills (1996: 112), who is himself a defender of overdetermination.

 

For X to be a cause of Y, X must contribute something to Y. The only way a purely mental event could contribute to a purely physical one would be to contribute some feature not already determined by a purely physical event. But if physical closure is true, there is no feature of the purely physical effect that is not contributed by the purely physical cause. Hence interactionism violates physical closure after all.

 

Mills says that this argument is invalid, because a physical event can have features not explained by the event which is its sufficient cause. For example, “the rock’s hitting the window is causally sufficient for the window’s breaking, and the window’s breaking has the feature of being the third window-breaking in the house this year; but the facts about prior window-breakings, rather than the rock’s hitting the window, are what cause this window-breaking to have this feature.”

 

The opponent of overdetermination could perhaps reply that his principle applies, not to every feature of events, but to a subgroup – say, intrinsic features, not merely relational or comparative ones. It is this kind of feature that the mental event would have to cause, but physical closure leaves no room for this. These matters are still controversial.

 

The problem with closure of physics may be radically altered if physical laws are indeterministic, as quantum theory seems to assert. If physical laws are deterministic, then any interference from outside would lead to a breach of those laws. But if they are indeterministic, might not interference produce a result that has a probability greater than zero, and so be consistent with the laws? This way, one might have interaction yet preserve a kind of nomological closure, in the sense that no laws are infringed. Because it involves assessing the significance and consequences of quantum theory, this is a difficult matter for the non-physicist to assess. Some argue that indeterminacy manifests itself only on the subatomic level, being cancelled out by the time one reaches even very tiny macroscopic objects: and human behaviour is a macroscopic phenomenon. Others argue that the structure of the brain is so finely tuned that minute variations could have macroscopic effects, rather in the way that, according to ‘chaos theory’, the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in China might affect the weather in New York. (For discussion of this, see Eccles (1980), (1987), and Popper and Eccles (1977).) Still others argue that quantum indeterminacy manifests itself directly at a high level, when acts of observation collapse the wave function, suggesting that the mind may play a direct role in affecting the state of the world (Hodgson 1988; Stapp 1993).

 

3.2 Epiphenomenalism

If the reality of property dualism is not to be denied, but the problem of how the immaterial is to affect the material is to be avoided, then epiphenomenalism may seem to be the answer. According to this theory, mental events are caused by physical events, but have no causal influence on the physical. I have introduced this theory as if its point were to avoid the problem of how two different categories of thing might interact. In fact, it is, at best, an incomplete solution to this problem. If it is mysterious how the non-physical can have it in its nature to influence the physical, it ought to be equally mysterious how the physical can have it in its nature to produce something non-physical. But that this latter is what occurs is an essential claim of epiphenomenalism. (For development of this point, see Green (2003), 149–51). In fact, epiphenomenalism is more effective as a way of saving the autonomy of the physical (the world as ‘closed under physics’) than as a contribution to avoiding the need for the physical and non-physical to have causal commerce.

 

There are at least three serious problems for epiphenomenalism. First, as I indicated in section 1, it is profoundly counterintuitive. What could be more apparent than that it is the pain that I feel that makes me cry, or the visual experience of the boulder rolling towards me that makes me run away? At least one can say that epiphenomenalism is a fall-back position: it tends to be adopted because other options are held to be unacceptable.

 

The second problem is that, if mental states do nothing, there is no reason why they should have evolved. This objection ties in with the first: the intuition there was that conscious states clearly modify our behaviour in certain ways, such as avoiding danger, and it is plain that they are very useful from an evolutionary perspective.

 

Frank Jackson (1982) replies to this objection by saying that it is the brain state associated with pain that evolves for this reason: the sensation is a by-product. Evolution is full of useless or even harmful by-products. For example, polar bears have evolved thick coats to keep them warm, even though this has the damaging side effect that they are heavy to carry. Jackson’s point is true in general, but does not seem to apply very happily to the case of mind. The heaviness of the polar bear’s coat follows directly from those properties and laws which make it warm: one could not, in any simple way, have one without the other. But with mental states, dualistically conceived, the situation is quite the opposite. The laws of physical nature which, the mechanist says, make brain states cause behaviour, in no way explain why brain states should give rise to conscious ones. The laws linking mind and brain are what Feigl (1958) calls nomological danglers, that is, brute facts added onto the body of integrated physical law. Why there should have been by-products of that kind seems to have no evolutionary explanation.

 

The third problem concerns the rationality of belief in epiphenomenalism, via its effect on the problem of other minds. It is natural to say that I know that I have mental states because I experience them directly. But how can I justify my belief that others have them? The simple version of the ‘argument from analogy’ says that I can extrapolate from my own case. I know that certain of my mental states are correlated with certain pieces of behaviour, and so I infer that similar behaviour in others is also accompanied by similar mental states. Many hold that this is a weak argument because it is induction from one instance, namely, my own. The argument is stronger if it is not a simple induction but an ‘argument to the best explanation’. I seem to know from my own case that mental events can be the explanation of behaviour, and I know of no other candidate explanation for typical human behaviour, so I postulate the same explanation for the behaviour of others. But if epiphenomenalism is true, my mental states do not explain my behaviour and there is a physical explanation for the behaviour of others. It is explanatorily redundant to postulate such states for others. I know, by introspection, that I have them, but is it not just as likely that I alone am subject to this quirk of nature, rather than that everyone is?

 

For more detailed treatment and further reading on this topic, see the entry epiphenomenalism.

3.3 Parallelism

The epiphenomenalist wishes to preserve the integrity of physical science and the physical world, and appends those mental features that he cannot reduce. The parallelist preserves both realms intact, but denies all causal interaction between them. They run in harmony with each other, but not because their mutual influence keeps each other in line. That they should behave as if they were interacting would seem to be a bizarre coincidence. This is why parallelism has tended to be adopted only by those – like Leibniz – who believe in a pre-established harmony, set in place by God. The progression of thought can be seen as follows. Descartes believes in a more or less natural form of interaction between immaterial mind and material body. Malebranche thought that this was impossible naturally, and so required God to intervene specifically on each occasion on which interaction was required. Leibniz decided that God might as well set things up so that they always behaved as if they were interacting, without particular intervention being required. Outside such a theistic framework, the theory is incredible. Even within such a framework, one might well sympathise with Berkeley’s instinct that once genuine interaction is ruled out one is best advised to allow that God creates the physical world directly, within the mental realm itself, as a construct out of experience.

 

4. Arguments for Dualism

4.1 The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism

One category of arguments for dualism is constituted by the standard objections against physicalism. Prime examples are those based on the existence of qualia, the most important of which is the so-called ‘knowledge argument’. Because this argument has its own entry (see the entry qualia: the knowledge argument), I shall deal relatively briefly with it here. One should bear in mind, however, that all arguments against physicalism are also arguments for the irreducible and hence immaterial nature of the mind and, given the existence of the material world, are thus arguments for dualism.

 

The knowledge argument asks us to imagine a future scientist who has lacked a certain sensory modality from birth, but who has acquired a perfect scientific understanding of how this modality operates in others. This scientist – call him Harpo – may have been born stone deaf, but become the world’s greatest expert on the machinery of hearing: he knows everything that there is to know within the range of the physical and behavioural sciences about hearing. Suppose that Harpo, thanks to developments in neurosurgery, has an operation which finally enables him to hear. It is suggested that he will then learn something he did not know before, which can be expressed as what it is like to hear, or the qualitative or phenomenal nature of sound. These qualitative features of experience are generally referred to as qualia. If Harpo learns something new, he did not know everything before. He knew all the physical facts before. So what he learns on coming to hear – the facts about the nature of experience or the nature of qualia – are non-physical. This establishes at least a state or property dualism. (See Jackson 1982; Robinson 1982.)

 

There are at least two lines of response to this popular but controversial argument. First is the ‘ability’ response. According to this, Harpo does not acquire any new factual knowledge, only ‘knowledge how’, in the form of the ability to respond directly to sounds, which he could not do before. This essentially behaviouristic account is exactly what the intuition behind the argument is meant to overthrow. Putting ourselves in Harpo’s position, it is meant to be obvious that what he acquires is knowledge of what something is like, not just how to do something. Such appeals to intuition are always, of course, open to denial by those who claim not to share the intuition. Some ability theorists seem to blur the distinction between knowing what something is like and knowing how to do something, by saying that the ability Harpo acquires is to imagine or remember the nature of sound. In this case, what he acquires the ability to do involves the representation to himself of what the thing is like. But this conception of representing to oneself, especially in the form of imagination, seems sufficiently close to producing in oneself something very like a sensory experience that it only defers the problem: until one has a physicalist gloss on what constitutes such representations as those involved in conscious memory and imagination, no progress has been made.

 

The other line of response is to argue that, although Harpo’s new knowledge is factual, it is not knowledge of a new fact. Rather, it is new way of grasping something that he already knew. He does not realise this, because the concepts employed to capture experience (such as ‘looks red’ or ‘sounds C-sharp’) are similar to demonstratives, and demonstrative concepts lack the kind of descriptive content that allow one to infer what they express from other pieces of information that one may already possess. A total scientific knowledge of the world would not enable you to say which time was ‘now’ or which place was ‘here’. Demonstrative concepts pick something out without saying anything extra about it. Similarly, the scientific knowledge that Harpo originally possessed did not enable him to anticipate what it would be like to re-express some parts of that knowledge using the demonstrative concepts that only experience can give one. The knowledge, therefore, appears to be genuinely new, whereas only the mode of conceiving it is novel.

 

Proponents of the epistemic argument respond that it is problematic to maintain both that the qualitative nature of experience can be genuinely novel, and that the quality itself be the same as some property already grasped scientifically: does not the experience’s phenomenal nature, which the demonstrative concepts capture, constitute a property in its own right? Another way to put this is to say that phenomenal concepts are not pure demonstratives, like ‘here’ and ‘now’, or ‘this’ and ‘that’, because they do capture a genuine qualitative content. Furthermore, experiencing does not seem to consist simply in exercising a particular kind of concept, demonstrative or not. When Harpo has his new form of experience, he does not simply exercise a new concept; he also grasps something new – the phenomenal quality – with that concept. How decisive these considerations are, remains controversial.

 

4.2 The Argument from Predicate Dualism to Property Dualism

I said above that predicate dualism might seem to have no ontological consequences, because it is concerned only with the different way things can be described within the contexts of the different sciences, not with any real difference in the things themselves. This, however, can be disputed.

 

The argument from predicate to property dualism moves in two steps, both controversial. The first claims that the irreducible special sciences, which are the sources of irreducible predicates, are not wholly objective in the way that physics is, but depend for their subject matter upon interest-relative perspectives on the world. This means that they, and the predicates special to them, depend on the existence of minds and mental states, for only minds have interest-relative perspectives. The second claim is that psychology – the science of the mental – is itself an irreducible special science, and so it, too, presupposes the existence of the mental. Mental predicates therefore presuppose the mentality that creates them: mentality cannot consist simply in the applicability of the predicates themselves.

 

First, let us consider the claim that the special sciences are not fully objective, but are interest-relative.

 

No-one would deny, of course, that the very same subject matter or ‘hunk of reality’ can be described in irreducibly different ways and it still be just that subject matter or piece of reality. A mass of matter could be characterized as a hurricane, or as a collection of chemical elements, or as mass of sub-atomic particles, and there be only the one mass of matter. But such different explanatory frameworks seem to presuppose different perspectives on that subject matter.

