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Alfred Kammer, Director of the European Department at the International Monetary Fund, discussing the panel titled Lessons from recent experiences in macroeconomic forecasting, at the ECB Forum on central banking, 28 June 2023 in Sintra, Portugal.
© Sérgio Garcia/Your Image for ECB
3 May 2016. What are the risks of closer macro ties between the two regions and how can they be mitigated? What do Asia’s economic managers in Asia need to know to better manage the spillovers from macroeconomic links with Europe? Panelists analyze the benefits and risks, and discuss ways to maximize the former while containing the latter.
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Michele Reilly is a scientist, an artist, and a systems thinker whose work resists easy classification. She trained in architecture and art at Cooper Union, where she began building intelligent machines and quickly became fascinated by the logic behind them. That curiosity drew her into mathematics, cryptography, macroeconomics, and eventually quantum physics. Her path has been shaped less by credentials than by the depth of her questions.
At MIT, where she teaches in the Department of Mechanical Engineering, Michele works at the intersection of computation and the structure of spacetime. She explores how information flows through the universe, drawing from Claude Shannon’s foundational theories and extending them into the quantum realm. Her research is ambitious, but it is rooted in careful thinking. She is not interested in speculation for its own sake. She wants to know what can be built, what can be measured, and what will last.
In 2016, she co-founded Turing, a quantum technology startup focused on building portable quantum memories and tools for long-distance quantum communication. She works closely with physicist Seth Lloyd on designing the scalable, robust systems needed to move quantum computing from theory into practice. The work is intricate and deliberate, building slowly toward a future that she sees as both beautiful and unfamiliar.
Michele is also a storyteller. Her science fiction series Steeplechase has received awards at Cannes and other international festivals. It reflects her belief that narrative and science are not separate pursuits, but parallel ways of exploring the unknown. In her teaching, she brings these strands together, guiding students through exercises that combine quantum theory, creative writing, and world-building. One of her courses, supported by MIT’s Center for Art, Science and Technology, invites students to imagine speculative futures grounded in scientific inquiry.
On her arm is a tattoo of Alan Turing. It is not ornamental. It is a quiet tribute to a thinker whose life and work continue to shape her own. Turing’s dedication to truth, structure, and the ethical weight of technology is a constant presence in her thinking. She carries it with her, quite literally.
The portrait above was made at The Interval at the Long Now Foundation in San Francisco. Michele is seated beside a polished table that reflects her image. Behind her stands the Orrery, a planetary model designed to keep time for ten thousand years. The setting reflects the spirit of her work. She is grounded in the present but always thinking forward, asking how we might live in ways that honor complexity, care, and continuity. She does not speak often about legacy. She speaks about attention, about precision, and about the discipline of staying with difficult questions until they begin to yield something real.
Three days till the madness is over…!
-Two finals and a research paper due TOMORROW
-One final on Tuesday
-Take-home final due Wednesday
....and then I’m FREE!
Please keep me in your thoughts/prayers. THANK YOU!!! :)
I'm sorry I've neglected your streams for a while now! As soon as finals are over, I promise I will get back in the swing of things, and that includes visiting your streams regularly! :)
Fifth annual Fiscal Summit sponsored by the Peter G. Peterson Foundation on May 14, 2014 in Washington, D.C.
Window-shopping in Akihabara. Actually, more like oogling the ladies as there's lots of girls wearing bizarre outfits in an attempt to sell you something. But don't tell my girlfriend.
Anyone with CS4? Can you view this large (the first link in the photo description) and tell me what font is used for my watermark? It's in the top-left corner (or this one). The font came with CS4 and I'm now apparently missing it in CS3 :( I'll return the favour with a cup of coffee (should you live in Toronto that is)!
(I'm trying to make for some good Flickr-time for checking out streams but haven't anticipated the workload that Macroeconomics and Accounting courses would create. I should know better.. *sigh* But the uploading will continue lol.)
Moderator Gabriela Frias (left to right), Anchor, CNN en Español, Min Zhu, Deputy Managing Director, IMF, Carolina Trivelli, former Minister of Social Inclusion, Peru, Raghuram Rajan, Reserve Bank of India, Governor, Liliana Rojas-Suarez, Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development, Alfred Hannig, Executive Director, AFI in the flagship seminar Financial Inclusion: Can it Meet Multiple Macroeconomic Goals, during the 2015 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Lima, Peru. Ryan Rayburn/IMF Photo
According to the UN Millennium Development Goals Report 2007, one billion people, or roughly one out of three urban dwellers, live in slum conditions.
The Macroeconomic Policy and Development Division Assists member states in addressing challenges to poverty reduction, such as the recent economic and financial crisis in the Asian and the Pacific region.
13 June 2010
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Photo: Kibae Park
Constantinos Herodotou, Governor of the Central bank of Cyprus, attending the panel titled Lessons from recent experiences in macroeconomic forecasting, at the ECB Forum on central banking, 28 June 2023 in Sintra, Portugal.
© Sérgio Garcia/Your Image for ECB
James Heintz, Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts, speaks on the panel Making Macroeconomics Work for Women on Wednesday, October 5 during the 2016 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington, D.C. Ryan Rayburn/IMF Photo
Recently, many economies have come under sharp foreign exchange pressures, reflecting large commodity price declines, volatile external financing conditions, and country-specific factors. This seminar will invite central bank officials from emerging and frontier markets to discuss their recent experiences in dealing with these pressures, including the role of exchange rate flexibility and constraints imposed by the overall macroeconomic policy frameworks and balance sheets.
Recently, many economies have come under sharp foreign exchange pressures, reflecting large commodity price declines, volatile external financing conditions, and country-specific factors. This seminar will invite central bank officials from emerging and frontier markets to discuss their recent experiences in dealing with these pressures, including the role of exchange rate flexibility and constraints imposed by the overall macroeconomic policy frameworks and balance sheets.
1st June 2016 - OECD 2016 Forum: Trade & Investment
Moderator: Cyrille Lachèvre, Macroeconomics Reporter, L’Opinion, France
Lilianne Ploumen, Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Netherlands
Photo: OECD/Hervé Cortinat
Ms. Utsunomiya - Good morning. Greetings also to those who are watching us online. I am Keiko Utsunomiya, External Relations Officer from the External Relations Department of the International Monetary Fund. With me here is Mr. Jerry Schiff, Deputy Director of the Asia and Pacific Department; Mr. Anoop Singh, Director of the Asia and Pacific Department; also Mr. Masahiko Takeda, Deputy Director; Mr. Markus Rodlauer, Deputy Director; and Mr. Hoe Ee Khor, also Deputy Director of the Asia and Pacific Department. Mr. Singh will give brief opening remarks before taking questions from the floor.
Anoop, please.
The Director of the Asia and Pacific Department (Mr. Singh) - ...on how we see the outlook for Asia, let me just mention at the start that we are going to be launching our Asian Economic Outlook in Asia very soon, and hopefully I might see some of you in the region as we go into much more detail on our assessments. Let me make three points at the start of my remarks.
As you have seen from press conferences this week and the World Economic Outlook WEO, Asia is clearly continuing to lead the three-speed global recovery. Having said that, we are looking at risks and they are shifting. In the short term, we are looking carefully at financial imbalances to see if they are building up in some countries. Of course, there is the clear reality that corporate and banking sector balance sheets in Asia are really still very sound. Beyond that, over the medium term, we are looking at the priorities in rebuilding policy space so as to ensure that foundations are laid for longer-term prosperity. Some countries in Asia might face what some call the “middle-income trap” and it is important that policies seek to avoid that.
Okay, briefly on these points. As I said, Asia is leading the three-speed global recovery. You have seen these numbers. You have seen that Asia is going to grow closer to 5 3/4 this year. If you look at Emerging Asia, it is well above that, over 7 percent this year. Of course, there is some variation on this in Asia.
Also important for us as we look at Asia is the ASEAN economies. They are growing at close to 5 1/2 percent and some frontier countries are growing even higher, about 6, 6 1/2, such as Cambodia, and Myanmar. For the Pacific Island countries, partly given their lower connectivity with the region, their growth is somewhat lagging.
The main point I want to make on the near-term outlook being so strong in Asia despite the external situation, which, of course, is improving and that helps Asia a lot, the main point is that domestic demand in Asia has been more of a key driver of the Asian growth than we could have expected a couple of years ago. Consumption and private investment have been robust across Asia, supported by a number of factors; of course, also, by relatively easy financial conditions.
What we are also learning is that the spillovers within Asia are positive and large. As you look at the data available for trade within Asia, especially among the ASEAN countries, you see that demand has picked up and there is more demand within ASEAN economies. The final demand is coming more in consumer products within ASEAN and less simply from the supply chain.
Let us talk briefly about China and Japan. In China, we recognize that the latest data do show a somewhat lower growth rate during the first quarter than expected, but in our view growth appears to be on track. Our projections remain at 8 percent this year, even picking up for next year. You have seen that some of the indicators in the first quarter have been rather strong. In Japan, our view is that a policy stimulus should help sustain growth around 1 1/2 percent for this year. In both cases, there are positive spillovers to the region from China and Japan.
Inflation is not an issue. In most countries, not in every country but in most countries, inflation should remain generally within the comfort zones of the targets of central banks.
Let us move now on to risks. They are certainly narrower and they are more balanced than they were six months ago. As I said, external risks have certainly come down and therefore we are looking more carefully at regional risks. In the near term, we are looking carefully at trends in credit ratios in relation to output gaps. We are seeing in many countries that credit ratios and output levels are fairly clearly moving above trends of course, fueled by easy global and domestic financial conditions. Therefore, there is a risk that balance sheets could come under pressure. But, as I said, corporate and financial sector balance sheets in Asia are generally sound.
There are a number of other risks of significance: regional risks, global risks, geo-politics. They would be disruptive, in part because Asia continues to have a highly integrated supply chain network, but the growing dependence on regional demand helps mitigate some of these potential risks. So, policymakers face a delicate balancing act, guarding against the potential buildup of financial imbalances while ensuring adequate support for growth.
So, in that context, let me say a few words on the macroeconomic policy stance in countries. These have been accommodative. They have served the region well, given the external risks. But output levels are close to or above trend in many countries, and output gaps have narrowed or have disappeared. Therefore, our sense is that monetary policymakers should stand very ready to respond quickly, decisively, and preemptively to avoid any risks of overheating.
Of course, this point is quite different from country to country within Asia. Let me make a brief point on Japan. In Japan, the new quantitative and qualitative monetary easing policy is clearly welcome, as Japan needs to reach and achieve its domestic goals of ending deflation and raising growth. But, as we have said, and as the Japan authorities have said, it needs to be complemented by ambitious fiscal sustainability and a growth strategy to revive the economy on a sustained basis.
Nevertheless, given that capital has come back to Asia, it is the case that macroprudential measures are playing and will have to play an important role, especially where there has been rapid credit growth in the context of strong capital inflows to ensure these do not put pressure on financial stability.
Asia will be attractive for capital over the medium term, given its growth fundamentals. Therefore, we can expect capital inflows to remain strong over the medium term. The challenge is how do you accommodate this capital coming in. Here, the most important point from my point of view is to ensure that the economic framework directs these capital flows into foreign direct investment rather than just portfolio, to help build infrastructure in areas important for medium-term growth.
In this context, I will also make a related point on fiscal policy. In many countries, as you look at their structural balances, their structural deficits, these are generally now somewhat higher than they were before the global crisis. Asian countries therefore need to rebuild their policy and fiscal space to ensure that infrastructure needs can be adequately and sustainably addressed.
This is closely linked to medium-term issues and that is how you make growth in Asia more inclusive, more sustainable. In this context, the fiscal policy framework is very important. We believe in many countries, especially in Emerging Asia, there is a lot of room to enhance the quality of revenue and expenditure policies, thereby helping make growth more resilient and more inclusive. This is also important for many countries to avoid what some have called the “middle-income trap.”
Thus, to maintain Asia’s growth leadership, many countries have to take reforms across a range of areas, especially strengthening infrastructure investment, but also reforms in goods and labor markets, and for many countries, meeting the challenges for demographic changes that are coming to much of Asia.
So, that is my introduction. The near term looks good. Policymakers are now looking at risks over the medium term. They are trying to ensure that Asia remains a growth leader while making their growth inclusive and sustainable. Thank you very much.
Ms. Utsunomiya - Thank you, Anoop.
Now we will take questions from the floor. We will also welcome questions online as well. Please identify yourself and affiliation.
Any questions, please?
Question - My question is for Mr. Singh.
You mentioned about China’s economy that we should not overreact about the recent data of slowdown. I was just wondering, what do you think is the biggest challenge for China’s economy despite what you said that we should not overreact?
You also mentioned about shadow banking. Do you have your own assessment or measurement about how large is China’s shadow banking?
Mr. Singh - Let me just, on your first point, mention that we just got some information overnight about China’s business sentiment indicator that shows improvement in overall business conditions in April. This has been driven by increases in new orders and production. This is consistent with our sense that growth remains close to 8 percent for this year.
You talked about other issues. I might ask my colleagues to speak more about this. Basically, I think we are at a stage where China, as the President has said, including recently in Haikou—I was recently at the Boao Forum and we heard President Xi Jinping speak. He spoke very comprehensively. He spoke about the need to adapt China’s growth model. He was very clear that China needs to change from its growth model being focused on manufacturing and exports, to being much more focused on what he calls “People Development,” to shift the focus from investment, manufacturing, and exports to consumption, to households. This is a change in the growth model. It involves a whole range of policies. Among those is financial sector reform. We have heard the People’s Bank of China speak very often of how this is a priority for China and for them in the near term. I raise this because you asked about shadow financing, shadow lending. This is clearly something which is being looked at.
On the one hand, it is an indication that financial developments and credit in China are deepening and are moving ahead in a more liberalized environment, but they need also to have full regulation. Therefore, there is concern that this is rising very fast. Overall, the point I will make is that in China recently credit growth has been large and the authorities are trying to moderate it.
Markus, you want to add to that?
The Deputy Director of the Asia and Pacific Department (Mr. Rodlauer) - Shadow banking, let us say nontraditional financing in China has become, of course, very important. As a share of total financial flows, it has risen to almost half; last year it was 40 percent of total intermediation. This year it is probably half. So, it is a very important part of growth, a very important part of China’s story of moving toward more market determination.
At the same time, of course, because it is growing so fast, whenever credit is growing very fast, it bears vigilance because there are issues about credit quality, issues about liquidity risks.
In terms of the overall size, why it is growing very fast in terms of the overall size, our assessment is that it is still manageable. It is still relatively small. The authorities have the margins to control it. But if the very rapid growth were to continue for some time, it would become, of course, larger and larger. So, our job is to point to the risks before they become a problem. I think that is the focus of the authorities at this point.
Question - The World Economic Outlook forecasts India’s growth to be at 7 percent in the medium term, while India is currently going through a phase of slowing growth and a high current account deficit and fiscal deficit is adding to India’s problems. So, where do you get this confidence from or what gives you the confidence that India will return to the 7 percent growth?
Mr. Singh - Let me make a couple of points. You are talking, I guess, more generally about potential growth. Our sense is clearly India has that potential. We have seen, however, a drop in growth in recent years, but we are seeing in recent months a changing sentiment responding to changing policies.
If you look at some high frequency indicators, you will see that a recovery from the low growth in India is beginning. As you know, we are projecting for this fiscal year growth rising to about 5.8. If you look at the calendar year for 2014, we are seeing it already rising to over 6, around 6 percent.
On policies, let me just say that one concern has been the slow rate of project approvals in India. Therefore, I think it is significant that the government has established a Cabinet Committee to accelerate project approvals and deal with this overhang of project requests that have not been approved.
On the other hand, and it is not just India but across Asia, capital is coming in. If you look at India, you will see that the balance of foreign direct investment to other capital has somewhat changed in recent years. The ratio of FDI has gone down a bit. Therefore, it is important for India and other countries that the balance goes back and rises for FDI that is more sustainable. The challenge is to ensure it goes into sectors that are important for growth.
It is in that context that we should look very carefully at what countries are doing in Asia, and recently in India, to improve the attractiveness of FDI and enhance its FDI framework. They have liberalized the FDI regime in a number of areas, including in retail and aviation.
So, overall, there has been reform in accelerating policy approvals, project approvals, liberalizing FDI, and continuing with the commitment for fiscal consolidation. The government is acting on a number of areas. That is why we do believe that potential growth in India could certainly go above where it currently has been.
Question - I have a question about the capital controls. When you think about G3 central banks, they are implementing huge quantitative easing and money flows to emerging markets, especially the countries that are growing fast. What do you recommend, to those countries that are getting portfolio inflows partly in FDI, the policy mix, capital controls or currency intervention? We have not seen currency intervention yet, but I would just like to hear your thoughts about that.
Ms. Utsunomiya - Could you clarify. Is that capital flows in Asia?
Question - In Emerging Asia in general.
Mr. Singh - I talked about this in my opening remarks. A lot has been written on this in recent months. Let me briefly mention there are two ways to see this.
In the short run, yes, there are concerns of capital volatility. In Emerging Asia, capital flows rebounded in the second half of last year, certainly went above previous trends, including in the first quarter of this year, but since then there has been moderation. So, on the one hand, there is the risk of volatility and this volatility is much more pronounced if the inflow is in the form of portfolio and other in the shorter term. So, the challenge for Asia is how to continue to get capital on a sustainable basis.
It is important to recognize that, looking beyond where global monetary conditions presently are, over the medium term, you are going to see emerging markets, especially in Asia, remaining the growth leader. Therefore, we have to expect that capital will continue to flow to emerging countries, especially Asia. That is the reality.
It’s a very simple issue, to my mind. The challenge for Asia is how you shift this, so that capital does not come with volatility in the short run, into short-run speculative or property investments that have caused bubbles and how do you shift that focus into FDI, as I said earlier.
Now, in the short run, you will see that countries in Asia have done a lot in these macroprudential measures, trying to target those flows which could be more sensitive from a shorter-run speculative point of view. They have stayed away from what is called capital controls so far. They have used a number of measures and I think to some extent they are succeeding, but I would say the more important longer-term issue is how to ensure that these flows go into infrastructure in much of Emerging Asia, across ASEAN, including India and South Asia; that the challenge is reorienting the fiscal policy space to build infrastructure and ensuring that this is boosted by foreign capital. That is the challenge.
Let me ask colleagues if you want to add to it.
Mr. Rodlauer - In terms of the individual country’s policy response to portfolio, large-scale portfolio inflows, I think there is not really a one-size-fits-all approach. It depends very much on the actual macro situation of the country, where they are in the policy framework. If there is room to have the traditional macro responses, like, some exchange rate appreciation for a country that may be undervalued or is not overvalued, that is one line of defense. If you have a monetary policy cycle where you can actually tighten, where you can actually loosen and you do not have overheating yet, you can reduce interest rates to keep capital flows outside.
If those macro traditional responses do not work, you may want to shift to macroprudential measures. There is a whole range of capital-based, liquidity-based measures that many countries have done. If that does not work in the end, as we have said, capital flow measures may in the end also be one of the policy tools in the arena as well as currency intervention.
For example, a country like Hong Kong, whose policy framework does not have an independent monetary policy, does not have capital controls, has a very clear fiscal framework, has very clear macro openness, no controls framework, macro-prudential and intervention are the main tools because that is consistent with their framework. So, it really depends on a country-by-country situation.
Question - Also a related question to the previous one. So, given that Japan has just announced a radical monetary easing policy, and we have seen many central banks have also done this, how can we assured that there will be no risk of competitive depreciation?
Mr. Singh - Well, I think on Japan we spoke about this yesterday, and I would say that the main point is that what Japan has done needs to be understood in terms of their own efforts to end decades-long deflation and to revive growth. Therefore, their new monetary framework is integral to this undertaking along with public debt and growth reforms. The ` process aims at raising domestic demand, and the nominal exchange rate could depreciate together with rising domestic demand to raise inflation.
Now, you talk about competitiveness. I do not think this is really a very big issue. In my view, as we look at currencies, we do not see in them any significant misalignments from their medium-term fundamentals. . I think what is crucial right now is for advanced economies to revive their growth that is important for the rest of the world. What we are seeing is part of their effort to do so.
Do you have anything on Japan?
The Deputy Director of the Asia and Pacific Department (Mr. Schiff) - Just a couple of small points. One is that I think your question more generally was about spillovers from the Japanese policy response. Of course, that is an important issue. I think it feeds also into our view that, while the monetary expansion is appropriate and welcome, it needs to be accompanied by structural reforms to raise potential growth and by a number of steps to bring the fiscal situation under control. If they do those things, and if Japan is able to sustain higher growth, then we think that that will be very good for the region as well as for the global economy.
The other small point is that, given that Asia is characterized by this very well-known supply chain, even the impact of a depreciation of one currency has a not so straightforward impact on other countries because, on the one hand, countries compete in third markets, but Japan is also an important supplier of inputs into the supply chain. In that case, depreciation may be helpful for other countries in that supply chain.
Mr. Singh - Let me just make one more comment on Japan. You know that the authorities have indicated that they will, by midyear, announce their growth strategy. It is very important. It is important also that the Prime Minister has recently given some outlines and it is very important to us that he has also highlighted the importance of healthcare and women in the workforce.
There was a paper we had written as staff last year about the gains in Japan of raising women in the workforce. It is interesting that in a recent statement by the Prime Minister, he is highlighting that increasing women in the workforce will be central, key to his growth strategy. So, I think we will be seeing more measures in the coming months.
