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The associates of Lord Jack Archibald and Co. have deemed one flaw critical to the condition of humankind as a specie. A terror of society's collective conscious, this veritable Achilles' heel has loomed in the dark mists of man's subconsciousness, threatening the qualia of the mind from within. What is this elder horror eating at the integrity of our intellect? The flaw is this: That the common man and gentleman alike does not possess the means to carry the firepower of an artillery battery upon his person, should the need for it be pressed upon him in the course of his diurnal habits. Furthermore, this lack is further felt in that such a thing, should it be possessed, is unlikely to be so obtained in a size convenient for a modest travel chest.
Hark, such phobia is banished. Lord Jack Archibald and Co. presents the spice grinder for your viewing and purchasing pleasure!
(A dignified individual of sharp intellect and a smart ready wit would be inclined to leave his astute and insightful opinion within the appropriately designated comment box. He may also deem it desirable and profitable to place his personal thoughts in notification upon the posted product.)
(In addition to this, said smart dressed suave mannered individual of fine and unique taste previously mentioned would be well suited to apply within at the Lord J. Archibald and Co. Offices about filling any vacancies within our prosperous and appealing workplace, should such a man fancy putting his hands and the sweat of his brow to the plow that is our weapons manufacturing. We would be happy to consort with minds of both old and new versions of the esteemed PMG program.)
Normally I don't like cats but this guy walked onto my property as a young stray and got my attention immediately. He seems to have an uncanny intellect and his ability to manipulate other animals and humans is beyond belief.
History
The John Rogers who bought Riverhill in 1840 was an only child, with a modest fortune, and a fine intellect. He became a classics scholar, a scientist and a friend of Charles Darwin. He was one of the first members of the Royal Horticultural Society and a patron of the plant collectors of the day.
He chose Riverhill because its sheltered situation offered an ideal lime free hillside where he could hope to establish newly introduced trees and shrubs. From his garden notebook, it can be seen that planting started in 1842. Subsequent generations, continued the planting and in 1910 Colonel John Middleton Rogers created what is now known as ‘The Wood Garden’ a fine collection of Japanese Maples, Rhododendrons and Azaleas. His wife, the infamous Muriel, created many additions including the now hidden Rock Gardens.
Until the beginning of the 2nd World War, eight full time gardeners kept Riverhill looking immaculate. Since the war years, however, a shortage of manpower and a lack of money has meant that the garden was allowed to deteriorate, with many parts of the original planting lost to everyday use and visitors.
Today, four generations of the Rogers family live at Riverhill,
The estate is managed by Edward Rogers (Great-great-great-grandson of the John Rogers who bought Riverhill in 1840) and his wife, Sarah.
Project 365 - Image 49/365
This morning when I woke up I strangely found Jeero lying in a bowl of peas, and had no idea at all why this was the case or what he wanted to achieve.
He lay totally silent for about 25 minutes and then he decided to talk to myself and Mireille, "I'm here to save the planet, I've joined Green Peas, see!".
It took a further 10 minutes for myself and Mireille to stop rolling on the floor with laughter, Jeero's lower intellect sure does provide some great laughter at times.
From the Uglydoll blog at adventuresinuglyworld.blogspot.com/
Belgian collectors card for Cine Rio à Coxyde. Photo: Unifrance Film.
French actress Bernadette Lafont (1938-2013) appeared in several classics of the Nouvelle Vague. Original and full of contradictions, she was both sexy and rather plain, brassy and quite serious, a mixture of intellect, sensuality and humour.
Bernadette Paule Anne Lafont was born in Nîmes in the South of France in 1938. She was the daughter of a pharmacist and his wife. As a teenager, she started her career as a dancer. She entered the Opéra de Nîmes where she fell in love with her future husband, the handsome actor Gérard Blain. In Paris, she met the young critic and aspiring film director François Truffaut, who offered her a role in his second short film, shot in Nîmes. So she made her screen debut in Les Mistons/The Mischief Makers (Francois Truffaut, 1957) opposite Gérard Blain. It was a comedy about five kids, who spy on two lovers during a hot summer day. It turned out to be that she was in the right place at the right time to catch the Nouvelle Vague movement, the new wave of filmmakers that would revolutionize the cinema.
She starred particularly in films by Truffaut and by Claude Chabrol. Her first feature and still one of her best-known films is Le Beau Serge/Bitter Reunion (Claude Chabrol, 1958) with Gérard Blain and Jean-Claude Brialy. (She had married Blain the year before but they would divorce a year later.) Many Nouvelle Vague films followed. With Chabrol she also made À double tour/Leda (Claude Chabrol, 1959) starring Madeleine Robinson, Les bonnes femmes/The Good Time Girls (Claude Chabrol, 1960) with Stéphane Audran, and Les godelureaux/Wise Guys (Claude Chabrol, 1961). She appeared in Truffaut’s comedy Tire-au-flanc 62/The Army Game (Claude de Givray, François Truffaut, 1960), and was the feisty heroine of Truffaut’s Une belle fille comme moi/A Gorgeous Bird Like Me (François Truffaut, 1972). For Louis Malle, she did a supporting part in his comedy Le voleur/The Thief of Paris (Louis Malle, 1967) starring Jean-Paul Belmondo, and for Jacques Rivette, she joined the cast of Out 1, noli me tangere/Out 1 (Jacques Rivette, Suzanne Schiffman, 1971) and Out 1: Spectre (Jacques Rivette, 1974). Finally, she played the role of Marie, one-third of the trio of lovers in La Maman et la Putain/The Mother and the Whore (Jean Eustache, 1973), considered by some critics as the last film of the Nouvelle Vague.
A well-known film with Bernadette Lafont is La Fiancée du Pirate/A Very Curious Girl (Nelly Kaplan, 1969). The success of this film about violence against women renewed her career after a difficult period. She was seen in Les stances à Sophie/Sophie’s Ways (Moshé Mizrahi, 1971), the crime drama Zig Zig (László Szabó, 1975) with Catherine Deneuve, and had a small part as the cellmate of Isabelle Huppert in Violette Nozière (Claude Chabrol, 1978). In Italy, she appeared in the comedy Il Ladrone/The Thief (Pasquale Festa Campanile, 1980). In a 1997 New York Times article, Katherine Knorr writes: “Lafont has in a tumultuous life done a bit of everything, from television movies to the stage, never quite the megastar but always a strong presence, smart and messed up all at the same time”. In the 1980s she appeared in Chabrol’s crime films Inspecteur Lavardin/Inspector Lavardin (Claude Chabrol, 1986) featuring Jean Poiret, and Masques/Masks (Claude Chabrol, 1987) with Philippe Noiret. She also played in Les saisons du plaisir/The Pleasure Seasons (1988) and other comedies by Jean-Pierre Mocky. Lafont won the César Award for Best Actress in a Supporting Role for L'Effrontée/Charlotte and Lulu (Claude Miller, 1985) starring Charlotte Gainsbourg. The energetic Lafont created in 1990 an audio-visual workshop to help young actors develop their creativity. She is the co-founder and on the committee that awards the Glace Gervais and an accompanying 100,000 franc prize to works competing in the Cannes Film Festival ‘Un certain Regard’ category. The award was designed to help bolster the budding careers of filmmakers. Her later films include Généalogies d'un crime/Genealogies of a Crime (Raul Ruiz, 1997) with Catherine Deneuve, and the comedy Ripoux 3/Part-Time Cops (Claude Zidi, 2003) with Philippe Noiret. In May 2007, she chaired the jury for the fifth edition of the Award for Education presented at the 60th Cannes Film Festival. After her divorce from Blain in 1959, Bernadette Lafont married the Hungarian sculptor Diourka Medveczky. Although the marriage was difficult and ended in a divorce, there were three children: actress Élisabeth Lafont, David Lafont and the late actress Pauline Lafont, who died in the summer of 1988 under tragic circumstances. She went for a walk near the family property in the Cevennes and never returned. For many weeks, police searched and the popular press went on a feeding frenzy. When Pauline's body was finally found, it became clear she had fallen down in a rough, lonely terrain. Lafont published her autobiography in 1997, an event heralded by a grand star-studded gala in Paris. For her long service to the French motion picture industry, she was given an Honorary César Award in 2003. She was made Officier de la Légion d'honneur (Officer of the Legion of Honour) in 2009. Bernadette Lafont had been hospitalised in her home town of Nimes on Monday after falling ill and died early Thursday 25 July, the hospital said in a statement.
Sources: Katherine Knorr (New York Times), Sandra Brennan (AllMovie), Wikipedia, and IMDb.
And, please check out our blog European Film Star Postcards.
He likes his martinis dry, and shaken - not stirred.
He loves (many) women, while having a spot in his heart for only his deceased wife.
SPECTRE fears his advanced gadgets, and razor-sharp intellect.
Who is he?
His name is Bond, James Bond.
(Finally made a passable Sean Connery / James Bond figure to go with my DB5. Now I need to make a Auric Goldfinger and his gold Rolls Royce, though...)
Thoughts?
Purchase signed print here.
chancenkosigomez.com/shop/onmymind
It’s funny how the mind works. If someone asked you not to think of something, your mind automatically generates the image or memory. I’ve spent the last 5 years being a student of Eastern teachings on understanding the mind and intellect. How can I really be happy or at peace with the restless mind making a mockery of everything? I’ve now come to understand that the mind is the storehouse of mystic energy, and intellect is the decision-making faculty. Both can be used as tools for navigating the game of life. One of my teachers shares that the mind passes through five major states: dull, distracted, partially gathered, or partially concentrated, one-pointed, and controlled. He would say, “To the uncontrolled mind, even the ground underneath one’s feet is a problem. I also realize that if not understood, the mind can be the driver, meanwhile, we sit in the back seat of our awareness. Being conscious to me means being aware that I am aware. That I create the reality I wish to experience. This portrait comes as a message of being the silent observer of the mind. Knowing that I have the option to be unattached and give little to no attention to the thoughts I observe if I wish. That with a distracted mind, I will achieve little in this world. The goal is to continue learning the art of removing as much negativity from thought and governing the mental moods and feelings that arise every day. When the clutter in the mind is clear, intuition starts working. That intuition is wisdom. That intuition knows everything that is right for us. A tutor who is inside. If the inner river is still and silent, then all the jewels hidden in the riverbed can be seen. When there is a wake of turbulence, then nothing is clear. People have been able perfom great deeds to hummanity and accomplish remarkable things for themselves because they were able to gather the rays of the mind and concentrate their mental strength.
A sparkling new Volvo B5TL / Wright Gemini 3, number 222 (SJ16 CSO), one of ten buses in the City Sight Seeing Tours fleet being introduced during September 2016. Note the plaque on the wall above the bus which reads:
In a house on the east side of this close ROBERT BURNS lived during his first visit to Edinburgh, 1786.
Burns arrived in Edinburgh on 28th November 1786, and took up residence in Baxters Close in the Lawnmarket, (now demolished). At that time Edinburgh was somewhat carefree, squalid, venerable, and literary. The Edinburgh society of the day welcomed the rustic poet and introduced him to the noblemen and learned professors of the day. The attention he received from all ranks would have turned any head today and Burns's independent spirit and strong intellect carried him safely through the Edinburgh period.
Edinburgh was a triumph for Burns where he completed writing the second edition of his poems, published in 1787.
For an accumulative guide of Lothian's new tour fleet, in numerical order, please click here as the story develops..
www.flickr.com/photos/stuart_montgomery/albums/7215767282...
"Man can embody truth but he cannot know it.
The intellect of man is forced to choose perfection of the life, or of the work, and if it take the second must refuse a heavenly mansion, raging in the dark."
(William Butler Yeats - Irish Writer, Dramatist and Poet. Nobel Prize for Literature in 1923, 1865-1939)
This amazing mansion stands at Rani ghat along the Ganges in Varanasi (Benaras).
This ghat is near the bridge where no tourist goes, it is a very quiet place away from the noise and the turmoil of the center.
On this side of the river many other buildings recall the splendour of the past which once made the renown of the City of Lights...
Join the photographer at www.facebook.com/laurent.goldstein.photography
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The evil that is within us all the ultimate villainous team and the most powerful forces of evil to roam the earth and beyond. The Legion seeks domination over all of mankind and to destroy the much despised Justice League. Consisting of the war mongers, assassins, thieves, kings, gods, aliens and those who swear revenge they are truly a force to be reckoned with.
The Legions roster gathered by the immortal tyrant Vandal Savage includes that of Lex Luthor; one of the most intelligent men on the planet, with enough power and influence to take countries by force and the only one that has subdued Superman time and time again.
Cheetah; the merciless woman gifted with the attributes of the dangerous animal of the wild, the Cheetah one of the few people who knows the ways of bringing Wonder Woman down to size.
Bane; in his words is the 'Bane of Humanity' with increased strength through the drug venom on which he has the only physical prowess to withstand the poison along with the intellect to plan masterful plans of strategies the seldom ever go astray, and the man who 'broke the bat'.
Mirror Master; the man who found and possibly helped create the mirror-verse, a multi dimensional realm connect through the reflective substances that reside upon earth, the one man fast enough to out think the Flash and stay one step ahead.
Black Manta; a man hidden in mystery and secrets, he host a long lived vendetta against Aquaman, holding his own legions of troops and soldiers he has his own army waiting beneath the ocean and is one of the few people that has evaded that of the league for his entire existence under the persona of Black Manta
Merlyn; the greatest archer in all of the world, always one level above his rival Green Arrow that he has bested in all of their meetings together, he has one of the sharpest eyes not only giving him the highest accuracy rate of all on earth, it also means he will never miss anything that goes on around from those hiding in his peripherals to those gone in plain sight. One of the highest ranking assassins in the world rivalling that of Deathstroke and Deadshot he is one that should not be underrated.