 

This is where basic physics, and perhaps those sciences reducible to basic physics, differ from irreducible special sciences. On a realist construal, the completed physics cuts physical reality up at its ultimate joints: any special science which is nomically strictly reducible to physics also, in virtue of this reduction, it could be argued, cuts reality at its joints, but not at its minutest ones. If scientific realism is true, a completed physics will tell one how the world is, independently of any special interest or concern: it is just how the world is. It would seem that, by contrast, a science which is not nomically reducible to physics does not take its legitimation from the underlying reality in this direct way. Rather, such a science is formed from the collaboration between, on the one hand, objective similarities in the world and, on the other, perspectives and interests of those who devise the science. The concept of hurricane is brought to bear from the perspective of creatures concerned about the weather. Creatures totally indifferent to the weather would have no reason to take the real patterns of phenomena that hurricanes share as constituting a single kind of thing. With the irreducible special sciences, there is an issue of salience , which involves a subjective component: a selection of phenomena with a certain teleology in mind is required before their structures or patterns are reified. The entities of metereology or biology are, in this respect, rather like Gestalt phenomena.

 

Even accepting this, why might it be thought that the perspectivality of the special sciences leads to a genuine property dualism in the philosophy of mind? It might seem to do so for the following reason. Having a perspective on the world, perceptual or intellectual, is a psychological state. So the irreducible special sciences presuppose the existence of mind. If one is to avoid an ontological dualism, the mind that has this perspective must be part of the physical reality on which it has its perspective. But psychology, it seems to be almost universally agreed, is one of those special sciences that is not reducible to physics, so if its subject matter is to be physical, it itself presupposes a perspective and, hence, the existence of a mind to see matter as psychological. If this mind is physical and irreducible, it presupposes mind to see it as such. We seem to be in a vicious circle or regress.

 

We can now understand the motivation for full-blown reduction. A true basic physics represents the world as it is in itself, and if the special sciences were reducible, then the existence of their ontologies would make sense as expressions of the physical, not just as ways of seeing or interpreting it. They could be understood ‘from the bottom up’, not from top down. The irreducibility of the special sciences creates no problem for the dualist, who sees the explanatory endeavor of the physical sciences as something carried on from a perspective conceptually outside of the physical world. Nor need this worry a physicalist, if he can reduce psychology, for then he could understand ‘from the bottom up’ the acts (with their internal, intentional contents) which created the irreducible ontologies of the other sciences. But psychology is one of the least likely of sciences to be reduced. If psychology cannot be reduced, this line of reasoning leads to real emergence for mental acts and hence to a real dualism for the properties those acts instantiate (Robinson 2003).

 

4.3 The Modal Argument

There is an argument, which has roots in Descartes (Meditation VI), which is a modal argument for dualism. One might put it as follows:

 

It is imaginable that one’s mind might exist without one’s body.

therefore

 

It is conceivable that one’s mind might exist without one’s body.

therefore

 

It is possible one’s mind might exist without one’s body.

therefore

 

One’s mind is a different entity from one’s body.

The rationale of the argument is a move from imaginability to real possibility. I include (2) because the notion of conceivability has one foot in the psychological camp, like imaginability, and one in the camp of pure logical possibility and therefore helps in the transition from one to the other.

 

This argument should be distinguished from a similar ‘conceivability’ argument, often known as the ‘zombie hypothesis’, which claims the imaginability and possibility of my body (or, in some forms, a body physically just like it) existing without there being any conscious states associated with it. (See, for example, Chalmers (1996), 94–9.) This latter argument, if sound, would show that conscious states were something over and above physical states. It is a different argument because the hypothesis that the unaltered body could exist without the mind is not the same as the suggestion that the mind might continue to exist without the body, nor are they trivially equivalent. The zombie argument establishes only property dualism and a property dualist might think disembodied existence inconceivable – for example, if he thought the identity of a mind through time depended on its relation to a body (e.g., Penelhum 1970).

 

Before Kripke (1972/80), the first challenge to such an argument would have concerned the move from (3) to (4). When philosophers generally believed in contingent identity, that move seemed to them invalid. But nowadays that inference is generally accepted and the issue concerns the relation between imaginability and possibility. No-one would nowadays identify the two (except, perhaps, for certain quasi-realists and anti-realists), but the view that imaginability is a solid test for possibility has been strongly defended. W. D. Hart ((1994), 266), for example, argues that no clear example has been produced such that “one can imagine that p (and tell less imaginative folk a story that enables them to imagine that p) plus a good argument that it is impossible that p. No such counterexamples have been forthcoming…” This claim is at least contentious. There seem to be good arguments that time-travel is incoherent, but every episode of Star-Trek or Doctor Who shows how one can imagine what it might be like were it possible.

 

It is worth relating the appeal to possibility in this argument to that involved in the more modest, anti-physicalist, zombie argument. The possibility of this hypothesis is also challenged, but all that is necessary for a zombie to be possible is that all and only the things that the physical sciences say about the body be true of such a creature. As the concepts involved in such sciences – e.g., neuron, cell, muscle – seem to make no reference, explicit or implicit, to their association with consciousness, and are defined in purely physical terms in the relevant science texts, there is a very powerful prima facie case for thinking that something could meet the condition of being just like them and lack any connection with consciousness. There is no parallel clear, uncontroversial and regimented account of mental concepts as a whole that fails to invoke, explicitly or implicitly, physical (e.g., behavioural) states.

 

For an analytical behaviourist the appeal to imaginability made in the argument fails, not because imagination is not a reliable guide to possibility, but because we cannot imagine such a thing, as it is a priori impossible. The impossibility of disembodiment is rather like that of time travel, because it is demonstrable a priori, though only by arguments that are controversial. The argument can only get under way for those philosophers who accept that the issue cannot be settled a priori, so the possibility of the disembodiment that we can imagine is still prima facie open.

 

A major rationale of those who think that imagination is not a safe indication of possibility, even when such possibility is not eliminable a priori, is that we can imagine that a posteriori necessities might be false – for example, that Hesperus might not be identical to Phosphorus. But if Kripke is correct, that is not a real possibility. Another way of putting this point is that there are many epistemic possibilities which are imaginable because they are epistemic possibilities, but which are not real possibilities. Richard Swinburne (1997, New Appendix C), whilst accepting this argument in general, has interesting reasons for thinking that it cannot apply in the mind-body case. He argues that in cases that involve a posteriori necessities, such as those identities that need discovering, it is because we identify those entities only by their ‘stereotypes’ (that is, by their superficial features observable by the layman) that we can be wrong about their essences. In the case of our experience of ourselves this is not true.

 

Now it is true that the essence of Hesperus cannot be discovered by a mere thought experiment. That is because what makes Hesperus Hesperus is not the stereotype, but what underlies it. But it does not follow that no one can ever have access to the essence of a substance, but must always rely for identification on a fallible stereotype. One might think that for the person him or herself, while what makes that person that person underlies what is observable to others, it does not underlie what is experienceable by that person, but is given directly in their own self-awareness.

 

This is a very appealing Cartesian intuition: my identity as the thinking thing that I am is revealed to me in consciousness, it is not something beyond the veil of consciousness. Now it could be replied to this that though I do access myself as a conscious subject, so classifying myself is rather like considering myself qua cyclist. Just as I might never have been a cyclist, I might never have been conscious, if things had gone wrong in my very early life. I am the organism, the animal, which might not have developed to the point of consciousness, and that essence as animal is not revealed to me just by introspection.

 

But there are vital differences between these cases. A cyclist is explicitly presented as a human being (or creature of some other animal species) cycling: there is no temptation to think of a cyclist as a basic kind of thing in its own right. Consciousness is not presented as a property of something, but as the subject itself. Swinburne’s claim that when we refer to ourselves we are referring to something we think we are directly aware of and not to ‘something we know not what’ that underlies our experience seemingly ‘of ourselves’ has powerful intuitive appeal and could only be overthrown by very forceful arguments. Yet, even if we are not referring primarily to a substrate, but to what is revealed in consciousness, could it not still be the case that there is a necessity stronger than causal connecting this consciousness to something physical? To consider this further we must investigate what the limits are of the possible analogy between cases of the water-H2O kind, and the mind-body relation.

 

We start from the analogy between the water stereotype – how water presents itself – and how consciousness is given first-personally to the subject. It is plausible to claim that something like water could exist without being H2O, but hardly that it could exist without some underlying nature. There is, however, no reason to deny that this underlying nature could be homogenous with its manifest nature: that is, it would seem to be possible that there is a world in which the water-like stuff is an element, as the ancients thought, and is water-like all the way down. The claim of the proponents of the dualist argument is that this latter kind of situation can be known to be true a priori in the case of the mind: that is, one can tell by introspection that it is not more-than-causally dependent on something of a radically different nature, such as a brain or body. What grounds might one have for thinking that one could tell that a priori?

 

The only general argument that seem to be available for this would be the principle that, for any two levels of discourse, A and B, they are more-than-causally connected only if one entails the other a priori. And the argument for accepting this principle would be that the relatively uncontroversial cases of a posteriori necessary connections are in fact cases in which one can argue a priori from facts about the microstructure to the manifest facts. In the case of water, for example, it would be claimed that it follows a priori that if there were something with the properties attributed to H2O by chemistry on a micro level, then that thing would possess waterish properties on a macro level. What is established a posteriori is that it is in fact H2O that underlies and explains the waterish properties round here, not something else: the sufficiency of the base – were it to obtain – to explain the phenomena, can be deduced a priori from the supposed nature of the base. This is, in effect, the argument that Chalmers uses to defend the zombie hypothesis. The suggestion is that the whole category of a posteriori more-than-causally necessary connections (often identified as a separate category of metaphysical necessity) comes to no more than this. If we accept that this is the correct account of a posteriori necessities, and also deny the analytically reductionist theories that would be necessary for a priori connections between mind and body, as conceived, for example, by the behaviourist or the functionalist, does it follow that we can tell a priori that consciousness is not more-than-causally dependent on the body?

 

It is helpful in considering this question to employ a distinction like Berkeley’s between ideas and notions. Ideas are the objects of our mental acts, and they capture transparently – ‘by way of image or likeness’ (Principles, sect. 27) – that of which they are the ideas. The self and its faculties are not the objects of our mental acts, but are captured only obliquely in the performance of its acts, and of these Berkeley says we have notions, meaning by this that what we capture of the nature of the dynamic agent does not seem to have the same transparency as what we capture as the normal objects of the agent’s mental acts. It is not necessary to become involved in Berkeley’s metaphysics in general to feel the force of the claim that the contents and internal objects of our mental acts are grasped with a lucidity that exceeds that of our grasp of the agent and the acts per se. Because of this, notions of the self perhaps have a ‘thickness’ and are permanently contestable: there seems always to be room for more dispute as to what is involved in that concept. (Though we shall see later, in 5.2.2, that there is a ‘non-thick’ way of taking the Berkeleyan concept of a notion.)

 

Because ‘thickness’ always leaves room for dispute, this is one of those cases in philosophy in which one is at the mercy of the arguments philosophers happen to think up. The conceivability argument creates a prima facie case for thinking that mind has no more than causal ontological dependence on the body. Let us assume that one rejects analytical (behaviourist or functionalist) accounts of mental predicates. Then the above arguments show that any necessary dependence of mind on body does not follow the model that applies in other scientific cases. This does not show that there may not be other reasons for believing in such dependence, for so many of the concepts in the area are still contested. For example, it might be argued that identity through time requires the kind of spatial existence that only body can give: or that the causal continuity required by a stream of consciousness cannot be a property of mere phenomena. All these might be put forward as ways of filling out those aspects of our understanding of the self that are only obliquely, not transparently, presented in self-awareness. The dualist must respond to any claim as it arises: the conceivability argument does not pre-empt them.......