Question - China is exhibiting enormous excess capacity right now and that has been fueled by a very high investment rate over the last few years, up to 50 percent in some years. Now, much of that investment is going into production that is not being used. It is most obvious in the retail and residential housing sector, where you see unoccupied apartment buildings. You will see it in commercial sectors as well. My two questions are, one, how much is that also playing out in the state-owned enterprise sector? Is there an enormous amount of built-up excess capacity being developed there? The second question is how do you see that being resolved or how do you see it being played out over the next few years? How do they get out of that excess capacity situation?
Mr. Singh - I am going to ask Markus to answer that. The point I make is that this is part of the effort to change the growth model, to change it from it being investment-led. We know that investment in residential housing has been very high in certain parts of China, and it is to change that focus to other areas.
Markus, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Rodlauer - I think it is very clear in the government’s own policy statements that reducing excess capacity and working it off is one of the key parts, and I think rather than just destroying capacity, obviously reorienting the growth model from one that is investment-based that is traditional in China, building out capacity for growth to come and then selling the products abroad or at home.
Now, when you look at the real estate sector, for example, we do, of course know there is excess capacity. I would not take sort of the headlines that come out. We have all seen the recent 60 Minutes report. Those are cases which are not representative of the whole situation in China. There is enormous demand for housing. There is enormous potential for continued urbanization. So, while there is excess capacity, we must not take the headlines at some point as indicative of the general situation.
We have done our own estimate of the capital stock in China and two things come out. On the one hand, there is evidence that if you build it up analytically from the various components—initial stock, investment, depreciation—potential output is about 5 percent higher than actual output. So economy-wide, there is significant spare capacity. At the same time, let us not forget that capital stock per worker in China is somewhere around 10 percent of the capital stock in the U.S. per worker. Again, indicative that there is a tremendous amount of room to raise capital stock further.
In many ways, the issue is not the level but the speed. When you try to catch up very, very fast, there is a risk that you create accidents, bubbles, and misallocation along the line. So, reducing the speed, reorienting the growth model to one that is more consumer-led, I think is the appropriate approach.
Ms. Utsunomiya - Let me take a question online. What are the consequences for Thailand and Asia of the high appreciation of the Thai baht?
Mr. Singh - Well, I think what we are seeing across Asia is part of what we call rebalancing. We are seeing capital coming into Asia; we are seeing currencies appreciating. This is consistent with fundamentals.
Beyond that, if we look at Thailand specifically, we have seen that growth has picked up. Growth has been about 6 last year; it should remain close to 6 percent for this year. From all accounts, if you look at exports, exports remain competitive and export growth has been strong. So, overall I think what we are seeing in Thailand and Asia is part of the process of the implications of rebalancing and the effects on exchange rates.
Question - For the past two days I heard the term “macroprudential measures” many times. Could you specify what macroprudential measures are? Especially for China, what advice will you give for China to address financial stability risks?
Mr. Rodlauer - Generally, we classify macroprudential measures into three types and they have different effects and they have different consequences. The most direct ones are the ones that we call credit-based which try to address directly the amount of credit that is going out from institutions; for example, loan-to-value ratios. You tell a bank that you can only have so many loans compared to the value of the mortgage.
Then we have the capital-based ones which try to fortify the individual institutions to build up capital, to make sure that they have enough buffers in case there was a problem. And then we have the liquidity-based macroprudential measures which make sure that there is enough liquidity buffers in the system, that banks do not have maturity mismatches.
So, all three of those have been quite extensively employed by China as well as its neighbors. We can take Hong Kong as another example, which is trying to fight a property price boom that is there and, given their policy framework, macroprudential measures the main tool they can use to address it. So, we advise countries to use those as much as they can, particularly if their policy framework is constrained, like the one in Hong Kong. We do see that they are effective.
They have different consequences in terms of price signals and resource allocation. We generally think that the price-based measures, like capital-based macroprudential measures, are perhaps the least distortive ones because, again, they are price-based, actinig mainly through the cost of funds for banks. Overall, as I say, China and Hong Kong have used the whole gamut of these measures and they are effective.
Ms. Utsunomiya - If there are no more questions, we would like to conclude our press conference here. I have printouts of the opening remarks here. We will also post the transcript of this briefing online later. As Anoop mentioned, we will be launching the Asia Pacific Regional Economic Outlook on Monday, April 29th, so please mark your calendar. Thank you all for coming.
Huw Pill, Chief Economist at the Bank of England, discussing the panel titled Lessons from recent experiences in macroeconomic forecasting, at the ECB Forum on central banking, 28 June 2023 in Sintra, Portugal.
© Sérgio Garcia/Your Image for ECB
Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board at the European Central Bank chairing the panel titled Lessons from recent experiences in macroeconomic forecasting, at the ECB Forum on central banking, 28 June 2023 in Sintra, Portugal.
© Sérgio Garcia/Your Image for ECB
Monetary policy challenges from falling natural interest rates
Klaus Adam, Professor, University of Oxford
Discussant: Argia Sbordone, Vice President and Function Head, Macroeconomic and Monetary Studies Function, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Chair: Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board, European Central Bank
© Bernd Hartung / European Central Bank
Qatar remains most resilient Gulf economy as its macroeconomic data outperform peers, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch.
“We expect Qatari macro to continue outperforming GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council) peers, as 2022 FIFA World Cup capex (capital expenditure) spending appears set to c...
goqatar.co/qatar-most-resilient-gulf-economy-outperform-p...
This series of workshops advances the work of a comprehensive comparative study of the fiscal histories of eleven Latin American countries. A team of economists in each of the countries will produce a monetary and fiscal history of each country from 1960 to the present. Viewing country specific data as “case studies,” the researchers will test two central hypotheses: first, that bad fiscal and monetary policies led to macroeconomic instability, and second, that macroeconomic instability was responsible for low growth and poor economic performance in this region.
These photos are from the workshop held in Argentina on August 18. Learn more: bfi.uchicago.edu/events/fiscal-and-monetary-history-latin...
Moderator Sheila MacVicar, leads the panel Making Macroeconomics Work for Women on Wednesday, October 5 during the 2016 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington, D.C. Ryan Rayburn/IMF Photo
Nyaradzayi Gumbonzvanda, Chair of the ActionAid International Board speaks on the panel Making Macroeconomics Work for Women on Wednesday, October 5 during the 2016 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington, D.C. Ryan Rayburn/IMF Photo
18 September 2020. The finance ministers and central bank governors of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), People’s Republic of China, Japan, and Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3) convened its 23rd meeting online. The ministers and governors discussed recent economic and financial developments in the region and strengthening regional financial cooperation through the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), and Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI), among others.
The meeting was held virtually as part of the 53rd Annual Meeting of the ADB Board of Governors (2nd Stage). View the full list of webinars and meetings.
The first stage of the 53rd Annual Meeting comprised a reduced-scale meeting of the Board of Governors on 22 May, during which Governors approved ADB’s financial statements and net income allocation in line with ADB institutional requirements.
Port of Suva is the most extensive and busiest container and general Port providing the maritime gateway to Fiji's capital Suva.
The Fiji Ports Development Project comprised wharf improvements at the ports of Suva and Lautoka, on the island of Viti Levu, the principal gateways for Fijiâs international trade. The projectâs objectives were to achieve a stable macroeconomic environment; support trade, investment, private sector development; and enhance the economyâs competitiveness through sustained improvements in port productivity.
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Chen Chen, Technical Assistance Advisor, IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, and Irene Yackovlev, Senior Economist, IMF Communications Department, introduce the new IMF course on the macroeconomics of climate change, at the International Monetary Fund.
IMF Photo/Allison Shelley
19 April 2022
Washington, DC, United States
Photo ref: AS220419045.cr3
Director-General Pascal Lamy, in presenting the Richard Snape Lecture on 26 November in Melbourne, Australia, said that: “The rising weight of influence of emerging economies has shifted the balance of power. This clearly implies a number of transitions to which we have not yet adjusted as classic Westphalia concepts of sovereignty are being challenged by the realities of interdependence. Some may consider this a problem, it is perhaps better to think of it as an opportunity to look at the real shaping factors of trade.” This is what he said:
“The Future of the Multilateral Trading System”
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am very pleased to have been asked to deliver a few remarks on the future of the multilateral trading system at this, the 2012 Richard Snape Lecture Series. Since 2003, this lecture series has served as a cornucopia of ideas and opinions and I hope the dialogue this evening will also offer new and compelling perspectives on the changing topography of international trade.
I say international trade, but the reality of twenty-first century economics is that the notion of geography and of a defined marketplace is becoming increasingly irrelevant as the DNA of trade continues to transform. The edges between international, regional and national trade are becoming increasingly blurred which means that trade-related decisions that would previously have been taken in silos must now be based on the whole economic picture. Policies and decision making must become external in reach given that their impacts are now felt beyond the borders of the nation state. As existentialists would say, we are in an ’age of transition’.
This evening I will speak briefly about this changing landscape of trade — a transformation premised on the geo-political shifts that have occurred over the last two decades and the exponential reach and impact of technological advances. I will also address the growing reach of value chains and touch on the new features that I see forming the trade agenda of the future, such as trade in value added and non-tariff measures. Finally I will provide some insight into how the World Trade Organization (WTO) is seeking to respond to these changes.
The rising weight of influence of emerging economies has shifted the balance of power. This clearly implies a number of transitions to which we have not yet adjusted as classic Westphalia concepts of sovereignty are being challenged by the realities of interdependence. Some may consider this a problem; it is perhaps better to think of it as an opportunity to look at the real shaping factors of trade.
International trade environment
First, a word about the current macroeconomic environment and trade growth climate — “subdued”. That is the word I would use. Subdued prospects and subdued expectations. I know this may sound a bit too downbeat here in Australia, given the high growth rates this country has seen in recent years. But the fact is that the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 has left a ubiquitous imprint on international trade and global growth. There have been false recoveries, unpredictable growth rates and a reassessment in many quarters as to the very theological basis of our economic models.
The old theories and hypotheses which governed the way we looked at trade in the twentieth century will require better calibration with the new reality of trade in the twenty-first century. Decades from now scholars and policy makers will look back on this period as a watershed moment in how we approached trade and economic policy. Whether we, collectively, recognised the missteps of the past and learnt from them or whether we continued to forge ahead on the road already traversed. Was it not Confucius that said one should ’study the past if you would define the future’?
As we near the end of 2012, the signs are not positive. We are living in a global macroeconomic environment in turmoil. Countries are still trying to find appropriate exit strategies from the economic crisis and global unemployment remains far too high. Although we have seen some positive signals recently, the European sovereign debt crisis has not yet retreated and this continues to have implications for fiscal adjustment in some of the euro area economies and the economic prospects of developing country markets, particularly those in Africa, given their strong trade links with Europe. And these economic uncertainties continue to lead to social unrest and political turmoil which have far reaching implications for global security.
The WTO recently revised its forecast for trade volume growth in 2012 to 2.5 per cent, down from 3.7 per cent in the spring. Exports of developing countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are expected to grow by 3.5 per cent while exports of developed countries by around 1.5 per cent. These weakening prospects reflect the toll that the European sovereign debt crisis and slowing global output growth have taken on international trade.
These figures are hardly surprising. They are in line with the downward revision of the International Monetary Fund’s forecast for global growth for this year and the lower growth forecast by the World Bank for East Asia of 7.2 per cent this year and 7.6 per cent in 2013, down from earlier estimates of 7.6 per cent and 8.0 per cent respectively, making this the slowest growth rate in the Asia Pacific region since 2001. The 2012 growth forecasts for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America have also been revised downwards. On the side of employment, the ILO has forecast that in 2013 an additional 7 million people will join the 200-million-strong ranks of the unemployed, a vast section of which will be unemployed youth.
For developed countries, the hindrances to growth include fiscal consolidation and bank deleveraging. The euro-zone will see negative growth this year and still faces elevated downside risks despite the European Central Bank’s recent policy actions. Forecasts earlier this month confirm that Europe’s economic prospects have dimmed considerably, with a more drawn-out recovery expected before any discernible return to growth. The US is expected to continue along its sluggish recovery (2.2 per cent growth). Despite the Federal Reserve’s announcement of measures to aid the economy, the US will continue to face headwinds in the form of households burdened with large debts and high unemployment as well as policy uncertainty because of the looming “fiscal cliff”.
While emerging and developing economies continue to grow, rates are lower than in the past. This suggests that the slowdown in advanced economies is spreading to emerging countries through lower exports and smaller capital flows. There is some volatility in commodity prices which could harm commodity exporters. One silver lining is that because of their better economic position, developing economies have greater ability to respond with fiscal and monetary stimulus if conditions worsen.
With such a challenging international background, there is always the risk that countries may seek to rebalance domestic growth by seeking to protect domestic producers. As I described in a recent editorial entitled ’Learning from the Crisis: The Fallacy of Protectionism’, there have been worrying signs of the traditional propensity of nation states to turn inwards when the global economic outlook is bad but for the most part, countries have exercised restraint. There is the fear, however, that if unemployment and economic stagnation persists, this discipline may be tested. Protectionism does not work, however. Closing off markets would be a mistake in a world where hampering imports will actively harm prospects for exporting success. Protectionism does not protect. It does not strengthen economies and it does not save jobs. Governments protect people by supporting domestic economic growth and social protection, not by resorting to short-term policies that may benefit the few at the expense of the many.
Geo-political transformations
This is no longer the world of the twentieth century dominated by the US pillar on one side and the European pillar on the other. We are in a twenty-first century multi-polar world. Ricardians would see this as a natural progression of comparative advantages while the Westphalia model would see this as a breakdown of the order of the nation state. I see this as the contemporary form of multilateralism, with notions of sovereignty being challenged by realities of interdependence. I see this as an opportunity. Opportunities for policy makers to take a new look at the forces moving trade and political-economic discourse.
The emergence of some developing countries as key players and as real contributors to global dialogue on trade and economics is a fundamental feature of this new geo-political reality. These emerging powers — China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Africa — and many others — Thailand, Chile, Turkey — are no longer policy takers. These countries now increasingly influence the pattern and scope of international trade, creating new supply and demand pulls and flexing their influence in international organisations. These changes in the geo-political and economic topography essentially led to the formation of the G-20 as we know it today — a group of countries which have an important stake but also a big responsibility in global economic governance.
The global network of imports and exports is no longer just the North-South paradigm of the past century. Increasingly we are seeing developing countries as producers and as markets for each other and this is one of the growing patterns of the new landscape of trade. To illustrate the growing shift, we only have to look at the evolution of merchandise trade between developing countries, which has expanded considerably in the past 20 years growing much faster than North-South trade. A recent report by UNCTAD notes that in 2010 South-South exports made up 23 per cent of world trade compared to just 13 per cent in 2000. Developing countries are now the largest market for other developing countries. While this is encouraging, the contribution of developing regions to South-South trade is highly skewed. Asian countries make up more than 80 per cent of South-South trade, with the shares of Africa and Latin America being just 6 per cent and 10 per cent respectively in 2010.
South-South trade with a focus on Africa
We are also seeing growing ties between Africa and China and Africa and India. Trade between China and Africa will likely hit upwards of USD 200 billion in 2012, up 25 per cent year on year. If this trend continues, reports are that Africa could surpass the EU and the US to become China’s largest trade partner in three to five years.
The importance of other developing countries to Africa is even more apparent if one excludes fuels and mining products from the calculations. The share of Africa’s non-fuels and mining products exports that went to developing countries rose from around 30 per cent in 2000 to 50 per cent in 2011. This reflects the fact that Africa’s exports to developing countries tend to be more diversified than its exports to developed countries. A similar shift in trade from developed to developing economies can be seen on the import side as well. The share of developing economies in African imports rose from around one-third (34 per cent) to more than a half (53 per cent) between 2000 and 2011.
If we dig deeper into the types of products being exported, we see an interesting picture. Recent research conducted by the International Trade Centre on ’Africa’s Trade Potential: Export Opportunities in Growth Markets’ showed that exports to traditional markets — Europe — were decreasing and exports were increasing to Asia — primarily China — but that the share of value-added goods to Europe were increasing while the majority of exports to Asia were in primary products.
The research also confirmed the increase in trading intra-regionally, with a shift to more value-added goods. Over the period 1995-2010, Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports of processed goods and semi-processed goods grew faster than exports of non-oil raw products and in terms of intra-regional exports, processed and semi-processed goods comprised the largest share of exports at 46 per cent and 41 per cent respectively. This trend towards greater intra-regional trade is one that we see happening across the globe. It is partly a reaction to the decreased demand, or foreshadowing possible loss of future demand, in traditional extra-regional markets as a result of the crisis coupled with a realisation of the untapped potential of countries in the immediate economic space. The African Union’s decision of January 2012 to focus on boosting intra-African trade and identifying 2017 as the target date for the completion of the Continental Free Trade Area are examples of how policies are beginning to reflect the economic viability of trading closer to home in addition to traditional extra-regional trading.
Trade in tasks
In addition to the reconfiguration of the actors in the multilateral trading system and the changing patterns of trade moving away from traditional North-South lines and also incorporating greater intra- and inter-regional trade, we are also seeing new trends in the way that goods and services are produced and traded. In essence there is a new narrative developing on trade which governments and business have to take notice of and align their policies and priorities around.
In WTO jargon, we have termed this ’Made in the World’. Increasingly, countries are trading in intermediates not final products. The concept of made in country X is becoming obsolete as we see the exponential increase of trade in intermediates or trade in tasks — where components of goods and services are produced and assembled in different countries. The old adage of ‘imports bad and exports good’ is made irrelevant when we look at the evidence — today almost 60 per cent of trade in goods is in intermediates or trade in tasks and the average import content of exports is around 40 per cent. This is why, as I intimated earlier, enacting protectionist measures, which could be trade distorting or trade diversionary, will actually have an inverse reaction in economies which are increasingly reliant on imports to complete their exports. This narrative is already transforming the policy debate on trade and hopefully will lead to a more nuanced and evidence-based decision process that truly reflects the impact that trade can actually have on growth, employment and innovation.
The spoils of trade in tasks are all amongst us. Let us take an iPhone. The legend inscribed on the back of an iPhone declares “Designed by Apple in California. Assembled in China”. This does not do justice to parts made in China, Korea, Japan, Germany, and the US by companies headquartered in Tokyo, Seoul, Bavaria, San Diego, Stuttgart, Texas and Geneva. The pieces, as we know, are put together in Shenzhen, China — by a company that happens to be based in Chinese Taipei. The iPhone, like more and more products, defies identification by a single country of origin. It can only be described as “Made in the World.”
And this is not necessarily a new phenomenon or one that is exclusive to high-tech products. By the 11th century AD, regular trade had evolved in which African ivory was shipped to India, where craftsmen carved it into jewellery for export to Europe. And consider the story of an opal mined in the highlands of Ethiopia: brought by middlemen from a rural miner to traders in Addis Ababa; air-freighted to a family-owned company in Jaipur, India, for cutting and polishing; sold to a US-based jewellery designer/retailer; and dispatched to Thailand to be set into a bracelet and then finally placed on offer to customers at one of the retailer’s authorised dealerships in China, Europe, the Caribbean, or North America. With value addition occurring in at least four different countries, that bracelet too is “Made in the World”.
This confirms that the way we measure trade needs to change. Our traditional methodology assigns the total commercial value of an import to a single country of origin. This was an accurate formula when trade was in final goods produced from domestic inputs. It might even have worked when imported raw materials were processed in a single country. But when applied to ’Made in the World’ products, the methodology can exaggerate bilateral trade balances and under-state where value addition occurs. This incongruence has two main impacts: one, inflated bilateral trade numbers which can inflame anti-trade sentiment; and two, lead to policies which are not aligned with the pace, direction and reality of world production and trade. Having an accurate, evidence-based methodology of the true value of trade is necessary if policy makers are to make informed decisions on trade and economic policy. The WTO, working with the OECD and many other partners, will contribute to this effort when we release the first set of comprehensive statistics on trade in value added during a conference in Geneva in mid-December this year. And I want to pay tribute to the excellent cooperation that we in the WTO have fostered with our colleagues in the OECD, an example of how inter-agency cooperation can help move the policy debate forward.
Value chains — growth and job chains
The increase in trade in intermediates, coupled with decreasing transport and communication costs, and greater fragmentation of production across the globe requires us to change our narrative on trade. Facilitating this movement in trade in tasks is the growing network of national, regional and global value chains which are increasingly characterising the trade conveyor belts of the twenty-first century. Value chains are not new constructs. They have been around for almost as long as the concept of trade has been.
Value chains represent a dynamic method of organizing production internationally. It involves the unbundling of stages of production across different countries based on their cost advantages. Increasingly, this process has moved beyond the outsourcing of manufacturing production and now involves services activities as well, primarily office tasks. Services are fundamental to value chains, comprising an ever growing component in the value of final products. One sure way to add value to raw materials is to increase the range of services you can offer alongside it in the form of transport, logistics, insurance, and distribution. This is particularly important for those economies which may not have land or mineral wealth and which rely on human capital as a form of economic competitiveness.
Value chains in agriculture, such as in agro food or processed agricultural products, are also important examples of the multi-polar and multi-modal form of production and distribution. Just take a recent study by the Food Safety Authority of Ireland that found that just one processed chicken food stuff had 53 separate ingredients. And each of these ingredients had multiple suppliers from different regions in the world. One must also consider the backward and forward linkages which connect the agriculture sector to other sectors, such as the sugar cane sector with its multiple consumer and industrial applications.