Captain Cold; the worlds leading expert in cryogenics technology second to that of Mr. Freeze he is cold hearted and will not think twice about hurting one or destroying life, he will do so without remorse. He is cold and calculating an will be willing to sacrifice a team mate to complete a mission. Cold is also a master of weather manipulation, that could change the temperature from high to low and vice versa.
Ocean Master; brother to the king of Atlantis and hidden in shadows as the vile Ocean Master, unknown to his brother Arthur that he pots against him, he provides information on the enemy to the Legion and is a master of the Atlantian water manipulation provided through the ancient relic he focuses the magic through the treasure, his skill competing that of Kaldur Ahm.
Metallo; the one man able to hold back the Man of Steel and is literally the adaptive machine that can survive any circumstance, even that of radiation (though prep must be given for such a feat) powered by a kryptonite heart and his life as a criminal before his transformation Metallo knows all of the tricks to fighting and his strength is enough to withstand foes such as Wonder Woman or Hawkman.
Circe; a woman with the powers of a god, a master of all form of magic, particularly that of Chaos and transformation. Circe is perhaps one of the strongest magic wielders that has ever existed, just below that of Klarion and the chaos and order lords and the Gods of Olympus. Possessing every incantation and spell, she holds anger to Wonder Woman for ruining her plans of domination and manipulation, creating that of her own realm.
Sinestro; some say he is the true embodiment of fear, the founding member of the Sinestro Corps, utilising that of the yellow element of the emotional spectrum, the emotion of Fear. With the ability to negate the power of will and a sworn oath to eradicate the Green Lantern Corps and the menace of the Guardians of space. Creating anything he can imagine, feeding of the fear around him to charge his ring. The man is responsible for crimes across the universe and with knowledge of the enemy of when he was part of the Green Lanterns he knows the extent of there power and their weaknesses.
Ma'alefa'ak; the Martian brother of J'onn J'onzz, Ma'alefa'ak possesses all the powers of normal Martian physiology except his ability to read and reach into minds, which he had sacrificed to create the plague and made himself immune and gave him immunity to fire that eradicated half of the green Martian race and helped lead the attack of the white Martains to complete the genocide of his own race. He holds personal hatred towards his brother for surviving the destruction of their race, he personally killed J'onn's wife and daughter in the war to prove his cold insanity. Following his brother to earth, he yearns to destroy his brother to complete his Genocide.
These most vile and despicable forces create that of the unbeatable team
....
....
....
The Legion of Doom!
bumblebee on chives; from the same series as this one.
“It is the marriage of the soul with Nature that makes the intellect fruitful,
and gives birth to imagination.”
(Henry David Thoreau)
Have a beautiful summer's day!
Character is higher than intellect... A great soul will be strong to live, as well as strong to think.
Ralph Waldo Emerson
Real Name: None
Age:Unknown
Species: Goldfish
Powers: Fish abilities and Genius intellect
Weakness: Hot temperatures and can't breathe out of water
Weapons: None
Job:None
Backstory: This fish was just an ordinary Goldfish until one day he swam past part of an ocean in Avalon City were TOXIN(I'll show him soon) was dumping his chemical waste into the water which genetically altered the gold fishes brain chemistry which gave him vast intellect. Going by the name Gills he is now hell bent on destroying humans and attempts to sink dry land by using his extreme intelligence to build extreme power suits and weapons.
This is one of my ridiculous
Villains everyone!
French postcard by Editions d'Art Yvon, Paris, no. 212. Photo: Sam Lévin.
French actress Bernadette Lafont (1938-2013) appeared in several classics of the Nouvelle Vague. Original and full of contradictions, she was both sexy and rather plain, brassy and quite serious, a mixture of intellect, sensuality and humour.
Bernadette Paule Anne Lafont was born in Nîmes in the South of France in 1938. She was the daughter of a pharmacist and his wife. As a teenager, she started her career as a dancer. She entered the Opéra de Nîmes where she fell in love with her future husband, the handsome actor Gérard Blain. In Paris, she met the young critic and aspiring film director François Truffaut, who offered her a role in his second short film, shot in Nîmes. So she made her screen debut in Les Mistons/The Mischief Makers (Francois Truffaut, 1957) opposite Gérard Blain. It was a comedy about five kids, who spy on two lovers during a hot summer day. It turned out to be that she was in the right place at the right time to catch the Nouvelle Vague movement, the new wave of filmmakers that would revolutionize the cinema.
She starred particularly in films by Truffaut and by Claude Chabrol. Her first feature and still one of her best-known films is Le Beau Serge/Bitter Reunion (Claude Chabrol, 1958) with Gérard Blain and Jean-Claude Brialy. (She had married Blain the year before but they would divorce a year later.) Many Nouvelle Vague films followed. With Chabrol she also made À double tour/Leda (Claude Chabrol, 1959) starring Madeleine Robinson, Les bonnes femmes/The Good Time Girls (Claude Chabrol, 1960) with Stéphane Audran, and Les godelureaux/Wise Guys (Claude Chabrol, 1961). She appeared in Truffaut’s comedy Tire-au-flanc 62/The Army Game (Claude de Givray, François Truffaut, 1960), and was the feisty heroine of Truffaut’s Une belle fille comme moi/A Gorgeous Bird Like Me (François Truffaut, 1972). For Louis Malle, she did a supporting part in his comedy Le voleur/The Thief of Paris (Louis Malle, 1967) starring Jean-Paul Belmondo, and for Jacques Rivette, she joined the cast of Out 1, noli me tangere/Out 1 (Jacques Rivette, Suzanne Schiffman, 1971) and Out 1: Spectre (Jacques Rivette, 1974). Finally, she played the role of Marie, one-third of the trio of lovers in La Maman et la Putain/The Mother and the Whore (Jean Eustache, 1973), considered by some critics as the last film of the Nouvelle Vague.
A well-known film with Bernadette Lafont is La Fiancée du Pirate/A Very Curious Girl (Nelly Kaplan, 1969). The success of this film about violence against women renewed her career after a difficult period. She was seen in Les stances à Sophie/Sophie’s Ways (Moshé Mizrahi, 1971), the crime drama Zig Zig (László Szabó, 1975) with Catherine Deneuve, and had a small part as the cellmate of Isabelle Huppert in Violette Nozière (Claude Chabrol, 1978). In Italy, she appeared in the comedy Il Ladrone/The Thief (Pasquale Festa Campanile, 1980). In a 1997 New York Times article, Katherine Knorr writes: “Lafont has in a tumultuous life done a bit of everything, from television movies to the stage, never quite the megastar but always a strong presence, smart and messed up all at the same time”. In the 1980s she appeared in Chabrol’s crime films Inspecteur Lavardin/Inspector Lavardin (Claude Chabrol, 1986) featuring Jean Poiret, and Masques/Masks (Claude Chabrol, 1987) with Philippe Noiret. She also played in Les saisons du plaisir/The Pleasure Seasons (1988) and other comedies by Jean-Pierre Mocky. Lafont won the César Award for Best Actress in a Supporting Role for L'Effrontée/Charlotte and Lulu (Claude Miller, 1985) starring Charlotte Gainsbourg. The energetic Lafont created in 1990 an audio-visual workshop to help young actors develop their creativity. She is the co-founder and on the committee that awards the Glace Gervais and an accompanying 100,000 franc prize to works competing in the Cannes Film Festival ‘Un certain Regard’ category. The award was designed to help bolster the budding careers of filmmakers. Her later films include Généalogies d'un crime/Genealogies of a Crime (Raul Ruiz, 1997) with Catherine Deneuve and the comedy Ripoux 3/Part-Time Cops (Claude Zidi, 2003) with Philippe Noiret. In May 2007, she chaired the jury for the fifth edition of the Award for Education presented at the 60th Cannes Film Festival. After her divorce from Blain in 1959, Bernadette Lafont married the Hungarian sculptor Diourka Medveczky. Although the marriage was difficult and ended in a divorce, there were three children: actress Élisabeth Lafont, David Lafont and the late actress Pauline Lafont, who died in the summer of 1988 under tragic circumstances. She went for a walk near the family property in the Cevennes and never returned. For many weeks, police searched and the popular press went on a feeding frenzy. When Pauline's body was finally found, it became clear she had fallen down in rough, lonely terrain. Lafont published her autobiography in 1997, an event heralded by a grand star-studded gala in Paris. For her long service to the French motion picture industry, she was given an Honorary César Award in 2003. She was made Officier de la Légion d'honneur (Officer of the Legion of Honour) in 2009. In 2013, Bernadette Lafont died in a hospital in her home town of Nimes.
Sources: Katherine Knorr (New York Times), Sandra Brennan (AllMovie), Wikipedia, and IMDb.
And, please check out our blog European Film Star Postcards.
This commission was an amazing challenge. Marlene Dietrich is the original blond bombshell who inspired Marilyn, who inspired Madonna, who inspired Lady Gaga... Her open gender fluidity and pansexuality, intellect and powerful presence make her an icon that should never be forgotten.
I hand sculpted the head for this doll, so she is truly one of a kind. Her make up is classic 30's (although Marlene's career in film and stage stretched from 1920's silent film era, through golden age of Hollywood, to Las Vegas marquee until 1970's). Her golden hair is curled alpaca and she wears my favourite doll fashion ever made: the Sybarite Blade's razorblade gown.
*This is a commissioned doll and not for sale. If you want a bespoke OOAK doll of your own please visit www.emiliacouture.com
The Greys, or Grays, diminuitive but legendarily emotionless beings of super intellect who are said to have been here, on this world, interacting with classified levels of government and science, are the stuff of fascinated legend and great fear.
They are the 'abductors', the ones who've appeared in countless reports as having spirited away many a human being for gruesome experiments. The Travis Walton case in the 1970's is one of the most famous.
Are they here or is it a hoax? The Walton case is hair-raising and points to the very real possibility that Walton was not lying.
It is said, though, that these beings want something that we have and they do not - emotion. They are trying to acquire it through genetic splicing, so it's said. Whatever the case, it indicates that the intuitive and emotional, that we often place as secondary to reason, is the secret to our advancement as a species as reason, by itself, can become almost monstrous. The Greys may be a perfect metaphor for understanding the dangers of the extremes of rationality.
Or, they're just great fun to scare ourselves with .....
Now more than ever, we need to use our gift of intellect and science to preserve our home planet, a pale blue dot when viewed from other worlds. This is our one and only Spaceship Earth. Let's not exploit it for political gain.
EPCOT Center | Future World | Spaceship Earth
Thanks for looking! I appreciate feedback.
The Surveyor
HKD
Falls Psychologie interessiert: Logik kontra Gefühl – Ordnung und Chaos
Der Landvermesser
Das Prinzip der Ordnung beruht auf der Grundlage von Teilung. Ein Ganzes wird zerschnitten in zwei Teile, die Yin und Yang genannt werden können. Die Ordnung im Kosmos beruht auf dem Vergleich von links und rechts, oben und unten, Himmel und Erde. Es entstehen einzelne Teile, die miteinander verglichen werden können. Auf diese Weise entsteht Wissen, natürlich aufkosten der Ganzheit, die als Ursprung der Zwei und damit der Zeit in Vergessenheit gerät. Die Zweiheit und mit ihr die Verzweifelung wird – weil eben so erfahren – als einzige Realität angesehen. Widerspruch wohin das Auge blickt und der Gedanke schweift. Und das ist vollkommen normal, denn Yin bedingt Yang, das Leben den Tod, die Freude das Leid, Antipathie und Sympathie, die Reihe könnte ich endlos fortsetzen.
Selbstverständlich findet sich der Widerspruch in der Psyche entwickelter Wesen, sobald sich in ihnen der Verstand gegen das Gefühl stellt und dieser innere Kampf bewusst wird. Kann der Trieb sich unbewusst ausleben, ist der betreffende Mensch in zwei Persönlichkeiten gespalten, wie die Geschichte um Dr. Jekyll und Mr. Hyde zeigt. Eine helle und eine dunkle Seite wird dann erkennbar und wieder ist es dadurch dem Bewusstsein möglich, sich selbst zu erkennen. Die Basis jeglicher Erkenntnis ist Trennung in A und nicht A.
Die westliche Gottheit Apollo oder der östliche Buddha Manjushri sind Platzhalter für die logische Funktion des Geistes, eben jener Motivationskraft, die nach Licht, nach Sonne und Erkenntnis strebt., sobald dieses Software-Programm in der Psyche gestartet wird Es könnte heißen: Search Yourself. In der Tat hat dieser Landvermesser mit dem apollinischen Prinzip zu tun. Von ihm wird er motiviert, sich mit Zahlen und mathematischen Vorgängen zu beschäftigen.
Ein hoch entwickelter Intellekt hat immer mehr Energie aus dem Bereich der Lenden und dem des Herzens gezogen und die Gefühlswelt eines Logikers wie etwa Tuvok (Star-Trek – Voyager – der Sicherheitsoffizier des Rauschiffes) ist nur noch rudimentär vorhanden. Alle sieben Jahre bricht sie aus den Tiefen der Psyche hervor und zwingt den Mann (Vulkanier) zur Paarung.
Der Intellekt übernimmt in gewissen Menschen die Macht und diese Konzentration der Energie auf abstrakte Ordnungsprinzipien bringt große Reichsgründer und Führungspersönlichkeiten hervor. Doch auch der Landvermesser streckt Grenzen ab, trennt Verantwortungsbereiche und schafft Ordnung unter der künftigen Nachbarschaft. Bis hierhin und nicht weiter, darfst du ackern, bauen oder Einzäunen.