5.2 The Unity of the Mind

Whether one believes that the mind is a substance or just a bundle of properties, the same challenge arises, which is to explain the nature of the unity of the immaterial mind. For the Cartesian, that means explaining how he understands the notion of immaterial substance. For the Humean, the issue is to explain the nature of the relationship between the different elements in the bundle that binds them into one thing. Neither tradition has been notably successful in this latter task: indeed, Hume, in the appendix to the Treatise, declared himself wholly mystified by the problem, rejecting his own initial solution (though quite why is not clear from the text).

plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/

My first time trying the chocolate wrap technique...and it was disasterous! Somehow it turned out pretty good in the end but I made a terrible mess! I spread the chocolate too thick I think. The ends started setting up before the middle. I thought I had better attach it to the cake before it set up too much. The chocolate from the mid section gushed off everywhere when I picked it up. I spent quite a long time scraping it all off. I am surprised it looks this good :) I made this for my husband's birthday to share with the family. A great time to try new things. I think I need to practice several more times before I would be confident selling one!

 

Based on the look of "emmascakes" which are done MUCH better than this!

Used the loopy flower quilting technique. Can't decide what color to bind it with.

Well, while I have been building for CCCX I have found some fun ways to use fig parts, so here are some of the things I have come up with lately.

#1- Possible Steampunk Captain, or just castle adventurer.

#2-The new standard for a sci-fi faction called K Korps that I hope to do a few builds for in the near future. Also, a purist way to build an awesome looking sniper rifle.

#3-A turkey warrior, avenging his lost brotheren.

 

Long Live Purism!

How to eat tacos ...

the technique ....

the expert hold .... is optional ....

the pinky move ...

in my Puerto Rico Series ...

 

Taken Dec 16, 2019

Thanks for your visits, faves, invites and comments ... (c)rebfoto

An idea for a technique for locking parts together without studs using 1x1 cheese slopes. It exists currently as an idea which I have not yet tested.

This is an interesting new technique for floors that TLG wasted no time coming up with, using the new shield tiles from the Nexo-Knights line. This could be a really interesting new part, if they release it in more "normal", non-transparent colors like this!

Canon Ftb, FD lens 50mm f1.8, Ilfochrome film

Connecting plates on the studs side. This is a tablescrab my son Sandro came up with. Might be useful.

... and fun with flash. This technique lets you create the look of night time. It was actually mid afternoon. I set the camera's white balance to around 3500k which made the whole scene blue. I set one bare flash behind her camera left. Then I set another flash in front of her camera right with a CTO gel on it to correct the color of the subject.

Some small minor details.

Some small minor details.

Part #30162, or 'prismatic binoculars' is a must if you want to do cool greebles.

 

(The one on the left doubles as a 180 degree studs-out SNOT with 5 plates height)

(Published in Photo Technique, Spring 2013)

 

Often, when I head out in search of a new photographic study in a relatively (or completely!) unfamiliar area, I rely upon a variety of means to guide me to my goal. The problem is many enticing subjects lie far from the beaten track and as such are difficult to find, and sadly I've a notoriously awful sense of direction... I cheerily describe occasions where I've ended up driving along remote and overgrown country lanes in search of something or other as my 'mystery tours' to my wife, who has been hostage on several of these much to her chagrin.

 

My battered, dishevelled and slightly out-dated UK road atlas is a constant companion, and has been snorted at derisively by many - yet it gives me a sense of place in relation to the land and sea, plus I gather the pretty lines on it actually indicate the presence of roads. I'm still enthralled and excited by new technology, yet fear I have reached the age where all too soon I'll start to develop an irrational fear and suspicion of it. Until that day, I plan to embrace it as best I can, ergo I have driven along those prettily coloured lines I mentioned in search of fascinating scenes also aided by other means. Google maps loaded on my phone helpfully provides me the opportunity to pinpoint a location in relation to my moving vehicle (hands-free of course!), and has on several instances stopped me from heading in the completely opposite direction from my goal. Yes, there are local road maps one can buy, but does anyone really bother with those? You do? Oh, ok... The obvious answer for me is of course satellite navigation, something I had hitherto avoided purely because my annual mileage just didn't seem to warrant it. However, increasingly, I need to seek out remote spots that I haven't visited before - yes, someone else will invariably have beaten me to it, but their images will be different to mine, and I think when producing your own work it's a thrill to shoot something fresh. So, I bit the bullet a few weeks ago and bought a sat nav. I've only used it a couple of times so far, but am encouraged that I'm yet to be guided into a riverbed, persuaded to traverse a shopping centre, or taken the wrong way around the M25. That last one would have been a real worry as I haven't been anywhere near London for ages. The child in me has insisted on downloading the near-obligatory 'comedy' voice to accompany me on my travels, and while I realise that particular novelty will soon grow tiresome I find it more disconcerting being directed by the clipped tones of James, Kate or Serena - even if the latter is able to tell me the name of the street I'm on. So, my current companions of choice are Burt and Ernie, of Sesame Street fame. Stop laughing at the back - I figure if I am to become stranded on a level-crossing as a train hurtles towards me at speed I might as well do so with a smile on my face...

 

Naturally, one of the best ways to discover somewhere new is to rely on the local knowledge of others - so many thanks to Martin Mattocks for guiding and accompanying me when I took this shot. Cheers for a great day out as always Martin, although if you're reading this there's no way I'm ever going back to that fish and chip shop...

 

On a separate note, I'm delighted my 'Bathing Dangerous Here' shot (elsewhere on my photostream) has been shortlisted for this year's LPOTY competition. I don't think I'll be as lucky as I was last year to progress to the book and exhibition in London, but if I do I might get to make that sat nav M25 attempt after all.

More techniques for the SNOT search engine. Pieces used can be found on this technique's page.

 

Credit for this technique goes out to Sean and Steph. Check out their awesome new video series! Lots of fun techniques.

Again a shot using the free-lensing technique...

Voronezh is a city and the administrative centre of Voronezh Oblast in southwestern Russia straddling the Voronezh River, located 12 kilometers (7.5 mi) from where it flows into the Don River. The city sits on the Southeastern Railway, which connects western Russia with the Urals and Siberia, the Caucasus and Ukraine, and the M4 highway (Moscow–Voronezh–Rostov-on-Don–Novorossiysk). In recent years the city has experienced rapid population growth, rising in 2021 to 1,057,681, up from 889,680 recorded in the 2010 Census, making it the 14th-most populous city in the country.

 

The first chronicle references to the word "Voronezh" are dated 1177, when the Ryazan prince Yaropolk, having lost the battle, fled "to Voronozh" and there was moving "from town to town". Modern data of archeology and history interpret Voronezh as a geographical region, which included the Voronezh river (tributary of the Don) and a number of settlements. In the lower reaches of the river, a unique Slavic town-planning complex of the 8th – early 11th century was discovered, which covered the territory of the present city of Voronezh and its environs (about 42 km long, about 13 forts and many unfortified villages). By the 12th – 13th centuries, most of the old towns were desolate, but new settlements appeared upstream, closer to Ryazan.

 

For many years, the hypothesis of the Soviet historian Vladimir Zagorovsky dominated: he produced the toponym "Voronezh" from the hypothetical Slavic personal name Voroneg. This man allegedly gave the name of a small town in the Chernigov Principality (now the village of Voronizh in Ukraine). Later, in the 11th or 12th century, the settlers were able to "transfer" this name to the Don region, where they named the second city Voronezh, and the river got its name from the city. However, now many researchers criticize the hypothesis, since in reality neither the name of Voroneg nor the second city was revealed, and usually the names of Russian cities repeated the names of the rivers, but not vice versa.

 

A comprehensive scientific analysis was conducted in 2015–2016 by the historian Pavel Popov. His conclusion: "Voronezh" is a probable Slavic macrotoponym associated with outstanding signs of nature, has a root voron- (from the proto-Slavic vorn) in the meaning of "black, dark" and the suffix -ezh (-azh, -ozh). It was not “transferred” and in the 8th - 9th centuries it marked a vast territory covered with black forests (oak forests) - from the mouth of the Voronezh river to the Voronozhsky annalistic forests in the middle and upper reaches of the river, and in the west to the Don (many forests were cut down). The historian believes that the main "city" of the early town-planning complex could repeat the name of the region – Voronezh. Now the hillfort is located in the administrative part of the modern city, in the Voronezh upland oak forest. This is one of Europe's largest ancient Slavic hillforts, the area of which – more than 9 hectares – 13 times the area of the main settlement in Kyiv before the baptism of Rus.

 

In it is assumed that the word "Voronezh" means bluing - a technique to increase the corrosion resistance of iron products. This explanation fits well with the proximity to the ancient city of Voronezh of a large iron deposit and the city of Stary Oskol. As well as the name of Voroneț Monastery known for its blue shade.

 

Folk etymology claims the name comes from combining the Russian words for raven (ворон) and hedgehog (еж) into Воронеж. According to this explanation two Slavic tribes named after the animals used this combination to name the river which later in turn provided the name for a settlement. There is not believed to be any scientific support for this explanation.

 

In the 16th century, the Middle Don basin, including the Voronezh river, was gradually conquered by Muscovy from the Nogai Horde (a successor state of the Golden Horde), and the current city of Voronezh was established in 1585 by Feodor I as a fort protecting the Muravsky Trail trade route against the slave raids of the Nogai and Crimean Tatars. The city was named after the river.

 

17th to 19th centuries

In the 17th century, Voronezh gradually evolved into a sizable town. Weronecz is shown on the Worona river in Resania in Joan Blaeu's map of 1645. Peter the Great built a dockyard in Voronezh where the Azov Flotilla was constructed for the Azov campaigns in 1695 and 1696. This fleet, the first ever built in Russia, included the first Russian ship of the line, Goto Predestinatsia. The Orthodox diocese of Voronezh was instituted in 1682 and its first bishop, Mitrofan of Voronezh, was later proclaimed the town's patron saint.

 

Owing to the Voronezh Admiralty Wharf, for a short time, Voronezh became the largest city of South Russia and the economic center of a large and fertile region. In 1711, it was made the seat of the Azov Governorate, which eventually morphed into the Voronezh Governorate.

 

In the 19th century, Voronezh was a center of the Central Black Earth Region. Manufacturing industry (mills, tallow-melting, butter-making, soap, leather, and other works) as well as bread, cattle, suet, and the hair trade developed in the town. A railway connected Voronezh with Moscow in 1868 and Rostov-on-Don in 1871.

   

Technique: It was early in the morning and this Wool Carder Bee was having a tough time getting its metabolism going. I was holding onto the stem of that flower with my left index finger and thumb, and resting the lens on that same hand to keep everything steady. The bee would occasionally move, and when it stopped I'd roll the flower's stem with my fingers to turn the critter toward the camera and look for a composition.

 

Tech Specs: Canon 70D (F16, 1/250, ISO 100) + a Canon MP-E 65mm macro lens (around 3x) + a diffused MT-24EX. This is a single, uncropped, frame taken hand held.