While value chains are not a new phenomenon, their importance is increasing in several regions of the world, such as East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. There are two principal reasons why these value chains are valuable to developing countries in particular.
First, they create a lot of trade among the developing countries who are members of the value chain. This is because each participating country is likely to specialize in a specific segment of the manufacturing process or on a particular office task and the resulting intermediate goods will need to be moved among the countries.
Second, value chains can be vital catalysts for expanding the productive capacity of developing countries. Participation in value chains allows enterprises from developing countries to find suitable foreign partners, gain access to foreign direct investment, become familiar with international business practices, and upgrade their skills and technology. The shift towards trade in tasks creates opportunities that did not exist when trade was dominated by exchanges of final goods. Particularly for smaller developing countries, value chains lower the bar for entry into the global economy. Companies need not try to produce entire cars, for example, that are internationally competitive — they might simply focus on getting a particular auto part right. We have seen this in Malaysia and Morocco, for example.
The fact that intermediate goods need to cross the border of developing countries involved in value chains multiple times means that the cost of any type of trade restriction will be magnified. Not only must tariffs be low but regulatory regimes have to be compatible, otherwise non-tariff measures and regulatory divergence will prevent the efficient functioning of value chains. This regulatory convergence is important in ensuring that value chains really work for countries.
Non-tariff measures
Ensuring this regulatory convergence is particularly critical given the increase in non-tariff measures (NTMs) which we have seen over the past decade. These are an important factor in international production chains as the broad decline in tariff levels has meant that non-tariff measures — such as technical standards, conformity certification, health and safety requirements, and services regulation — loom larger in international trade than before.
This year’s edition of the World Trade Report, the WTO’s flagship research publication, examined the evolving landscape of NTMs. One of its most important findings was that the nature of NTMs has shifted: the traditional protection-motivated quotas and safeguards have increasingly given way to a precaution-oriented emphasis on health, safety, environmental quality, and other social considerations. These concerns are wholly legitimate, and cannot — indeed, should not — be blindly trumped by a desire to keep trade completely unobstructed. That said, the nature of the measures taken to pursue public policy objectives, and the way those measures are administered, can have widely varying effects on trade, both positive and negative. NTMs should ideally not increase trade costs more than the minimum necessary to achieve their objective. Similarly, it is reasonable to argue that NTMs should not be constructed in ways that unduly favour domestic interests. Yet, in light of the complex societal objectives and policies in play where NTMs are concerned, finding the right balance will require cooperation and dialogue.
Unlike tariff negotiations in the WTO that aim to negotiate to a zero level of tariffs, discussions on non-tariff measures must instead focus on transparency, coherence and capacity. Transparency is critical. Producers and traders need more information about existing NTMs, which are by definition harder to measure and compare than tariffs. At the WTO, we have created the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP), a one-stop shop for accessing all information notified to the WTO by members, including NTMs, tariffs, trade remedy use, and trade statistics.
Coherence is needed to ensure that companies do not have to face a series of competing standards and requirements and that there is capacity to help companies, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises, better understand and adapt to these measures. The issue of private standards is particularly important in this regard. In the field of cooperation, there is a need to develop shared understandings about why particular measures are used for a certain goal. Distinguishing whether NTMs are being used for legitimate ends, or for protecting domestic producers, makes NTMs an elusive trade policy tool.
As NTMs — such as technical product standards, health and safety requirements, and related testing procedures — become increasingly pervasive, they can create real problems for traders. These measures can be complicated and confusing for business, costly to comply with, and can vary significantly from country to country, and from sector to sector. It is, of course, not the role of the WTO, nor should it be, to eliminate NTMs, or even to harmonize them to level the playing field. Rather, countries must continue to rely on WTO rules and enforcement to avoid any discriminatory and unnecessarily trade-restrictive NTMs, and for the rest that are in line with WTO rules to seek to promote regulatory convergence between countries in the relevant fora to minimize differences that can cause trade friction.
I recognise that convergence among countries at very different levels of development is rarely straightforward. Moreover, mutual recognition and harmonization can raise tough questions about trust, good governance and domestic regulatory autonomy. Co-operation among governments — in standard-setting bodies, regional fora and multilateral organisations — remains the best way forward. However, continuing to provide effective capacity building to help exporters comply with NTMs in important markets or helping governments participate in standard-setting are two absolutes. The WTO, through the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF), continues to provide this assistance to our developing members in the field of sanitary and phytosanitary standards.
How is the WTO addressing these changes?
The WTO will be 18 years old in January 2013. In the majority of countries, we will now be considered an adult! How has the WTO sought to adjust to the changes in the multilateral system? When the organization was established in 1995, there were 76 original GATT members and another 50 nations at various stages in the membership process. Today, we have 157 members, having recently added Samoa, Montenegro, the Russian Federation and just recently Laos to the fold. The technological and logistics changes in the world of trade have been nothing short of transformational and the increase in trade in intermediates has meant we have had to find new angles to look at the contribution of trade to growth and development.
How has the WTO sought to remain relevant in a world where the geo-political changes have meant we exist in a different structure today than we did in 2001 when we launched the current round of negotiations (termed the Doha Development Agenda)? As I mentioned at the opening of the WTO’s annual Public Forum in September this year, how do we deal with a system where there is a ’redistribution of the geopolitical deck of cards on a global scale’?
The WTO has four main pillars of work. The negotiating function which in some respects is at a standstill although there is some progress being made in some quarters; the Aid for Trade function which includes both coordinating the work on Aid for Trade but also providing trade-related technical assistance and capacity building to developing country officials; the monitoring and surveillance function; and the litigation function housed in our Dispute Settlement arm, which I might add is the only global trade judiciary of its kind.
The WTO, in many ways, is one of the most successful examples of rules-based multilateralism at work. Its capacity to administer and enforce the global trade rules especially through its monitoring and surveillance function has been a major input into preventing a widespread resort to protectionist measures. Both our in-house monitoring and our reporting to the G-20 in this area have kept the international community involved and informed. The WTO is not immune to the geo-economic and geo-political transformations of our time. The standstill in the negotiations — when taken to its very basic level — is premised on the relative contributions that members at different levels of development could or should make. As in other organisations and on other issues, such as on climate change, this is a question that the international community cannot ignore. To move forward on multilateral negotiations, this basic question of “rights” versus “responsibilities” must be addressed.
However, it is not necessary to reshape the whole WTO agenda to address this issue. Some academics believe that the WTO should start from the beginning again. However, this academic approach has limited political relevance. The issues under debate in the Doha Development Agenda remain relevant, but the reality is that, at some point in the future, the WTO will likely have to combine these issues with new areas if the global rule making agenda is to ensure it aligns with what is actually happening in markets.
To quote Vincent Van Gogh, ’great things are done by a series of small things brought together’ and in the WTO, members are seeking to move forward step by step in some key areas. One of these where progress is being made and which is intimately linked to many of the issues I mentioned earlier, such as value chains and non-tariff measures, is that of trade facilitation. In many respects, trade facilitation is economics 101. At its core, it is about making trade easier and less costly and in a world increasingly focused on value chains and trade in intermediates, effective trade facilitation is simply not a choice — it is an unquestionable core element in any country or business policy decision if the aim is to grow and attract investment.
The evidence speaks for itself — every extra day required to ship goods reduces trade by 1 per cent. On an average sea voyage of 20 days, one extra day at sea results in a 4.5 per cent drop in trade between any two trading partners. Overall, the OECD estimates that for its members, the fees, formalities and clearance procedures constitute roughly 10 per cent of the value of any trade transaction. This is almost double the worldwide average trade-weighted tariff. Globally, that is close to $2 trillion. A WTO deal on trade facilitation would reduce those costs from 10 per cent of the value of trade to 5 per cent of its value.
The negotiations at the WTO have the potential to deliver real and tangible results to countries at all levels — a truly “win-win” deal. And for the first time, we have the structure of an agreement which would be premised not on exemptions for developing countries but rather on helping them to build the capacity to adopt the same measures that even the most developed member will adopt. This is an important, and some may say, seismic shift in how countries are approaching negotiations.
There has also been some important progress on issues related to least-developed countries (LDCs) with the recent adoption of a package to streamline the accession of LDCs to the WTO, and work is moving forward on the operationalization of a waiver allowing WTO members to provide preferential access to LDCs in the area of services.
Work on the Government Procurement Agreement is proceeding well, with the deal reached in December 2011 to expand the sectors covered by around $100 billion in new market opportunities. Not only will this inject greater transparency into the tender processes, thereby helping fight corruption in procurement, but greater competition in the bidding will also enable governments to shop around for the best prices, delivering better value for money for taxpayers and keeping a tighter rein on spending. Members are currently finalising the accession of new members such as China to this agreement. The implications of that are self-evident. Work is also continuing on expanding the Information Technology Agreement which has the potential to spur innovation and create jobs in the important area of information technology.
On the Aid for Trade front, the WTO continues to lead, along with the OECD, on the Aid for Trade global work programme. The resource mobilisation pillar has been incredibly successful, with over USD 45 billion committed in Aid for Trade in 2010, the highest amount ever. The programme has fostered a culture of trade mainstreaming and results orientation and is increasingly profiling an important complement to traditional Official Development Assistance and that is South-South co-operation. I want to take the opportunity of being in Melbourne to praise the role of Australia in the area of trade capacity-building, not only committing to support developing countries, and in particular LDCs, but actually delivering on its commitments. The focus of the fourth Global Review of Aid for Trade in July 2013 will be on ’Connecting to Value Chains’. This will show how Aid for Trade can help developing countries create, access and benefit from value chains and will profile the private sector so that there is a better appreciation for what private actors look for when they invest in value chains in countries.
One final element before I close is on the Stakeholder Panel on Defining the Future of Trade, which I established in April 2012 to analyse challenges to global trade opening in the 21st century, to look at the drivers of today and tomorrow’s trade, and to examine trade patterns and what it means to open global trade in the 21st century. This very impressive group of individuals have been working assiduously on these issues and the findings of their work will be presented in the New Year. Much like Richard Snape’s intellectual work helped shape the Australian Productivity Commission, I believe the work of the Stakeholder Panel can provide a useful contribution to the WTO and its members as it continues to navigate this changing landscape of multilateral trade.
I believe the future of the multilateral trading system is bright. It will be different — and in some cases unrecognisable — but bright. I am confident of that.
I thank you.
Chen Chen, Technical Assistance Advisor, IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, and Irene Yackovlev, Senior Economist, IMF Communications Department, introduce the new IMF course on the macroeconomics of climate change, at the International Monetary Fund.
IMF Photo/Allison Shelley
19 April 2022
Washington, DC, United States
Photo ref: AS220419040.cr3
Dr Hanan Morsy, Director, Macroeconomic Policy, Forecasting and Research Department, African Development Bank having a portrait with Madam Janet Heckman, Managing Director, Southern and Mediterranean Region, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development during Annual Meeting 2019 - Day 1 - Special Event Luncheon African Economic Outlook at Sala Banquet Sipopo Conference Center Annex Building on June 11, 2019, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea.
She was my seatmate in our lifelong learning class on Astronomy today. We introduced ourselves and spoke a few words about our anticipation of the course since this was the first class. Meet Rheta.
It was a very good class (I have taken a course taught by this Professor in the past) and at the end of class I asked her if she was in a rush after class and she said she wasn’t. I explained 100 Strangers and made my request for her participation, noting that I was intrigued by what she had shared in the few minutes before class and would like to have her be part of my project. She asked a number of questions but since she had not given consent, I was prepared to take that as a polite “no” by omission and we visited for a few more minutes before the 20 year-old students started taking over the classroom for their Macroeconomics class.
When we reached the exit from the building I was about to wish her a good week when she said “But what did you want to do about your project?” I was happily surprised to find out she was happy to participate. Perhaps I hadn’t picked up on a cue or maybe she was just taking my measure as we talked while leaving the building. I took a few photos as we headed toward the subway station and I knew I wasn’t thrilled with the results but felt guilty for keeping her in the cold and suggested we stop in the coffee shop for me to get to know her a bit better.
Rheta is 84 and a Sociology professor emeritus from the university where we are taking our Astronomy course. When she reached 65 she faced mandatory retirement (the law has since changed) but she was quick to tell me she doesn’t use the word “retirement.” She calls it “moving on.” I understand her distinction and I like it. She is from North Bay, Ontario but trained at the University of Toronto. Surprising to me, most of her teaching was in the Nutrition Department which had recruited her early on. She was with the university for 43 years, an impressive record. She told me the thing she liked most about her teaching career was her relationship with the students. After all this time, she still has students who come to her home to visit and to share a meal with her. They prefer the atmosphere of her apartment to going to a restaurant because it is “cozy and comfortable.” She has three adult children and is proud to be a grandmother six times over. We had common ground in that she told me she had worked as an “untrained” social worker in her youth.
The university website introduces Rheta as follows: "Rheta Rosen is a family sociologist and a professor emeritus at Ryerson University. Besides developing the continuing education Certificate in Family Life Education in 1991, she was active on the committee that created the present Certificate in Family Supports. Rheta teaches Group Dynamics and Interpersonal Communication for our program, and has taught in Ryerson’s School of Nutrition for many years."
While we were having coffee a street person panhandled us and looked to be in pretty rough shape. I gave a coin. Rheta dug into her purse and gave him some change as well, then engaged him in a conversation about his well-being, suggesting that he get a better coat from the shelter and be more attentive to taking his medication for his schizophrenia. The man was surprised at the extent of Rheta’s interest and hardly knew what to say but finally departed promising her that he would look after himself. I felt this said a lot about Rheta as a concerned citizen of the world. When I invited her advice to the project photographers, she said “Relationships. Life is about relationships.”
I don’t recall having had a subject more invested in my project. Rheta asked if I was satisfied with the photo and that she would be happy for me to take a few more if need be. She was even willing to walk around to find a spot that suited my needs, saying “It really isn’t THAT cold.” I took her up on the offer and we walked to a nearby spot I’ve used before and took this photo there before we walked to the subway to go our separate ways. Rheta was surprised that I wasn’t pursuing making a book of my photos and stories and told me that she has an unfinished project involving interviews with seniors in care facilities.
In retrospect, I am fascinated with having met a Professor who has returned to the university where she had her teaching career - as a student. This is the perfect illustration of the concept of lifelong learning. It is said that those who keep learning in their later years are healthier and happier than those who don't. Meeting Rheta gave credence to that theory. She practices Pilates regularly and did downhill skiing until four years ago.
Thank you Rheta for being such an interesting encounter and for participating in 100 Strangers. You are #719 in the 8th Round of my project. See you in class next week.
Find out more about the project and see pictures taken by the other photographers in our group at the 100 Strangers Flickr Group page.
Follow-up: I met Rheta at class the following week and she apologized for not having emailed me with her feedback about the write-up. It turns out her computer mouse had died. Instead of the email, she had a printed copy of my write-up in an envelope with my name on it with suggestions for some minor adjustments. She hoped I didn't mind her making suggestions for accuracy. I told her I was in fact tickled that she'd taken that much time and joked that I was surprised she hadn't used her red pen to mark the paper. She laughed and said "They are just some minor suggestions. You would get a very good grade." I teased "I guess you will always be the professor." It was an enjoyable exchange and I've made the changes she suggested.
Port of Suva is the most extensive and busiest container and general Port providing the maritime gateway to Fiji's capital Suva.
The Fiji Ports Development Project comprised wharf improvements at the ports of Suva and Lautoka, on the island of Viti Levu, the principal gateways for Fijiâs international trade. The projectâs objectives were to achieve a stable macroeconomic environment; support trade, investment, private sector development; and enhance the economyâs competitiveness through sustained improvements in port productivity.
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Frustrated and powerless’: In fight with China for global influence, diplomacy is America’s biggest weakness
In Panama, a bridge to connect the country highlights China’s growing diplomatic presence and sway, while the U.S. goes four-and-a-half years without an ambassador.
PANAMA CITY — On the Pacific side of the Panama Canal, a massive gray convention center built largely by Chinese contractors gleams in the sun, eagerly hosting visitors from a world emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic. A few miles north, colorful shipping containers lay stacked under the stern gaze of quay cranes at the Port of Balboa, a facility run by a Chinese-linked firm.
A new bridge is supposed to rise in the same area. Various plans have called for it to have six lanes, two soaring towers and even a high-end restaurant. To the delight of Panamanians, the span would ease the traffic clogging other bridges connecting this Central American country’s east and west, the kind that leads to two- or even three-hour commutes. To the annoyance of U.S. diplomats, the contract to build the bridge has been given to a consortium controlled by the Chinese government.
It didn’t have to be this way.
In late 2017, the then-U.S. ambassador to Panama, John Feeley, urged American firms to compete to build what’s called the “fourth bridge.” It was a sensitive time. Earlier that year, Panama had switched its diplomatic relations from Taiwan to Beijing, blindsiding Washington. A bid for the $1.5 billion project could have signaled America’s enduring interest in this country in its own hemisphere, home to a canal whose U.S.-led construction transformed global trade over a century ago. But U.S. firms, for various reasons, declined to bid. And unlike his counterparts from China, with their communist rule and state-owned enterprises, Feeley, a mere U.S. diplomat, held little sway over American companies.
“I felt frustrated and powerless,” Feeley recalled. “I rang every bell in Washington that I could to try to drum up U.S. private sector interest. I asked for a commercial delegation to come down, and I got nothing.”
Such scenes have been playing out from Kenya to the Solomon Islands as the United States and China engage in a growing contest for international influence that could heavily shape geopolitics in the decades ahead. Beijing’s success in bolstering its presence in the Americas attests to the scope of its ambitions and the extent of the United States’ challenge in answering them. President Joe Biden and his aides recognize the stakes involved, and they argue that to compete with China, the United States must, above all, invest in its physical, technological and even sociological infrastructure at home.
But when it comes to the global faceoff, America’s approach to diplomacy could prove its biggest weakness, according to conversations POLITICO held with more than 50 former and current U.S. and foreign officials, diplomats, analysts and others who follow international affairs, as well as reviews of an array of congressional, think tank and other studies. Some of the people interviewed were granted anonymity to more candidly discuss a sensitive issue.
Over the past decade, China has increased its spending on diplomacy and even surpassed the United States in the number of diplomatic posts it has worldwide. It appears to have grown its number of diplomats, and they are far better trained and more assertive than their predecessors, including at multilateral organizations like the United Nations. U.S. spending on diplomacy, meanwhile, has stayed effectively flat, as has the size of the U.S. Foreign Service, while funding, security and other factors have limited America’s diplomatic footprint abroad.
“Once upon a time, it was a given that the American embassy in a given country, in most countries, was the biggest embassy, the most visible embassy, the most influential embassy,” said Eric Rubin, the president of the American Foreign Service Association, the diplomats’ union, and a former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria. “That is not the case now in many parts of the world. In much of the developing world, it’s China.”
China’s intense focus on “commercial diplomacy,” which includes promoting trade deals and infrastructure projects, gives its envoys an edge, especially in Latin American and African countries that feel neglected by Washington. U.S. government initiatives to counter China’s infrastructure programs are not easily accessed or as well-funded. The U.S. diplomatic tradition, meanwhile, has de-emphasized the commercial element. The relatively few U.S. diplomats who specialize in it rely heavily on a private sector that, unlike Chinese state-run firms, often won’t come through, especially in certain parts of the world.
“The Chinese are not in Africa to teach rice paper painting,” said Patricia Moller, a former U.S. ambassador to Guinea and Burundi who now does private sector work on the continent. “They’re in Africa to support the business undertakings of Chinese investment. That’s why they’re there. And it’s a very pointy spear that the Chinese have.”
Growing political partisanship is another factor harming America’s ability to conduct basic diplomacy. Republicans and Democrats in Congress agree that China poses a long-term challenge to the United States, and they’ve spiked military spending and devoted new resources to taking on Beijing economically and technologically. But legislation boosting U.S. diplomacy frequently gets delayed or derailed amid partisan sniping, and U.S. diplomats cannot guarantee that Congress will fund an administration’s initiatives past the next election.
The partisanship problem is most visible in U.S. senators’ willingness to block ambassador nominees, often for reasons unrelated to their postings. Some ambassadorships have sat empty for years. It wasn’t until just weeks ago, for instance, that the Senate confirmed an ambassador to replace Feeley, who left his position four-and-a-half years ago. The absence was in part due to a Republican senator’s desire to pressure Biden on Cuba policy. It upset Panamanians and gave an opening to China’s suave Spanish-speaking ambassador here.
The U.S. confirmation paralysis “creates opportunities for our adversaries to talk to the countries involved and say ‘You matter to us because we have an ambassador here. You don’t matter to the United States because they don’t have one,’” said Harry Harris, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea.
China’s diplomatic ascent is not without flaws. Its envoys and their staff are sometimes so aggressive they inspire backlash; some recently were filmed attacking pro-democracy protesters in Britain. The Chinese government’s overseas economic projects — from building ports to railways, in particular under the Belt and Road Initiative — have often been of low quality, environmentally unsound and a strain on host country budgets. There are reports Beijing is overhauling Belt and Road as partners struggle to repay debts.