Regeln, Gesetze, Vorschriften, Erlasse, all diese Dinge finden energetisch ihre Wurzeln in der Motivationskraft A1. In einem Menschen paart sich gern die Energie A5 dazu. Der Landvermesser steht mit beiden Beinen auf der Erde, er ist verbunden mit der Scholle, der Außenwelt mit ihren Prinzipien und Ordnungsstrukturen. Und zu dieser Ordnung trägt er bei, vernünftig, sachlich, präzise. Dafür sorgt A5, die zuverlässige und rationale Motivationskraft, die Tuvok so wunderbar verkörpert, während Madame Captain ein hervorragendes Beispiel für eine Führungspersönlichkeit ist, die von A1 motiviert wird. Der Captain (A1) und der Sicherheitsoffizier (A5) sind in der Serie sehr gut miteinander befreundet. Der Captain stellt die Regeln auf und der Logiker setzt sie mit gebührender Logik um.
Auch der Landvermesser arbeitet mit Logik und Sachverstand, Emotionalität stört bei Tätigkeiten, die einen kühlen Kopf brauchen. Wenn sich in Systemen Fehler einschleichen, spielt eine andere Energie mit, das chaotische Prinzip. Es ist der Ordnung entgegengesetzt und gleichzeitig komplementär wie es Yin für Yang oder die Ebbe für die Flut ist. Ordnung und Chaos bedingen einander und ziehen sich an. Und so schleichen sich immer wieder subversive Kräfte in die Ordnungs- und Sicherheitssysteme ein und entpuppen sich als geschickte Gegenspieler.
Wie beim Schach, mal gewinnt Weiß, ein anderes Mal Schwarz. Und aufgrund der Teilung in Schwarz und Weiß nehmen die Bewusstheit und schließlich die Selbst-Bewusstheit zu.
Selbsterkenntnis beruht auf der vorausgegangenen Teilung, die sich aufgrund dieses Erkennens anschickt, wieder ein Ganzes zu werden und diesen Vorgang auch zu verstehen.
Wie viel versteht der Landvermesser bereits von sich selbst? Kennt er die verschiedenen Bereiche seines Denkens und Fühlens? Wird er bald beginnen mit der Vermessung seiner Innenwelt?
Das sind Fragen, die ich in dieses Bild hinein interpretiere. Vielleicht geht dieser Vermesser nach getaner Arbeit mit seinem Freund zur Jagd… Ach, was weiß ich denn schon?
HKD
Digital art based on own photography and textures
HKD
"Euclid's Elements is certainly one of the greatest books ever written, and one of the most perfect monuments of the Greek intellect."
Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 211
My entry in the preliminary round of the 2018 Bio-Cup, of course! I was set from the start on offering something entirely original. After a days or two muddling through various unsatisfying 'elements' from alchemy, technology, and science, I suddenly recalled the Greek mathematician Euclid's authorship of the landmark geometry textbook entitled Elements, and knew I would depict him. In a Bionicle twist, he now wields Geometry powers in addition to his trademark compass and straightedge! I look forward to your thoughts, hope you enjoy, and wish my fellow participants good luck in the Bio-Cup!
One of the weaknesses of much abstract painting is the attempt to substitute the inventions of the intellect for a pristine imaginative conception. The inner life of a human being is a vast and varied realm and does not concern itself alone with stimulating arrangements of color, form and design. The term 'life' as used in art is something not to be held in contempt, for it applies all of its existence, and the province of art is to react to it and not to shun it. Painting will have to deal more fully and less obliquely with life and nature's phenomena before it can again be great.
-- Edward Hopper
1. The Mind-Body Problem and the History of Dualism
1.1 The Mind-Body Problem
The mind-body problem is the problem: what is the relationship between mind and body? Or alternatively: what is the relationship between mental properties and physical properties?
Humans have (or seem to have) both physical properties and mental properties. People have (or seem to have)the sort of properties attributed in the physical sciences. These physical properties include size, weight, shape, colour, motion through space and time, etc. But they also have (or seem to have) mental properties, which we do not attribute to typical physical objects These properties involve consciousness (including perceptual experience, emotional experience, and much else), intentionality (including beliefs, desires, and much else), and they are possessed by a subject or a self. Physical properties are public, in the sense that they are, in principle, equally observable by anyone. Some physical properties – like those of an electron – are not directly observable at all, but they are equally available to all, to the same degree, with scientific equipment and techniques. The same is not true of mental properties. I may be able to tell that you are in pain by your behaviour, but only you can feel it directly. Similarly, you just know how something looks to you, and I can only surmise. Conscious mental events are private to the subject, who has a privileged access to them of a kind no-one has to the physical. The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between these two sets of properties. The mind-body problem breaks down into a number of components. The ontological question: what are mental states and what are physical states? Is one class a subclass of the other, so that all mental states are physical, or vice versa? Or are mental states and physical states entirely distinct?
The causal question: do physical states influence mental states? Do mental states influence physical states? If so, how?
Different aspects of the mind-body problem arise for different aspects of the mental, such as consciousness, intentionality, the self. The problem of consciousness: what is consciousness? How is it related to the brain and the body? The problem of intentionality: what is intentionality? How is it related to the brain and the body? The problem of the self: what is the self? How is it related to the brain and the body? Other aspects of the mind-body problem arise for aspects of the physical. For example:
The problem of embodiment: what is it for the mind to be housed in a body? What is it for a body to belong to a particular subject?
The seemingly intractable nature of these problems have given rise to many different philosophical views.
Materialist views say that, despite appearances to the contrary, mental states are just physical states. Behaviourism, functionalism, mind-brain identity theory and the computational theory of mind are examples of how materialists attempt to explain how this can be so. The most common factor in such theories is the attempt to explicate the nature of mind and consciousness in terms of their ability to directly or indirectly modify behaviour, but there are versions of materialism that try to tie the mental to the physical without explicitly explaining the mental in terms of its behaviour-modifying role. The latter are often grouped together under the label ‘non-reductive physicalism’, though this label is itself rendered elusive because of the controversial nature of the term ‘reduction’.
Idealist views say that physical states are really mental. This is because the physical world is an empirical world and, as such, it is the intersubjective product of our collective experience.
Dualist views (the subject of this entry) say that the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other. For the various forms that dualism can take and the associated problems, see below.
In sum, we can say that there is a mind-body problem because both consciousness and thought, broadly construed, seem very different from anything physical and there is no convincing consensus on how to build a satisfactorily unified picture of creatures possessed of both a mind and a body.
Other entries which concern aspects of the mind-body problem include (among many others): behaviorism, consciousness, eliminative materialism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, identity theory, intentionality, mental causation, neutral monism, and physicalism.
1.2 History of dualism
In dualism, ‘mind’ is contrasted with ‘body’, but at different times, different aspects of the mind have been the centre of attention. In the classical and mediaeval periods, it was the intellect that was thought to be most obviously resistant to a materialistic account: from Descartes on, the main stumbling block to materialist monism was supposed to be ‘consciousness’, of which phenomenal consciousness or sensation came to be considered as the paradigm instance.
The classical emphasis originates in Plato’s Phaedo. Plato believed that the true substances are not physical bodies, which are ephemeral, but the eternal Forms of which bodies are imperfect copies. These Forms not only make the world possible, they also make it intelligible, because they perform the role of universals, or what Frege called ‘concepts’. It is their connection with intelligibility that is relevant to the philosophy of mind. Because Forms are the grounds of intelligibility, they are what the intellect must grasp in the process of understanding. In Phaedo Plato presents a variety of arguments for the immortality of the soul, but the one that is relevant for our purposes is that the intellect is immaterial because Forms are immaterial and intellect must have an affinity with the Forms it apprehends (78b4–84b8). This affinity is so strong that the soul strives to leave the body in which it is imprisoned and to dwell in the realm of Forms. It may take many reincarnations before this is achieved. Plato’s dualism is not, therefore, simply a doctrine in the philosophy of mind, but an integral part of his whole metaphysics.
One problem with Plato’s dualism was that, though he speaks of the soul as imprisoned in the body, there is no clear account of what binds a particular soul to a particular body. Their difference in nature makes the union a mystery.
Aristotle did not believe in Platonic Forms, existing independently of their instances. Aristotelian forms (the capital ‘F’ has disappeared with their standing as autonomous entities) are the natures and properties of things and exist embodied in those things. This enabled Aristotle to explain the union of body and soul by saying that the soul is the form of the body. This means that a particular person’s soul is no more than his nature as a human being. Because this seems to make the soul into a property of the body, it led many interpreters, both ancient and modern, to interpret his theory as materialistic. The interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind – and, indeed, of his whole doctrine of form – remains as live an issue today as it was immediately after his death (Robinson 1983 and 1991; Nussbaum 1984; Rorty and Nussbaum, eds, 1992). Nevertheless, the text makes it clear that Aristotle believed that the intellect, though part of the soul, differs from other faculties in not having a bodily organ. His argument for this constitutes a more tightly argued case than Plato’s for the immateriality of thought and, hence, for a kind of dualism. He argued that the intellect must be immaterial because if it were material it could not receive all forms. Just as the eye, because of its particular physical nature, is sensitive to light but not to sound, and the ear to sound and not to light, so, if the intellect were in a physical organ it could be sensitive only to a restricted range of physical things; but this is not the case, for we can think about any kind of material object (De Anima III,4; 429a10–b9). As it does not have a material organ, its activity must be essentially immaterial.
It is common for modern Aristotelians, who otherwise have a high view of Aristotle’s relevance to modern philosophy, to treat this argument as being of purely historical interest, and not essential to Aristotle’s system as a whole. They emphasize that he was not a ‘Cartesian’ dualist, because the intellect is an aspect of the soul and the soul is the form of the body, not a separate substance. Kenny (1989) argues that Aristotle’s theory of mind as form gives him an account similar to Ryle (1949), for it makes the soul equivalent to the dispositions possessed by a living body. This ‘anti-Cartesian’ approach to Aristotle arguably ignores the fact that, for Aristotle, the form is the substance.
These issues might seem to be of purely historical interest. But we shall see in below, in section 4.5, that this is not so.
The identification of form and substance is a feature of Aristotle’s system that Aquinas effectively exploits in this context, identifying soul, intellect and form, and treating them as a substance. (See, for example, Aquinas (1912), Part I, questions 75 and 76.) But though the form (and, hence, the intellect with which it is identical) are the substance of the human person, they are not the person itself. Aquinas says that when one addresses prayers to a saint – other than the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is believed to retain her body in heaven and is, therefore, always a complete person – one should say, not, for example, ‘Saint Peter pray for us’, but ‘soul of Saint Peter pray for us’. The soul, though an immaterial substance, is the person only when united with its body. Without the body, those aspects of its personal memory that depend on images (which are held to be corporeal) will be lost.(See Aquinas (1912), Part I, question 89.)
The more modern versions of dualism have their origin in Descartes’ Meditations, and in the debate that was consequent upon Descartes’ theory. Descartes was a substance dualist. He believed that there were two kinds of substance: matter, of which the essential property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it thinks. Descartes’ conception of the relation between mind and body was quite different from that held in the Aristotelian tradition. For Aristotle, there is no exact science of matter. How matter behaves is essentially affected by the form that is in it. You cannot combine just any matter with any form – you cannot make a knife out of butter, nor a human being out of paper – so the nature of the matter is a necessary condition for the nature of the substance. But the nature of the substance does not follow from the nature of its matter alone: there is no ‘bottom up’ account of substances. Matter is a determinable made determinate by form. This was how Aristotle thought that he was able to explain the connection of soul to body: a particular soul exists as the organizing principle in a particular parcel of matter.
The belief in the relative indeterminacy of matter is one reason for Aristotle’s rejection of atomism. If matter is atomic, then it is already a collection of determinate objects in its own right, and it becomes natural to regard the properties of macroscopic substances as mere summations of the natures of the atoms.
Although, unlike most of his fashionable contemporaries and immediate successors, Descartes was not an atomist, he was, like the others, a mechanist about the properties of matter. Bodies are machines that work according to their own laws. Except where there are minds interfering with it, matter proceeds deterministically, in its own right. Where there are minds requiring to influence bodies, they must work by ‘pulling levers’ in a piece of machinery that already has its own laws of operation. This raises the question of where those ‘levers’ are in the body. Descartes opted for the pineal gland, mainly because it is not duplicated on both sides of the brain, so it is a candidate for having a unique, unifying function.
The main uncertainty that faced Descartes and his contemporaries, however, was not where interaction took place, but how two things so different as thought and extension could interact at all. This would be particularly mysterious if one had an impact view of causal interaction, as would anyone influenced by atomism, for whom the paradigm of causation is like two billiard balls cannoning off one another.
Various of Descartes’ disciples, such as Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche, concluded that all mind-body interactions required the direct intervention of God. The appropriate states of mind and body were only the occasions for such intervention, not real causes. Now it would be convenient to think that occasionalists held that all causation was natural except for that between mind and body. In fact they generalized their conclusion and treated all causation as directly dependent on God. Why this was so, we cannot discuss here.
Descartes’ conception of a dualism of substances came under attack from the more radical empiricists, who found it difficult to attach sense to the concept of substance at all. Locke, as a moderate empiricist, accepted that there were both material and immaterial substances. Berkeley famously rejected material substance, because he rejected all existence outside the mind. In his early Notebooks, he toyed with the idea of rejecting immaterial substance, because we could have no idea of it, and reducing the self to a collection of the ‘ideas’ that constituted its contents. Finally, he decided that the self, conceived as something over and above the ideas of which it was aware, was essential for an adequate understanding of the human person. Although the self and its acts are not presented to consciousness as objects of awareness, we are obliquely aware of them simply by dint of being active subjects. Hume rejected such claims, and proclaimed the self to be nothing more than a concatenation of its ephemeral contents.