2018-11-20 backup from gitbook

 

2011-05-08　ƒ/9.0／1.3s／IS0 200　Nikon D70s+Nikkor 18-70mm f/3.5-4.5@21.8mm

 

今天的陽光若隱若現，陽光冒出雲層的時候，白色的溪水剛好處於過曝的高亮度，黑卡遮了老半天實在難以克服這種局部高反差的場景。失敗了好幾次後，我改用取巧的方法，先對好焦，等待陽光快被雲層遮住的那一霎那，按下快門、抽走黑卡，成功。

 

這張照片是探訪完源流瀑布，回頭往下走的時候補拍的。我拿著相機，站在這個半山腰往下看，看著腳下的垂直山崖，那一刻，我有點嚇壞了，一陣恐懼感衝上背脊，直直的衝向腦門，那種感覺有點像是一轉身才突然發現自己是處在如此危險的地方，但是下一秒，我竟又莫名的感到興奮。我因為腳下陡峭的高度而產生恐懼，但是更因為第一次徒手爬上來而沾沾自喜。我搞不清楚自己是害怕？是高興？還是落入一種無法感知當下的危險情況之中，更奇怪的是，在這樣的氣氛中我居然還可以分心，我注意到空氣中一陣陣野花的香味隨著微微的山風往外散逸，這真的是一種很奇怪的錯亂狀態。片刻後，我深深吸了一口氣，才又回到所處的現實之中。

 

又濕又滑都還不足以形容我腳下的危險，溪水挾帶著轟隆隆的吼聲從腳下凌空而落，落在我每次停下來喝咖啡的地方，這真的是不用測量也知道掉下去就玩完了的高度。再想到待會不知道要怎下去這件事，我馬上又開始焦慮了，算了，算了，等等的事，待會再費心吧。

 

GPS：121°32'56.70"E,25°13'37.17"N

 

Black Card technique photography／Single RAW／no PS Layers process／no HDR process

 

In the darkest deepest oceans, beautiful creatures like Jelly-fish illuminate their surroundings and their environment. However, dont be fooled by their cute looks, they are extremely venomous and fast killers

Technique: I worked the picture in raw, gave it a yellowish tone and desaturated. I used a texture which I "multiplied" and then used a "humid paper" filter, also used new layer orange color which I also multiplied.

 

I was looking at the picture which I had treated and asked myself why did I treat it this way? Why a faux vintage. It´s because it it looks better, well, I would cenrtainley not say it looks better but different. And then I realized the way I treated gets closer to how I remembered that place, to how I wanted to file it in my memory. That´s my self reasoning why I gave a vintage treatment to the picture ; )

Young Sumatran orangutan (Pongo abeli) named "Aisha" is not yet 29 months old but she is strong, agile, and seemingly fearless when climbing and swinging on the ropes.

San Diego Zoo

 

Conservation Status: Critically Endangered

 

Northern Harrier | Hunting Technique

 

Smaller than the more common Red-tailed Hawk generally hunting from the periphery of woodlands, Northern Harriers, aka marsh hawk or ring-tailed hawk, prefer to fly low over open habitats, listening to prey activity below by twisting and turning abruptly over tangles of grasses and shrubs. Here, a male Harrier is seen flying over an open field into 50 km/h sustained wind gusting to nearly 100 km/h and from time to time touching down in search of small rodents, principally mice and voles. In addition to single action shots, some progressive composite images illustrating the Harrier’s sight and/or sound-based hunting strategy are provided throughout this photo album. According to “All About Birds”, Northern Harriers breed throughout Canada but generally do not winter north of the CAN-USA border. Granted, Kingston is on the northern fringe of the Harrier wintering range, however, the current mild winter and lack of snow in Southeastern Ontario may have influenced this bird’s innate desired to migrate south

 

Technique: I found this Woodlouse going through the leaf litter in my yard. I carefully picked up the leaf it was on and carried it to my patio table so I could shoot it in front of an artificial flower (to keep the background from being black). As it moved around it would pause and I'd look for an interesting angle. I held the leaf in my left hand, and rested the lens on that same hand to help keep the scene steady.

 

Tech Specs: Canon 80D (F11, 1/250, ISO 100) + a Canon MP-E 65mm macro lens (around 2x) + a diffused MT-24EX (both flash heads on the Canon flash mount, E-TTL metering). This is a single, uncropped, frame taken hand held.

Starring... Anna Torv as FBI Agent Olivia Dunham, Joshua Jackson as Peter Bishop, John Noble as Dr. Walter Bishop, Lance Reddick as Agent Phillip Broyles, Blair Brown as Nina Sharp, Jasika Nicole as Astrid Farnsworth,

 

Fringe is an American science fiction television series created by J. J. Abrams, Alex Kurtzman and Roberto Orci. The series follows a Federal Bureau of Investigation "Fringe Division" team based in Boston, Massachusetts under the supervision of Homeland Security. The team uses unorthodox "fringe" science and FBI investigative techniques to investigate a series of unexplained, often ghastly occurrences, which are related to mysteries surrounding a parallel universe. The show has been described as a hybrid of The X-Files, Altered States, The Twilight Zone and Dark Angel.[1][2]

 

The series premiered in North America on August 19, 2008, on the Fox network. Fringe was part of a Fox initiative known as "Remote-Free TV". Episodes of Fringe were longer than standard dramas on current network television. The show ran with half the commercials during the first season, adding about six minutes to the show's runtime.[3] When the show went to a commercial, a short bumper aired informing the viewer of roughly how much time commercials will consume before the program resumed. On October 1, 2008, Fringe's first season was extended to 22 episodes.[4] This was then cut back to 20 episodes with the season finale airing May 12.[5] The series was renewed for a second season.[6] Season 2 premiered September 18, 2009.[7] However, Fox's "Remote-Free TV" trial did not continue past the first season. On March 6, 2010, Entertainment Weekly and Variety reported that Fox had renewed Fringe for a third season;[8] it was later reported that it would be for a full 22 episodes.[9] The third season premiered September 23, 2010.[10]

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More about Fringe: On Wikipedia.

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For Photo of Prison Break Cast: Click Here...Photo of Prison Break Cast.

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For Photo of Lost Cast: Click Here... Photo of Lost Cast.

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My other Flickr Sites: Jimmy MacDonald [2] Jimmy MacDonald [3]

 

My Website: Jimmy MacDonald's Website

 

My YouTube Chanel: Jimmy MacDonald's YouTube

 

My Blog: Yahoo Profiles Blog

 

My Blog '2' BlogSpot.

 

My Flickr Group Photos: Christians in Prayer & Worship

 

Guestbook: View/Sign Guestbook

Photo Guestbook: View/Sign Photo Guestbook

____________________________________________________________________________

 

Anna Torv... Olivia Dunham (65 episodes, 2008-2011)

Joshua Jackson... Peter Bishop (65 episodes, 2008-2011)

Lance Reddick... Agent Phillip Broyles / ... (65 episodes, 2008-2011)

Blair Brown... Nina Sharp (65 episodes, 2008-2011)

Jasika Nicole... Astrid Farnsworth / ... (65 episodes, 2008-2011)

John Noble... Dr. Walter Bishop (65 episodes, 2008-2011)

Kirk Acevedo... Agent Charlie Francis / ... (30 episodes, 2008-2010)

Michael Cerveris... The Observer / ... (25 episodes, 2008-2010)

Mark Valley... John Scott (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Ari Graynor... Rachel / ... (10 episodes, 2009-2010)

Lily Pilblad... Ella / ... (10 episodes, 2009-2010)

Jacqueline Beaulieu... Nina's Assistant (10 episodes, 2008)

Sebastian Roché... Thomas Jerome Newton (8 episodes, 2009-2010)

Leonard Nimoy... Dr. William Bell / ... (7 episodes, 2009-2010)

Ryan Mcdonald... Brandon (6 episodes, 2009-2010)

Chance Kelly... Mitchell Loeb / ... (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Darby Lynn Totten... Agent #2 / ... (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Seth Gabel... Lincoln Lee (5 episodes, 2010)

Kevin Corrigan... Sam Weiss (4 episodes, 2009-2010)

Jared Harris... David Robert Jones (4 episodes, 2008-2009)

Michael Gaston... Sanford Harris (4 episodes, 2009)

Gerard Plunkett... Sen. Van Horn / ... (3 episodes, 2009-2010)

Ash Roeca... Agent Rodriguez / ... (3 episodes, 2008-2009)

Philip Winchester... Frank Stanton (3 episodes, 2010)

Ryan McDonald... Brandon / ... (3 episodes, 2010)

Clark Middleton... Edward Markham / ... (3 episodes, 2009-2010)

Stefan Arngrim... Store Owner (3 episodes, 2009-2010)

Eugene Lipinski... December (3 episodes, 2009-2010)

Karen Holness... Diane Broyles / ... (3 episodes, 2009-2010)

Matthew Martin... ND Agent / ... (3 episodes, 2008-2009)

Mig Macario... Tech / ... (3 episodes, 2010)

Roger R. Cross... Hybrid / ... (2 episodes, 2009)

Peter Woodward... August (2 episodes, 2009-2010)

Meghan Markle... Junior FBI Agent Amy Jessup (2 episodes, 2009)

Kenneth Tigar... Warden Johan Lennox (2 episodes, 2008-2009)

Trini Alvarado... Samantha Loeb (2 episodes, 2008-2009)

Chinasa Ogbuagu... Lloyd / ... (2 episodes, 2009)

Guiesseppe Jones... Agent #3 / ... (2 episodes, 2008-2009)

Douglas Chapman... Agent / ... (2 episodes, 2009-2010)

Chris Eastman... CSI Investigator (2 episodes, 2009)

Anna Van Hooft... Nina's Assistant (2 episodes, 2009)

Brian Slaten... Man #1 / ... (2 episodes, 2008-2009)

Chad Gittens... Agent #2 / ... (2 episodes, 2009)

Chris Shields... ND Agent / ... (2 episodes, 2009)

Jenni Blong... Dr. Carla Warren (2 episodes, 2010)

Orla Brady... Elizabeth Bishop (2 episodes, 2010)

Amy Madigan... Marilyn Dunham (2 episodes, 2010)

Omar Metwally... James Heath / ... (2 episodes, 2010)

David Call... Nick Lane (2 episodes, 2009-2010)

Marie Avgeropoulos... Leah / ... (2 episodes, 2010)

Hamza Adam... Deputy (2 episodes, 2010)

Diana Bang... Nora (2 episodes, 2010)

David Richmond-Peck... CSI Detective Kassel (2 episodes, 2010)

Silver Kim... Actor / ... (2 episodes, 2010)

Scott Patey... Stock Boy (2 episodes, 2010)

John Prowse... Corpse #2 / ... (2 episodes, 2010)

John Shaw... Medical Examiner (2 episodes, 2010)

Eve Harlow... Cashier (2 episodes, 2010)

Jamie Switch... Lloyd Becker (2 episodes, 2010)

Nelson Peña... Junior Agent / ... (2 episodes, 2009)

James Pizzinato... Dave (2 episodes, 2010)

Megan Leitch... Elaine (2 episodes, 2010)

Mary Alison Raine... Actor / ... (2 episodes, 2010)

Cam Cronin... Fbi Tech / ... (2 episodes, 2009-2010)

Robyn Payne... Agent / ... (2 episodes, 2009)

Alberta Mayne... Young Mother (2 episodes, 2010)

Al Miro... Neal (2 episodes, 2010)

Sierra Pitkin... Jordan (2 episodes, 2010)

David Shumbris... Man #1 / ... (2 episodes, 2008-2009)

Jennifer Butler... CSU Investigator (2 episodes, 2008)

Takako Haywood... FBI Agent (2 episodes, 2008)

Harry L. Seddon... Catatonic Mental Patient / ... (2 episodes, 2008)

Danny Doherty... Boston Fireman / ... (2 episodes, 2009-2010)

Alison Wandzura... Olivia Body Double / ... (2 episodes, 2010-2011)

Heather Doerksen... Assistant / ... (2 episodes, 2010)

Ryan James McDonald... Brandon (2 episodes, 2010)

Simon Raymond... Fringe Division Tech / ... (2 episodes, 2010)

Cameron K. Smith... Cab Driver (2 episodes, 2010)

 

Create a character page for:

Series Produced by

Jeff Pinkner.... executive producer (64 episodes, 2008-2011)

J.H. Wyman.... executive producer / co-executive producer (50 episodes, 2009-2011)

J.J. Abrams.... executive producer (46 episodes, 2008-2010)

Bryan Burk.... executive producer (46 episodes, 2008-2010)

Alex Kurtzman.... consulting producer / executive producer (46 episodes, 2008-2010)

Roberto Orci.... consulting producer / executive producer (46 episodes, 2008-2010)

Tamara Isaac.... co-producer / associate producer / ... (42 episodes, 2008-2010)