Still, many countries find that China is a willing partner when the United States is not. China appears intent on winning hearts and minds while the United States comes across as arrogant. Here again, Panama is an example: The country’s current government is wary of Beijing and has held up or nixed some Chinese projects, but Washington hasn’t taken advantage of the moment, Panamanian leaders privately say. When U.S. diplomats stop by, they typically come with lectures about cleaning up Panamanian corruption and warnings about China, while U.S. military leaders publicly raise security concerns about Chinese projects along the canal. But the Americans offer few, if any, tangible alternatives to the trade, infrastructure projects and other assistance Beijing is willing to offer this country of 4.3 million.
U.S. officials are “basically telling us, the region, ‘Be careful with China, be careful with this or that,’” said Nicole Wong, a former senior Panamanian foreign ministry official who helped oversee the switch in diplomatic ties from Taiwan to Beijing. “But the agenda, the bilateral agenda, the building of a really good bilateral agenda is set aside, because they forget to talk about building things together.”
The Biden administration is well aware of many of the vulnerabilities in America’s diplomatic playbook, but its solutions so far are limited, heavily domestically focused, and could take years to implement — time in which Beijing could strengthen its position, another presidential administration could change course, or Congress could resist the need for funding. And to a degree, the Biden administration is still trying to undo the damage wrought on the State Department by former President Donald Trump, who tried to slash its budget by a third. Congress thwarted that attempt, but it hurt U.S. diplomatic prestige and morale. Trump’s heavy-handed approach to foreign policy also drove many experienced U.S. diplomats, such as Feeley, to quit.
“We had dug a quite deep hole for ourselves over the last several years, and the world was not going to wait for the United States to sort out itself while China was evolving,” said State Department Counselor Derek Chollet, one of the top officials whom the department designated to speak on the broad issue of U.S. diplomacy and the Chinese challenge. “There’s no silver bullet.”
The Chinese communist system may be repressive and rigid, but it is more steady than the trajectory of the United States, with long-term plans that can run decades. U.S. diplomacy, on the other hand, has become too capricious, unreliable and exposed to partisan deadlock, officials and analysts say.
On ambassadorships and more, “domestic politics in the U.S. is undermining U.S. national interests throughout the world,” warned Samuel Lewis Navarro, a former first vice president and foreign minister of Panama.
The everywhere strategy
Three years ago, Washington was startled to learn that China had established a bigger network of diplomatic facilities than the United States, topping one ranking of countries. “With 276 posts globally, China has for the first time surpassed the United States’ network by three posts,” reported the Lowy Institute, a think tank in Australia. It helped that China had successfully pushed governments in places like Panama to drop Taiwan in favor of Beijing.
It’s unclear how the think tank’s rankings have changed since 2019, although a top Chinese official recently said the country now has more than 280 diplomatic outposts, while recent State Department statistics say the U.S. has 275. In any case, the message was unmistakable: In diplomacy, China intends to be everywhere. In particular, Chinese diplomats lavish attention on two regions that are often afterthoughts in U.S. policy — Africa and Latin America — while devoting significant resources to their Asian neighbors. This can mean building big embassies or simply having a small outpost with a few diplomats, just to mark a presence. That includes places right on America’s doorstep, like the Caribbean.
For the Chinese, “it’s all about geography,” said Matt Pottinger, a former deputy national security adviser under Trump. “They’ve consciously studied imperial Japan’s strategy right before World War II, and they’ve consciously studied … European colonial powers in the 18th and 19th centuries to emulate the geographic distribution of key possessions and bases and treaty ports, because they’re actually trying to replicate, in particular, the 19th century British model.”
In this century, China’s multifaceted approach to diplomacy includes trying to dominate the digital and information space, especially via state media, while also promoting infrastructure projects and trade. It further involves symbolic gestures that nonetheless resonate abroad: For instance, for more than three decades, the Chinese foreign minister’s first annual overseas trip has been to Africa.
It’s tough to pin down the exact number of Chinese diplomats. A Chinese official said “thousands” after looking into the topic. Research by POLITICO and Sydney Tucker and Yun Sun of the Stimson Center, a security-focused think tank, turned up essays that said Chinese diplomatic personnel numbered at least 5,000, but it’s not clear how updated that number is or how “diplomat” is defined.
The State Department has around 13,500 Foreign Service employees — the traditional U.S. diplomats who rotate through embassies — and 11,000 Civil Service employees. Those figures have barely budged in about a decade. The department also has around 50,000 locally hired staffers around the world.
Meanwhile, the U.S. also faces questions about the shape of its global diplomatic footprint, with decisions from decades past now looking unwise.
Take the Solomon Islands, a nation in the Pacific where the United States fought the Japanese in the Battle of Guadalcanal, a turning point favoring the Allies in World War II. In 1988, amid tussles over fishing rights and the brewing Bougainville conflict, the United States opened an embassy in the islands’ capital, Honiara, according to the State Department historian’s office. (That decade also saw some U.S. worries about Soviet Union influence in the Pacific.) Still, the U.S. ambassador to the islands was co-credentialed as envoy to Papua New Guinea and based in that country’s capital, Port Moresby, according to the historian’s office.
But five years later, the U.S. shut down the Solomon Islands embassy, one of around 20 diplomatic facilities — most of them consulates — to be closed. U.S. officials at the time called it a “reorganization” and indicated it was necessary because America had to open missions in newly independent post-Soviet states, according to media reports at the time. The U.S. government apparently took this route instead of growing the diplomatic budget to add new posts.
Jump ahead nearly three decades. In February of this year, Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed that the United States would once again establish an embassy in the Solomon Islands. The main reason? To counter China’s intense courting of Pacific island countries. The Solomon Islands, it was soon revealed, signed a security pact with China that the U.S. and its allies, including Australia, worry gives Beijing too much control and a future military base. It’s not clear that having a U.S. embassy in the Solomon Islands would have prevented the security pact, but it might have led to earlier intervention by U.S. officials.
The Biden administration has sent representatives to urge Honiara to reconsider, part of a scramble to show that the United States still cares about the region. The administration has said it would also open embassies in the Pacific island countries of Kiribati and Tonga and launch other programs to prove America’s devotion. In late September, the United States held a summit for Pacific island leaders and unveiled a “Pacific Partnership Strategy.”
Pivoting beyond Asia
Despite having to deal with Russia’s war in Ukraine, Biden and his aides have long made clear that Asia is the region the U.S. must prioritize in the long term precisely because of the challenges posed by China. Aside from the focus on the islands, the Biden team has launched an array of other initiatives for what it calls the “Indo-Pacific.” That includes a special security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom.
Few foreign policy specialists say Washington should focus less on Asia. But many warn that America also must have a much higher minimum level of engagement — substantive, funded engagement with tangible results in reasonable timeframes — throughout the rest of the world, because Beijing sees the whole globe as the arena of competition. Otherwise, the United States risks making the same error it made decades back by retrenching from the Pacific islands, except on a larger scale — in Africa, the Middle East and America’s southern neighborhood.
In the latter, longstanding feelings of neglect seem to be morphing into outright anger, especially after what many Latin American leaders saw as a lackluster U.S. performance during the Summit of the Americas this year, when the U.S. set forth proposals that some leaders felt lacked substance.
Latin American leaders are not arguing for the type of past U.S. involvement that has included backing coups, deploying troops and supporting deeply repressive governments. When Trump aides praised the Monroe Doctrine — the notion set forth in 1823 by President James Monroe that other world powers should not interfere in America’s hemisphere — that stirred ugly memories in the region. (Biden administration officials have avoided such language, even as they question China’s motives.) Many Latin American leaders do, however, want new or renewed trade deals with Washington, they want infrastructure projects, and they want more than what Francisco Santos Calderón, a former Colombian ambassador to the United States, described as U.S. “blah blah blah.”
When it comes to China, “there’s no rivalry, because the U.S. isn’t present in that rivalry here in Latin America,” the former envoy said. He noted that China is now the top trading partner for several Latin American countries. “There’s no real evidence that there’s a U.S. policy toward Latin America,” he said. “There’s pronouncements, there’s communiques, but a policy? None whatsoever.”
When pressed on their diplomatic priorities, Biden aides mention the challenges they face as well as efforts they’re undertaking. They note that the Ukraine war has grabbed much of their attention, and that, following the Trump years, they’ve had to spend significant time rebuilding relationships with U.S. allies. But they also mention State Department reshaping and modernization plans that, among other things, call for a more tech-savvy diplomatic crew and the creation of a “China House” to focus on Beijing. Interagency “deal teams” that support U.S. businesses abroad predate Biden, but his aides view them as important mechanisms, too. They further stress that top State Department officials are constantly visiting countries all over the world, not just those in Asia.
Above all, Biden administration officials say the best thing the United States can do to project strength abroad is to rebuild at home, so they point to recent infrastructure and other bills focused on the domestic front. A more vibrant United States can offer more to other countries and steer them away from what can be predatory Chinese influence, U.S. officials argue.
“We know that this is the decisive geopolitical challenge of this decade, and we need to get organized for it,” a senior State Department official said. When asked whether such a long-term approach is vulnerable to future U.S. political stalemates and quicker Chinese moves, the official acknowledged the risk. “I’m not going to contest we would like to always move faster, offer more and better,” the official said, “but we’ve got to do it in a way that is ultimately held to high standards.”
‘It all comes down to budget’
Some analysts worry that by emphasizing that the Chinese Communist Party is a threat to U.S. dominance (a belief with broad bipartisan backing in Washington), the United States could provoke an unnecessary and possibly violent confrontation, and some argue China’s rise is overstated given its demographic trends and pandemic struggles. But there also is a widespread sense that, China or no China, America has for too long let its diplomatic muscles atrophy while increasing reliance on its military might as leverage.
Over the past 10 years, U.S. annual funding for the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and related functions has, for all intents and purposes, stayed the same — floating around $55 billion. (This does not include emergency funding driven partly by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, but it does include the now phased-out budget category called “Overseas Contingency Operations.”) By contrast, the U.S. national defense budget, which hovered around $650 billion five years ago, could approach $850 billion in the coming year.
China’s funding for foreign affairs is less transparent, but the numbers available show that, although much less than the American budget, the Asian giant has raised its spending on diplomacy by roughly 50 percent over the past decade and more than doubled it over the past 15 years, coming out to roughly $7 billion in the 2022 budget. The figures, published by China’s National Bureau of Statistics, include some cuts in funding during the pandemic years.
Current and former U.S. diplomats sound beaten down when asked why congressional spending on their work has been flat. Some argue that the State Department and USAID could do more with existing funds if they were more efficient. Others say more resources are needed, but that it’s hard to sell the importance of diplomacy, which often involves behind-the-scenes work where the key weapons are words and trust, not fighter jets or tanks, to the U.S. public. Lawmakers eager to keep arms manufacturers in their districts don’t have similar motivators for diplomacy, even though plenty of U.S. defense officials have urged Congress to devote more resources to diplomacy. Trump’s denigration of U.S. diplomats, casting them as a “Deep State Department” thwarting his agenda, has left a mark. Some U.S. diplomats fear future GOP presidents will try to cut the department’s budget or avoid increasing it to appease the Republican base.
Leading lawmakers from both parties bristle at the idea that they don’t care, but their actions, or lack thereof, underscore that diplomacy isn’t a high priority. Congressional aides point to legislation designed to boost U.S. diplomacy, but they also have many stories about how such bills have fallen victim to partisan objections, foot-dragging or sheer neglect by legislators facing numerous demands on their time. Predictably, Republicans blame Democrats, and Democrats blame Republicans. But both sides acknowledge that the old adage that America’s partisan fights should be set aside at “the water’s edge” is in tatters.
“Diplomacy is too important for politics,” said Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “I want to be able to say that we can then work together to find that middle ground, so that we can put forward a real diplomatic policy and be an example to our friends and our allies.”
Last year was the first time in nearly two decades that Congress passed a comprehensive bill authorizing State Department spending and setting policy priorities. To get it through, however, lawmakers included it as part of the must-pass National Defense Authorization Act, a move with symbolism not lost on American diplomats.
“Yes, please call your congressperson and advise that we need a greater budget for foreign policy,” a second senior State Department official said. “It all comes down to budget, whether it’s macroeconomic access to lending or if it’s ability to open embassies. It all comes down to money.”
‘Be happy with everyone’
At the luxurious Central Hotel in Panama City’s Casco Viejo neighborhood, a mix of narrow roads, artsy coffee shops and historic buildings, Wei Qiang sips a cappuccino and expresses disbelief at the notion that his embassy, or his country, is a threat of any kind to the United States.
The Chinese ambassador is easy to track down here, amiably texting with a reporter on WhatsApp and sharing photos of his younger self with Cuba’s late revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro. Dressed in a short-sleeved light blue dress shirt, the gray-haired Wei subs in Spanish words in the occasional moments he can’t recall English ones. He’s well-schooled in Chinese diplomatic talking points, but he’s also relatively frank compared to many of his colleagues.
Wei expresses perplexity over a U.S. military commander’s recent warnings about Chinese projects along the canal. He notes that one firm that’s drawn scrutiny, the one that runs ports on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the canal, is a Hong Kong-based private company that’s operated the facilities for many years. He dismisses arguments that Hong Kong is now firmly under Beijing’s control, that even private firms are not free from the Chinese Communist Party’s grip, and that China weaponizes its businesses to aid its geostrategic aims.
In Panama, at least, the U.S. diplomatic presence is stronger than China’s, Wei insists, laughing politely when the long absence of an American ambassador is mentioned. The American embassy has hundreds of staffers; the Chinese embassy, for now, usually has fewer than 20, according to Wei. China merely wants to establish ties with countries like Panama in ways that help everyone involved, especially economically, Wei says, insisting that it’s U.S. officials who seem bent on creating a conflict with Beijing.
“We don’t understand why they worry so much,” Wei said of U.S. officials. “From my point of view, it is unfortunate that the U.S. is practicing, or is exerting, anti-China policies in the region.”
Wei’s assertions about U.S. influence here are not without basis. Panama has long been a cultural crossroads, not least because of the canal. But whether it’s along the country’s palm tree-lined shores or in Panama City’s funky skyscrapers, U.S. influence far outpaces China’s. The U.S. dollar is accepted here, many Panamanians speak at least some English, and the United States is the top source of foreign direct investment in Panama, despite corruption problems that have landed Panama on the Financial Action Task Force’s “gray list” and were highlighted in the “Panama Papers” investigation. U.S.-Panama relations have not always been smooth; the U.S. briefly invaded Panama 33 years ago to overthrow a military ruler, but America’s democratic ideals resonate among Panamanians.
In the aggregate, Panama is considered relatively well off, but it is one of Latin America’s worst performers on income distribution, with wealthy urban centers and poorer rural areas. Its leaders stress that the United States remains Panama’s most important partner and that they’d like to enhance that partnership.
“We are always hopeful and want to engage more with the U.S. and try to get more investment from the U.S. and everywhere else,” Erika Mouynes, who until recently was Panama’s foreign minister, told POLITICO in a September interview. “We’re coming out of the pandemic, so we’re all striving to get foreign investment.” When asked if she could request something specific from Biden, Mouynes said an “investment plan regarding infrastructure.”
That said, Panamanian leaders are unwilling to ignore China’s potential as a partner. Although Panamanian President Laurentino Cortizo, who took office in 2019, has been far more cautious than his predecessor, Juan Carlos Varela, in dealing with Beijing, Cortizo said in May of this year that he wanted to restart free trade talks with China.
And many of this country’s residents see value in not picking sides between the United States and China. “We are a small country,” said Raul Mitchell, 56, who works in tourism. “We have to be peaceful, neutral, no problems with no one, be happy with everyone.”
From ‘wolf warriors’ to ‘lovable’
Chinese diplomats in Panama want to increase their influence beyond just business. One of their targets is the significant number of Panamanians of Chinese heritage. Many of these Panamanians’ ancestors arrived in Panama in the 1800s to help build a railroad that preceded the canal. U.S. diplomats say with envy that Beijing is making inroads with that diaspora, whose prominent members include Wong, the former foreign ministry official.
China reaches Panamanians of all backgrounds through places like the Confucius Institute it opened at the University of Panama, one of numerous such centers it has launched worldwide. It reaches them by promoting books that trash American actions during the U.S.-led creation of the 50-mile canal from 1904 to 1914. It reaches them by spending significant amounts on Chinese state-controlled media in the Spanish language. It reaches them through scholarships and other means that expose young Panamanians to China as a country and culture — a “people-to-people” effort Wei is keen to highlight. (The United States has many similar outreach programs, including an “American Space” that it recently opened in Panama, one of around 600 worldwide.)
In many ways, Wei embodies the growing sophistication of Chinese diplomacy.
Whereas once Chinese diplomats didn’t speak the local languages well, dressed unfashionably and were content to observe proceedings, now they are stylish, linguistically fluent and assertive participants in debates, several former U.S. ambassadors told POLITICO. The Chinese also will engage whomever is in charge, no matter how they got there.
In Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, Chinese diplomats have barely missed a beat as the country has swung from a military dictatorship to partial civilian rule to once again a military dictatorship. Scot Marciel, a former U.S. ambassador to Myanmar, said that in 2017, when Myanmar’s military forces carried out a vicious crackdown on Rohingya Muslims that much of the world calls a genocide, China saw it as “an opportunity.” The Chinese, now accused of their own genocide against Uyghur Muslims, redoubled their visits to Myanmar and invited its leaders to Beijing.
“They don’t have to worry about getting criticized by their human rights groups or anything,” Marciel said. Instead, he said, the Chinese essentially told Myanmar, “‘We’ll protect you in the U.N. Security Council,’ that sort of thing. ‘We’re your friends. And oh, by the way, we’ve got all these projects we want to do.’”
Marciel said he and China’s ambassador to Myanmar had good relations but some surprising interactions. For instance, the Chinese ambassador suggested strongly that Marciel not visit Kachin state, a restive Myanmar region that borders China. Marciel replied that he was accredited to the whole country and would travel where he pleased. Once, after Marciel visited Kachin, the Chinese ambassador traveled there and told local groups not to engage with Westerners. That upset some local leaders, who publicly complained.
Some Chinese diplomats, inspired by their leaders’ calls for a “fighting spirit,” have adopted such aggressive attitudes that they’ve been dubbed “wolf warriors,” a reference to a Chinese film. They include Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian and the now-departed Chinese ambassador to Sweden. The latter picked so many fights he was reportedly summoned to the Swedish Foreign Ministry more than 40 times.
Wei is not seen as a “wolf warrior,” but he defended his colleagues who were, saying they were reflecting the feelings of the Chinese people. Still, the “wolf warrior” stance has often backfired internationally, and Chinese officials seem to realize it. Last year, Chinese leader Xi Jinping called for an image of a “credible, lovable and respectable China” so it could expand its “circle of friends.” Other Chinese officials have since indicated their diplomats won’t back down.
Xi has been consolidating his rule in China, where he’s become the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, thanks in part to crackdowns on dissidents. Xi’s desire to make China a global rival to the United States has both emboldened Chinese diplomats but also limited them, forcing them to watch their back in a system where colleagues are expected to tattle on each other.
Daniel Russel, a top Asia aide to then-President Barack Obama, recalled one encounter in Beijing with a highly experienced Chinese counterpart during the Xi years. The Chinese official was intimately familiar with his country’s talking points on numerous issues he and Russel had previously discussed.
This time, when they reached a sensitive topic, “I looked across and saw my Chinese interlocutor do something that I had absolutely never seen him do,” Russel said. “He cracked open their notebook, flipped through their table of contents and found the topic, identified the page number, opened the book to that page, and began to read from the text, and to read in Chinese the position paper from start to finish. What it told me was he was not talking to me. He was performing for the benefit of the people sitting behind him taking notes, any one of whom would have happily ratted him out, since attrition at the top is the best strategy for advancement in a highly competitive system.”
The downsides of China’s promises
The U.S. Embassy in Panama sits well away from the bustling center of the capital, nestled on a hill along a wooded area. Its main building glints in the sun after one of the many storms during Panama’s wet season. Entering the structure involves crossing multiple security gates and heading up a twisting road.
The U.S. embassy’s staffers include at least one “regional China officer,” a category established in the Trump era. These officers, along with the State Department’s so-called “China watchers,” another fairly new formal category, keep tabs on Chinese government activity in a host country or an entire region, sharing that information with others in the U.S. government. Some of the exchanges happen in what are called “China conferences.” One such gathering is set for December in Hawaii, according to a person familiar with the issue, and one of its goals is to increase collaboration with the Department of Defense, according to text of an agenda the person shared. (The State Department declined to delve into many details about the China-focused diplomats or the China conferences.)
Embassy officials have paid close attention to China’s forays here, and they admit that the Chinese government’s ability to direct companies to take on overseas infrastructure projects is an advantage for Beijing. But the U.S. officials also emphasized the wariness of China among current Panamanian leaders, alluding to reports of problems with the Chinese-built convention center and changes to the original designs for the fourth bridge. The officials implied that U.S. pressure is one reason Cortizo’s government is more skeptical of China.
“There are things that we’ve done to help them understand the risks and the opportunities to rethink and to go with more trusted vendors,” one senior U.S. embassy official said of Panamanians. “But a lot of that is just sort of learning the hard way.”
Panama is one of many places where Chinese projects have prompted controversy. A Chinese-built railway in Kenya has become the target of lawsuits and corruption investigations. A Chinese-built port in Pakistan has prompted protests among Pakistanis upset about the increased securitization of the area, the damage caused to fishermen’s livelihoods and reports that China, not Pakistan, would reap most of the riches the port does produce. In Sri Lanka and other countries, China has been blamed, in part if not in full, for debt crises. China also has drawn criticism in some countries for importing Chinese labor instead of hiring locals.