In fact, Hume criticised the whole conception of substance for lacking in empirical content: when you search for the owner of the properties that make up a substance, you find nothing but further properties. Consequently, the mind is, he claimed, nothing but a ‘bundle’ or ‘heap’ of impressions and ideas – that is, of particular mental states or events, without an owner. This position has been labelled bundle dualism, and it is a special case of a general bundle theory of substance, according to which objects in general are just organised collections of properties. The problem for the Humean is to explain what binds the elements in the bundle together. This is an issue for any kind of substance, but for material bodies the solution seems fairly straightforward: the unity of a physical bundle is constituted by some form of causal interaction between the elements in the bundle. For the mind, mere causal connection is not enough; some further relation of co-consciousness is required. We shall see in 5.2.1 that it is problematic whether one can treat such a relation as more primitive than the notion of belonging to a subject.
One should note the following about Hume’s theory. His bundle theory is a theory about the nature of the unity of the mind. As a theory about this unity, it is not necessarily dualist. Parfit (1970, 1984) and Shoemaker (1984, ch. 2), for example, accept it as physicalists. In general, physicalists will accept it unless they wish to ascribe the unity to the brain or the organism as a whole. Before the bundle theory can be dualist one must accept property dualism, for more about which, see the next section.
A crisis in the history of dualism came, however, with the growing popularity of mechanism in science in the nineteenth century. According to the mechanist, the world is, as it would now be expressed, ‘closed under physics’. This means that everything that happens follows from and is in accord with the laws of physics. There is, therefore, no scope for interference in the physical world by the mind in the way that interactionism seems to require. According to the mechanist, the conscious mind is an epiphenomenon (a notion given general currency by T. H. Huxley 1893): that is, it is a by-product of the physical system which has no influence back on it. In this way, the facts of consciousness are acknowledged but the integrity of physical science is preserved. However, many philosophers found it implausible to claim such things as the following; the pain that I have when you hit me, the visual sensations I have when I see the ferocious lion bearing down on me or the conscious sense of understanding I have when I hear your argument – all have nothing directly to do with the way I respond. It is very largely due to the need to avoid this counterintuitiveness that we owe the concern of twentieth century philosophy to devise a plausible form of materialist monism. But, although dualism has been out of fashion in psychology since the advent of behaviourism (Watson 1913) and in philosophy since Ryle (1949), the argument is by no means over. Some distinguished neurologists, such as Sherrington (1940) and Eccles (Popper and Eccles 1977) have continued to defend dualism as the only theory that can preserve the data of consciousness. Amongst mainstream philosophers, discontent with physicalism led to a modest revival of property dualism in the last decade of the twentieth century. At least some of the reasons for this should become clear below.
2. Varieties of Dualism: Ontology
There are various ways of dividing up kinds of dualism. One natural way is in terms of what sorts of things one chooses to be dualistic about. The most common categories lighted upon for these purposes are substance and property, giving one substance dualism and property dualism. There is, however, an important third category, namely predicate dualism. As this last is the weakest theory, in the sense that it claims least, I shall begin by characterizing it.
2.1 Predicate dualism
Predicate dualism is the theory that psychological or mentalistic predicates are (a) essential for a full description of the world and (b) are not reducible to physicalistic predicates. For a mental predicate to be reducible, there would be bridging laws connecting types of psychological states to types of physical ones in such a way that the use of the mental predicate carried no information that could not be expressed without it. An example of what we believe to be a true type reduction outside psychology is the case of water, where water is always H2O: something is water if and only if it is H2O. If one were to replace the word ‘water’ by ‘H2O’, it is plausible to say that one could convey all the same information. But the terms in many of the special sciences (that is, any science except physics itself) are not reducible in this way. Not every hurricane or every infectious disease, let alone every devaluation of the currency or every coup d’etat has the same constitutive structure. These states are defined more by what they do than by their composition or structure. Their names are classified as functional terms rather than natural kind terms. It goes with this that such kinds of state are multiply realizable; that is, they may be constituted by different kinds of physical structures under different circumstances. Because of this, unlike in the case of water and H2O, one could not replace these terms by some more basic physical description and still convey the same information. There is no particular description, using the language of physics or chemistry, that would do the work of the word ‘hurricane’, in the way that ‘H2O’ would do the work of ‘water’. It is widely agreed that many, if not all, psychological states are similarly irreducible, and so psychological predicates are not reducible to physical descriptions and one has predicate dualism. (The classic source for irreducibility in the special sciences in general is Fodor (1974), and for irreducibility in the philosophy of mind, Davidson (1971).)
2.2 Property Dualism
Whereas predicate dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of predicates in our language, property dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of property out in the world. Property dualism can be seen as a step stronger than predicate dualism. Although the predicate ‘hurricane’ is not equivalent to any single description using the language of physics, we believe that each individual hurricane is nothing but a collection of physical atoms behaving in a certain way: one need have no more than the physical atoms, with their normal physical properties, following normal physical laws, for there to be a hurricane. One might say that we need more than the language of physics to describe and explain the weather, but we do not need more than its ontology. There is token identity between each individual hurricane and a mass of atoms, even if there is no type identity between hurricanes as kinds and some particular structure of atoms as a kind. Genuine property dualism occurs when, even at the individual level, the ontology of physics is not sufficient to constitute what is there. The irreducible language is not just another way of describing what there is, it requires that there be something more there than was allowed for in the initial ontology. Until the early part of the twentieth century, it was common to think that biological phenomena (‘life’) required property dualism (an irreducible ‘vital force’), but nowadays the special physical sciences other than psychology are generally thought to involve only predicate dualism. In the case of mind, property dualism is defended by those who argue that the qualitative nature of consciousness is not merely another way of categorizing states of the brain or of behaviour, but a genuinely emergent phenomenon.
2.3 Substance Dualism
There are two important concepts deployed in this notion. One is that of substance, the other is the dualism of these substances. A substance is characterized by its properties, but, according to those who believe in substances, it is more than the collection of the properties it possesses, it is the thing which possesses them. So the mind is not just a collection of thoughts, but is that which thinks, an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial states. Properties are the properties of objects. If one is a property dualist, one may wonder what kinds of objects possess the irreducible or immaterial properties in which one believes. One can use a neutral expression and attribute them to persons, but, until one has an account of person, this is not explanatory. One might attribute them to human beings qua animals, or to the brains of these animals. Then one will be holding that these immaterial properties are possessed by what is otherwise a purely material thing. But one may also think that not only mental states are immaterial, but that the subject that possesses them must also be immaterial. Then one will be a dualist about that to which mental states and properties belong as well about the properties themselves. Now one might try to think of these subjects as just bundles of the immaterial states. This is Hume’s view. But if one thinks that the owner of these states is something quite over and above the states themselves, and is immaterial, as they are, one will be a substance dualist.
Substance dualism is also often dubbed ‘Cartesian dualism’, but some substance dualists are keen to distinguish their theories from Descartes’s. E. J. Lowe, for example, is a substance dualist, in the following sense. He holds that a normal human being involves two substances, one a body and the other a person. The latter is not, however, a purely mental substance that can be defined in terms of thought or consciousness alone, as Descartes claimed. But persons and their bodies have different identity conditions and are both substances, so there are two substances essentially involved in a human being, hence this is a form of substance dualism. Lowe (2006) claims that his theory is close to P. F. Strawson’s (1959), whilst admitting that Strawson would not have called it substance dualism.
3. Varieties of Dualism: Interaction
If mind and body are different realms, in the way required by either property or substance dualism, then there arises the question of how they are related. Common sense tells us that they interact: thoughts and feelings are at least sometimes caused by bodily events and at least sometimes themselves give rise to bodily responses. I shall now consider briefly the problems for interactionism, and its main rivals, epiphenomenalism and parallelism.
3.1 Interactionism
Interactionism is the view that mind and body – or mental events and physical events – causally influence each other. That this is so is one of our common-sense beliefs, because it appears to be a feature of everyday experience. The physical world influences my experience through my senses, and I often react behaviourally to those experiences. My thinking, too, influences my speech and my actions. There is, therefore, a massive natural prejudice in favour of interactionism. It has been claimed, however, that it faces serious problems (some of which were anticipated in section 1).
The simplest objection to interaction is that, in so far as mental properties, states or substances are of radically different kinds from each other, they lack that communality necessary for interaction. It is generally agreed that, in its most naive form, this objection to interactionism rests on a ‘billiard ball’ picture of causation: if all causation is by impact, how can the material and the immaterial impact upon each other? But if causation is either by a more ethereal force or energy or only a matter of constant conjunction, there would appear to be no problem in principle with the idea of interaction of mind and body.
Even if there is no objection in principle, there appears to be a conflict between interactionism and some basic principles of physical science. For example, if causal power was flowing in and out of the physical system, energy would not be conserved, and the conservation of energy is a fundamental scientific law. Various responses have been made to this. One suggestion is that it might be possible for mind to influence the distribution of energy, without altering its quantity. (See Averill and Keating 1981). Another response is to challenge the relevance of the conservation principle in this context. The conservation principle states that ‘in a causally isolated system the total amount of energy will remain constant’. Whereas ‘[t]he interactionist denies…that the human body is an isolated system’, so the principle is irrelevant (Larmer (1986), 282: this article presents a good brief survey of the options). This approach has been termed conditionality, namely the view that conservation is conditional on the physical system being closed, that is, that nothing non-physical is interacting or interfering with it, and, of course, the interactionist claims that this condition is, trivially, not met. That conditionality is the best line for the dualist to take, and that other approaches do not work, is defended in Pitts (2019) and Cucu and Pitts (2019). This, they claim, makes the plausibility of interactionism an empirical matter which only close investigation on the fine operation of the brain could hope to settle. Cucu, in a separate article (2018), claims to find critical neuronal events which do not have sufficient physical explanation.This claim clearly needs further investigation.
Robins Collins (2011) has claimed that the appeal to conservation by opponents of interactionism is something of a red herring because conservation principles are not ubiquitous in physics. He argues that energy is not conserved in general relativity, in quantum theory, or in the universe taken as a whole. Why then, should we insist on it in mind-brain interaction?
Most discussion of interactionism takes place in the context of the assumption that it is incompatible with the world’s being ‘closed under physics’. This is a very natural assumption, but it is not justified if causal overdetermination of behaviour is possible. There could then be a complete physical cause of behaviour, and a mental one. The strongest intuitive objection against overdetermination is clearly stated by Mills (1996: 112), who is himself a defender of overdetermination.
For X to be a cause of Y, X must contribute something to Y. The only way a purely mental event could contribute to a purely physical one would be to contribute some feature not already determined by a purely physical event. But if physical closure is true, there is no feature of the purely physical effect that is not contributed by the purely physical cause. Hence interactionism violates physical closure after all.
Mills says that this argument is invalid, because a physical event can have features not explained by the event which is its sufficient cause. For example, “the rock’s hitting the window is causally sufficient for the window’s breaking, and the window’s breaking has the feature of being the third window-breaking in the house this year; but the facts about prior window-breakings, rather than the rock’s hitting the window, are what cause this window-breaking to have this feature.”
The opponent of overdetermination could perhaps reply that his principle applies, not to every feature of events, but to a subgroup – say, intrinsic features, not merely relational or comparative ones. It is this kind of feature that the mental event would have to cause, but physical closure leaves no room for this. These matters are still controversial.
The problem with closure of physics may be radically altered if physical laws are indeterministic, as quantum theory seems to assert. If physical laws are deterministic, then any interference from outside would lead to a breach of those laws. But if they are indeterministic, might not interference produce a result that has a probability greater than zero, and so be consistent with the laws? This way, one might have interaction yet preserve a kind of nomological closure, in the sense that no laws are infringed. Because it involves assessing the significance and consequences of quantum theory, this is a difficult matter for the non-physicist to assess. Some argue that indeterminacy manifests itself only on the subatomic level, being cancelled out by the time one reaches even very tiny macroscopic objects: and human behaviour is a macroscopic phenomenon. Others argue that the structure of the brain is so finely tuned that minute variations could have macroscopic effects, rather in the way that, according to ‘chaos theory’, the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in China might affect the weather in New York. (For discussion of this, see Eccles (1980), (1987), and Popper and Eccles (1977).) Still others argue that quantum indeterminacy manifests itself directly at a high level, when acts of observation collapse the wave function, suggesting that the mind may play a direct role in affecting the state of the world (Hodgson 1988; Stapp 1993).
3.2 Epiphenomenalism
If the reality of property dualism is not to be denied, but the problem of how the immaterial is to affect the material is to be avoided, then epiphenomenalism may seem to be the answer. According to this theory, mental events are caused by physical events, but have no causal influence on the physical. I have introduced this theory as if its point were to avoid the problem of how two different categories of thing might interact. In fact, it is, at best, an incomplete solution to this problem. If it is mysterious how the non-physical can have it in its nature to influence the physical, it ought to be equally mysterious how the physical can have it in its nature to produce something non-physical. But that this latter is what occurs is an essential claim of epiphenomenalism. (For development of this point, see Green (2003), 149–51). In fact, epiphenomenalism is more effective as a way of saving the autonomy of the physical (the world as ‘closed under physics’) than as a contribution to avoiding the need for the physical and non-physical to have causal commerce.
There are at least three serious problems for epiphenomenalism. First, as I indicated in section 1, it is profoundly counterintuitive. What could be more apparent than that it is the pain that I feel that makes me cry, or the visual experience of the boulder rolling towards me that makes me run away? At least one can say that epiphenomenalism is a fall-back position: it tends to be adopted because other options are held to be unacceptable.