Robert M. Williams Jr..... producer (36 episodes, 2008-2010)

Tanya M. Swerling.... co-producer / associate producer / ... (31 episodes, 2009-2010)

Joe Chappelle.... co-executive producer / executive producer (25 episodes, 2009-2010)

Akiva Goldsman.... consulting producer (25 episodes, 2009-2010)

Kathy Lingg.... producer (25 episodes, 2009-2010)

Reid Shane.... supervising producer / co-executive producer (25 episodes, 2009-2010)

Josh Singer.... supervising producer / co-executive producer (25 episodes, 2009-2010)

David Wilcox.... co-executive producer (25 episodes, 2009-2010)

Ashley Miller.... producer (22 episodes, 2009-2010)

Zack Stentz.... producer (22 episodes, 2009-2010)

Jeff Vlaming.... supervising producer (22 episodes, 2009-2010)

David H. Goodman.... co-executive producer (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

Brad Kane.... co-producer (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

J.R. Orci.... supervising producer (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

Brooke Kennedy.... co-executive producer (16 episodes, 2008-2010)

Fred Toye.... producer (14 episodes, 2008-2010)

Jason Cahill.... consulting producer (11 episodes, 2008-2009)

Felicia D. Henderson.... co-executive producer (11 episodes, 2008-2009)

John Litvack.... consulting producer (11 episodes, 2008-2009)

Darin Morgan.... consulting producer (11 episodes, 2008-2009)

Andrew Kreisberg.... co-executive producer (7 episodes, 2009-2010)

Brad Anderson.... producer (5 episodes, 2009-2010)

Paul A. Edwards.... producer (4 episodes, 2008)

Monica Breen.... co-executive producer (3 episodes, 2010)

Alison Schapker.... co-executive producer (3 episodes, 2010)

Vladimir Stefoff.... co-producer (3 episodes, 2010)

Athena Wickham.... co-producer (3 episodes, 2010)

 

Series Original Music by

Michael Giacchino (44 episodes, 2008-2010)

Chris Tilton (24 episodes, 2009-2010)

 

Series Cinematography by

Tom Yatsko (24 episodes, 2008-2010)

David Moxness (11 episodes, 2009-2010)

Fred Murphy (5 episodes, 2009-2010)

Michael Slovis (4 episodes, 2009)

 

Series Film Editing by

Jon Dudkowski (14 episodes, 2008-2010)

Luyen H. Vu (10 episodes, 2009-2010)

Scott Vickrey (7 episodes, 2008-2009)

Timothy A. Good (7 episodes, 2010-2011)

Tanya M. Swerling (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Henk Van Eeghen (4 episodes, 2009-2010)

Michelle Tesoro (3 episodes, 2010)

 

Series Casting by

April Webster (24 episodes, 2008-2010)

Sara Isaacson (22 episodes, 2010-2011)

Ross Meyerson (14 episodes, 2008-2010)

Julie Tucker (14 episodes, 2008-2010)

Cindy Tolan (7 episodes, 2008)

 

Series Production Design by

Ian D. Thomas (44 episodes, 2009-2011)

Steven J. Jordan (14 episodes, 2008-2010)

Anne Stuhler (6 episodes, 2008)

Carol Spier (2 episodes, 2008)

 

Series Art Direction by

Peter Andringa (17 episodes, 2009-2010)

Randall Richards (3 episodes, 2008)

Roswell Hamrick (2 episodes, 2008)

 

Series Set Decoration by

Beth Kushnick (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

Louise Roper (20 episodes, 2009-2010)

Justin Papp (18 episodes, 2008-2009)

Bobbi Allyn (3 episodes, 2010)

 

Series Costume Design by

Jenni Gullett (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

Marie Abma (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

Joanna Brett (2 episodes, 2008)

 

Series Makeup Department

Ian C. Ballard.... department head hair / department head hair stylist / ... (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

Kymbra C. Kelley.... makeup department head / department head make-up (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

Dana Hamel.... department head make-up / department head makeup (20 episodes, 2009-2010)

Kymbra Callaghan.... makeup department head (18 episodes, 2008-2009)

Anne-Michelle Radcliffe.... hair department head / department head hair (16 episodes, 2008-2010)

Todd Masters.... special effects makeup designer / special effects makeup / ... (16 episodes, 2009-2010)

Stephen Kelley.... makeup effects designer / special makeup effects artist (8 episodes, 2008-2009)

Calla Syna Dreyer.... assistant makeup artist / department head makeup / ... (8 episodes, 2009-2010)

Amanda Kuryk.... assistant makeup artist / first assistant makeup artist / ... (8 episodes, 2010)

Louie Zakarian.... special makeup effects artist / special effects makeup designer (7 episodes, 2009-2010)

Stephen G. Bishop.... department head hair (4 episodes, 2008)

Rachel Griffin.... special makeup effects artist / makeup artist (4 episodes, 2010)

Andy Clement.... special makeup effects designer/creator (2 episodes, 2009)

Craig Lindberg.... additional makeup effects (2 episodes, 2009)

Lancel Reyes.... special makeup effects artist (2 episodes, 2009)

Kathleen P. Campbell.... first assistant hair stylist (2 episodes, 2010)

Mariah Crawley.... second assistant hair stylist (2 episodes, 2010)

Angela Wood.... first assistant makeup artist (2 episodes, 2010)

  

Neil Morrill.... special makeup effects artist (unknown episodes)

 

Series Production Management

Robert M. Williams Jr..... unit production manager (36 episodes, 2008-2010)

Andrew Balek.... post-production supervisor (28 episodes, 2008-2010)

John Klump.... post-production supervisor (23 episodes, 2008-2010)

Vladimir Stefoff.... production manager (20 episodes, 2009-2010)

Amanda Lencioni.... post-production supervisor (14 episodes, 2009-2010)

Dana J. Kuznetzkoff.... unit production manager / unit production manager: NY (6 episodes, 2008)

Brian Moraga.... post-production supervisor (6 episodes, 2010)

April Nocifora.... post-production supervisor (6 episodes, 2010)

Michael C. Young.... production manager (3 episodes, 2009)

Jill Risk.... post-production supervisor (3 episodes, 2010)

Daniel Rodriguez.... post-production supervisor (2 episodes, 2008)

 

Series Second Unit Director or Assistant Director

Brian Giddens.... first assistant director (11 episodes, 2009-2010)

Warren Hanna.... second assistant director (11 episodes, 2009-2010)

Vadim Epstein.... second second assistant director (10 episodes, 2009)

Brent Crowell.... first assistant director: second unit / first assistant director (9 episodes, 2009-2010)

Greg Zenon.... first assistant director (9 episodes, 2009-2010)

Amy Lynn.... second assistant director (8 episodes, 2008-2009)

Gary S. Rake.... first assistant director (8 episodes, 2008-2009)

David R. Baron.... second assistant director (8 episodes, 2009-2010)

Patrick Mangan.... second assistant director (7 episodes, 2008-2010)

Marcos González Palma.... second assistant director: second unit / second second assistant director (7 episodes, 2008-2009)

Colin MacLellan.... first assistant director (7 episodes, 2008-2009)

Thomas Tobin.... assistant director: second unit / second second assistant director (7 episodes, 2008)

Cole Boughton.... trainee assistant director (7 episodes, 2009-2010)

Tim Whyte.... second second assistant director / third assistant director / ... (7 episodes, 2009-2010)

Joshua Lucido.... dga trainee (6 episodes, 2008)

Tammy Tamkin.... second assistant director: second unit / third assistant director: second unit (6 episodes, 2009-2010)

Sarah Rae Garrett.... second assistant director / second assistant director: NY (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Christo Morse.... first assistant director (3 episodes, 2008)

John E. Gallagher.... first assistant director (3 episodes, 2009-2010)

Karin Behrenz.... third assistant director (2 episodes, 2010)

Katherine Keizer.... second assistant director (2 episodes, 2010)

  

Adam Bocknek.... third assistant director (unknown episodes)

Patrick Murphy.... third assistant director (unknown episodes)

 

Series Art Department

Gavin De West.... assistant property master / on-set props (26 episodes, 2009-2011)

Michael Love.... props / props buyer (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

Robert K. Smith.... property master (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

John Wilcox.... paint coordinator (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

Justin Papp.... on-set dresser (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

Kaem Coughlin.... camera scenic artist (20 episodes, 2008-2009)

Judy Gurr.... assistant set decorator (20 episodes, 2008-2009)

Emily Gaunt.... charge scenic artist (19 episodes, 2008-2009)

Anya Lebow.... set dresser (19 episodes, 2008-2009)

Bentley Wood.... on-set property assistant / first property assistant / ... (19 episodes, 2008-2009)

Paula R. Montgomery.... set decoration buyer (16 episodes, 2009-2010)

Theresa Gonzalez.... scenic industrial (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Michael D. Harrell.... assistant property master (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Matthew Rignanese.... art department (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Peter Gelfman.... property master (12 episodes, 2008-2009)

Robin McAllister.... assistant property master (12 episodes, 2008-2009)

Natalie N. Dorset.... property master / props (10 episodes, 2008-2010)

Robert Zorella.... art department coordinator (10 episodes, 2008)

Jeremy Rosenstein.... assistant art director (9 episodes, 2008-2009)

Holly Watson.... graphic artist (9 episodes, 2008)

Kyle Salvatore.... assistant property master (8 episodes, 2009)

Robert Ludemann.... additional graphic artist (7 episodes, 2008-2009)

Michael Dundas.... scenic artist (7 episodes, 2009)

Victoria Stewart.... art department assistant (6 episodes, 2008)

Clare Davis.... construction coordinator (6 episodes, 2009-2010)

Eliza Hooker.... set dresser (6 episodes, 2010)

Sylvia Trapanese.... scenic foreman (5 episodes, 2008)

Vincent Accardi.... construction coordinator (4 episodes, 2008)

William Stenzel.... construction foreman (4 episodes, 2008)

Tara Boccia.... props (4 episodes, 2009)

Kevin L. Raper.... additional graphic artist (3 episodes, 2009)

James V. Kent.... assistant property master (2 episodes, 2008)

Lisa Kent.... assistant set decorator (2 episodes, 2008)

Randall Richards.... assistant art director (2 episodes, 2008)

Cathie Hahnel.... graphic artist / graphic design: art department (2 episodes, 2009-2010)

Tessa Brophy.... art department coordinator (2 episodes, 2009)

Chris Andreas.... set decorating coordinator (2 episodes, 2010)

Alistair Bell.... carpenter (2 episodes, 2010)

Todd Brooks.... buyer (2 episodes, 2010)

Lisa Canzi.... art department coordinator (2 episodes, 2010)

Sierra Laflamme.... on-set dresser (2 episodes, 2010)

Bob Levesque.... assistant property master (2 episodes, 2010)

Sergio Mattei.... lead dresser (2 episodes, 2010)

Mark Morgan.... lead dresser (2 episodes, 2010)

Eric Partridge.... props (2 episodes, 2010)

Brent Russell.... assistant set decorator (2 episodes, 2010)

Rob Schwenk.... foreman (2 episodes, 2010)

Jerry Staar.... assistant props (2 episodes, 2010)

 

Series Sound Department

Rick Norman.... re-recording mixer / sound re-recording mixer (26 episodes, 2009-2010)

Thomas A. Harris.... supervising sound editor (23 episodes, 2008-2010)

Eric Batut.... sound mixer (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

Paul Curtis.... supervising sound editor (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

Bruce Tanis.... sound effects designer / sound effects editor / ... (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

Larry Hoff.... sound mixer (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

Kyle Billingsley.... foley mixer (20 episodes, 2008-2009)

Michael Ferdie.... sound editor (20 episodes, 2008-2009)

Nick Neutra.... foley supervisor (20 episodes, 2008-2009)