Still, even as foreign governments grow more cautious, China’s allure is hard to resist. That’s especially the case if there’s little U.S. or other Western interest or resources for development projects. And for many unscrupulous foreign leaders, China’s willingness to ignore issues like human rights and corruption is a plus.
There’s also the reality that the Chinese have lifted hundreds of millions of their own people out of poverty in recent decades. For political leaders trying to keep their population’s allegiance, especially in poorer nations, that is a powerful thing, said W. Gyude Moore, a former Liberian minister of public works now with the Center for Global Development.
“I can have freedom of speech and be hungry, I can have minority rights and be hungry,” Moore said. “Whereas true human rights, the Chinese will argue, is about providing economic opportunities for people and taking people out of poverty.”
Chinese officials like Wei are not concerned about setbacks. The ambassador said he’s confident that, whether in Panama or elsewhere, China will remain an appealing partner. He also said China will learn from its mistakes and adapt. “China has been making progress, little by little, step by step … in the quality of their projects, work, in terms of corporate governance, social responsibility, environment-friendliness, that type of thing,” Wei said.
Initiatives come, initiatives go
U.S. leaders have recognized the power of China’s infrastructure-focused initiatives, especially Belt and Road. Those initiatives have grown as traditional U.S. development arms, like USAID, have increasingly focused on less visible projects, such as providing technical assistance to governments on everything from education to fighting corruption. As critical as that work is, it doesn’t often get the United States the credit that, say, building a sports stadium gets China.
One key American response to the Chinese initiatives has been the 2019 establishment of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, a government body that helps finance overseas infrastructure and other projects. But the DFC has a financing limit of $60 billion, far below the hundreds of billions of dollars China has been willing to commit to overseas development. (Some reports say China has devoted $1 trillion for Belt and Road.)
The DFC is supposed to target poorer nations, leaving a country like Panama largely ineligible. It also has what many officials describe as a nightmarish amount of bureaucratic hurdles. “I tried to get money from the DFC for a port in Colombia in the Urabá en Antioquia region. It was impossible,” said Santos, the former Colombian envoy.
There are efforts in Congress to improve the DFC, but it’s not clear how far they will get. A spokesperson defended the DFC, saying it “has ramped up operations and worked to increase its portfolio, maximize impact, and advance international development and U.S. foreign policy priorities.”
The growing populism and deepening partisanship in the United States has made it increasingly difficult for a president to pursue trade deals with other countries. The Biden administration has instead promoted economic “frameworks.” Such arrangements are packages that touch on topics like supply chains and sustainability but which are often vague and don’t necessarily involve lowering tariffs or opening up markets. Countries are willing to sign up, but privately their representatives roll their eyes about the frameworks, deriding them as full of promises as opposed to substantive agreements. They similarly shrug at the recently unveiled Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, a project led by the United States and other G-7 countries that pledges to “mobilize $600 billion by 2027” for infrastructure projects around the world. That “mobilization” includes leveraging private sector investments.
Again, it’s theoretical, and no one can say for certain if the money will come through, but Biden administration officials are urging foreign leaders to be patient and to weigh the negatives of striking quick deals with the Chinese.
“We don’t tell our companies to steal intellectual property,” a third senior State Department official said. The official added that the U.S. is unlikely to establish state-owned enterprises like China, but organizations like the DFC and other initiatives may help offer more incentives for the American private sector to invest in certain regions. “We do have tools,” the official said. “We just have to get better at them.”
Never far from foreign officials’ minds is the fact that U.S. presidents serve at most eight years and are subject to the whims of a Congress that is parsimonious even when controlled by the president’s party. Plus, new presidents often want to abandon old plans, so initiatives come and go.
Under Trump, for example, the United States launched the America Crece (Growth in the Americas) program in 2019. According to a press release at the time, the program was “an innovative, whole-of-government approach to support economic development by catalyzing private sector investment in energy and other infrastructure projects across Latin America and the Caribbean.” Today, Latin American — not to mention U.S. — officials have only a vague memory of that plan, and the Biden administration appears to have ditched it as it tried to shed vestiges of Trump.
In mid-August, a State Department spokesperson said America Crece had been “superseded” by Biden plans like the PGII. When asked if the department could point to any examples of infrastructure projects launched under America Crece, the department waited more than a week to refer POLITICO to the Treasury Department for an answer. After two weeks, the Treasury Department declined to comment.
When Mouynes was asked about the economic frameworks and other U.S. proposals, she noted that they have yet to be implemented. “We’re eager to get started and actually see how that will translate into actual projects in each one of our countries,” she said, adding, “Of course, I’m hopeful.”
Chollet, the State Department counselor, acknowledged that the U.S. political system often encourages a “presentism” view when it comes to crafting foreign policy. “We’re trying to build structures that are going to outlast us,” he said of the Biden administration.
The weakest diplomatic muscle
The U.S. Embassy in Panama has diplomats focused on commerce, which is unsurprising given the importance of the canal to global trade. (By key measures, the United States is the top user of the canal, with China second. The canal is so important to Washington that although the U.S. transferred control of the passage to Panama more than two decades ago, it retains the right to take military action to secure it if needed — an arrangement well known to Beijing.)
Still, U.S. diplomats in Panama and well beyond say that if any part of America’s diplomatic infrastructure needs help, it’s the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service.
The Commercial Service is part of the Department of Commerce, not State. Its responsibilities include helping increase U.S. exports and cutting through trade barriers, with the goal of leveling the playing field for U.S. companies who must abide by American laws such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. It is present in U.S. diplomatic missions in around 78 countries, including Panama. That’s fewer than half of the world’s countries, but the Commercial Service stresses that it’s in the places that account for most U.S. exports.
In 2014, the Commercial Service had around 1,750 employees. In the years since, it lost hundreds of employees due to attrition, stagnant budgets and other reasons. With some fluctuations, the staff numbers have come down to around 1,430, of which 250 are Foreign Service officers. Under Biden, it is trying to recover those losses, according to a Commerce Department official who laid out the numbers to POLITICO.
The Biden team is looking at other ways to emphasize such diplomacy; as part of the modernization plans for the State Department, Blinken has pledged to increase the number of diplomats focused on topics like trade, including “economic officers” whose responsibilities include reporting on business and related activities in other countries.
During Tibor Nagy’s stint as assistant secretary of State for African affairs under Trump, he surveyed the embassies under his purview to learn how many diplomats focused on commercial issues. “I said, ‘Tell me, how many positions does the Chinese embassy have to promote trade and investment, as opposed to the U.S. embassy?’ And, overwhelmingly, it was like three or four positions for the Chinese to an American one,” Nagy recalled. “And then, in Africa, we have some embassies that … their staffing is so small, that we have somebody who might be, say, responsible for commercial advocacy, commercial diplomacy, but they do visas in the morning. It was absolutely ridiculous.”
Wei readily acknowledges that while U.S. diplomats focus on promoting issues like good governance, democracy and human rights, Chinese envoys are more keen to promote economic ties. “A good trade relationship is one of the foundations, or the most important foundations, for a bilateral relationship,” Wei said. He marveled at how often U.S. private sector firms skip bidding opportunities in Panama — “They’re not interested,” Wei said. “They never come.”
U.S. private businesses consider many factors when weighing overseas projects. Corruption is among them, but it’s a problem worldwide, not just in Panama. The FCPA bars such firms from engaging in bribery abroad. In a sense, the law offers companies a protective cover when approached for such schemes, but it also can frustrate U.S. efforts to compete with firms from places without such rules.
Other factors include the size of the market, whether the project is big enough to return a profit, as well as the costs of labor. Many countries in Latin America in particular struggle to make the case that they are worth the risk and time as compared to more populous ones in Asia, where labor costs may be lower.
“Especially in the smaller countries, right, even sort of the Perus and the Ecuadors, but especially in the Caribbean and in Central America, countless government officials told us we simply don’t have any interest from American companies,” said Roberta Jacobson, a former top State Department official who dealt with Latin America and was U.S. ambassador to Mexico. Even when U.S. firms were interested, Jacobson added, they risk being under-bid by Chinese or other companies whose governments subsidize their work.
Among the U.S.-based companies Feeley said he approached about bidding to build the “fourth bridge” in Panama was Bechtel, the construction and engineering giant. A Bechtel spokesperson said that, in passing on the fourth bridge project, “we had to prioritize key resources and where we had a higher likelihood of winning and executing successfully.” The spokesperson also suggested that, in the long run, Bechtel was serving U.S. interests abroad by doing high-quality work.
“Bechtel competes for and frequently wins major projects abroad—but competition to win is intense, including against state-backed enterprises from other countries, and the risks can be significant,” the spokesperson said in a statement.
Some foreign diplomats say the U.S. needs to offer more incentives for private firms to take on projects in regions like Latin America or Africa. But sometimes, U.S. diplomats and American analysts say, the best approach is not to rely on the U.S. private sector. Instead, it’s better to nudge a foreign government to turn to companies from American allies, such as Japan or South Korea or any number of European nations, instead of China. That’s one reason the Biden administration, which has worked hard to repair relationships with allied countries frayed by Trump, is pushing multilateral economic initiatives like the PGII. But such efforts, too, require more U.S. diplomatic focus on the commercial space.
Where are the ambassadors?
For most of the past five years, the U.S. Embassy in Panama has been led by a “chargé d’affaires.” That person, typically a career diplomat, may get more attention from Panamanians than diplomats from many other countries, and some in the position are considered highly effective. But none has the status or sway of a Senate-confirmed ambassador, U.S. officials concede. In a small country like Panama, where the entire government seems to run on WhatsApp, an ambassador can make a big difference. And in many countries, diplomatic protocol is very important, so a chargé d’affaires cannot get as easy access to a president, or even a foreign minister, as an actual ambassador.
Feeley ended his 28-year diplomatic career in March 2018, blasting Trump as he bid farewell. In April 2020, Trump announced his nominee to replace Feeley would be Erik Bethel, a financial professional who speaks Spanish and Mandarin. He never got confirmed. Nearly nine months into his presidency, Biden announced his pick for the Panama job: Mari Carmen Aponte, a lawyer and former ambassador to El Salvador. She was confirmed in late September. The delay in her case was in part due to Republican Sen. Rick Scott of Florida, a person familiar with the issue said. Scott has blocked some nominees to object to Biden’s policies toward Cuba, an important issue in his state.
A Scott spokesperson blamed confirmation delays on Democrats’ poor use of Senate floor time. Other Republicans point out that although some individual senators use the nomination process to score political points, the White House also can be slow to vet and nominate people. Whatever the reason, according to the Partnership for Public Service, the past 15 years have seen a serious slowdown in confirmation of ambassadors. Under Biden, as of this past Tuesday, it has taken an average of 145.7 days. Under Trump it also was 145.7 days, while Obama ran at 121.1 days. Previous presidents going to back to Ronald Reagan didn’t break triple digits. As of Oct. 7, nearly 40 ambassadorships were unfilled, according to the American Foreign Service Association. They include posts in India, Italy and Colombia.
“It’s no way to run a country,” said Max Stier, the chief executive officer of the Partnership for Public Service, a non-profit whose activities include tracking presidential nominees. “We compete on the quality of our government against our primary competitors, so China is obviously concern No. 1. China doesn’t have this problem.”
Like Trump, Biden has frequently named “special envoys” for some positions, avoiding the confirmation logjam, although administration officials deny that’s the reason. The extensive use of special envoys has, however, annoyed lawmakers. So, they enhanced the Senate’s power to confirm such roles in the authorization bill that passed last year, an invitation for more partisan gridlock.
Chinese diplomats seem to spend more time in a country, and in some cases appear to get more training, than their U.S. counterparts. Four told POLITICO that their typical tour of duty in a foreign posting lasts four years, compared to three for U.S. diplomats from the State Department. Senior Chinese diplomats at times stay longer than four years. Many top Chinese diplomats have attended U.S. universities or send their children to such schools.
Foreign affairs specialists differ on whether having U.S. diplomats stay longer at a post would help promote American interests, but they generally agree that more U.S. diplomats should be abroad instead of in Washington. “We should be pushing our diplomats out to the edge, to the point of friction, as it were, and that doesn’t mean bigger embassies, what it means is more points of presence,” said Pottinger, who now chairs the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Chinese diplomats have another advantage over their U.S. counterparts: They don’t have to worry as much about security. America’s status as the dominant global power means U.S. diplomats often have targets on their backs. As a result, security rules make it tough for them to move around a country or to even open diplomatic facilities, and U.S. embassies are at times fortified zones far from capital city centers. Chinese envoys generally have more freedom of movement.
The Biden team has moved to ease such restrictions on U.S. diplomats, making high-profile moves such as reopening its embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, despite the ongoing war. But it’s a gamble. The fallout from the 2012 attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya — which killed four Americans, including an ambassador, and led to repeated Republican political attacks on Democrats — casts a partisan shadow that analysts say has handcuffed American diplomacy.
China also is paying heightened attention to multilateral organizations like the United Nations and trying to place its citizens in top spots at such institutions. China skeptics say Beijing wants to rewrite international rules on everything from trade to human rights in its favor, and that’s one reason it is showering diplomatic attention on even the smallest countries. Those countries, after all, get votes in international bodies. A top Chinese official recently explained that a key concept of “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” is that China would “lead the reform of the global governance system with the concept of fairness and justice.”
Jeff Feltman, a former top United Nations official, noted that China often pushes for U.N. documents to reflect its views, emphasizing the rights of states above individuals and economic rights as more important than political rights. In documents about the rule of law, he said, “the Chinese would always add ‘between states’ after the expression ‘rule of law’ so that instead of being a discussion about how do governments treat their citizens, it becomes a discussion of how do states interact with each other.” It’s natural for a rising power like China to demand a bigger say, Feltman said, but it means the United States must improve its multilateral diplomatic tradecraft and give such diplomacy more prestige.
In a nod to such concerns, Blinken has created a State Department office focused on ensuring the U.S. and its allies get more top seats in multilateral bodies.
Needing a bridge
As dusk approaches in Panama City, a slew of car headlights sparkle from one of the existing spans over the canal, the Bridge of the Americas. Once again, the traffic on the bridge is backed up, delaying people eager to get home.
The fourth bridge would, in theory, be built close to the Bridge of the Americas, taking on much of its existing vehicular load. The bridge has been talked about, in some form or another, for at least a decade, and its absence so far is somewhat ironic. This is a country, after all, famed for its ability to ease transit.
“Yes, we need the fourth bridge,” said Yanina Campbell, 55, an artisan who sells specially crafted purses. “There’s a lot of traffic, and let’s understand, trade takes place in both the capital and the outlying areas.”
The bridge construction has been delayed for various reasons, including concerns about a linked metro project that was eventually separated from the bridge plans. Financing the project also was a challenge, which the pandemic didn’t help. The contract, however, appears solid, former Panamanian officials say, making it legally perilous for Panama to cancel on the Chinese companies.
When asked if the Cortizo administration’s wariness of increasing Chinese influence in Panama was one reason the bridge plans were on hold, Mouynes insisted the reasons were technical and financial.
“We do want to start that project as soon as possible,” the now-former foreign minister said.
So does the Chinese government.
In fact, Chinese state media already are touting the fourth bridge as a prime example of Beijing’s growing influence in Latin America. The United States is trying to catch up, Chinese outlets gloat. In June, China’s “Global Times,” one of Beijing’s most unabashed mouthpieces, cited analysts as saying that if the United States “attempts to force [other] countries to choose sides, it is doomed to hit the wall as countries are fed up with attempts to politicize economic matters and to stir up ideological confrontations.”
As China eyes a bigger role in Panama and beyond, confrontation of many kinds seems inevitable.
March 30, 2023 - NIGER. World Bank Group President David Malpass delivers his 2023 Spring Meetings Positioning Speech at the Mahatma Gandhi International Convention Center in Niamey, Niger. During his speech, President Malpass discussed challenges facing development policy, including the need for macroeconomic stability, the importance of private capital to international integration, and the increasing need to support global public goods. President Malpass emphasized the role of education in supporting growth and creating pathways out of fragility and extremism, which are both critical for Africa’s Sahel Region. The event was hosted by the Abdou Moumouni University of Niamey. Photo: World Bank / Torie Smith
PHOTO ID: 033023-Niger-DM-02674
In this Analytical Corner, Danny Jiang, Margaux MacDonald and Johannes Eugster talk about how bilateral trade balances are largely driven by macroeconomic factors, rather than bilateral obstacles to trades at IMF Headquarters during the 2019 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings, October 15, 2019 in Washington, DC. IMF Photograph/Cliff Owen
is a country in northeastern Africa. It is the largest country in Africa, and the Arab World, and tenth largest in the world by area. It is bordered by Egypt to the north, the Red Sea to the northeast, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, Kenya and Uganda to the southeast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic to the southwest, Chad to the west and Libya to the northwest. The world's longest river, the Nile, divides the country between east and west sides..
Sudan is home to one of the world's oldest continuous major civilizations, with historical and urban settlements dating back to 3000 BC. The people of Sudan have a long history extending from antiquity, which is intertwined with the history of Egypt, with which it was united politically over several periods. After gaining independence from Egypt, and the United Kingdom in 1956, Sudan suffered a civil war, lasting 17 years, subsequently followed by ethnic, religious, and economic conflicts between the Northern Sudanese (with Arab and Nubian roots), and the Christian and animist Nilotes of Southern Sudan. This led to a second civil war in 1983, and due to continuing political and military struggles, Sudan was seized in a bloodless coup d'état by colonel Omar al-Bashir in 1989, who thereafter proclaimed himself President of Sudan.
Sudan then achieved great economic growth by implementing macroeconomic reforms and finally ended the civil war by adopting a new constitution in 2005 with rebel groups in the south, granting them limited autonomy to be followed by a referendum about independence in 2011. Rich in natural resources such as petroleum and crude oil, Sudan's economy is currently amongst the fastest growing economies in the world. The People's Republic of China and Japan are the largest trading partners of Sudan.
However, after an Islamic legal code was introduced on a national level, the ruling National Congress (NCP) established themselves as the sole political party in the state and has since supported the use of recruited Arab militias in guerrilla warfare, such as in the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Because of thousands of people being displaced and killed, the need for humanitarian care in Darfur has attracted worldwide attention, and the conflict has been described as a genocide. Officially a federal presidential representative democratic republic, the politics of Sudan are widely considered by the international community to take place within an authoritarian dictatorship due to the influence of the NCP. These factors led to the termination of diplomatic relations between Sudan and Chad, obstructed humanitarian assistance to the civilian population and has even led to war crimes charges being issued against members of the Sudanese government. On 4 March 2008, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the first sitting head of state ever indicted by the ICC. Sudan has also been the subject of severe sanctions due to alleged ties with Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda. Sudan has scored low in human development in the last few years, ranking #150 in 2009, between Haiti and Tanzania. Statistics indicate that about 17% of the population live on less than US $1.25 per day.
A member of the United Nations, Sudan also maintains membership with the AU, LAS, OIC and NAM, as well as serving as an observer in WTO.Its capital is Khartoum, which serves as the political, cultural and commercial center of the nation, while Omdurman remains the largest city. Among Sudan's population of 42 million people, Sunni islam is the official and largest religion, while Arabic and English are the official languages.
History
Please go to
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sudan
Geography
Please go to
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Sudan
Other info
Oficial Name:
جمهورية السودان
Jumhuriyat as-Sudan
Independence:
September 6, 1968
Area:
2.505.810 km2
Inhabitants:
39.110.000
Languages:
Acheron Acholi Afitti Aja Aka Ama Anuak Arabic, Standard Arabic, Sudanese Creole Arabic, Sudanese Spoken Avokaya Bai Baka Banda, Mid-Southern Banda, Togbo-Vara Banda, West Central Banda-Banda Banda-Mbrès Banda-Ndélé Bari Bedawi Belanda Bor Belanda Viri Beli Berta Boguru Bongo Burun Dagik Dair Daju, Dar Fur Daju, Dar Sila Didinga Dilling Dinka, Northeastern Dinka, Northwestern Dinka, South Central Dinka, Southeastern Dinka, Southwestern Domari Dongotono El Hugeirat Feroge Fulfulde, Adamawa Fur Gaam Gbaya Ghulfan Gula Gumuz Hausa Heiban Indri Jumjum Jur Modo Kacipo-Balesi Kadaru Kakwa Kanga Kanuri, Central Karko Katcha-Kadugli-Miri Katla Keiga Keliko Kelo Kenuzi-Dongola Ko Koalib Komo Krongo Lafofa, Laro Logorik Lokoya Lopit Lumun Luwo Mabaan Ma'di Mandari Masalit Midob Mo'da Molo Moro Morokodo Moru Murle Narim Nding Ndogo Ngile Njalgulgule Nobiin Nuer Nyamusa-Molo Olu'bo Opuuo Otoro Otuho Päri Reel Shatt Shilluk Shwai Sinyar Sungor Suri Tagoi Talodi Tegali Temein Tennet Tese Thuri Tigré Tima Tingal Tira Tocho Toposa Tulishi Tumtum Uduk Wali Warnang Yulu Zaghawa Zande
Capital city:
Karthoum
Meaning country name:
From the Arabic Bilad as-Sudan, "Land of the blacks". Originally referred to most of the Sahel region.