The second problem is that, if mental states do nothing, there is no reason why they should have evolved. This objection ties in with the first: the intuition there was that conscious states clearly modify our behaviour in certain ways, such as avoiding danger, and it is plain that they are very useful from an evolutionary perspective.
Frank Jackson (1982) replies to this objection by saying that it is the brain state associated with pain that evolves for this reason: the sensation is a by-product. Evolution is full of useless or even harmful by-products. For example, polar bears have evolved thick coats to keep them warm, even though this has the damaging side effect that they are heavy to carry. Jackson’s point is true in general, but does not seem to apply very happily to the case of mind. The heaviness of the polar bear’s coat follows directly from those properties and laws which make it warm: one could not, in any simple way, have one without the other. But with mental states, dualistically conceived, the situation is quite the opposite. The laws of physical nature which, the mechanist says, make brain states cause behaviour, in no way explain why brain states should give rise to conscious ones. The laws linking mind and brain are what Feigl (1958) calls nomological danglers, that is, brute facts added onto the body of integrated physical law. Why there should have been by-products of that kind seems to have no evolutionary explanation.
The third problem concerns the rationality of belief in epiphenomenalism, via its effect on the problem of other minds. It is natural to say that I know that I have mental states because I experience them directly. But how can I justify my belief that others have them? The simple version of the ‘argument from analogy’ says that I can extrapolate from my own case. I know that certain of my mental states are correlated with certain pieces of behaviour, and so I infer that similar behaviour in others is also accompanied by similar mental states. Many hold that this is a weak argument because it is induction from one instance, namely, my own. The argument is stronger if it is not a simple induction but an ‘argument to the best explanation’. I seem to know from my own case that mental events can be the explanation of behaviour, and I know of no other candidate explanation for typical human behaviour, so I postulate the same explanation for the behaviour of others. But if epiphenomenalism is true, my mental states do not explain my behaviour and there is a physical explanation for the behaviour of others. It is explanatorily redundant to postulate such states for others. I know, by introspection, that I have them, but is it not just as likely that I alone am subject to this quirk of nature, rather than that everyone is?
For more detailed treatment and further reading on this topic, see the entry epiphenomenalism.
3.3 Parallelism
The epiphenomenalist wishes to preserve the integrity of physical science and the physical world, and appends those mental features that he cannot reduce. The parallelist preserves both realms intact, but denies all causal interaction between them. They run in harmony with each other, but not because their mutual influence keeps each other in line. That they should behave as if they were interacting would seem to be a bizarre coincidence. This is why parallelism has tended to be adopted only by those – like Leibniz – who believe in a pre-established harmony, set in place by God. The progression of thought can be seen as follows. Descartes believes in a more or less natural form of interaction between immaterial mind and material body. Malebranche thought that this was impossible naturally, and so required God to intervene specifically on each occasion on which interaction was required. Leibniz decided that God might as well set things up so that they always behaved as if they were interacting, without particular intervention being required. Outside such a theistic framework, the theory is incredible. Even within such a framework, one might well sympathise with Berkeley’s instinct that once genuine interaction is ruled out one is best advised to allow that God creates the physical world directly, within the mental realm itself, as a construct out of experience.
4. Arguments for Dualism
4.1 The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism
One category of arguments for dualism is constituted by the standard objections against physicalism. Prime examples are those based on the existence of qualia, the most important of which is the so-called ‘knowledge argument’. Because this argument has its own entry (see the entry qualia: the knowledge argument), I shall deal relatively briefly with it here. One should bear in mind, however, that all arguments against physicalism are also arguments for the irreducible and hence immaterial nature of the mind and, given the existence of the material world, are thus arguments for dualism.
The knowledge argument asks us to imagine a future scientist who has lacked a certain sensory modality from birth, but who has acquired a perfect scientific understanding of how this modality operates in others. This scientist – call him Harpo – may have been born stone deaf, but become the world’s greatest expert on the machinery of hearing: he knows everything that there is to know within the range of the physical and behavioural sciences about hearing. Suppose that Harpo, thanks to developments in neurosurgery, has an operation which finally enables him to hear. It is suggested that he will then learn something he did not know before, which can be expressed as what it is like to hear, or the qualitative or phenomenal nature of sound. These qualitative features of experience are generally referred to as qualia. If Harpo learns something new, he did not know everything before. He knew all the physical facts before. So what he learns on coming to hear – the facts about the nature of experience or the nature of qualia – are non-physical. This establishes at least a state or property dualism. (See Jackson 1982; Robinson 1982.)
There are at least two lines of response to this popular but controversial argument. First is the ‘ability’ response. According to this, Harpo does not acquire any new factual knowledge, only ‘knowledge how’, in the form of the ability to respond directly to sounds, which he could not do before. This essentially behaviouristic account is exactly what the intuition behind the argument is meant to overthrow. Putting ourselves in Harpo’s position, it is meant to be obvious that what he acquires is knowledge of what something is like, not just how to do something. Such appeals to intuition are always, of course, open to denial by those who claim not to share the intuition. Some ability theorists seem to blur the distinction between knowing what something is like and knowing how to do something, by saying that the ability Harpo acquires is to imagine or remember the nature of sound. In this case, what he acquires the ability to do involves the representation to himself of what the thing is like. But this conception of representing to oneself, especially in the form of imagination, seems sufficiently close to producing in oneself something very like a sensory experience that it only defers the problem: until one has a physicalist gloss on what constitutes such representations as those involved in conscious memory and imagination, no progress has been made.
The other line of response is to argue that, although Harpo’s new knowledge is factual, it is not knowledge of a new fact. Rather, it is new way of grasping something that he already knew. He does not realise this, because the concepts employed to capture experience (such as ‘looks red’ or ‘sounds C-sharp’) are similar to demonstratives, and demonstrative concepts lack the kind of descriptive content that allow one to infer what they express from other pieces of information that one may already possess. A total scientific knowledge of the world would not enable you to say which time was ‘now’ or which place was ‘here’. Demonstrative concepts pick something out without saying anything extra about it. Similarly, the scientific knowledge that Harpo originally possessed did not enable him to anticipate what it would be like to re-express some parts of that knowledge using the demonstrative concepts that only experience can give one. The knowledge, therefore, appears to be genuinely new, whereas only the mode of conceiving it is novel.
Proponents of the epistemic argument respond that it is problematic to maintain both that the qualitative nature of experience can be genuinely novel, and that the quality itself be the same as some property already grasped scientifically: does not the experience’s phenomenal nature, which the demonstrative concepts capture, constitute a property in its own right? Another way to put this is to say that phenomenal concepts are not pure demonstratives, like ‘here’ and ‘now’, or ‘this’ and ‘that’, because they do capture a genuine qualitative content. Furthermore, experiencing does not seem to consist simply in exercising a particular kind of concept, demonstrative or not. When Harpo has his new form of experience, he does not simply exercise a new concept; he also grasps something new – the phenomenal quality – with that concept. How decisive these considerations are, remains controversial.
4.2 The Argument from Predicate Dualism to Property Dualism
I said above that predicate dualism might seem to have no ontological consequences, because it is concerned only with the different way things can be described within the contexts of the different sciences, not with any real difference in the things themselves. This, however, can be disputed.
The argument from predicate to property dualism moves in two steps, both controversial. The first claims that the irreducible special sciences, which are the sources of irreducible predicates, are not wholly objective in the way that physics is, but depend for their subject matter upon interest-relative perspectives on the world. This means that they, and the predicates special to them, depend on the existence of minds and mental states, for only minds have interest-relative perspectives. The second claim is that psychology – the science of the mental – is itself an irreducible special science, and so it, too, presupposes the existence of the mental. Mental predicates therefore presuppose the mentality that creates them: mentality cannot consist simply in the applicability of the predicates themselves.
First, let us consider the claim that the special sciences are not fully objective, but are interest-relative.
No-one would deny, of course, that the very same subject matter or ‘hunk of reality’ can be described in irreducibly different ways and it still be just that subject matter or piece of reality. A mass of matter could be characterized as a hurricane, or as a collection of chemical elements, or as mass of sub-atomic particles, and there be only the one mass of matter. But such different explanatory frameworks seem to presuppose different perspectives on that subject matter.
This is where basic physics, and perhaps those sciences reducible to basic physics, differ from irreducible special sciences. On a realist construal, the completed physics cuts physical reality up at its ultimate joints: any special science which is nomically strictly reducible to physics also, in virtue of this reduction, it could be argued, cuts reality at its joints, but not at its minutest ones. If scientific realism is true, a completed physics will tell one how the world is, independently of any special interest or concern: it is just how the world is. It would seem that, by contrast, a science which is not nomically reducible to physics does not take its legitimation from the underlying reality in this direct way. Rather, such a science is formed from the collaboration between, on the one hand, objective similarities in the world and, on the other, perspectives and interests of those who devise the science. The concept of hurricane is brought to bear from the perspective of creatures concerned about the weather. Creatures totally indifferent to the weather would have no reason to take the real patterns of phenomena that hurricanes share as constituting a single kind of thing. With the irreducible special sciences, there is an issue of salience , which involves a subjective component: a selection of phenomena with a certain teleology in mind is required before their structures or patterns are reified. The entities of metereology or biology are, in this respect, rather like Gestalt phenomena.
Even accepting this, why might it be thought that the perspectivality of the special sciences leads to a genuine property dualism in the philosophy of mind? It might seem to do so for the following reason. Having a perspective on the world, perceptual or intellectual, is a psychological state. So the irreducible special sciences presuppose the existence of mind. If one is to avoid an ontological dualism, the mind that has this perspective must be part of the physical reality on which it has its perspective. But psychology, it seems to be almost universally agreed, is one of those special sciences that is not reducible to physics, so if its subject matter is to be physical, it itself presupposes a perspective and, hence, the existence of a mind to see matter as psychological. If this mind is physical and irreducible, it presupposes mind to see it as such. We seem to be in a vicious circle or regress.
We can now understand the motivation for full-blown reduction. A true basic physics represents the world as it is in itself, and if the special sciences were reducible, then the existence of their ontologies would make sense as expressions of the physical, not just as ways of seeing or interpreting it. They could be understood ‘from the bottom up’, not from top down. The irreducibility of the special sciences creates no problem for the dualist, who sees the explanatory endeavor of the physical sciences as something carried on from a perspective conceptually outside of the physical world. Nor need this worry a physicalist, if he can reduce psychology, for then he could understand ‘from the bottom up’ the acts (with their internal, intentional contents) which created the irreducible ontologies of the other sciences. But psychology is one of the least likely of sciences to be reduced. If psychology cannot be reduced, this line of reasoning leads to real emergence for mental acts and hence to a real dualism for the properties those acts instantiate (Robinson 2003).
4.3 The Modal Argument
There is an argument, which has roots in Descartes (Meditation VI), which is a modal argument for dualism. One might put it as follows:
It is imaginable that one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
It is conceivable that one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
It is possible one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
One’s mind is a different entity from one’s body.
The rationale of the argument is a move from imaginability to real possibility. I include (2) because the notion of conceivability has one foot in the psychological camp, like imaginability, and one in the camp of pure logical possibility and therefore helps in the transition from one to the other.
This argument should be distinguished from a similar ‘conceivability’ argument, often known as the ‘zombie hypothesis’, which claims the imaginability and possibility of my body (or, in some forms, a body physically just like it) existing without there being any conscious states associated with it. (See, for example, Chalmers (1996), 94–9.) This latter argument, if sound, would show that conscious states were something over and above physical states. It is a different argument because the hypothesis that the unaltered body could exist without the mind is not the same as the suggestion that the mind might continue to exist without the body, nor are they trivially equivalent. The zombie argument establishes only property dualism and a property dualist might think disembodied existence inconceivable – for example, if he thought the identity of a mind through time depended on its relation to a body (e.g., Penelhum 1970).
Before Kripke (1972/80), the first challenge to such an argument would have concerned the move from (3) to (4). When philosophers generally believed in contingent identity, that move seemed to them invalid. But nowadays that inference is generally accepted and the issue concerns the relation between imaginability and possibility. No-one would nowadays identify the two (except, perhaps, for certain quasi-realists and anti-realists), but the view that imaginability is a solid test for possibility has been strongly defended. W. D. Hart ((1994), 266), for example, argues that no clear example has been produced such that “one can imagine that p (and tell less imaginative folk a story that enables them to imagine that p) plus a good argument that it is impossible that p. No such counterexamples have been forthcoming…” This claim is at least contentious. There seem to be good arguments that time-travel is incoherent, but every episode of Star-Trek or Doctor Who shows how one can imagine what it might be like were it possible.
It is worth relating the appeal to possibility in this argument to that involved in the more modest, anti-physicalist, zombie argument. The possibility of this hypothesis is also challenged, but all that is necessary for a zombie to be possible is that all and only the things that the physical sciences say about the body be true of such a creature. As the concepts involved in such sciences – e.g., neuron, cell, muscle – seem to make no reference, explicit or implicit, to their association with consciousness, and are defined in purely physical terms in the relevant science texts, there is a very powerful prima facie case for thinking that something could meet the condition of being just like them and lack any connection with consciousness. There is no parallel clear, uncontroversial and regimented account of mental concepts as a whole that fails to invoke, explicitly or implicitly, physical (e.g., behavioural) states.
For an analytical behaviourist the appeal to imaginability made in the argument fails, not because imagination is not a reliable guide to possibility, but because we cannot imagine such a thing, as it is a priori impossible. The impossibility of disembodiment is rather like that of time travel, because it is demonstrable a priori, though only by arguments that are controversial. The argument can only get under way for those philosophers who accept that the issue cannot be settled a priori, so the possibility of the disembodiment that we can imagine is still prima facie open.