Tom E. Dahl.... sound re-recording mixer / re-recording mixer (19 episodes, 2008-2009)

Mark D. Fleming.... sound re-recording mixer / re-recording mixer (19 episodes, 2008-2009)

David Long.... audio layback (18 episodes, 2008-2009)

Mark Hensley.... re-recording mixer (17 episodes, 2009-2010)

Deron Street.... first assistant sound editor (16 episodes, 2008-2010)

Michael Fowler.... adr recordist (16 episodes, 2008-2009)

Cynthia Merrill.... foley artist (16 episodes, 2008-2009)

Douglas Murray.... adr mixer (16 episodes, 2008-2009)

Jason Oliver.... adr mixer / sound recordist (13 episodes, 2008-2010)

Gabrielle Gilbert Reeves.... dialogue editor (12 episodes, 2008-2009)

Bob Kellough.... sound effects editor (12 episodes, 2008-2009)

Mark DeSimone.... adr mixer: New York (11 episodes, 2008-2009)

Beauxregard Neylon.... adr mixer (11 episodes, 2008-2009)

Daniel Brennan.... adr mixer (8 episodes, 2008-2009)

Christopher B. Reeves.... dialogue editor (7 episodes, 2008-2009)

John Guentner.... foley cueing / foley mixer assistant (7 episodes, 2009)

Brian Harman.... re-recording mixer / sound re-recording mixer (7 episodes, 2010)

Stephen Fitzmaurice.... adr mixer (5 episodes, 2008-2010)

Steffan Falesitch.... sound editor (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Scott Cannizzaro.... adr mixer (5 episodes, 2009-2010)

Daniel McIntosh.... sound mixer: tandem unit (4 episodes, 2008)

Amanda Jacques.... utility (3 episodes, 2008-2009)

Noah Timan.... additional sound mixer (3 episodes, 2008-2009)

Richard Partlow.... foley artist (3 episodes, 2009-2010)

Mark Allen.... sound effects editor (3 episodes, 2010)

Shelley Roden.... foley artist (3 episodes, 2010)

James Bailey.... foley artist (2 episodes, 2008)

Paul Tirone.... adr mixer / adr recordist (2 episodes, 2008)

Marc Meyer.... sound effects editor (2 episodes, 2009-2010)

Bobby Roelofs.... sound utility (2 episodes, 2009)

Steven J. Rogers.... production sound mixer: second unit / sound: second unit (2 episodes, 2009)

Danny Duperrault.... boom operator (2 episodes, 2010)

Eric Justen.... sound re-recording mixer (2 episodes, 2010)

  

Sean Paul Armstrong.... second boom operator (unknown episodes)

Alan Zielonko.... boom operator (unknown episodes)

 

Series Special Effects by

Bob Comer.... special effects coordinator (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

Douglas W. Beard.... special effects designer (20 episodes, 2009-2010)

Conrad V. Brink Jr..... special effects coordinator (14 episodes, 2008-2010)

Harry Tomsic.... fabricator/welder (2 episodes, 2010)

 

Series Visual Effects by

Jay Worth.... visual effects supervisor: Los Angeles / visual effects supervisor / ... (43 episodes, 2008-2010)

Chris Wright.... visual effects producer (39 episodes, 2008-2010)

Rodrigo Dorsch.... digital compositor: Zoic Studios / lead compositor: Zoic Studios (35 episodes, 2008-2010)

Lee Gabel.... matchmove artist / match move artist / ... (34 episodes, 2008-2010)

Davy Nethercutt.... digital compositor (31 episodes, 2008-2010)

Johnathan R. Banta.... lead compositor / digital compositor / ... (29 episodes, 2008-2010)

Robert Habros.... visual effects supervisor: Vancouver (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

Christopher Scollard.... visual effects supervisor / visual effects supervisor: New York / ... (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

Jake Braver.... visual effects assistant / additional visual effects supervisor (20 episodes, 2008-2009)

Christopher Lance.... digital compositor: CoSA VFX (16 episodes, 2009-2010)

Tom Mahoney.... digital compositor: CoSA VFX (16 episodes, 2009-2010)

David Beedon.... digital effects artist: CoSA VFX (15 episodes, 2009-2010)

Jon Tanimoto.... digital compositor: CoSA VFX (15 episodes, 2009-2010)

Paul Le Blanc.... computer graphics playback (14 episodes, 2008-2009)

Michael Kirylo.... lead cgi artist (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Jason Sax.... visual effects coordinator (11 episodes, 2010)

Scott Dewis.... cgi supervisor: Race Rocks Digital / CGI supervisor: Race Rocks Digital [ca] (10 episodes, 2008)

Ben Campanaro.... compositor: Eden FX / rotoscope artist: Eden FX (9 episodes, 2009-2010)

Stefan Bredereck.... visual effects compositor: EdenFX / visual effects and animation: EdenFX / ... (8 episodes, 2009-2010)

Ido Banai.... digital compositor (7 episodes, 2008)

Fred Pienkos.... digital compositor (7 episodes, 2009-2010)

Eric Hance.... visual effects artist (6 episodes, 2009-2010)

Edward M. Ruiz II.... digital compositor: Eden FX / rotoscope artist: Eden FX / ... (6 episodes, 2010)

Andrew Orloff.... vfx supervisor: Zoic Studios (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Dave Zeevalk.... digital effects artist / digital artist: Zoic Studios (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Stephen W. Pugh.... visual effects producer: EdenFX (5 episodes, 2009)

Ilan Gabai.... digital effects artist (4 episodes, 2008-2009)

Matt Rosenfeld.... lighting lead / visual effects artist (4 episodes, 2008-2009)

Craig Edwards.... digital effects artist: EdenFX (4 episodes, 2009-2010)

Adica Manis.... visual effects producer: Pixomondo (4 episodes, 2010)

Ricardo Nadu.... rigger: Zoic Studios (3 episodes, 2008)

Lars Simkins.... visual effects artist / matte artist (3 episodes, 2009-2010)

Eric Haas.... digital effects artist: EdenFX (3 episodes, 2009)

John Karner.... visual effects (3 episodes, 2009)

Jeffrey I. Kaplan.... visual effects artist: Eden FX (3 episodes, 2010)

Jesse Siglow.... compositor (2 episodes, 2008-2009)

Charles Bunnag.... digital matte artist (2 episodes, 2008)

Marlon Perez.... digital artist (2 episodes, 2008)

Levi Ahmu.... visual effects artist (2 episodes, 2009)

Tim Matney.... matte painter (2 episodes, 2009)

Matthew Collorafice.... digital compositor (2 episodes, 2010)

Charles Collyer.... digital compositor (2 episodes, 2010)

Jason Hearne.... visual effects artist (2 episodes, 2010)

Mark Hennessy-Barrett.... visual effects artist (2 episodes, 2010)

Scott Kingston.... visual effects producer (2 episodes, 2010)

Chris Montesano.... visual effects artist (2 episodes, 2010)

Jose Perez.... visual effects artist (2 episodes, 2010)

John J. Renzulli.... digital compositor (2 episodes, 2010)

Derek Serra.... visual effects artist (2 episodes, 2010)

John Vanderbeck.... digital compositor (2 episodes, 2010)

  

Kristen Branan.... head of production: Zoic Studios (unknown episodes)

Jon Dudkowski.... visual effects editor (unknown episodes)

Joseph Ngo.... systems administrator (unknown episodes)

Ricardo Quintero.... digital compositor (unknown episodes)

Tefft Smith.... digital artist (unknown episodes)

Sean Tompkins.... visual effects coordinator (unknown episodes)

 

Series Stunts

Shauna Duggins.... stunt coordinator / stunt double: Anna Torv (21 episodes, 2008-2010)

Mike Mitchell.... stunt coordinator (20 episodes, 2009-2010)

Mike Burke.... stunt driver / stunt double / ... (8 episodes, 2008-2009)

David Shumbris.... stunts / stunt double (6 episodes, 2008-2009)

Roy Farfel.... stunt driver (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Maja Stace-Smith.... stunt double: Anna Torv / stunt performer: nurse (5 episodes, 2010)

Jared Burke.... stunt double / stunts (4 episodes, 2008-2009)

Joanne Lamstein.... stunt performer / stunt double: Blair Brown / ... (4 episodes, 2008-2009)

Ian Mclaughlin.... key stunt rigger / stunt double / ... (4 episodes, 2008-2009)

Luis Moco.... stunt performer (4 episodes, 2008-2009)

Gene Harrison.... stunts / stunt performer (3 episodes, 2008-2009)

Donald John Hewitt.... stunts (3 episodes, 2008-2009)

Cort Hessler.... stunt coordinator / stunts (3 episodes, 2009)

Rick Pearce.... stunt coordinator (3 episodes, 2010)

Caroline Leppanen.... stunt double / stunts (2 episodes, 2008-2009)

Christopher Place.... stunt double / stunts (2 episodes, 2008-2009)

Rob Hayter.... stunt double: Stephen McHattie / stunt performer (2 episodes, 2009-2010)

Chad Hessler.... stunts (2 episodes, 2009)

Chad Sayn.... stunt rigger (2 episodes, 2009)

Atlin Mitchell.... stunt double: Anna Torv (2 episodes, 2010)

  

Bryan Renfro.... stunt driver (unknown episodes, 2008)

Jere Gillis.... stunt driver (unknown episodes)

Blair Johannes.... stunt double: Mark Valley (unknown episodes)

Danny Lima.... stunts (unknown episodes)

John MacDonald.... stunt performer (unknown episodes)

Ken Quinn.... stunt coordinator (unknown episodes)

Branko Racki.... stunt performer (unknown episodes)

Robert Racki.... utility stunts (unknown episodes)

Steve 'Shack' Shackleton.... stunt driver (unknown episodes)

Al Vrkljan.... stunt driver (unknown episodes)

 

Series Camera and Electrical Department

David S. Warner.... gaffer (25 episodes, 2009-2010)

David J. Dawson.... key grip (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

Scott Wallace.... video playback operator (23 episodes, 2009-2010)

Philip Gleason.... video playback operator (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

Tim Guinness.... gaffer (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

Cesar Baptista.... dolly grip (20 episodes, 2008-2009)

Christopher Tammaro.... camera operator: "a" camera (20 episodes, 2009-2010)

Sal Lanza.... key grip (18 episodes, 2008-2010)

Denny Kortze.... second assistant camera: "a" camera / first assistant camera: 2nd unit / ... (17 episodes, 2008-2009)

Jeff Muhlstock.... camera operator / steadicam operator / ... (17 episodes, 2008-2009)

Ed Nessen.... first assistant camera: "b" camera (17 episodes, 2008-2009)

Meg Kettell.... second assistant camera: "b" camera (16 episodes, 2008-2009)

Andre Gheorghiu.... motion picture video coordinator (15 episodes, 2009-2010)

Mark Lunn.... assistant camera / first assistant camera / ... (15 episodes, 2009-2010)

Prem Marimuthu.... lighting technician (14 episodes, 2009-2010)

Tim McAuliffe.... rigging gaffer (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Jon Jovellanos.... best boy grip: second unit (13 episodes, 2009-2010)

Ryan McMaster.... director of photography: second unit (13 episodes, 2009-2010)

Andrew Priestley.... first assistant camera (12 episodes, 2008-2009)

Max Torroba.... computer/video playback coordinator / playback coordinator (9 episodes, 2009-2010)

Edward Hohman.... dolly grip: 2nd unit (7 episodes, 2009)

Ted Goodwin.... electric / grip (6 episodes, 2008)

Nick Maczka.... grip (6 episodes, 2009)

Chris Drechsler.... lighting technician (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Michael Fuchs.... camera production assistant (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Steve Drellich.... camera operator: "b" camera (5 episodes, 2008)