Description Flag:
The flag of Sudan (Arabic: علم السودان) was adopted on May 20, 1970, and consists of a red-white-black tricolor with a green triangle next to the hoist. Prior to the 1969 military coup of Gaafar Nimeiry, a blue-yellow-green tricolor design was used.
Red stands for bloodshed against British colonialism and the martyrs of Republic of Sudan.
White stands for purity and optimism.
Black stands for independence struggle.
Green stands for prosperity, and agriculture.
Coat of arms:
The current coat of arms of Sudan was adopted in 1969. It shows a Secretary Bird bearing a shield from the time of Muhammad ibn Abdalla, the self-proclaimed Mahdi who briefly ruled Sudan in the 19th century. Two scrolls are placed on the arms; the upper one displays the national motto, Al-nasr lana ('Victory is ours'), and the lower one displays the title of the state, Jumhuriyat as-Sudan ('Republic of Sudan').
The secretary bird was chosen as a distinctively Sudanese variant of the "Eagle of Saladin" and "Hawk of Qureish" seen in the emblems of some Arab states, and associated with Arab nationalism (see Coat of arms of Egypt etc.).
The pre-1969 Sudanese state emblem consisted of a rhinoceros enclosed by two palm-trees.
Motto:
"Al-Nasr Lana"
National Anthem: نحن جند الله جند الوطن - Nahnu Jund Allah Jund Al-watan
نحن جند الله جند الوطن *** إن دعا داعي الفداء لم نخــن
نتحدى الموت عند المحن *** نشترى المجد بأغلى ثمن
هذه الأرض لنا فليعش *** سوداننا علماً بين الأمم
يابني السودان هذا رمزكم *** يحمل العبء ويحمى أرضكم
Transliterated
Nahnu Djundullah Djundulwatan.
In Da A Da Il Fida Lam Nakhun.
Natahaddal Maut Endalmihan.
Nashta Ril Madjd Bi Aghlathaman.
Hathihil Ard Lana! Falyaish Sudanuna,
Alaman Bayn Al Umam.
Ya Benissudan, Hatharamzukum;
Yah Miluleb, Wa Yahmi Ardakum.
English
"We are the army of God and of our land,
We shall never fail when called to sacrifice.
Whether braving death, hardship or pain,
We'll buy glory, for any given price.
May this Our land, the Sudan live very long,
Showing all nations the way.
Sons of the Sudan, summoned now to serve,
Shoulder the task of preserving our country."
Internet Page: www.sudan.gov.sd
Sudan in diferent languages
eng | bam | cat | dan | dsb | eus | fao | fin | fur | hau | hrv | hsb | ibo | ina | ita | jav | lld | mlt | nor | pol | que | roh | ron | rup | scn | slv | sme | swa | swe | szl | tgl | tur | zza: Sudan
aze | bos | crh | kaa | mol | slo | tuk | uzb: Sudan / Судан
bre | cor | fra | hat | jnf | wln: Soudan
arg | ast | glg | slk | spa: Sudán
deu | ltz | nds: Sudan / Sudan
est | vor | wol: Sudaan
afr | nld: Soedan
frp | oci: Sodan
gla | srd: Sudàn
ind | msa: Sudan / سودان
kin | run: Suda
lin | sqi: Sudani
ces: Súdán
cym: Y Sudan
epo: Sudano
fry: Sûdan
gle: An tSúdáin / An tSúdáin
glv: Yn Toodaan
haw: Sudana
hun: Szudán
isl: Súdan
kmr: Sûdan / Судан / سوودان
kur: Sûdan / سوودان
lat: Sudania
lav: Sudāna
lit: Sudanas
mlg: Sodana
nrm: Sououdaun
por: Sudão
rmy: Sudan / सुदान
smg: Sudans
smo: Sutana
som: Suudaan
tet: Sudaun
ton: Suteni
vie: Xu-đăng
vol: Sudän
zul: iSudana
abq | alt | bul | che | chm | chv | kbd | kir | kjh | kom | krc | kum | mkd | mon | oss | rus | tyv | udm | ukr: Судан (Sudan)
bak | bel | srp | tat: Судан / Sudan
kaz: Судан / Swdan / سۋدان
tgk: Судон / سودان / Sudon
ara: السودان (as-Sūdān)
fas: سودان / Sudân
prs: سودان (Sūdān)
pus: سوډان (Sūḋān); سودان (Sūdān)
uig: سۇدان / Sudan / Судан
urd: سوڈان (Sūḋān)
div: ސޫދާން (Sūdān)
syr: ܣܘܕܢ (Sūdan)
heb: סודן (Sûdan); סודאן (Sûdân)
lad: סודאן / Sudan
yid: סודאַן (Sudan)
amh: ሱዳን (Sudan)
ell: Σουδάν (Soydán)
hye: Սուդան (Soudan)
kat: სუდანი (Sudani)
hin: सूडान (Sūḍān)
ben: সুদান (Sudān)
pan: ਸੂਡਾਨ (Sūḍān)
kan: ಸುಡಾನ್ (Suḍān)
mal: സുഡാന് (Suḍān)
tam: சூடான் (Čūṭāṉ)
tel: సూడాన్ (Sūḍān)
zho: 蘇丹/苏丹 (Sūdān)
jpn: スーダン (Sūdan)
kor: 수단 (Sudan)
bod: སུའུ་ཏན་ (Su'u.tan.); སུའུ་དའན་ (Su'u.d'an.)
mya: ဆူဒန္ (Sʰudã)
tha: ซูดาน (Sūdān)
lao: ສູດັງ (Sūdâṅ)
khm: ស៊ូដង់ (Sūdăṅ)
5 May 2021. The 16th informal meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Finance Ministers was held on the sidelines of the 54th Annual Meeting of the ADB Board of Governors. The theme of the informal meeting was “Economic Recovery from COVID-19: Toward Inclusive and Resilient Growth.” Participants discussed fiscal and other macroeconomic policies that help South Asian economies to recover.
Agenda -
Advanced Biofuels Leadership Conference
“Go Big, Stay Strong”
April 2-5, 2012, Capital Hilton, Washington, DC
Conference Program Preliminary Agenda – Subject to Change
Day One: Monday, April 2, 2012- Renewable Chemicals
8:00 AM Continental Breakfast
8:30 AM Welcome and Introduction Jim Lane, Editor & Publisher, Biofuels Digest
8:40 AM Keynote Address Christophe Schilling, CEO, Genomatica
9:00AM LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES
Stephen J. Gatto, Chairman & CEO, Myriant
Jack Oswald, CEO, SynGest, Inc.
Joe Jobe, CEO, National Biodiesel Board
Moderator; Jim Lane, Editor and Publisher, Biofuels Digest
10:15 AM Networking and Refreshment Break
10:45AM BUILDING LARGE VALUE PROPOSITIONS
Chas Eggert, CEO, OPX Biotechnologies
Dennis Banasiak, CEO Avello Bioenergy
Stefan Muller, Senior Vice President, Ensyn Technologies
Jere Kolstad, President, Rivertop Renewables
Moderator, Jack Oswald, CEO, SynGest
12:15 PM Luncheon
2:15 PM THE RACE FOR SCALE
Robert Wedinger, President and CEO, Rennovia
Richard Eno, CEO, Metabolix
Bill Radany, CEO, Verdezyne
Jonathan Wolfson, CEO, Solazyme
Moderator; Jim Lane, Editor and Publisher, Biofuels Digest
4:00 PM STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND INVESTMENT
James Stephens, President, CSO, and Interim CEO, Blue Marble Biomaterials
Ganesh Kishore, CEO, Malaysian Life Sciences Fund
Dan Trunfio, CEO, Bio-Architecture Labs
5:30 PM Closing Comments and End of Day One
Day Two: Tuesday, April 3, 2012- Advanced biofuels
8:20 AM Welcome and Introduction
Jim Lane, Editor and Publisher, Biofuels Digest
8:40 AM Opening Address
John Melo, CEO, Amyris
9:00 ABLC GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES OUTLOOK
Mike McAdams, President, Advanced Biofuels Association
Harry S. Baumes, Ph.D., Director, Office of Energy Policy and New Uses, USDA
Brian Duff, Demonstration and Deployment Supervisor, Biomass Program, US DOE
Brent Erickson, Executive Vice President, BIO
Mary Rosenthal, Executive Director, Algal Biomass Organization
Brooke Coleman, Executive Director, Advanced Ethanol Council
Moderator: Wes Bolson, Vice President, Government Affairs, Codexis
10:00 AM Networking and Refreshment Break
10:30 AM Morning Keynote Address
Robert Johnsen, CEO, Primus Green Energy
11:00 BOLD LEADERSHIP FOR CHALLENGING TIMES
Jonathan Wolfson, CEO, Solazyme
Ed Dineen, CEO, LS9
Lee Edwards, CEO, Virent
Jennifer Holmgren, CEO, LanzaTech
Bob Mayer, CEO, Cobalt Technologies
12:05 PM Special Keynote Address
Thomas J. Vilsack, United States Secretary of Agriculture
12:15 PM Luncheon
2:00 PM Afternoon Opening Address
Philip Lavielle, CEO, Virdia
2:15 PM THE RACE FOR SCALE
Dan Cohrs, CFO, Rentech
James Rekoske, GM, Honeywell’s UOP
Theodora Retsina, CEO, American Process
Bill Brady, CEO, Mascoma
Deborah E. Dodge, Sr. Manager, Genencor
Gary Luce, CEO, Terrabon
4:10 PM Networking and Refreshment Break.
4:40 PM PILOT TO PLAYER
C.J. Warner, Chairman and President, Sapphire Energy
Jim Imbler, CEO, ZeaChem
K’Lynne Johnson, CEO, Elevance Renewable Sciences
Martin Mitchell, Business Development Manger, Biofuels, Süd-Chemie
Alan Shaw, Principal, Alan Shaw Consulting
6:00 PM Introduction to Hot 30 and Hot 50 Reception
6:10 PM The 30 Hottest Companies in Renewable Chemicals and
50 Hottest Companies in Bioenergy cocktail reception.
Day Three: Wednesday, April 4, 2012- Advanced biofuels
8:00 AM Continental Breakfast
8:30 AM Welcome and Introduction
Jim Lane, Editor & Publisher, Biofuels Digest
9:00 AM HOT TECHNOLOGIES
Kevin Weiss, CEO, Byogy Renewables
Kevin Berner, President & CEO, Phycal
Dr. John Kasab, Technicsal Specialist, Ricado
Robert Graham, Chairman and CEO, Ensyn
Moderator: Todd Taylor, Frederickson & Byron
10:30 AM Networking and Refreshment Break.
10:30 AM Morning Keynote Address
Peter Strumph, iCEO, Codexis
11:20 HOT STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS AND JOINT VENTURES
Bob Mayer, CEO, Cobalt Technologies
Michael Burnside, CEO, Catchlight Enrrgy
Todd Becker, CEO, Green Plains Renewable Energy
Tim Burns, BioProcess Algae
Franck Mode, Eco-Devemopment Investment Advisor, Champagne-Ardennes Region
12:50 PM Keynote Address
Philip New, CEO, BP Biofuels
1:10 PM Luncheon
2:20 PM PROJECT FINANCE AND FINANCING STRUCTURES
Mark J. Riedy, Partner, Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo
John M. May, Managing Director, Stern Brothers & Co.
John R. Kirkwood, Partner, Krieg DeVault LLP
3:15 PM Networking and Refreshment Break.
4:40 PM HOT FEEDSTOCKS
Carl Rush, SVP, Organic Growth Group, Wasyte Management
Daphne Preuss, CEO, Chromatin
Richard Hamilton, CEO, Ceres
Kef Kasdin, CEO, Proterro
Maud Hinchee, CTO, ArborGen
Moderator: Naveen Sikka, CEO, TerViva
5:30 PM Close of Proceedings
Day Four: Thursday, April 5, 2012- Military and Aviation Markets
7:30 AM Continental Breakfast
8:00 AM Opening General Address (in conjunction with the Bio-Based Investor Summit)
Patrick Gruber, CEO, Gevo
8:30 AM Gen. Wesley K. Clark (Ret.), Co-Chairman, Growth Energy, Former Supreme Allied Commander and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command
9:00 AM Thomas Hicks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy
9:20 AM BEYOND HEFA: PROGRESS TOWARDS FUEL QUALIFICATION
Glenn Johnston, VP Regulatory Affairs, Gevo
Fernando Garcia, Sr. Director, Regulatory Affairs, Amyris
Ed Coppola, Principal Engineer, Applied Research Associates
Aaron Imrie, Commercisl Manager, Virent
Moderator: Mark Rumizen, Aviation Fuels Specialist, FAA
10:30 AM ALIGNING BUSINESS FUNDAMENTALS, FEEDSTOCK TO FLIGHT
Jeffrey J. Steiner, Ph.D., Senior Advisor for Bioenergy, USDA
Zia Haq, Senior Analyst, Biomass Program, US DOE
Donald Schenk, Principal, ACA Associates
Eric Bowen, SVP, Renewable Energy Group
Robert Sturtz, Managing Director, Strategic Sourcing Fuels, United Airlines
Cyndy Thyfault, President, Westar Trading Resources
Moderator: Bruno Miller, Principal, Energy & Environment, Metron Aviation
11:40 AM Networking and Refreshment Break.
12:00 STRUCTURED NETWORKING: PRODUCERS AND END-USERS
1:00 PM Luncheon and Networking
2:30 PM DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS
Jay Long, Alaska Airlines
John Heimlich, Vice President, and co-lead of “Farm to Fly” initiative, Airlines for America
Mark Iden, Defense Logistics Agency
Nate Brown, FAA Office of Environment and Energy, and CAAFI Leadership Team
Chris Tindal, PE, CEM, Director for Operational Energy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy
Elizabeth Leavitt, Director, Aviation Planning and Environmental Services, Port of Seattle
Moderator: Richard Altman, Executive DIrector, CAAFI
3:45 PM STATE AND REGIONAL DEPLOYMENT EFFORTS
Jill Stuckey, Director, Center for Innovation in Energy, Georgia Environmental Finance Authority
Kyle Zeringue, Assistant Director, Louisiana Economic Development
Joelle Simonpietri, Deputy, US Pacific Command Energy Office, U.S. Navy
Dr. Rafael Hernandez, Associate Director of the Sustainable Energy Research Center, Mississippi State University
Moderator: Robert Sturtz, Managing Director, Strategic Sourcing Fuels, United Airlines
4:15 PM Close of Proceedings
Day Four: Thursday, April 5, 2012- Bio-Based Investor Summit
7:30 AM Continental Breakfast
8:00 AM Opening General Address
in conjunction with the Bio-Based Investor Summit)
Patrick Gruber, CEO, Gevo
8:30 AM Gen. Wesley K. Clark (Ret.), Co-Chairman, Growth Energy, Former Supreme Allied Commander and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command
9:00 AM THE ARC OF FINANCE – FROM ANGEL TO IPO Presenter TBA
9:15 AM MACROECONOMIC DRIVER AND FINANCING ISSUES
Donald G. Roberts, Vice Chairman and Managing Director, CIBC World Markets, Inc.
Mike McAdams, President, Advanced Biofuels Association
Alejandro Zamorano-Cadavid, US Bioenergy Analyst, Bloomberg New Energy Finance
Moderator: Mark. J. Riedy, Partner, Mintz Levin
10:00 AM MAXIMIZING CREDIT QUALITY
Greg Remec, Analyst, Fitch
Mark Habib, Project Finance, Standard & Poor’s
Moderators: Marvin Anderson, SVP, Stern Brothers and Co.,
Les Krone, SVP, Stern Brothers and Co.,
James Dack, VP, Stern Brothers and Co.
10:30 AM Networking and Refreshment Break.
11:30 VIEW FROM THE SELL SIDE
Ian Barnett, Executive Vice President, Finance and Corporate Development, Ensyn
Joseph Regnery, SVP, Government and Regulatory Affairs, ZeaChem, Inc.
Gary Luce, CEO, Terrabon, Inc.
Pavel Molchanov, SVP, Energy Equity Research, Raymond James & Associates
Moderators: John May, Managing Director, Stern Brothers & Co.
John Kirkwood, Partner, Krieg DeVault
12:30 PM Luncheon and Networking
2:00 PM VIEW FROM THE BUY-SIDE II
Michael Eckhart, Managing Director, Global Head of Environmental Finance, Institutional Clients Group, CitiGroup
Basil Karampelas, President, American Process
Michael Proskin, Vice President, Credit Suisse
Jim Matheson, General Partner, Flagship Ventures
Moderators: Chris Groobey, Partner, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati; John Hamer, Venture Partner, Burrill & Company
3:15 PM CREATIVE FINANCING SOURCES AND STRUCTURES
Joseph O. Evans, Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President, Chaparral Energy
David Scott, E.V.P., Utility and Mining Practices Leader, Willis America
Moderators: John May, Managing Director, Stern Brothers & Co.
John Kirkwood, Partner, Krieg DeVault,
Mark. J. Riedy, Partner, Mintz Levin
4:30 PM WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? A SUMMARY DISCUSSION
5:00 PM Close of Proceedings
-----------------
Confirmed Speakers include:
Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack
Growth Energy co-chairman Gen. Wesley K. Clark (Ret.)
BP Biofuels CEO Phil New
Jonathan Wolfson, CEO, Solazyme
Ed Dineen, CEO, LS9
Lee Edwards, CEO, Virent
Pat Gruber, CEO, Gevo
Jennifer Holmgren, CEO, LanzaTech
Gary Luce, CEO, Terrabon
Bill Brady, CEO, Mascoma
Jim Rekoske, GM, UOP
K’Lynne Johnson, CEO, Elevance
Peter Strumpf, iCEO, Codexis
Jim Imbler, CEO, ZeaChem
Kevin Weiss, CEO, Byogy Renewables
Michael Burnside, CEO, Catchlight Energy
Tim Burns, CEO, BioProcess Algae
Kevin Berner, CEO, Phycal
Alan Shaw, Principal, Alan Shaw Consulting
Christophe Schilling – CEO, Genomatica
Jack Oswald – CEO, SynGest
Chas Eggert – CEO, OPX Bio
Stan Banasiak – CEO, Avello Bioenergy
Rick Eno – CEO, Metabolix
Jere Kolstad – CEO, Rivertop Renewables
Rich Cilento – CEO, GlycosBio
Atul Thakrar – CEO, Segetis
John May, MD, Stern Brothers
Mary Reidy, Partner, Mintz Levin
Cindy Thyfault, CEO, Westar
John Kirwood, Kreig DeVault
Moderator Sheila MacVicar (left to right) leads the panel Making Macroeconomics Work for Women with panelists Claver Gatete, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning of Rwanda, Elizabeth Shuler, Secretary Treasurer, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Nyaradzayi Gumbonzvanda, Chair of the ActionAid International Board, James Heintz, Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts and Kalpana Kochar, Director, Human Resources Department, IMF, on Wednesday, October 5 during the 2016 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington, D.C. Ryan Rayburn/IMF Photo
3 May 2021. The finance ministers and central bank governors of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), People’s Republic of China, Japan, and Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3) convened its 24th meeting online.
The ministers and governors discussed recent economic and financial developments in the region and strengthening regional financial cooperation through the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), and Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI), among others.
The event was held during the 54th Annual Meeting of the ADB Board of Governors.
3 May 2021. The finance ministers and central bank governors of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), People’s Republic of China, Japan, and Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3) convened its 24th meeting online.
The ministers and governors discussed recent economic and financial developments in the region and strengthening regional financial cooperation through the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), and Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI), among others.
The event was held during the 54th Annual Meeting of the ADB Board of Governors.
the weather is pretty warm here in stroudsburg but my macroeconomics classroom is positively frigid. yay for bandanas!
also, alan, i am rethinking growing my hair out--i've just learned how to part it correctly!! although i'm sure you'd say it looked great before, i assure you there is indeed a difference :P
wearing:
linen 'women of the wild west' jacket
bright red 'euskadi pays basque' (?) bandana
grey h&m t-shirt
mum's flowery skirt
black socks & flats, rxd
your necklace & betsey johnson watch
15/365
The real estate industry is increasingly influenced by rapid technological advancements and significant demographic shifts, which include growing urbanization, longevity of Baby Boomers, and differentiated lifestyle patterns of Millennials. In addition, macroeconomic and regulatory developments continue to impact profitability. How can companies gain a competitive advantage and drive top- and bottom-line growth? Here are some trends to pay attention to in 2017.
Economic outlook: Growth tempered by higher interest rates?
Gross domestic product growth will likely increase 2.5 percent in 2017, according to Deloitte’s Q3 2016 US Economic Forecast. The modest economic improvement could temper the pace of commercial real estate (CRE) transaction activity.
Volatile global markets have led to continued low interest rates. The Deloitte economics team anticipates the Federal Reserve is likely to raise interest rates in the short-to-medium term. Higher interest rates are likely to increase mortgage costs and could deter real estate investments to some extent.
An improving employment scenario and rising labor participation are expected to result in an unemployment rate of less than 5 percent. The employment-to-population ratio is projected to peak in 2018, as retiring Baby Boomers may reduce the share of employed. The improving labor markets and household wealth will likely boost consumer confidence.
Regulatory outlook: Greater compliance costs on the horizon
New accounting standards on lease accounting and revenue recognitionwill likely increase the compliance and administration costs for real estate investment trusts (REITs) and engineering and construction (E&C) companies.