A major rationale of those who think that imagination is not a safe indication of possibility, even when such possibility is not eliminable a priori, is that we can imagine that a posteriori necessities might be false – for example, that Hesperus might not be identical to Phosphorus. But if Kripke is correct, that is not a real possibility. Another way of putting this point is that there are many epistemic possibilities which are imaginable because they are epistemic possibilities, but which are not real possibilities. Richard Swinburne (1997, New Appendix C), whilst accepting this argument in general, has interesting reasons for thinking that it cannot apply in the mind-body case. He argues that in cases that involve a posteriori necessities, such as those identities that need discovering, it is because we identify those entities only by their ‘stereotypes’ (that is, by their superficial features observable by the layman) that we can be wrong about their essences. In the case of our experience of ourselves this is not true.
Now it is true that the essence of Hesperus cannot be discovered by a mere thought experiment. That is because what makes Hesperus Hesperus is not the stereotype, but what underlies it. But it does not follow that no one can ever have access to the essence of a substance, but must always rely for identification on a fallible stereotype. One might think that for the person him or herself, while what makes that person that person underlies what is observable to others, it does not underlie what is experienceable by that person, but is given directly in their own self-awareness.
This is a very appealing Cartesian intuition: my identity as the thinking thing that I am is revealed to me in consciousness, it is not something beyond the veil of consciousness. Now it could be replied to this that though I do access myself as a conscious subject, so classifying myself is rather like considering myself qua cyclist. Just as I might never have been a cyclist, I might never have been conscious, if things had gone wrong in my very early life. I am the organism, the animal, which might not have developed to the point of consciousness, and that essence as animal is not revealed to me just by introspection.
But there are vital differences between these cases. A cyclist is explicitly presented as a human being (or creature of some other animal species) cycling: there is no temptation to think of a cyclist as a basic kind of thing in its own right. Consciousness is not presented as a property of something, but as the subject itself. Swinburne’s claim that when we refer to ourselves we are referring to something we think we are directly aware of and not to ‘something we know not what’ that underlies our experience seemingly ‘of ourselves’ has powerful intuitive appeal and could only be overthrown by very forceful arguments. Yet, even if we are not referring primarily to a substrate, but to what is revealed in consciousness, could it not still be the case that there is a necessity stronger than causal connecting this consciousness to something physical? To consider this further we must investigate what the limits are of the possible analogy between cases of the water-H2O kind, and the mind-body relation.
We start from the analogy between the water stereotype – how water presents itself – and how consciousness is given first-personally to the subject. It is plausible to claim that something like water could exist without being H2O, but hardly that it could exist without some underlying nature. There is, however, no reason to deny that this underlying nature could be homogenous with its manifest nature: that is, it would seem to be possible that there is a world in which the water-like stuff is an element, as the ancients thought, and is water-like all the way down. The claim of the proponents of the dualist argument is that this latter kind of situation can be known to be true a priori in the case of the mind: that is, one can tell by introspection that it is not more-than-causally dependent on something of a radically different nature, such as a brain or body. What grounds might one have for thinking that one could tell that a priori?
The only general argument that seem to be available for this would be the principle that, for any two levels of discourse, A and B, they are more-than-causally connected only if one entails the other a priori. And the argument for accepting this principle would be that the relatively uncontroversial cases of a posteriori necessary connections are in fact cases in which one can argue a priori from facts about the microstructure to the manifest facts. In the case of water, for example, it would be claimed that it follows a priori that if there were something with the properties attributed to H2O by chemistry on a micro level, then that thing would possess waterish properties on a macro level. What is established a posteriori is that it is in fact H2O that underlies and explains the waterish properties round here, not something else: the sufficiency of the base – were it to obtain – to explain the phenomena, can be deduced a priori from the supposed nature of the base. This is, in effect, the argument that Chalmers uses to defend the zombie hypothesis. The suggestion is that the whole category of a posteriori more-than-causally necessary connections (often identified as a separate category of metaphysical necessity) comes to no more than this. If we accept that this is the correct account of a posteriori necessities, and also deny the analytically reductionist theories that would be necessary for a priori connections between mind and body, as conceived, for example, by the behaviourist or the functionalist, does it follow that we can tell a priori that consciousness is not more-than-causally dependent on the body?
It is helpful in considering this question to employ a distinction like Berkeley’s between ideas and notions. Ideas are the objects of our mental acts, and they capture transparently – ‘by way of image or likeness’ (Principles, sect. 27) – that of which they are the ideas. The self and its faculties are not the objects of our mental acts, but are captured only obliquely in the performance of its acts, and of these Berkeley says we have notions, meaning by this that what we capture of the nature of the dynamic agent does not seem to have the same transparency as what we capture as the normal objects of the agent’s mental acts. It is not necessary to become involved in Berkeley’s metaphysics in general to feel the force of the claim that the contents and internal objects of our mental acts are grasped with a lucidity that exceeds that of our grasp of the agent and the acts per se. Because of this, notions of the self perhaps have a ‘thickness’ and are permanently contestable: there seems always to be room for more dispute as to what is involved in that concept. (Though we shall see later, in 5.2.2, that there is a ‘non-thick’ way of taking the Berkeleyan concept of a notion.)
Because ‘thickness’ always leaves room for dispute, this is one of those cases in philosophy in which one is at the mercy of the arguments philosophers happen to think up. The conceivability argument creates a prima facie case for thinking that mind has no more than causal ontological dependence on the body. Let us assume that one rejects analytical (behaviourist or functionalist) accounts of mental predicates. Then the above arguments show that any necessary dependence of mind on body does not follow the model that applies in other scientific cases. This does not show that there may not be other reasons for believing in such dependence, for so many of the concepts in the area are still contested. For example, it might be argued that identity through time requires the kind of spatial existence that only body can give: or that the causal continuity required by a stream of consciousness cannot be a property of mere phenomena. All these might be put forward as ways of filling out those aspects of our understanding of the self that are only obliquely, not transparently, presented in self-awareness. The dualist must respond to any claim as it arises: the conceivability argument does not pre-empt them.......
5.2 The Unity of the Mind
Whether one believes that the mind is a substance or just a bundle of properties, the same challenge arises, which is to explain the nature of the unity of the immaterial mind. For the Cartesian, that means explaining how he understands the notion of immaterial substance. For the Humean, the issue is to explain the nature of the relationship between the different elements in the bundle that binds them into one thing. Neither tradition has been notably successful in this latter task: indeed, Hume, in the appendix to the Treatise, declared himself wholly mystified by the problem, rejecting his own initial solution (though quite why is not clear from the text).
{3.2.2010 ~ Day 107 of 365} **EXPLORE**
It was far too beautiful a day to be stuck inside an office, though that's where I found myself. Thank goodness for a leisurely lunch and stroll around the park - fresh air and warm sunshine is what my soul needed today :)
Today's gratitude ~ left overs! Girlfriend is tired, and in no mood to waste precious veg time in the kitchen ;)
Feelings Versus Intellect.
Procese divizibil schimbare Propuneri de-a lungul implicații ipotezelor anterioare simțit,
verschiedene Theorien untrennbar Geschwindigkeit anzeigt entfernte Bewegungen verhältnismäßig Kräfte kniete,
άνιση αγάπες διαφέρουν αντίστοιχες συνθήκες κατηγορίες συμμέτρηση ομοιότητα περιπτώσεις,
megnyilvánulásai a jelenség feltárására motivációs kérdések illusztrációk kifejezések ismert,
в подчинении сознания представление невнятно макрокосма принципы внутренней части природы,
paradossali filosofia riflette esitazioni dogma modifiche Considerando l'individualità del ridicolo,
eðlislæg ástæður óbeinum raun núverandi Virknin eignuðust skoðanir fáránleikans tengingar orsakir,
forståelige undervisnings sjeler usvikelige belysning påfølgende konsepter fantasi innvendig heretter,
moderne uitgeput filosofie representaties transcendentale selecties bloemlezing esthetiek posities vallen,
génie spécifique et extraordinaire capacité consciente dispositions des règles instinctives art,
影響を受けない物腰丁寧な不協和音の再発の教義の危険説得力のある声の魅力的な事項は、成長.
Steve.D.Hammond.
Let no one say when he is tempted, “I am being tempted by God,” for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one. But each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire. Then desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin, and sin when it is fully grown brings forth death (James 1:13-15)
We think of sin as a single act, but God sees it as a process. Adam committed one act of sin, and yet that one act brought sin, death, and judgment on the whole human race. James described this process of sin in four stages.
Desire (v. 14). The word lust means any kind of desire, and not necessarily sexual passions. The normal desires of life were given to us by God and, of themselves, are not sinful. Without these desires, we could not function. Unless we felt hunger and thirst, we would never eat and drink, and we would die. Without fatigue, the body would never rest and would eventually wear out. Sex is a normal desire; without it the human race could not continue.
It is when we want to satisfy these desires in ways outside God’s will that we get into trouble. Eating is normal; gluttony is sin. Sleep is normal; laziness is sin. “Marriage is honorable in all, and the bed undefiled; but whoremongers and adulterers God will judge” (Heb. 13:4).
Some people try to become “spiritual” by denying these normal desires, or by seeking to suppress them; but this only makes them less than human. These fundamental desires of life are the steam in the boiler that makes the machinery go. Turn off the steam and you have no power. Let the steam go its own way and you have destruction. The secret is in constant control. These desires must be our servants and not our masters; and this we can do through Jesus Christ.
Deception (v. 14). No temptation appears as temptation; it always seems more alluring than it really is. James used two illustrations from the world of sports to prove his point. Drawn away carries with it the idea of the baiting of a trap; and enticed in the original Greek means “to bait a hook.” The hunter and the fisherman have to use bait to attract and catch their prey. No animal is deliberately going to step into a trap and no fish will knowingly bite at a naked hook. The idea is to hide the trap and the hook.
Temptation always carries with it some bait that appeals to our natural desires. The bait not only attracts us, but it also hides the fact that yielding to the desire will eventually bring sorrow and punishment. It is the bait that is the exciting thing. Lot would never have moved toward Sodom had he not seen the “well-watered plains of Jordan” (Gen. 13:10ff). When David looked on his neighbor’s wife, he would never have committed adultery had he seen the tragic consequences: the death of a baby (Bathsheba’s son), the murder of a brave soldier (Uriah), the violation of a daughter (Tamar). The bait keeps us from seeing the consequences of sin.
V 2, p 343 When Jesus was tempted by Satan, He always dealt with the temptation on the basis of the Word of God. Three times He said, “It is written.” From the human point of view, turning stones into bread to satisfy hunger is a sensible thing to do; but not from God’s point of view. When you know the Bible, you can detect the bait and deal with it decisively. This is what it means to walk by faith and not by sight.
Disobedience (v. 15). We have moved from the emotions (desire) and the intellect (deception) to the will. James changed the picture from hunting and fishing to the birth of a baby. Desire conceives a method for taking the bait. The will approves and acts; and the result is sin. Whether we feel it or not, we are hooked and trapped. The baby is born, and just wait until it matures!
Christian living is a matter of the will, not the feelings. I often hear believers say, “I don’t feel like reading the Bible.” Or, “I don’t feel like attending prayer meeting.” Children operate on the basis of feeling, but adults operate on the basis of will. They act because it is right, no matter how they feel. This explains why immature Christians easily fall into temptation: they let their feelings make the decisions. The more you exercise your will in saying a decisive no to temptation, the more God will take control of your life. “For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure” (Phil. 2:13).
Death (v. 15). Disobedience gives birth to death, not life. It may take years for the sin to mature, but when it does, the result will be death. If we will only believe God’s Word and see this final tragedy, it will encourage us not to yield to temptation. God has erected this barrier because He loves us. “Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die?” (Ezek. 18:23)
These four stages in temptation and sin are perfectly depicted in the first sin recorded in the Bible in Genesis 3.
Warren W. Wiersbe, The Bible Exposition Commentary (vol. 2; Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1996), 342–343.
Island of Flying Books
“What do you want?” Little Rinpoche asks.
“I am here to bring back all these books to the island where they came from.”
“Oh yes, I remember”, he says. “I’ve ordered them back. Well done so far. Now open your mind and let all concepts fly away!”
He claps his hands and you will not believe it, but all books fly away.
HKD
„Rinpoche“, fragte der Junge. „Woher kommen die Wünsche?“
Sie kommen aus dem See der himmlischen Erde.
Und wo liegt dieser See?
Auf der Insel der fliegenden Bücher...
Die gibt es doch gar nicht.
Doch gibt es sie. Im innersten deiner Seele. Manche nennen diesen Ort auch Phantasie oder Imagination. Sobald du mit dem Boot deines Wünschens auf die Insel reist, erlebst du deine Phantasie. Und von dort bekommst du die Botschaften für deinen Alltag. Was wäre das Leben ohne Phantasie? Koste am schönsten Nektar deiner Seele, lass deine Phantasie zu, dann bist du mit der Insel der fliegenden Bücher verbunden.