Andrew Voegeli.... b camera / steadicam operator (5 episodes, 2009)

Saade Mustafa.... second unit: camera operator (4 episodes, 2008-2009)

Peter McEntyre.... rigging gaffer (4 episodes, 2008)

Lou Gruzelier.... steadicam operator / Steadicam operator / ... (4 episodes, 2009-2010)

Stephen Girouard.... grip (4 episodes, 2009)

Daniel Luebke.... electrician (4 episodes, 2009)

Jacob Bond.... lighting technician (4 episodes, 2010)

Phil Oetiker.... camera operator (3 episodes, 2008-2009)

Donald Russell.... additional camera operator / camera operator: second unit (3 episodes, 2009)

Edward Herrera.... camera production assistant (2 episodes, 2008)

Douglas Pellegrino.... additional camera operator (2 episodes, 2008)

Virgile Dean.... grip (2 episodes, 2009-2010)

Doug Brantner.... lighting technician (2 episodes, 2009)

David A. Erickson.... electrician (2 episodes, 2009)

Christopher B. Green.... first assistant camera / first assistant camera: "b" camera (2 episodes, 2009)

Pieter Reyneke.... lighting technician (2 episodes, 2009)

Daniel D. Sariano.... assistant camera (2 episodes, 2009)

Jennifer Scarlata.... electrician (2 episodes, 2009)

John C. Walker.... camera trainee (2 episodes, 2009)

Bruce Crawford.... best boy grip (2 episodes, 2010)

Nazim Edeer.... second assistant camera: "b" camera (2 episodes, 2010)

Katie Matheson.... loader (2 episodes, 2010)

Craig Munroe.... dolly grip: "a" camera (2 episodes, 2010)

Geoff Preston.... lamp operator (2 episodes, 2010)

Tobias Sarin.... first assistant camera: "b" camera (2 episodes, 2010)

Kevin Stachow.... generator operator (2 episodes, 2010)

Chris Stigter.... rigging gaffer (2 episodes, 2010)

James Warner.... best boy (2 episodes, 2010)

Mark Weinhaupl.... second assistant camera: "a" camera (2 episodes, 2010)

Jason Tidsbury.... light balloon technician (2 episodes, 2011)

  

Darren Spriet.... camera loader (unknown episodes)

Dean Stinchcombe.... first assistant camera (unknown episodes)

John Sztejnmiler.... generator operator (unknown episodes)

Franco Tata.... gaffer (unknown episodes)

 

Series Casting Department

Stephanie R. Hunter.... extras casting associate (19 episodes, 2008-2009)

April Webster.... original casting (18 episodes, 2008-2010)

Corinne Clark.... casting: Canada (17 episodes, 2009-2010)

Jennifer Page.... casting: Canada (17 episodes, 2009-2010)

Tiffany Moon.... extras casting director (16 episodes, 2008-2009)

Maria Higgins.... casting associate (13 episodes, 2008-2010)

Sara Isaacson.... casting associate (9 episodes, 2009-2010)

Rori Bergman.... casting associate (7 episodes, 2008)

Jaye Riske.... casting associate (6 episodes, 2009-2010)

Michelle Allen.... casting: Canada (6 episodes, 2009)

Luis Sanchez-Cañete.... extras casting / extras casting director (4 episodes, 2008)

 

Series Costume and Wardrobe Department

Heather Rupert.... costume dyer/breakdown (21 episodes, 2009-2010)

Audrey Wong.... costume set supervisor / set supervisor (19 episodes, 2009-2010)

Careen Fowles.... costume supervisor (16 episodes, 2008-2009)

Danielle Rice.... costume department intern (15 episodes, 2008-2009)

Kurtis Reeves.... prep costumer/buyer (14 episodes, 2009-2010)

Jessica Pitcairn.... costume coordinator (11 episodes, 2008-2009)

Amela Baksic.... assistant costume designer (10 episodes, 2008-2009)

Rachel Leek.... key costumer (8 episodes, 2008-2009)

Carmia Marshall.... key costumer / set costumer (8 episodes, 2008-2009)

Stephani Lewis.... costume coordinator (8 episodes, 2008)

Lisa Padovani.... associate costume designer (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Debbe DuPerrieu.... set costumer (4 episodes, 2009-2010)

Thomas M. Smalley.... additional wardrobe (4 episodes, 2009)

Tina Ulee.... second costumer (4 episodes, 2009)

Natalie Arango.... key set costumer (3 episodes, 2008)

Shane Deschamps.... costume supervisor / set costumer (3 episodes, 2009)

Barrett Hong.... wardrobe supervisor (3 episodes, 2009)

Derek Moreno.... set costumer (2 episodes, 2008)

Jessica Costa.... costume coordinator (2 episodes, 2010)

Kevin Knight.... assistant costume designer (2 episodes, 2010)

Clare McLaren.... truck costumer (2 episodes, 2010)

Maria Waterman.... background costumer (2 episodes, 2010)

  

Nadia 'Sunny' Sorge.... background costume supervisor: pilot episode (unknown episodes)

 

Series Editorial Department

Tyson Hilgenberg.... post-production coordinator (39 episodes, 2008-2010)

Chad Rubel.... assistant editor / first assistant editor (19 episodes, 2008-2010)

Elizabeth Barnette.... assistant editor (7 episodes, 2009-2010)

Jennifer Van Goethem.... assistant editor (7 episodes, 2009-2010)

Lisa De Moraes.... assistant editor (6 episodes, 2008-2010)

Joshua Alan Baca.... online editor (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

Luyen H. Vu.... assistant editor (5 episodes, 2008-2009)

 

Series Music Department

Charles Scott IV.... music supervisor (63 episodes, 2008-2011)

Paul Apelgren.... music editor (44 episodes, 2008-2010)

J.J. Abrams.... composer: main title theme / composer: theme music (43 episodes, 2008-2010)

Billy Gottlieb.... music supervisor (41 episodes, 2008-2010)

Stephen M. Davis.... music editor (20 episodes, 2008-2010)

Chad Seiter.... composer: additional music (19 episodes, 2008-2009)

Chris Tilton.... composer: additional music (10 episodes, 2009)

Dan Wallin.... score engineer (6 episodes, 2008)

Michael Aarvold.... music scoring mixer (2 episodes, 2009)

 

Series Transportation Department

Larry Tardif.... transportation captain / camera car driver (8 episodes, 2009-2010)

Mike Zosiuk.... transportation security captain (5 episodes, 2010)

  

Gord Bettles.... picture car mechanic (unknown episodes)

 

Series Other crew

Andrew Kramer.... main title design / title designer / ... (40 episodes, 2008-2010)

Mindy Stevenson.... accounting auditor (34 episodes, 2008-2010)

Amy D'Alessandro.... titles / titles by (31 episodes, 2008-2010)

Cole Boughton.... key production assistant / production assistant (22 episodes, 2009-2010)

Scott Walden.... location manager (22 episodes, 2009-2010)

Nathaniel Moher.... assistant production coordinator / second assistant production coordinator (22 episodes, 2010-2011)

Graham Roland.... executive story editor (22 episodes, 2010-2011)

Yuell Newsome.... stock librarian (20 episodes, 2008-2009)

Diego Daniel Pardo.... on set dialect coach (19 episodes, 2008-2009)

Erika Goldfarb.... assistant production office coordinator (18 episodes, 2008-2009)

Bill Burns.... location scout (18 episodes, 2009-2010)

Jeffrey A. Brown.... assistant location manager (17 episodes, 2008-2009)

Talia Mayer.... location coordinator (17 episodes, 2008-2009)

Kerry Roberts.... payroll accountant (17 episodes, 2008-2009)

Lynn H. Powers.... location manager (16 episodes, 2008-2010)

Rob Coleman.... location scout (16 episodes, 2008-2009)

Rachel A. Gibson.... assistant accountant (16 episodes, 2008-2009)

Justin Kron.... location scout (16 episodes, 2008-2009)

Amy Meisner.... set production assistant / staff production assistant / ... (16 episodes, 2008-2009)

Matthew H. Wiesner.... location scout (16 episodes, 2008-2009)

Suzanne Clements-Smith.... assistant accountant (16 episodes, 2009-2010)

Shabazz Ray.... stand-in: Lance Reddick (15 episodes, 2008-2009)

Krista Huppert.... payroll assistant / payroll: crew (15 episodes, 2009-2010)

Malissa Katrynuk.... location scout (14 episodes, 2009-2010)

Stephen Ananicz.... set production assistant / production assistant (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Gjustina Dushku.... production assistant (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Rosa Garces.... second assistant accountant (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Jesse Hove.... location assistant (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Colby Knapp.... key second assistant accountant (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

James Parsons.... production assistant (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Vince Robinette.... production accountant (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Jamie Vermilye.... location assistant (13 episodes, 2008-2009)

Garnett Humenick.... craft service (13 episodes, 2009-2010)

Tom Teotico.... location scout (13 episodes, 2009-2010)

Dhana Rivera.... production coordinator (12 episodes, 2008-2009)

Nora Zuckerman.... staff writer (12 episodes, 2009-2010)

Josh Arnoudse.... production assistant (11 episodes, 2008-2009)

Ramón Rodríguez.... first accountant / first assistant accountant (11 episodes, 2008-2009)

Alexandra La Roche.... script supervisor (11 episodes, 2009-2010)

Max Torroba.... playback coordinator / computer/video playback coordinator (11 episodes, 2009-2010)

Lindsey Lefkow.... production secretary (10 episodes, 2008-2009)

Bonny Northcott.... trainee assistant location manager / assistant: location manager / ... (10 episodes, 2009-2010)

Sonja Beck Gingerich.... location assistant (9 episodes, 2008-2009)

Christopher M. Lewis.... office production assistant (9 episodes, 2008)

Rachel Connors.... script supervisor (9 episodes, 2009-2010)

Patti Henderson.... script supervisor (9 episodes, 2009-2010)

Shayne A. Wilson.... assistant production coordinator / first assistant production coordinator (9 episodes, 2009-2010)

Chris Farrow.... production assistant (8 episodes, 2008-2009)

Suk Yi Mar.... assistant location manager (8 episodes, 2008-2009)

Jacob Silver.... location unit assistant (8 episodes, 2008)

Tyler Scott.... production assistant (8 episodes, 2010)

Sean Wolput.... key production assistant (8 episodes, 2010)

Joshua Williams.... production assistant (7 episodes, 2008-2009)

Maire Ni Rochain.... production coordinator (7 episodes, 2009-2010)

Michael Bishop.... production assistant (7 episodes, 2009)

Joseph Lombardi.... production accountant (7 episodes, 2009)

Joshua A. Friedman.... production assistant (6 episodes, 2008)

Paul Kahil.... production assistant (6 episodes, 2008)

Michael Bendner.... background coordinator (6 episodes, 2009-2010)

Kymn Brettoner.... production accountant (6 episodes, 2009-2010)

Dan Majkut.... production assistant (6 episodes, 2009)

Joe Proietto.... office production assistant (5 episodes, 2008)

Anita Meehan-Truelove.... production coordinator (5 episodes, 2009-2010)

Steve Loff.... assistant accountant (5 episodes, 2009)

Sean M. Sullivan.... location scout (5 episodes, 2009)

Shawn Wilson.... assistant accountant (5 episodes, 2009)

Imran Yusufzai.... accounting clerk (5 episodes, 2009)

Lilla Zuckerman.... staff writer (5 episodes, 2010)

Jillian Demmerle.... location coordinator (4 episodes, 2008)

Quincy Gow.... production secretary (4 episodes, 2008)

Orit Greenberg.... location scout (4 episodes, 2008)

Liz Magee.... production assistant (4 episodes, 2008)

Lisa Molinaro.... script supervisor (4 episodes, 2008)