While increased exemptions under the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA) will increase foreign investments in CRE,risk retention rules will likely lower commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) issuance and reduce capital availability in secondary and tertiary markets.
In addition, the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015 will not only ease REIT tax provisions and research and development (R&D) tax credits for E&C companies, it will also increase the flexibility to invest in startups for R&D experimentation. At the same time, corporate tax reforms will reduce flexibility for corporations to spin off real estate assets into REIT structures.
Disruptive trends: Shaking up the CRE marketplace
Collaborative economy. Startups based on the sharing or collaborative economy, like Airbnb or WeWork, are disrupting the way organizations lease and use CRE. Companies face challenges from new competitors that are providing dynamically configurable spaces and flexible leases. Owners need to rethink their approach toward space design, lease administration, and lease duration.
Disintermediation of brokerage and leasing. Technological advancements are making CRE data more ubiquitous and transparent. These changes are enabling online leasing in a cost-effective, real-time manner and threatening the traditional brokerage model. Traditional brokers should consider diversifying their core business focus to include consultative opportunities, invest in data and technology, and collaborate with startups to get ahead in the game.
Competition for talent. A shortage of candidates with strong skills in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM); rising urbanization; and Millennials’ preference for an open and flexible work culture are changing the employment marketplace and will result in significant competition for talent. There is likely to be greater demand for mixed-use developments as consumers prefer to “live, work, and play” in proximity; office space usage will be redefined and even rationalized. Companies should choose locations in areas that have concentrations of STEM talent and revamp design and development teams to cater to changing consumer preferences.
Last mile. Online retailing, on-demand manufacturing, and innovations in speed and mode of delivery (such as same-day delivery and e-lockers) are disrupting the retail and industrial markets. Demand for large retail and industrial spaces will contract, and there will be a blurring of lines between these two property types. For example, retail properties could double as fulfillment centers. While retail owners can try different store formats and enhance end-customer experience, industrials should potentially focus on smaller and more flexible spaces within cities to enable faster delivery.
Future of mobility: Emergence of “pay-per-use” is beginning to challenge the model of personally owned vehicles. Along with this, the advent of self-driving vehicles will potentially transform the entire mobility ecosystem. This has the potential to change demand-supply dynamics, free up large parking spaces in prime areas that can be put to different uses, and shift tenant demography. Companies need to be more strategic in analyzing the impact of mobility patterns and options on their long-term revenue and profitability, exploring design changes to existing spaces, and revisiting tenant strategies.
Homebuilders: Demand-supply mismatch may offset rising confidence
Homebuilders’ confidence is on a rise due to improved employment, household income, and strong demand from Millennials. However, a demand-supply mismatch may continue due to ongoing labor shortages and permit issuance delays. Housing starts increased by 0.9 percent year-over-year in August 2016, even though housing permits reduced 1.2 percent year-over-year in August. Deloitte’s Q3 2016 US Economic Forecast suggests that housing starts are likely to reach 1.5 million in 2017 compared with an estimated 1.3 million in 2016. In contrast, in the first half of 2016, orders for homebuilders grew by an average of 29 percent compared with in the second half of 2015, but deliveries by homebuilders declined an average of 14 percent. As a result, the average order backlog has climbed to 36 percent, due primarily to labor shortages and permit issuance delays.
Home prices are likely to grow, albeit at a slower pace, due to limited inventory and supply. According to the quarterly Zillow® Home Price Expectations Survey, the Midwest region may witness a surge in demand due to job growth and relatively lower prices compared with the coastal markets.
In 2016, total home sales are expected to grow at approximately 3.6 percent on an annual basis. The slower growth is likely to be driven by supply constraints, potentially higher interest rates, and rising prices. Sales for new homes are expected to grow by 21.3 percent year-over-year to 609,000 homes. In contrast, sales for existing homes are expected to grow at a slower rate, approximately 1.9 percent year-over-year, to 5.3 million homes. This is in line with the Deloitte economics team’s 3Q 2016 forecast.
Home mortgage originations and delinquency rates improved in 2015, but they could be impacted by an imminent interest rate hike, even though banks have gradually loosened residential mortgage standards.
Homebuilders are building more units for rent, as rental demand and rental values have been strong and homebuilders look to grow and diversify. This strategy is likely to influence homebuilders’ business models and blur lines with multifamily owners.
A time for reinvention and change
Real estate companies will need to reinvent their strategies in 2017 to prepare and respond to the changes in the macroeconomic and built environment. Specifically, companies will need to:
•Consider the influence of Real Link technology advancements, urbanization, changing consumer preferences, security, climate change, and resource scarcity concerns on real estate decisions.
•Leverage technologies such as the Internet of Things, cloud computing, mobility, 3D printing, and advanced analytics to be innovative with respect to locating future developments.
•Resolve integration issues with legacy systems while adopting new technologies.
•Adopt a targeted and multipronged cybersecurity strategy that is secure, vigilant, and resilient.
•Drive innovation by partnering with existing startups, establishing research and innovation labs, and creating corporate accelerators.
•Invest in the tools and talent to respond to the changes in the ecosystem at a desirable pace.
Germany's energy crisis threatens a family-run business:
The Duran: Putin delivers confident Federal assembly speech, suspense start nuclear treaty:
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70565
Presidential Address to Federal Assembly
Vladimir Putin delivered his Address to the Federal Assembly. The ceremony took place in Gostiny Dvor, Moscow.
February 21, 2023 13:50
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon,
Members of the Federation Assembly – senators, State Duma deputies,
Citizens of Russia,
This Presidential Address comes, as we all know, at a difficult, watershed period for our country. This is a time of radical, irreversible change in the entire world, of crucial historical events that will determine the future of our country and our people, a time when every one of us bears a colossal responsibility.
One year ago, to protect the people in our historical lands, to ensure the security of our country and to eliminate the threat coming from the neo-Nazi regime that had taken hold in Ukraine after the 2014 coup, it was decided to begin the special military operation. Step by step, carefully and consistently we will deal with the tasks we have at hand.
Since 2014, Donbass has been fighting for the right to live in their land and to speak their native tongue. It fought and never gave up amid the blockade, constant shelling and the Kiev regime’s overt hatred. It hoped and waited that Russia would come to help.
In the meantime, as you know well, we were doing everything in our power to solve this problem by peaceful means, and patiently conducted talks on a peaceful solution to this devastating conflict.
This appalling method of deception has been tried and tested many times before. They behaved just as shamelessly and duplicitously when destroying Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. They will never be able to wash off this shame. The concepts of honour, trust, and decency are not for them.
Over the long centuries of colonialism, diktat and hegemony, they got used to being allowed everything, got used to spitting on the whole world. It turned out that they treat people living in their own countries with the same disdain, like a master. After all, they cynically deceived them too, tricked them with tall stories about the search for peace, about adherence to the UN Security Council resolutions on Donbass. Indeed, the Western elites have become a symbol of total, unprincipled lies.
We firmly defend our interests as well as our belief that in today’s world there should be no division into so-called civilised countries and all the rest and that there is a need for an honest partnership that rejects any exclusivity, especially an aggressive one.
We were open and sincerely ready for a constructive dialogue with the West; we said and insisted that both Europe and the whole world needed an indivisible security system equal for all countries, and for many years we suggested that our partners discuss this idea together and work on its implementation. But in response, we received either an indistinct or hypocritical reaction, as far as words were concerned. But there were also actions: NATO’s expansion to our borders, the creation of new deployment areas for missile defence in Europe and Asia – they decided to take cover from us under an ‘umbrella’ – deployment of military contingents, and not just near Russia’s borders.
I would like to stress –in fact, this is well-known – that no other country has so many military bases abroad as the United States. There are hundreds of them – I want to emphasise this – hundreds of bases all over the world; the planet is covered with them, and one look at the map is enough to see this.
The whole world witnessed how they withdrew from fundamental agreements on weapons, including the treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles, unilaterally tearing up the fundamental agreements that maintain world peace. For some reason, they did it. They do not do anything without a reason, as we know.
Finally, in December 2021, we officially submitted draft agreements on security guarantees to the USA and NATO. In essence, all key, fundamental points were rejected. After that it finally became clear that the go-ahead for the implementation of aggressive plans had been given and they were not going to stop.
The threat was growing by the day. Judging by the information we received, there was no doubt that everything would be in place by February 2022 for launching yet another bloody punitive operation in Donbass. Let me remind you that back in 2014, the Kiev regime sent its artillery, tanks and warplanes to fight in Donbass.
We all remember the aerial footage of airstrikes targeting Donetsk. Other cities also suffered from airstrikes. In 2015, they tried to mount a frontal assault against Donbass again, while keeping the blockade in place and continuing to shell and terrorise civilians. Let me remind you that all of this was completely at odds with the documents and resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, but everyone pretended that nothing was happening.
Let me reiterate that they were the ones who started this war, while we used force and are using it to stop the war.
Those who plotted a new attack against Donetsk in the Donbass region, and against Lugansk understood that Crimea and Sevastopol would be the next target. We realised this as well. Even today, Kiev is openly discussing far-reaching plans of this kind. They exposed themselves by making public what we knew already.
We are defending human lives and our common home, while the West seeks unlimited power. It has already spent over $150 billion on helping and arming the Kiev regime. To give you an idea, according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the G7 countries earmarked about $60 billion in 2020–2021 to help the world’s poorest countries. Is this clear? They spent $150 billion on the war, while giving $60 billion to the poorest countries, despite pretending to care about them all the time, and also conditioning this support on obedience on behalf of the beneficiary countries. What about all this talk of fighting poverty, sustainable development and protection of the environment? Where did it all go? Has it all vanished? Meanwhile, they keep channelling more money into the war effort. They eagerly invest in sowing unrest and encouraging government coups in other countries around the world.
The recent Munich Conference turned into an endless stream of accusations against Russia. One gets the impression that this was done so that everyone would forget what the so-called West has been doing over the past decades. They were the ones who let the genie out of the bottle, plunging entire regions into chaos.
According to US experts, almost 900,000 people were killed during wars unleashed by the United States after 2001, and over 38 million became refugees. Please note, we did not invent these statistics; it is the Americans who are providing them. They are now simply trying to erase all this from the memory of humankind, and they are pretending that all this never happened. However, no one in the world has forgotten this or will ever forget it.
None of them cares about human casualties and tragedies because many trillions of dollars are at stake, of course. They can also continue to rob everyone under the guise of democracy and freedoms, to impose neoliberal and essentially totalitarian values, to brand entire countries and nations, to publicly insult their leaders, to suppress dissent in their own countries and to divert attention from corruption scandals by creating an enemy image. We continue to see all this on television, which highlights greater domestic economic, social and inter-ethnic problems, contradictions and disagreements.
I would like to recall that, in the 1930s, the West had virtually paved the way to power for the Nazis in Germany. In our time, they started turning Ukraine into an “anti-Russia.”
Actually, this project is not new. People who are knowledgeable about history at least to some extent realise that this project dates back to the 19th century. The Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland had conceived it for one purpose, that is, to deprive Russia of these historical territories that are now called Ukraine. This is their goal. There is nothing new here; they are repeating everything.
The West expedited the implementation of this project today by supporting the 2014 coup. That was a bloody, anti-state and unconstitutional coup. They pretended that nothing happened, and that this is how things should be. They even said how much money they had spent on it. Russophobia and extremely aggressive nationalism formed its ideological foundation.
Quite recently, a brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was named Edelweiss after a Nazi division whose personnel were involved in deporting Jews, executing prisoners of war and conducting punitive operations against partisans in Yugoslavia, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Greece. We are ashamed to talk about this, but they are not. Personnel serving with the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Ukrainian National Guard are particularly fond of chevrons formerly worn by soldiers from Das Reich, Totenkopf (Death’s Head) and Galichina divisions and other SS units. Their hands are also stained with blood. Ukrainian armoured vehicles feature insignia of the Nazi German Wehrmacht.
Neo-Nazis are open about whose heirs they consider themselves to be. Surprisingly, none of the powers that be in the West are seeing it. Why? Because they – pardon my language – could not care less about it. They do not care who they are betting on in their fight against us, against Russia. In fact, anyone will do as long as they fight against us and our country. Indeed, we saw terrorists and neo-Nazis in their ranks. They would let all kinds of ghouls join their ranks, for God’s sake, as long as they act on their will as a weapon against Russia.
In fact, the anti-Russia project is part of the revanchist policy towards our country to create flashpoints of instability and conflicts next to our borders. Back then, in the 1930s, and now the design remains the same and it is to direct aggression to the East, to spark a war in Europe, and to eliminate competitors by using a proxy force.
We are not at war with the people of Ukraine. I have made that clear many times. The people of Ukraine have become hostages of the Kiev regime and its Western handlers, who have in fact occupied that country in the political, military and economic sense and have been destroying Ukrainian industry for decades now as they plundered its natural resources. This led to social degradation and an immeasurable increase in poverty and inequality. Recruiting resources for military operations in these circumstances was easy. Nobody was thinking about people, who were conditioned for slaughter and eventually became expendables. It is a sad and dreadful thing to say, but it is a fact.
Responsibility for inciting and escalating the Ukraine conflict as well as the sheer number of casualties lies entirely with the Western elites and, of course, today’s Kiev regime, for which the Ukrainian people are, in fact, not its own people. The current Ukrainian regime is serving not national interests, but the interests of third countries.
The West is using Ukraine as a battering ram against Russia and as a testing range. I am not going to discuss in detail the West's attempts to turn the war around, or their plans to ramp up military supplies, since everyone is well aware of that. However, there is one circumstance that everyone should be clear about: the longer the range of the Western systems that will be supplied to Ukraine, the further we will have to move the threat away from our borders. This is obvious.
The Western elite make no secret of their goal, which is, I quote, “Russia’s strategic defeat.” What does this mean to us? This means they plan to finish us once and for all. In other words, they plan to grow a local conflict into a global confrontation. This is how we understand it and we will respond accordingly, because this represents an existential threat to our country.
However, they too realise it is impossible to defeat Russia on the battlefield and are conducting increasingly aggressive information attacks against us targeting primarily the younger generation. They never stop lying and distorting historical facts as they attack our culture, the Russian Orthodox Church and other traditional religious organizations in our country.
Look what they are doing to their own people. It is all about the destruction of the family, of cultural and national identity, perversion and abuse of children, including pedophilia, all of which are declared normal in their life. They are forcing the priests to bless same-sex marriages. Bless their hearts, let them do as they please. Here is what I would like to say in this regard. Adult people can do as they please. We in Russia have always seen it that way and always will: no one is going to intrude into other people’s private lives, and we are not going to do it, either.
But here is what I would like to tell them: look at the holy scripture and the main books of other world religions. They say it all, including that family is the union of a man and a woman, but these sacred texts are now being questioned. Reportedly, the Anglican Church is planning, just planning, to explore the idea of a gender-neutral god. What is there to say? Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.
Millions of people in the West realise that they are being led to a spiritual disaster. Frankly, the elite appear to have gone crazy, and it looks like there is no cure for that. But like I said, these are their problems, while we must protect our children, which we will do. We will protect our children from degradation and degeneration.
Clearly, the West will try to undermine and divide our society and to bet on the fifth columnists who, throughout history, and I want to emphasise this, have been using the same poison of contempt for their own Fatherland and the desire to make money by selling this poison to anyone who is willing to pay for it. It has always been that way.
Those who have embarked on the road of outright betrayal, committing terrorist and other crimes against the security of our society and the country’s territorial integrity, will be held accountable for this under law. But we will never behave like the Kiev regime and the Western elite, which have been and still are involved in witch hunts. We will not settle scores with those who take a step aside and turn their back on their Motherland. Let this be on their conscience, let them live with this – they will have to live with it. The main point is that our people, the citizens of Russia, have given them a moral assessment.
I am proud, and I think we are all proud that our multi-ethnic nation, the absolute majority of our citizens, have taken a principled stance on the special military operation. They understand the basic idea of what we are doing and support our actions on the defence of Donbass. This support primarily revealed their true patriotism – a feeling that is historically inherent in our nation. It is stunning in its dignity and deep understnding by everyone – I will stress, everyone – of the inseparable link between one’s own destiny and the destiny of the Fatherland.
My dear friends, I would like to thank everyone, all the people of Russia for their courage and resolve. I would like to thank our heroes, soldiers and officers in the Army and the Navy, the Russian Guards, the secret services staff, and all structures of authority, the fighters in Donetsk and Lugansk corps, volunteers and patriots who are now fighting in the ranks of the BARS combat army reserve.
I would like to apologise that I will not be able to mention everyone during today’s speech. You know, when I was drafting this speech, I wrote a very long list of these heroic units but then removed it from my text because, as I said, it is impossible to mention everyone, and I was afraid to offend anyone I might leave out.
My deepest gratitude to the parents, wives and families of our defenders, the doctors and paramedics, combat medics and medical nurses that are saving the wounded; to the railway workers and drivers that are supplying the front; to the builders that are erecting fortifications and restoring housing, roads and civilian facilities; to the workers and engineers at defence companies, who are now working almost around-the-clock, in several shifts; and to rural workers who reliably ensure food security for the country.
I am grateful to the teachers who sincerely care for the young generations of Russia, especially those that are working in very difficult, almost front-line conditions; the cultural figures that are visiting the zone of hostilities and hospitals to support the soldiers and officers; volunteers that are helping the front and civilians; journalists, primarily war correspondents, that are risking their lives to tell the truth to the world; pastors of Russia’s traditional religions and military clergy, whose wise words support and inspire people; government officials and business people – all those who fulfill their professional, civil and simply human duty.
My special words go to the residents of the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. You, my friends, determined your future at the referendums and made a clear choice despite the neo-Nazis’ threats and violence, amid the close military actions. But there has been nothing stronger than your intent to be with Russia, with your Motherland.
(Applause)
I want to emphasise that this is the reaction of the audience to the residents of the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. Once again, our deepest respect for them all.
We have already begun and will expand a major socioeconomic recovery and development programme for these new regions within the Federation. It includes restoring production facilities, jobs, and the ports on the Sea of Azov, which again became Russia’s landlocked sea, and building new, modern road,s like we did in Crimea, which now has a reliable land transport corridor with all of Russia. We will definitely implement all of these plans together.
Russia’s regions are currently providing direct assistance to the cities, districts and villages in the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. They are doing it sincerely, like true brothers and sisters. We are together again, which means that we have become even stronger, and we will do everything in our power to bring back the long-awaited peace to our land and ensure the safety of our people. Our soldiers, our heroes are fighting for this, for their ancestors, for the future of their children and grandchildren, for uniting our people.
Friends, I would like to ask you to pay your respects to our fellow soldiers who were killed in the attacks of neo-Nazis and raiders, who gave up their lives for Russia, for civilians, the elderly, women and children.
(A minute of silence)
Thank you.
We all understand, and I understand also how unbearably hard it is for their wives, sons and daughters, for their parents who raised those dignified defenders of the Fatherland – like the Young Guard members from Krasnodon, young men and women who fought against Nazism and for Donbass during the Great Patriotic War. Everyone in Russia remembers their courage, resilience, enormous strength of spirit and self-sacrifice to this day.
Our duty is to support the families that have lost their loved ones and to help them raise their children and give them an education and a job. The family of each participant in the special military operation must be a priority and treated with care and respect. Their needs must be responded to immediately, without bureaucratic delays.
I suggest establishing a dedicated state fund for bringing targeted, personalised assistance to the families of fallen fighters, as well as veterans of the special military operation. This entity will be tasked with coordinating efforts to offer social, medical support and counselling, and also address matters related to sending them to health resorts and providing rehabilitation services, while also assisting them in education, sports, employment and in acquiring a new profession. This fund will also have an essential mission to ensure long-term home care and high-technology prosthetics for those who need that.
I am asking the Government to work with the State Council Commission on Social Policy and with the regions to resolve the organisational matters as quickly as possible.
The state fund must be transparent in its work, while streamlining assistance and operating as a one-stop-shop, free from red tape or administrative barriers. Every family without exception, and every veteran will have their personal social worker, a coordinator, who will be there for them in person to resolve in real time any issue they might face. Let me emphasise that the fund must open its offices in all regions of the Russian Federation in 2023.
We already have measures in place for supporting Great Patriotic War veterans, combat veterans, as well as participants in local conflicts. I believe these essential elements will be added to the state fund’s mission moving forward. We need to explore this possibility, and I am asking the Government to do so.
Make no mistake: the fact that we are establishing a state fund does not mean that other institutions or officials at other levels of government will be relieved of their responsibility. I expect all federal agencies, regions and municipalities to stay focused on veterans, on service personnel and their families. In this context, I would like to thank the senior regional officials, mayors, and governors who routinely meet with people, including by visiting the line of contact, and support their fellow countrymen.
On a special note, let me say that today, career service personnel, mobilised conscripts, and volunteers all share frontline hardships, including in terms of provisions, supplies and equipment, remuneration, and insurance payments to the wounded, as well as healthcare services. However, there are complaints that make it all the way to my office, as well as to the governors, as they have been telling me, and to the military prosecutor’s office and the Human Rights Commissioner, showing that some of these issues have yet to be resolved. We need to get to the bottom of each complaint on a case-by-case basis.
And one more thing: everyone understands that serving in the special military operation zone causes immense physical and mental stress, since people risk their lives and health every day. For this reason, I believe that the mobilised conscripts, as well as all service personnel, and all those taking part in the special military operation, including volunteers, must benefit from a leave of absence of at least 14 days every six months without counting the time it takes them to travel to their destination. This way, every fighter will be able to meet family and spend time with their loved ones.