Heute bin ich erwachsen, beinahe schon ein alter Mann, doch jetzt habe ich die Insel der Seligen entdeckt, Hypoberea. Aus meiner Sicht ist sie vergleichbar mit Shambhala von dem Rinpoche in eben jenem Buch berichtete, das auf dem obigen Bild durch die Gegend fliegt. Die kleine Figur hat sich aus der Druckerschwärze selbst erschaffen und nutzt das Buch wie einen fliegenden Teppich. Ich muss noch herausfinden, wer dieser kleine Mann ist... :-)
HKD
Falls Psychologie interessiert:
Auf dem Pfad der Entwicklung des Bewusstseins aus den Schleiern der Maya kommt der Punkt, an dem man alle Konzepte wieder aufgeben muss. Ein freies Bewusstsein kann weder an Prinzipien noch an Konzepten haften, obwohl sie für die Befreiung notwendig sind. Bewusstheit wird durch den Logos gebildet und daher kann man die Konzepte die er aufbaut als Boot oder Fahrzeug bezeichnen. Mit dem Boot setzt man über den großen Strom. Auf der anderen Seite liegt das Paradies der Freiheit. Es ist die innere Freiheit, das diamantene Bewusstsein. Dagegen sind äußere Freiheiten und Unfreiheiten unwesentlich. Was aber nicht heißt, dass sie zu vernachlässigen wären... :-)
Daher muss man sich konkret von den Büchern befreien. Ich selbst bin rituell mit einem Koffer voller Bücher in die Wüste gefahren und habe sie am Fuße einer großen Wanderdüne vergraben. Für große Übergänge bedurfte es bei mir stets großer Rituale, damit der Geist die Veränderung akzeptieren und verstehen konnte.
HKD
Anmerkung:
This is digital art work, not reality.
Das Bild ist ein digital hergestelltes Werk.
Jede Ähnlichkeit mit realen Gegebenheiten wäre rein zufällig.
HKD
"Winter is good -- his Hoar Delights
Italic flavor yield
To Intellects inebriate
With Summer, or the World --
Generic as a Quarry
And hearty -- as a Rose --
Invited with Asperity
But welcome when he goes."
- Emily Dickinson
=========
Nothing new. Prepping for my youngest son's birthday party. His birthday was last month but we are late as always.
These things start out modestly, and then they escalate terribly to being over-the-top!
We had all the best intentions :-)
I suppose my greatest asset is my femininity and that is why I became Jojo as I was never really at home as a man and always looked up to women for their intellect and looks with a kind of envy. I'm quite a sexual being too and I've learnt all the things we T.Girls are supposed to do and now I'm used to it I love it especially being 'entertained' and as long as they let me feel female I have no qualmes about my lovers lol. But having said that apart from the fact that I'm obviously not one, in other respects I feel like a woman. That means I might enjoy lovely clothes and looking good but I get no fetish enjoyment at all from dressing or blatant exhibitionism and never have. Of course that doesn't mean I look down on others who do and that is fine as we are all different with different lives and needs. That doesn't mean I don't like to post sexy pictures as well but I do things my way and I like to think it is also why I have so many followers. Of course some of them keep coming back hoping they might see more. Well guys it does happen and there's always tomorrow.
History
The John Rogers who bought Riverhill in 1840 was an only child, with a modest fortune, and a fine intellect. He became a classics scholar, a scientist and a friend of Charles Darwin. He was one of the first members of the Royal Horticultural Society and a patron of the plant collectors of the day.
He chose Riverhill because its sheltered situation offered an ideal lime free hillside where he could hope to establish newly introduced trees and shrubs. From his garden notebook, it can be seen that planting started in 1842. Subsequent generations, continued the planting and in 1910 Colonel John Middleton Rogers created what is now known as ‘The Wood Garden’ a fine collection of Japanese Maples, Rhododendrons and Azaleas. His wife, the infamous Muriel, created many additions including the now hidden Rock Gardens.
Until the beginning of the 2nd World War, eight full time gardeners kept Riverhill looking immaculate. Since the war years, however, a shortage of manpower and a lack of money has meant that the garden was allowed to deteriorate, with many parts of the original planting lost to everyday use and visitors.
Today, four generations of the Rogers family live at Riverhill,
The estate is managed by Edward Rogers (Great-great-great-grandson of the John Rogers who bought Riverhill in 1840) and his wife, Sarah.
When God created man in His image, He created a measure; the human perception of the world corresponds to God's creative intention. Man by definition is a center, or "the center" in a given universe; not by accident, but in virtue of the very nature of Being, and this is why that which is large or small for man is large or small in the divine intention; man perceives things as they present themselves in the divine Intellect. And that is why the world of the indefinitely small, as well as the world of the indefinitely large, is as it were forbidden to man, who should not want to disproportionately enlarge the small or to disproportionately reduce the large. Man ought to feel that there is no advantage or happiness in such enterprises; and he would feel it if he had maintained a relationship with the Absolute, or if this relationship were sincere and sufficient.
He, who is really at peace with God is free from all unhealthy curiosity, if one may say so; he lives, like a well-guarded child, in the blessed garden of a grace that does not forsake him; the Creator knows the best place for the creature, and He knows what is good for man.
In a certain sense, the world of atoms as well as that of galaxies is hostile to human beings, and comprises for them, in principle or potentially, a climate of alienation and terror. Some people will doubtless argue that "the man of our times" is an "adult," but this is pride, even satanism, for a normal man always keeps a childlike side, as all sacred Scriptures attest by their language; if such were not the case, childhood itself would not comprise a positive aspect. Of course, a mature man ought to be "adult," but he can be so otherwise than by plunging into forbidden abysses; the spiritual victory over illusion is a matter appreciably more serious than the insensitivityof the explorers of the inhuman.
There are two points to consider in created things, namely the empirical appearance and the mechanism; now the appearance manifests the divine intention, as we have stated above; the mechanism merely operates the mode of manifestation.
For example, in man's body the divine intention is expressed by its form, its deiformity, its symbolism and its beauty; the mechanism is its anatomy and vital functioning.
The modern mentality, having always a scientific and "iconoclastic" tendency, tends to overaccentuate the mechanism to the detriment of the creative intention, and does so on all levels, psychological as well as physical; the result is a jaded and "demystified" mentality that is no longer "impressed" by anything. By forgetting the divine intention - which nonetheless is apparent a priori - one ends in an emptiness devoid of all reference points and meaning, and in a mentality of nihilism and despair, if not of careless and brutal materialism. In the face of this deviation it is the child who is right when he believes that the blue sky above us is Paradise.
---
Frithjof Schuon: Roots of the Human Condition
Year of the Monkey
Lunar Lanterns, giant lanterns representing animal signs of the Chinese zodiac in city centre locations from 6–14 February.
Ox
"People born in the Year of the Monkey are fun-loving, energetic and inquisitive. Their intellect allows them to adapt to any situation, they are confident, charismatic, loyal and inventive.
Sometimes, the Monkey can be a little too curious for his or her own good, as well as careless, restless, immature and arrogant."
Lorenzo Lotto (ca. 1480-1556)
Alte Pinakothek, Munich
The Venetian Lorenzo Lotto developed a very idiosyncratic pictorial language of his own and sought unconventional iconographic solutions.
This work shows a vision of St Catherine of Alexandria.
While on the lookout for a suitable husband who could equal her status, wealth and intellect, a hermit presented her with a picture of the Virgin and Child and suggested Christ as her spouse.
In a dream, the Christ Child thereupon placed a ring on Catherine's finger as a sign of the mystical marriage.
Inv. Nr. 32
Provenance: 1804 from the secularization of the first bishop's residence of Wurzburg.
THE DISCOVERY by gleitzeit blog (the lost Interview in Rome)
I am using magnifying glass to be able to read a a PDF file of a very low quality.
My eyes are hurting. What I have found is something that is just not available…
I must say on the search for anything tagged “invisible” I find some pretty amazing
stuff I would never know about (later on that)
Paul meet me at the gate. He looked younger than I had expected. Dressed
casually.
As a host he cordially offered me to dine. While we entered the hall I had an urge to ask him, is this a museum? trying not to break anything as we passed by sculptures, paintings,
ceramics and a lot of other pieces of art which I had never seen before.
This unexpected excitement spoiled my appetite, and I was no longer hungry and
instead drank some wine.
He made clear that it is not any kind of a museum, but instead, his Paul’s studio. He lives not in Rome, but by the Terranian sea, where he was going shortly.
I asked Paul how he earns a living. Paul thought a little and tried to find an appropriate explanation. He finally lit on: "I am of independent means and don’t have to earn a living" pouring me another glass of wine.
I asked him: “ Can I buy some of your paintings? How much it will cost me?”
This question Paul left unanswered but he said that commonly he paints his
pictures without the intention to sell them.
Earlier I noticed a little girl and a young woman moving about him.
OMG!!!! I am shaken up. NOBODY KNOWS ANYTHING ABOUT Paul Jaisini’s personal life! I don’t believe this. THANK YOU GOOGLE! this is like really mystifying. I am not an emotional person, rather someone who loves to work hard and get the job done. This turned into something other than working.
Google nowadays is not your “grandfather’s” google so to speak. It is tailored
around you, your daily Internet activity, So finding any news, any special
information is no longer an easy task. I guess because there’s too much of
everything and what one is looking for could be placed out of reach. So we sort
of live on a planet that is flat as in dark ages. I say that because if one is
provided the info that is tailored with limitation it implies that breaking
away is not something one would even comprehend! We are too used to trust our social functioning and think that we know everything, on top of all news provided to us by the honest practice of the broadcasting companies.
We don’t want to be those conspiracy freaks with no trust to anything or
anyone. But truth is, if you don’t want to pay high dollar for some expert
articles on the topics that could give more than the free info, you are really
up against a brick wall of the new unknown reality and a total incapacity to acquire
the needed info of high quality without spending your whole life learning all the crap on the net and beyond in order to find finally what you need.
So search is a tricky mother. If you are creative and sort of spontaneous you
might somehow find your own style of fishing out the essentials. But in my case I
often felt helpless and lost no longer willing to participate in this
undertaking trying to document Gleitzeit.
It doesn’t look like I had managed a short explanation. But this is my formula of
finding something that is not available on the tailored to fit google search.
I enter the variations of phrases and words from the gleitzeit context of emails, postings, essays and add some other words I find on my way of locating Paul Jaisini's links. Turning the tag in a sort of a potion number nine that had proven to fetch some impossible to find info on such a quick inquiry without opening thousands of websites where I might find or might not find anything at all. And the most effective findings are with the tag "invisible" added to other things, be it email abbreviations and so on.
“The other must be his wife”, I thought, because Paul called her with some pet name's asking for a bottle of wine, for a book, or an ash tray.
“Is she your wife? “ I asked just in case.
Paul looked me in the eyes and said: “She is not my wife, nor the mother of my daughter, she is my secretary. “
The secretary I sensed didn’t like me much.
She didn’t call Jaisini by his name, Paul, but she instead addressed him as
mister Jaisini. She seemed obsequious and perhaps didn’t like me for my unrestrained manner and direct questions. She said to Paul: “You should not waste your time on this interview. You need to return to your work. “
Paul said: “It will be few minutes." and spent a few hours with me. A self-ruling man.
Paul didn’t drink any wine but he behaved at times extravagantly, showing the
outlines of the silhouettes in his paintings and explaining what was happening in the pictures.
Paul said that the point of his art being hidden from the public is an
intrigue that engages press in constant attempts to uncover the ‘truth’ behind it all. Nevertheless it is very disappointing, that people don’t care about real art, as they do about private affairs.
We went upstairs and in a spacious hall I saw a large painting. I didn’t hide my
awe.
“Wow! Where did you get such a big piece of canvas? The art stores don’t sell
this linen in such sizes. “
“It is stitched together from pieces," answered Paul.
“How did you reach the upper parts of the painting"
"I climbed the riser. Do you see the nude black man up there, tangled with a
serpent?"
"It reminds me of Laocoön. Is it intentional?"
"No, he is a symbol of physical grace without intellect. Do you see a group of
female bodies intertwined in a threesome?"
"No, I don’t see it. Where is the threesome?"
"To the left, look there."
"I look there."
"There the three figures, here is one, here is another one and the third one."
"Third is not a female figure, it’s some animal."
"It’s a female, but there is an animal, a bit higher up. The clown in the center
tears his mouth in a bloody smile, carrying out his role of a fool, laughing when
he wants to cry."
"Is that a monkey?"
"You got it, she is another symbol of the fate, she stopped hitting the tom-tom,
her direct purpose in circus. When she stopped to play and started to think, she
realized that her life is pitiful and she wants to kill herself. It’s a second
symbol of the same meaning."
"Tell me about that threesome again."
"Well, they show the natural grace, as three graces would, the sensual concept of
procreation."
"This picture must be a depiction of a circus performance, I suppose. Is it ?
Why it is so dynamic?"
"It is a circus performance but is the personal trial of human character. The ball construction is an object: - Paulsen’s ball, it is also a title of the painting."
"This ball creates some weight and it seems to move the composition with it’s
size and position and it seems to be on a verge of rolling down."
"You’re right! I also sense this immediate impulse to prevent the clown to fall
off that ball.
We went to other paintings, whole series of paintings.
When I gathered all my sensations about the art that surrounded me, it was time to leave. Paul Jaisini escorted me to the door. I shook his hand saying:
"You are an interesting man!"
"I am not a man..."
(the last sentence was a good ending)
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbolism
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbolism_(arts)
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invisibility
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatalism
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gracefulness
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossible_object
Have to type as I read PDF file that can’t be copied
Have to type as I read PDF file that can’t be copied
I am using magnifying glass to be able to read a a PDF file of very low quality. My eyes are hurting. What I have found is something that is just not available… I must say on the search for anything tagged “invisible” I find some pretty amazing stuff I would never know about (later on that) Now I am sitting in my office instead of having night out. It really is an impossible task to just discern the text. I filled up a spray bottle with cold water to spray my face to frequently refresh my eyes, as they get tired from the magnifying glass. It’s totally worth it, the thrill of discovery is my ultimate high.
Subj: Re: any suggestions?
Date: 2/5/00 Pacific Standard Time
From: bcwoodward@bigfoot.com (B. Woodward)
To: Yustas61@aol.com
CC: Angela Ahermeign
The attached file with original text before translation can be used in all related your project on Paul Jaisini.