Melissa Kalbfus.... script supervisor: 2nd Unit (4 episodes, 2009)

Natalie Lapointe.... assistant: Reid Shane (4 episodes, 2009)

Ryan Steacy.... armorer (4 episodes, 2010)

Christina Cortez.... production assistant / additional production assistant (3 episodes, 2008-2009)

Scotch James Diaz Crisostomo.... payroll accountant (3 episodes, 2008)

Shannon Dennard.... location scout (3 episodes, 2008)

Catherine Gore.... script supervisor (3 episodes, 2008)

John F. Perez Jr..... location production assistant (3 episodes, 2008)

R. Zachary Shildwachter.... production assistant (3 episodes, 2008)

Paul Singh.... location scout (3 episodes, 2008)

Marisa Vrooman.... location scout (3 episodes, 2008)

Nils Widboom.... location scout (3 episodes, 2008)

Justin Doble.... script coordinator (3 episodes, 2009-2010)

Dan Kukkonen.... first assistant accountant (3 episodes, 2009)

Desiree Young.... location scout (3 episodes, 2009)

Robert Chiappetta.... story editor (3 episodes, 2010)

Ethan Gross.... story editor (3 episodes, 2010)

Colleen Reid.... assistant to director (3 episodes, 2010)

Glen Whitman.... story editor (3 episodes, 2010)

Nate Braeuer.... location scout (2 episodes, 2008)

Evan Gabriele.... assistant location manager (2 episodes, 2008)

Damon Michael Gordon.... location manager (2 episodes, 2008)

Corri Hopkins.... location assistant (2 episodes, 2008)

Keith Marlin.... background production assistant (2 episodes, 2008)

Anthony Vincent.... martial arts trainer: Joshua Jackson (2 episodes, 2008)

Devin Taylor.... playback editor (2 episodes, 2009-2010)

Amanda Bayard.... production assistant (2 episodes, 2009)

Michael Consolmagno.... production assistant (2 episodes, 2009)

Shane Lennox.... assistant location manager (2 episodes, 2009)

Loyzo Smolinsky.... production secretary (2 episodes, 2009)

Marina Alstad.... background coordinator (2 episodes, 2010)

Michelle Louise Bartolo.... assistant accountant (2 episodes, 2010)

Stuart Blackie.... office production assistant (2 episodes, 2010)

Jessica Feskun.... trainee assistant location manager (2 episodes, 2010)

Victor Formosa.... production assistant (2 episodes, 2010)

Steven Forster.... chef: Edible Planet (2 episodes, 2010)

Anji Freeland.... payroll: cast/US (2 episodes, 2010)

Jennifer Giannone.... clerk (2 episodes, 2010)

Ingrid Kenning.... script supervisor (2 episodes, 2010)

Tom MacNeill.... stand-in (2 episodes, 2010)

Marion Pejaire.... production assistant (2 episodes, 2010)

Sacha Schaddelee.... assistant chef: Edible Planet (2 episodes, 2010)

Cimone Schelle.... assistant chef: Edible Planet (2 episodes, 2010)

Tiffani Timms.... stand-in (2 episodes, 2010)

Linda Watters.... stand-in (2 episodes, 2010)

Lisa Wilder.... script supervisor (2 episodes, 2010)

  

Magali Boccaccio.... script coordinator (unknown episodes)

Amy Cuthbertson.... production coordinator (unknown episodes)

Stephanie Holinski.... production assistant (unknown episodes)

Andrea Voss.... assistant production coordinator (unknown episodes)

Casey Wallace.... production assistant (unknown episodes)

 

Series Thanks

Oliver Wyman.... special thanks (1 episode, 2010)

  

Atardecer en la barra de San Esteban de Pravia... cómo no... empezó a llover :(

 

Sin filtros, "Black Card (or black cloth) Technique"

 

Nikon D7000

ISO 100

5''

f9

Tokina 11-16mm a 11mm

  

Useful?

How my brick wall technique works. To get a weathered effect, use 1x2 plates with bar. To get a more regular effect, use 1x2 plates with 2 clips and connect those to a bar. If you run out of 1x2 tiles, use grille plates; they have the same effect.

Westpac Rescue Helicopter, 'Lifesaver 36', Eurocopter AS350 'Squirrel'.

I've finally caught myself a momentary break, of which has allowed me to achieve my first attempt at a new model of helicopter and an MFB Teleboom (photos coming later). Built using many new trial techniques and to be clear from all angles, although the frontal portion of the cockpit I'm not too happy with to match an AS350.

Boxpleat + technique du cylindre 32x64

Pour le défi du mois du forum d'origami (vol). Je voulais combiner mes deux spécialités : la technique du cylindre et les personnages en boxpleating. Voici le résultat. Eh oui, la soucoupe volante est complètement ronde. Une petite modification à la soucoupe et on croirait que l'extra-terrestre sort d'un cratère.

 

For the monthly challenge of the origami forum (flying). I wanted to combine my two specialties : my cylinder technique and boxpleated characters. Here's the result. The flying saucer is perfectly round. A small modification to it and the alien could come out of a crater.

Incomparable rapper Immortal Technique, October 5, 2005, opening for Palestinian rap trio DAM. His shirt says "GUERRILLA REPUBLIC: Since 1794."

 

...

 

Lyrics from "Bin Laden" by Immortal Technique with Mos Def:

 

[Mos Def - talking]

Man, you hear this bullshit they be talkin'

Every day, man

It's like these motherfuckers is just like professional liars

YouknowwhatI'msayin? It's wild

Listen

 

[Hook - Mos Def]

Bin Laden didn't blow up the projects

It was you, nigga

Tell the truth, nigga

(Bush knocked down the towers)--[Jadakiss]

Tell the truth, nigga

(Bush knocked down the towers)--[Jadakiss]

Tell the truth, nigga

 

[Verse 1 - Immortal Technique]

I pledge no allegiance, nigga fuck the president's speeches

I'm baptized by America and covered in leeches

The dirty water that bleaches your soul and your facial features

Drownin' you in propaganda that they spit through the speakers

And if you speak about the evil that the government does

The Patriot Act'll track you to the type of your blood

They try to frame you, and say you was tryna sell drugs

And throw a federal indictment on niggaz to show you love

This shit is run by fake Christians, fake politicians

Look at they mansions, then look at the conditions you live in

All they talk about is terrorism on television

They tell you to listen, but they don't really tell you they mission

They funded Al-Qaeda, and now they blame the Muslim religion

Even though Bin Laden, was a CIA tactician

They gave him billions of dollars, and they funded his purpose

Fahrenheit 9/11, that's just scratchin' the surface

 

[Hook - Mos Def]

Bin Laden didn't blow up the projects

It was you, nigga

Tell the truth, nigga

(Bush knocked down the towers)--[Jadakiss]

Tell the truth, nigga

(Bush knocked down the towers)--[Jadakiss]

Tell the truth, nigga

 

[Verse 2 - Immortal Technique]

They say the rebels in Iraq still fight for Saddam

But that's bullshit, I'll show you why it's totally wrong

Cuz if another country invaded the hood tonight

It'd be warfare through Harlem, and Washington Heights

I wouldn't be fightin' for Bush or White America's dream

I'd be fightin' for my people's survival and self-esteem

I wouldn't fight for racist churches from the south, my nigga

I'd be fightin' to keep the occupation out, my nigga

You ever clock someone who talk shit, or look at you wrong?

Imagine if they shot at you, and was rapin' your moms

And of course Saddam Hussein had chemical weapons

We sold him that shit, after Ronald Reagan's election

Mercenary contractors fightin' a new era

Corporate military bankin' off the war on terror

They controllin' the ghetto, with the failed attack

Tryna distract the fact that they engineerin' the crack

So I'm strapped like Lee Malvo holdin' a sniper rifle

These bullets'll touch your kids, and I don't mean like Michael

Your body be sent to the morgue, stripped down and recycled

I fire on house niggaz that support you and like you

Cuz innocent people get murdered in the struggle daily

And poor people never get shit and struggle daily

This ain't no alien conspiracy theory, this shit is real

Written on the dollar underneath the Masonic seal

 

(I don't rap for dead presidents

I'd rather see the president dead

It's never been said but I set precedents)--[Eminem]

 

[Hook - Mos Def]

Bin Laden didn't blow up the projects

It was you, nigga

Tell the truth, nigga

(Bush knocked down the towers)--[Jadakiss]

Tell the truth, nigga

(Bush knocked down the towers)--[Jadakiss]

Tell the truth, nigga

  

(Shady Records was 80 seconds away from the towers

Some cowards fucked with the wrong building, they meant to hit ours)-- [Eminem]

 

Technique: This Miner bee must have fallen asleep in a flower the night before and I found it in the morning. I held on to the flower with my left hand, and then braced the lens on that same hand to keep the scene steady.

 

Tech Specs: Canon 80D (F11, 1/250, ISO 100) + a Canon MP-E 65mm macro lens (about 3x) + a diffused MT-24EX (both flash heads on the Canon flash mount, E-TTL metering). This is a single, uncropped, frame taken hand held.

Here is a new set of LEGO ideas and techniques, made with LDD

I'm sure you'll find a use to this idea

I tried to make the explanation readable thanks to the colors as if we had a tutorial

 

Do not forget to watch the album with all the right techniques on your right =>

 

Find all my creations on Flickr group « News LEGO Techniques ».

This Flickr group includes:

 

- Ideas for new LEGO pieces

- Techniques for assembling bricks

- Tutorials for making accessories, objects, etc.

The wall can be built very solidly by anchoring the diagonal section every third brick layer and interlocking the side walls to the center.

This filigree technique known as "Damasquinado" (damascened) is very old and the most popular decoration for swords, guns and armours since ancient times. It is mainly the inlaying of a precious metal as gold or even silver into another standard metal like steel, iron, copper or bronze.

This craftmanship of oriental inspiration and after the presence in Spain of the Arabs during 700 years in the Middle Ages, was adopted by the spanish craftmen, mainly those from Toledo city.

  

I spent an enjoyable time a few days ago practicing a new technique that I learned for photographing hummingbird. Even if the pictures hadn't turned out well, it would have been fun, as these little birds are a lot of fun to watch.

 

I learned the lighting from a book by Linda Robbins called The Hummingbird Guide. Her method is to use a minimum 0f 5 to 6 strobes, a supplied background, and photograph the birds in the shade so that you don't have to overpower the sunlight. When you use multiple strobes on a subject in the shade you can use lower power settings for each flash which results in shorter flash durations which means it freezes the wing blur. I used 6 Yongnuo strobes because I wanted to use identical manual power output for each flash . One strobe was pointed at the background, one was underneath the feeder, and the other 4 strobes surrounded the feeder. The strobes were all at under 1/32nd power, in manual mode, and were triggered by a Yongnuo RF-603N., and you can see the EXIF info on the side. This method is the only way that I've been able to photograph one of these birds with little, or no, wing blur. Down below in the first comment, you can see a picture of the setup that I used.

 

I've taken quite a few pictures of hummers over the years and put them an album creatively called Hummingbirds.

www.flickr.com/photos/9422878@N08/sets/72157627149575339/

For those who were interested.

Technique: It was a cool day and this butterfly was having a tough time getting it's metabolism going, so shooting it at high magnification was easy. The background color is just from the flower that the butterfly was on.

 

Tech Specs: Canon 80D (F11, 1/250, ISO 100) + a Canon MP-E 65mm macro lens (about 3x) + a diffused MT-24EX (both flash heads on the Canon flash mount, E-TTL metering). This is a single, uncropped, frame taken hand held.

I searched for a solution to add something to 'jumpered'/half-stud offset wall. The ring wins with his clutch power, but I will go with the handcuffs, just because I have more of them available...Moc will be uploaded on main acc soon...

Sandwich Technique.