Colleagues, as you are aware, a 2021–2025 plan for building and developing the Armed Forces was approved by a Presidential Executive Order and is being implemented and adjusted as necessary. Importantly, our next steps to reinforce the Army and the Navy and to secure the current and future development of the Armed Forces must be based on actual combat experience gained during the special military operation, which is extremely important, I would even say absolutely invaluable to us.
For example, the latest systems account for over 91 percent, 91.3 percent, of Russia's nuclear deterrence forces. To reiterate, based on our newly acquired experience, we must access a similarly high quality level for all other components of the Armed Forces.
Officers and sergeants who act as competent, modern and decisive commanders, and they are many, will be promoted to higher positions as a matter of priority, sent to military universities and academies, and will serve as a powerful personnel reserve for the Armed Forces. Without a doubt, they are a valuable resource in civilian life and at governments at all levels. I just want our colleagues to pay attention to that. It is very important. The people must know that the Motherland appreciates their contribution to the defence of the Fatherland.
We will widely introduce the latest technology to ensure high-quality standards in the Army and Navy. We have corresponding pilot projects and samples of weapons and equipment in each area. Many of them are significantly superior to their foreign counterparts. Our goal is to start mass production. This work is underway and is picking up pace. Importantly, this relies on domestic research and the industrial base and involves small- and medium-sized high-tech businesses in implementation of the state defence order.
Today, our plants, design bureaus and research teams employ experienced specialists and increasing numbers of talented and highly skilled young people who are oriented towards breakthrough achievements while remaining true to the tradition of Russian gunsmiths, which is to spare no effort to ensure victory.
We will certainly strengthen the guarantees for our workforce, in part concerning salaries and social security. I propose launching a special programme for low-cost rental housing for defence industry employees. The rental payments for them will be significantly lower than the going market rate, since a significant portion of it will be covered by the state.
The Government reviewed this issue. I instruct you to work through the details of this programme and start building such rental housing without delay, primarily, in the cities that are major defence, industrial and research centres.
Colleagues,
As I have already said, the West has opened not only military and informational warfare against us, but is also seeking to fight us on the economic front. However, they have not succeeded on any of these fronts, and never will. Moreover, those who initiated the sanctions are punishing themselves: they sent prices soaring in their own countries, destroyed jobs, forced companies to close, and caused an energy crisis, while telling their people that the Russians were to blame for all of this. We hear that.
What means did they use against us in their efforts to attack us with sanctions? They tried disrupting economic ties with Russian companies and depriving the financial system of its communication channels to shutter our economy, isolate us from export markets and thus undermine our revenues. They also stole our foreign exchange reserves, to call a spade a spade, tried to depreciate the ruble and drive inflation to destructive heights.
Let me reiterate that the sanctions against Russia are merely a means, while the aim as declared by the Western leaders, to quote them, is to make us suffer. “Make them suffer” – what a humane attitude. They want to make our people suffer, which is designed to destabilise our society from within.
However, their gamble failed to pay off. The Russian economy, as well as its governance model proved to be much more resilient than the West thought. The Government, parliament, the Bank of Russia, the regions and of course the business community and their employees all worked together to ensure that the economic situation remained stable, offered people protection and preserved jobs, prevented shortages, including of essential goods, and supported the financial system and business owners who invest in their enterprises, which also means investing in national development.
As early as in March 2022, we launched a dedicated assistance package for businesses and the economy worth about a trillion rubles. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this has nothing to do with printing money. Not at all. Everything we do is solidly rooted in market principles.
In 2022, there was a decline in the gross domestic product. Mr Mishustin called me to say, “I would like to ask you to mention this.” I think that these data were released yesterday, right on schedule.
You may remember that some predicted that the economy would shrink by 20 to 25 percent, or maybe 10 percent. Only recently, we spoke about a 2.9 percent decline, and I was the one who announced this figure. Later it came down to 2.5 percent. However, in 2022, the GDP declined by 2.1 percent, according to the latest data. And we must be mindful of the fact that back in February and March of last year some predicted that the economy would be in free fall.
Russian businesses have restructured their logistics and have strengthened their ties with responsible, predictable partners – there are many of them, they are the majority in the world.
I would like to note that the share of the Russian ruble in our international settlements has doubled as compared to December 2021, reaching one third of the total, and including the currencies of the friendly countries, it exceeds half of all transactions.
We will continue working with our partners to create a sustainable, safe system of international settlements, which will be independent of the dollar and other Western reserve currencies that are bound to lose their universal appeal with this policy of the Western elite, the Western rulers. They are doing all this to themselves with their own hands.
We are not the ones reducing transactions in dollars or other so-called universal currencies – they are doing everything with their own hands.
You know, there is a maxim, cannons versus butter. Of course, national defence is the top priority, but in resolving strategic tasks in this area, we should not repeat the mistakes of the past and should not destroy our own economy. We have everything we need to both ensure our security and create conditions for confident progress in our country. We are acting in line with this logic and we intend to continue doing this.
Thus, many basic, I will stress, civilian industries in the national economy are far from being in decline, they have increased their production last year by a considerable amount. The scale of housing put into service exceeded 100 million square meters for the first time in our modern history.
As for agricultural production, it recorded two-digit growth rates last year. Thank you very much. We are most grateful to our agricultural producers. Russian agrarians harvested a record amount – over 150 million tonnes of grain, including over 100 million tonnes of wheat. By the end of the agricultural season, that is, June 30, 2023, we will bring our grain exports to 55–60 million tonnes.
Just 10 or 15 years ago, this seemed like a fairy tale, an absolutely unfeasible plan. If you remember, and I am sure some people do remember this – the former Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Agriculture are here – just recently, agrarians took in 60 million tonnes overall in a year, whereas now 55–60 million is their export potential alone. I am convinced we have every opportunity for a similar breakthrough in other areas as well.
We prevented the labour market from collapsing. On the contrary, we were able to reduce unemployment in the current environment. Today, considering the major challenges coming at us from all sides, the labour market is even better than it used to be. You may remember that the unemployment rate was 4.7 percent before the pandemic, and now, I believe, it is 3.7 percent. What is the figure, Mr Mishustin? 3.7 percent? This is an all-time low.
Let me reiterate that the Russian economy has prevailed over the risks it faced – it has prevailed. Of course, it was impossible to anticipate many of them, and we had to respond literally on the fly, dealing with issues as they emerged. Both the state and businesses had to move quickly. I will note that private actors, SMEs, played an essential role in these efforts, and we must remember this. We avoided having to apply excessive regulation or distorting the economy by giving the state a more prominent role.
What else there is to say? The recession was limited to the second quarter of 2022, while the economy grew in the third and fourth quarters. In fact, the Russian economy has embarked on a new growth cycle. Experts believe that it will rely on a fundamentally new model and structure. New, promising global markets, including the Asia-Pacific, are taking precedence, as is the domestic market, with its research, technology and workforce no longer geared toward exporting commodities but manufacturing goods with high added value. This will help Russia unleash its immense potential in all spheres and sectors.
We expect to see a solid increase in domestic demand as early as this year. I am convinced that companies will use this opportunity to expand their manufacturing, make new products that are in high demand, and to take over the market niches vacated or about to be vacated by Western companies as they withdraw.
Today, we clearly see what is going on and understand the structural issues we have to address in logistics, technology, finance, and human resources. Over the past years, we have been talking a lot and at length about the need to restructure our economy. Now these changes are a vital necessity, a game changer, and all for the better. We know what needs to be done to enable Russia to make steady progress and to develop independently regardless of any outside pressure or threats, while guaranteeing our national security and interests.
I would like to point out and to emphasise that the essence of our task is not to adapt to circumstances. Our strategic task is to take the economy to a new horizon. Everything is changing now, and changing extremely fast. This is not only a time of challenges but also a time of opportunities. This is really so today. And our future depends on the way we realise these opportunities. We must put an end – and I want to emphase this – to all interagency conflicts, red tape, grievances, doublespeak, or any other nonsense. Everything we do must contribute to achieving our goals and delivering results. This is what we must strive to achieve.
Enabling Russian companies and small family-run businesses to successfully tap the market is a victory in itself. Building cutting-edge factories and kilometres of new roads is a victory. Every new school, every new kindergarten we build is a victory. Scientific discoveries and new technologies – these are also victories, of course. What matters is that all of us contribute to our shared success.
What areas should we focus the partnership of the state, the regions and domestic business on?
First, we will expand promising foreign economic ties and build new logistics corridors. A decision has already been made to extend the Moscow-Kazan expressway to Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk and Tyumen, and eventually to Irkutsk and Vladivostok with branches to Kazakhstan, Mongolia and China. This will, in part, allows us to considerably expand our ties with Southeast Asian markets.
We will develop Black Sea and Sea of Azov ports. We will pay special attention to the North-South international corridor, as those who work on this every day know. Vessels with a draft of up to 4.5 meters will be able to pass through the Volga-Caspian Sea Canal this year. This will open up new routes for business cooperation with India, Iran, Pakistan, and the Middle Eastern countries. We will continue developing this corridor.
Our plans include expedited modernisation of the eastern railways – the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Baikal-Amur Railway (BAM) – and building up the potential of the Northern Sea Route. This will create not only additional freight traffic but also a foundation for reaching our national goals on developing Siberia, the Arctic and the Far East.
The infrastructure of the regions and the development of infrastructure, including communications, telecommunications and railways will receive a powerful impetus. Next year, 2024, we will bring to a proper condition at least 85 percent of all roads in the country’s largest metropolises, as well as over half of all regional and municipal roads. I am sure we will achieve this.
We will also continue our free gas distribution programme. We have already made the decision to extend it to social facilities – kindergartens and schools, outpatient clinics and hospitals, as well as primary healthcare centres. This programme will now be permanent for our citizens – they can always request a connection to the gas distribution system.
This year, we will launch a large programme to build and repair housing and utility systems. Over the next ten years, we plan to invest at least 4.5 trillion rubles in this. We know how important this is for our people and how neglected this area has been. It is necessary to improve this situation, and we will do it. It is important to give the programme a powerful start. So, I would like to ask the Government to ensure stable funding for this.
Second, we will need to significantly expand our economy’s production capabilities and to increase domestic industrial capacity.
An industrial mortgage tool has been created, and an easy-term loan can now be taken out not only to purchase production facilities, but also to build or upgrade them. The size of such a loan was discussed many times and there were plans to increase it. It is a decent amount for a first step: up to 500 million rubles. It is available at a rate of 3 or 5 percent for up to seven years. It sounds like a very good programme and should be put to good use.
New terms for industrial clusters took effect this year, including a lower fiscal and administrative burden on resident companies, and long-term state orders and subsidies to support demand for their innovative products, which are just entering the market.
According to estimates, these measures will generate high-demand projects worth over 10 trillion rubles by 2030. Investment is expected to reach about 2 trillion this year alone. Please note that these are not forecasts, but existing benchmarks.
Therefore, I would like the Government to expedite the launch of these projects, give a hand to businesses and come up with systemic support measures, including tax incentives. I am aware that the financial bloc does not like to provide incentives, and I partly share this approach: the taxation system must be consistent and without niches or exemptions, but this particular case calls for a creative approach.
So, starting this year, Russian companies will be able to reduce their revenue taxes if they purchase advanced domestic IT solutions and AI-enhanced products. Moreover, these expenses will be credited at one and a half times the actual cost, meaning that every ruble invested in purchasing such products will result in a tax deduction of 1.5 rubles.
I propose extending these deductions to purchases of all kinds of Russian high-tech equipment. I would like the Government to come up with a list of such equipment by specific industry and with the procedure for granting deductions. This is a good solution to reinvigorate the economy.
Third, a crucial issue on our economic development agenda to do with the new sources of funding investment, which we have been talking about a lot.
Thanks to our strong payments balance, Russia does not need to borrow funds abroad, kowtow and beg for money, and then hold long discussions on what, how much and on what conditions we would pay back. Russian banks are working stably and sustainably and have a solid margin for security.
In 2022, the volume of bank loans for the corporate sector increased, I repeat, increased. There was considerable concern about that, but we have reported growth, an increase of 14 percent, or more than we reported in 2021, before the miliary operation. In 2021, the figure was 11.7 percent; last year, it was 14 percent. The mortgage portfolio went up by 20.4 percent. We are growing.
Last year, the banking sector as a whole operated at a profit. It was not as large as in the preceding years, but it was considerable nevertheless: 203 billion rubles. This is another indicator of the stability of the Russian financial sector.
According to our estimates, inflation in Russia will approach the target figure of 4 percent in the second quarter this year. I would like to remind you that the inflation rate has reached 12, 17 and 20 percent in some EU countries. Our figure is 4 or 5 percent; the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry are still discussing the figure, but it will be close to the target. Given these positive dynamics and other macroeconomic parameters, we are creating objective conditions for lowering long-term interest rates in the economy, which means that loans for the real economic sector will become more affordable.
Individual long-term savings are a vital source of investment resources around the world, and we must also stimulate their attraction into the investment sphere. I would like the Government to expedite the submission of draft laws to the State Duma to launch the relevant state programme as soon as this April.
It is important to create additional conditions to encourage people to invest and earn at home, in the country. At the same time, it is necessary to guarantee the safety of people’s investment in voluntary retirement savings. We should create a mechanism here similar to the one used for insuring bank deposits. I would like to remind you that such savings, worth up to 1.4 million rubles, are insured by the state on guarantee deposits. I propose doubling the sum to 2.8 million rubles for voluntary retirement savings. Likewise, we must protect people’s investment in other long-term investment instruments, including against the possible bankruptcy of financial brokers.
Separate decisions must be taken to attract funds to rapidly growing and high-tech businesses. We will approve support for the placement of their shares on the domestic stock market, including tax benefits for both the companies and the buyers of their stock.
Freedom of enterprise is a vital element of economic sovereignty. I will repeat: against the backdrop of external attempts to contain Russia, private businesses have proven their ability to quickly adapt to the changing environment and ensure economic growth in difficult conditions. So, every business initiative aimed at benefiting the country should receive support.
I believe it is necessary to return, in this context, to the revision of a number of norms of criminal law as regards the economic elements of crime. Of course, the state must control what is happening in this area. We should not allow an anything-goes attitude here but we should not go too far, either. It is necessary to move faster towards the decriminalisation I mentioned. I hope the Government will consistently and seriously conduct this work together with Parliament, the law-enforcement bodies and business associations.
At the same time, I would like to ask the Government to suggest, in close cooperation with Parliament, additional measures for speeding up the de-offshorisation of the economy. Businesses, primarily those operating in key sectors and industries should operate in Russian jurisdiction – this is a fundamental principle.
Colleagues, in this context I would like to make a small philosophical digression. This is what I would like to single out.
We remember what problems and imbalances the Soviet economy faced in its later stages. This is why after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its planned system, in the chaos of the 1990s, the country began to create its economy along the lines of market relations and private ownership. Overall, this was the right thing to do. The Western countries were largely an example to follow in this respect. As you know, their advisers were a dime a dozen, and it seemed enough to simply copy their models. True, I remember they still argued with each other – the Europeans argued with the Americans on how the Russian economy should develop.
And what happened as a result? Our national economy was largely oriented to the West and for the most part as a source of raw materials. Naturally, there were different nuances, but overall, we were seen as a source of raw materials. The reasons for this are also clear – naturally, the new Russian businesses that were taking shape were primarily oriented toward generating profit, quick and easy profit in the first place. What could provide this? Of course, the sale of resources – oil, gas, metals and timber.
Few people thought about other alternatives or, probably, they did not have the opportunity to invest long-term. This is the reason other, more complex industries did not make much headway. It took us years – other governments saw this clearly – to break this negative trend. We had to adjust our tax system and make large-scale public investments.
We have achieved real and visible change. Indeed, the results are there, but, again, we should keep in mind the circumstances in which our major businesses developed. Technologies were coming from the West, cheaper sources of financing and lucrative markets were in the West, and capital started flowing to the West as well. Unfortunately, instead of expanding production and buying equipment and technology to create new jobs in Russia, they spent their money on foreign mansions, yachts and luxury real estate.
They began to invest in the economy later, but initially the money flowed rapidly to the West for consumption purposes. And since their money was there, that is where their children were educated, where their life was, their future. It was very difficult and almost impossible for the state to track and prevent these developments, because we lived in a free market paradigm.
Recent events have clearly shown that the image of the West as a safe haven for capital was a mirage. Those who failed to understand this in time, who saw Russia only as a source of income and planned to live mostly abroad, have lost a lot. They just got robbed there and saw even their legitimate money taken away.
At some point I made a joke – many may still remember it – I told Russian businesspeople that they will make themselves sick running from courtroom to courtroom and from office to office in the West trying to save their money. That is exactly how it turned out.
You know, I will say something that is quite simple, but truly important. Trust me, not a single ordinary citizen in our country felt sorry for those who lost their assets in foreign banks, lost their yachts or palaces abroad, and so on. In their conversations around the kitchen table, people have all recalled the privatisation of the 1990s, when enterprises that had been built by our entire nation were sold for next to nothing and the so-called new elites flaunted their lavish lifestyle.
There are other key aspects. During the years that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union, the West never stopped trying to set the post-Soviet states on fire and, most importantly, finish off Russia as the largest surviving portion of the historical reaches of our state. They encouraged international terrorists to assault us, provoked regional conflicts along the perimeter of our borders, ignored our interests and tried to contain and suppress our economy.
I am saying this because big business in Russia controls strategic enterprises with thousands of workers that determine the socioeconomic well-being of many regions and, hence, the overall state of affairs. So, whenever leaders or owners of such businesses become dependent on governments that adopt policies that are unfriendly to Russia, this poses a great threat to us, a danger to our country. This is an untenable situation.
Yes, everyone has a choice. Some may choose to live in a seized mansion with a blocked account, trying to find a place for themselves in a seemingly attractive Western capital, a resort or some other comfortable place abroad. Anyone has the right to do that, and we will never infringe on it. But it is time to see that in the West these people have always been and will always remain second class strangers who can be treated any way, and their money, connections and the acquired titles of counts, peers or mayors will not help at all. They must understand that they are second class people there.
There is another option: to stay with your Motherland, to work for your compatriots, not only to open new businesses but also to change life around you in cities, towns and throughout your country. We have quite a few businesspeople like this, real fighters in our business community, and we associate the future of our business with them. Everyone must know that the sources of their prosperity and their future can only be here, in their native country Russia.
If they do, we will create a very strong and self-sufficient economy that will not remain aloof in the world but will make use of all its competitive advantages. Russian capital, the money earned here, must be put to work for the country, for our national development. Today, we see huge potential in the development of infrastructure, the manufacturing sector, in domestic tourism and many other industries.
I would like those who have come up against the predatory mores of the West to hear what I have to say: running around with cap in hand, begging for your own money makes no sense, and most importantly, it accomplishes nothing, especially now that you realise who you are dealing with. Stop clinging to the past, resorting to the courts to get at least something back. Change your lives and your jobs, because you are strong people – I am addressing our businesspeople now, many of whom I have known for years, who know what is what in life.
Launch new projects, earn money, work hard for Russia, invest in enterprises and jobs, and help schools and universities, science and healthcare, culture and sports. In this way, you will increase your wealth and will also win the respect and gratitude of the people for a generation ahead. The state and society will certainly support you.
Let us consider this as a message for your business: get moving in the right direction.
To be continued.
In the CD Talk - Macroeconomic Frameworks - Scaling Up Government Capacity with Online Training, Yongzheng Yang, Ellen Nedde and Lyn Javier speak about innovative approaches for training to shrink the skills gap at the IMF Headquarters during the 2019 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings, October 16, 2019 in Washington, DC. IMF Photograph/Joshua Roberts
1 May 2019. Panelists present the AREO 2019, a flagship report produced by the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), which discusses the regional economic prospects as well as a thematic study on “Building Capacity and Connectivity for the New Economy.”
The event was held during the 52nd Annual Meeting of the ADB Board of Governors.
Learn more about the event.
1 May 2019. At a seminar held by the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) on the sidelines of the 52nd Annual Meeting of the ADB Board of Governors, participants discussed how East Asia can tackle multiple challenges related to strengthening its collective development capacity and cross-border connectivity. The AREO 2019, a flagship report produced by AMRO, was launched immediately prior to the seminar. The report discusses the economic prospects of the dynamic East Asian region, as well as a thematic study on “Building Capacity and Connectivity for the New Economy.”
Visit the event page for more information on this event and its speakers.
INFLATION ----
Global Economic Prospects - January 2013: Assuring Growth Over the Medium Term ---- More than four years after the global financial crisis hit, high-income countries struggle to restructure their economies and regain fiscal sustainability.
Developing countries, where growth is 1-2 percentage points below what it was during the pre-crisis period, have been affected by the weakness in high-income countries. To regain pre-crisis growth rates, they will need to focus on productivity-enhancing domestic policies rather than demand stimulus.
Although the major risks to the global economy are similar to those of a year ago, the likelihood that they will materialize has diminished, as has the magnitude of estimated impacts should these events occur. Major downside risks include the loss of access to capital markets by vulnerable Euro Area countries, lack of agreement on U.S. fiscal policy and the debt ceiling, and commodity price shocks.
In an environment of slow growth and continued volatility, a steady hand is required in developing countries to avoid pro-cyclical policy and to rebuild macroeconomic buffers so that authorities can react in the case of new external or domestic shocks.
Source : web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/...