All my corrections are in () and sometimes they replace the words nearby, other times they get inserted or have comments as well. It should be clear. Angela, you had some trouble with colloquialisms, unclear constructions and misplaced verb tenses. You switched among various forms of the past with irregularity. I’ve brushed it up. It makes a good narrative, though. Very interesting :)
Original Message-
From Angela A, Sent Thursday, February 03, 2000, 4: 25 PM
to bcwoodward@bigfoot.com
Subject Any suggestions
My first meeting with Paul Jaisini in Rome
(was it your first meeting with him, or just first time in Rome… unclear construction)
Paul Jaisini’s appearance at the exhibition of his art made a lot of noise in 1995 in Rome.
(caused a lot of noise, a lot of excitement, or was it just a noisy appearance?)
After newspapers published the (a) photograph of Paul Jaisini in the empty gallery, I read the article and realized how lucky I was to be in Rome. Nobody saw Paul Jaisini’s paintings. Yes, nobody… This what happened next. I called him once, then (a) second time. (,b)But Paul didn’t return my calls. Unfortunately I was not able to stay on guards (stand guard is the appropriate colloquialism) to catch him by the art gallery being (as I was) preoccupied with my (own) business. So I decided that I have (needed, not have) to find a way to see Paul Jaisini’s (hidden) paintings if he hides them. Such extravagance has (had) to be stopped.
I decided to offer him (no him here) to write a testament about (to) the existence of his art (, which would necessarily lead to him revealing it to me.) which will rise the necessity to see it.
I heard about Paul Jaisini before (that time) because he is quite a (reverse the a and quite) well-known contemporary artist. When I set up the appointment to meet (him) I easily found his cozy two- story town-house surrounded by (an) antique iron fence.
When I called (on) the intercom it took a while to explain who I was and why (I had come) did I come.
Paul meet me at the gate. He looked younger than I (had) expected. Dressed casually.
As a host he cordially offered me to dine. While we were entering (entered) the hall I had an urge to ask him, (“I) is it (this) a museum (?), trying to brake (break) anything, (no comma… as we passed) passing by sculptures, paintings, ceramic pieces (ceramics… drop the p word) and a lot of (other pieces of) art which I (had never seen before. drop rest of the sentence) was not able…
Gosh, I can feel how B. Woodward was feeling… WILL SHE REALLY SEE THE PAINTINGS by PAUL JAISINI?????? my eyes are punishing me for this thrill. I need to stop looking into the magnifier when I am now writing a comment without looking into unreadable copy.
Just waiting to get the courage to continue… my eyes need rest, I made myself some coffee with soy milk. But it surely means I want to prolong the suspense. I have no idea what is written in that text I located only god knows where or how.
I think that a gamer guru would understand me after he/she played hardest strategic games for a very long time and turned into a savvy thrill seeker.
medium.com/art-submissions/don-t-bother-901454f687cd The time has come to start making sense of things, of the world, of each other. We think we’re doing that, but we’re actually doing the opposite. We are complicating…EVERYTHING…tothe point of utter madness. Our world has become one ginormous madhouse, ESPECIALLY cyberspace — this alternate world we created within our world that seems to have created a world within itself — yet to be identified, recognized, and named. Making sense of things is not a bad thing. For example, let’s start with one major web enigma: Paul Jaisini and “Gleitzeit” which is this, uh, odd art movement the guy started in the 90s. If you simply google either of those names, I gaurantee you a good WTF moment or two. You’ll not just be scratching your head over this one. You’ll be scratching every part of your body like a delusional nutcase who thinks your skin is literally crawling with countless bugs. IT’S GONNA BUG THE HELL OUT OF YOU, let’s just say…maybe for a day or a week…or maybe, as for some folks, long after you’ve discovered it. You’ll be itching to understand what it’s about even just a little bit. Your mind will try to make sense of Paul Jaisini and/or Gleitzeit, it will want to, but will fail miserably. Frustration and anger will start setting in. I know because that’s how it was for me and every person that tried. The deeper you dig, the more you try to figure it out, the more confused, overwhelmed, baffled, and perplexed you’ll get. I guess for the people that attempt to understand the Paul Jaisini and Gleitzeit thing or debunk it, my advice is: DON’T EVEN TRY. DON’T GO THERE. IT’S NOT FOR YOU. The sleepless nights, the uncertainty, the questions and ideas that start invading your head, the horror of “waking up” from normality and regularity, the trauma of moving from one dimension to another… is not worth it. Well, for me it was worth it, but not for others. They claim it’s crazy and even dangerous for the mind, Paul Jaisini’s Gleitzeit. Well, sure, I mean you gotta break some eggs to make an omelette, dontchya? So, Gleitzeit is the omelette and all parties involved in GIG (Gleitzeit International Group) are the eggs. Makes sense. Speaking of which, “they” don’t want it to make sense, not even close. As a member of the group, I’m breaking protocol BIG TIME by writing this, by encouraging that you go out there, look this stuff up and figure it out, take away its shield of senselessness and defeat it… for the sake of a better world and future for us all. I hope someone out there hears me….one way or another, it had to be said…. Stelly Riesling
Happy Melancholia
Blue Fire
Keeps me flying
Through happy nights
I love being alone with you
Logos – North Island
Cool Fire
Cool Mind
HKD
I am nearly happy
Means I am happy
With beeing
Nearly happy
HKD
Fallen man, and thus the average man, is as it were poisoned by the passional element, either grossly or subtly; from this results an obscuring of the Intellect and the necessity of a Revelation coming from the outside. Remove the passional element from the soul and the intelligence (remove "the rust from the mirror" or "from the heart") and the Intellect will be released; it will reveal from within what religion reveals from without.
This brings us to an important point: in order to make itself understood by souls impregnated with passion, religion must itself adopt a so to speak passional language, whence dogmatism, which excludes, and moralism, which schematizes; if the average man or collective man were not passional, Revelation would speak the language of the Intellect and there would be no exoterism, nor for that matter esoterism considered as an occult complement.
There are here three possibilities: firstly, men dominate the passional element, everyone lives spiritually by his inward Revelation; this is the golden age, in which everyone is born
an initiate.
Second possibility: men are affected by the passional element to the point of forgetting certain aspects of the Truth, whence the necessity - or the opportuneness - of Revelations that while being outward are metaphysical in spirit, such as the Upanishads.
Thirdly: the majority of men are dominated by passions, whence the formalistic, exclusive and combative religions, which communicate to them on the one hand the means of channelling the passional element with a view to salvation, and on the other hand the means of overcoming it in view of the total Truth, and of thereby transcending the religious formalism which veils it while suggesting it in an indirect manner. Religious revelation is both a veil of light and a light veiled.
---
Esoterism as Principle and as Way by Frithjof Schuon
Logic can either operate as part of an intellection, or else, on the contrary, put itself at the service of an error; moreover unintelligence can diminish or even nullify logic, so that philosophy can in fact become the vehicle of almost anything: it can be an Aristotelianism carrying ontological insights, just as it can degenerate into an "existentialism" in which logic has become a mere shadow of itself, a blind and unreal operation.
Indeed, what can be said of a "metaphysic" which idiotically posits man at the centre of the Real, like a sack of coal, and which operates with such blatantly subjective and conjectural concepts as "worry" and "anguish"? When unintelligence (and the variety we mean here is in no wise incompatible with what passes for intelligence in "worldly" circles) and passion prostitute logic, it is impossible to escape from that mental satanism which is so frequently to be found in contemporary thought.
The validity of a logical demonstration thus depends on the knowledge which we, as demonstrators, have of the subject in view, and it is evidently wrong to take as our starting-point not this direct knowledge but pure and simple logic.
When man has no "visionary" knowledge of Being, and merely "thinks" with his "brain" instead of "seeing" with his "heart", all his logic is useless to him, because it starts out from an initial fallacy. Moreover, the validity of a demonstration must be distinguished from its dialectical efficacy; the latter evidently depends on the intuitive disposition available for the recognition of truth when demonstrated, and therefore on an intellectual capacity.
Logic is nothing but the science of mental co-ordination and of arriving at rational conclusions; it cannot, therefore, attain the transcendent through its own resources; a supralogical -not an illogical- dialectic, based on symbolism and analogy, and therefore descriptive rather than ratiocinative, may be harder for some people to assimilate, but it conforms more closely to transcendent Reality.
Contemporary philosophy, on the other hand, really amounts to a decapitated logic: what is intellectually evident it calls "prejudice"; wishing to free itself from servitude to the mental, it sinks into infralogic; shutting itself off from the intellectual light above, it exposes itself to the obscurity of the lowest "subconscious" beneath.
Philosophic scepticism takes itself for a healthy attitude and for an absence of "prejudices", whereas it is in fact something completely artificial; it proceeds, not from real knowledge, but from sheer ignorance, and for this reason it is as alien to intelligence as it is to reality.
---
Frithjof Schuon
---
Quoted in: The Essential Frithjof Schuon (edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr)
"Photography is a marvelous discovery, a science that has attracted the greatest intellects, and art that excites the most astute minds—and one that can be practiced by any imbecile."
Nadar (Gaspard-Félix Tournachon)
[Photographer, b. 1820, Paris, d. 1910, Paris.]
Pentacon 29mm F2.8 Multi Coating
General Sir John Monash.
(1865-1931) was a civil engineer who became an Australian military commander in World War I. Regarded as Australia's greatest general, his brilliant leadership turned the tide of the war. Monash was also a born writer and intellect, and his writing displays a delight in detail, mastery and grace.
Dust jacket note on "John Monash"
The Australian Victories in France in 1918.
See Currency and other words at ozwords.com.au/
By Kel Richards..
Using the kit lens and a 10mm tube.
From Google Gemini AI.
what did the world do at the end of World war II?
The world reacted to the end of World War II with a mix of jubilation, relief, and a somber understanding of the immense cost of the conflict. Here's a breakdown of some key responses:
Celebrations and Relief:
Widespread Joy: News of the surrenders (first Germany in May 1945, then Japan in August 1945) sparked massive celebrations in Allied countries. People filled the streets,embracing and cheering, marking the end of years of hardship, anxiety, and loss.
Return of Soldiers: The end of the war meant the return of soldiers to their home countries. This was a joyous occasion for families and communities, although it was also a period of readjustment for many veterans.
Reconstruction and Recovery:
Devastation in Europe and Asia: Many parts of Europe and Asia lay in ruins. Cities were bombed, infrastructure was destroyed, and economies were shattered. The immediate focus was on providing humanitarian aid, rebuilding infrastructure, and restarting economies.
The Marshall Plan: The United States launched the Marshall Plan, a massive economic aid program to help rebuild European economies. This was crucial in preventing further instability and fostering recovery.
Political and Geopolitical Shifts:
Emergence of Superpowers: The war significantly altered the global balance of power. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers, leading to a period of geopolitical tension known as the Cold War.
Formation of the United Nations: In 1945, the United Nations was established with the goal of preventing future global conflicts through international cooperation and diplomacy.
Decolonization: The war weakened European colonial powers, contributing to the rise of independence movements in Asia and Africa.
Dealing with the Aftermath:
Nuremberg Trials: The Nuremberg trials were held to bring Nazi leaders to justice for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace. This set a precedent for international criminal law.
Coming to Terms with the Holocaust: The full extent of the Holocaust was revealed after the war, shocking the world and leading to a greater understanding of the horrors of genocide.
A Desire for Peace:
"Never Again": The immense suffering caused by the war led to a widespread desire to prevent future global conflicts. This sentiment was reflected in the formation of the United Nations and other international efforts to promote peace and cooperation.
In summary, the end of World War II was met with widespread celebration and relief, but also marked the beginning of a long process of recovery, reconstruction, and dealing with the political and social consequences of the conflict. 1 The world was forever changed by the war, and its aftermath shaped the course of the 20th century. 2
Name- Ronald Johnson/ Bone Crusher (Hero)
Universe: DC
Age: 45
Weapons- Any firearm or bladed weaponry
Allies: The US Marines, Commissioner Gordon and The GCPD, and Batman
Enemies- Anyone who threatens the US, The Shadow, and gang operations. and Thugs.
Skills/ Abilities- Extreme strength, Extreme intellect, Rock Hard Skin, Great Leadership Qualities, Weapons and Hand to Hand Combat knowledge and experience.
Back Story:
Ronald Johnson, Ron to his friends, was always a good child. He was a tall, built boy with blond hair. He did well in school and never got in trouble. He knew that he wanted to join the US Marines when he grew up. When Ron was 19, he joined the US Marine Corps. He was one of the top members of his squad. When Ron was 29, he was sent over seas for War. Ron had such a strong punch, he would break several bones of anyone he hit. Because of this, his squad gave him the nickname "Bone Crusher".
During the war, he suffered a horrible accident, causing him to loose both his arms and legs. Surprisingly, he survived the incident, but his life was forever changed.
The Military had been working on a new procedure that would allow injured War veterans to be able to move and fight like they use to be able to. Hearing of Ron's accident, they asked if Ron would like to be the first subject to the operation. John accepted.
The procedure made Ron into a new Man and changed his appearance drastically. His arms and legs were extended and his skin was turned rock hard, making it extremely hard to pierce his skin with a bullet or knife. Some of his body was also reinforced with metal joints and plates. He was made a custom US Marine Armor Suit that covered his head and Chest. He could take the armor off, but he wore it most of the time to show support for his Country. Because of the procedure, Ron was not able to age. He is not immortal, but he would not show signs of aging.
Ron used his new body to fight against terrorist and anyone who fought against his country. He was given his own squad and was sent back overseas to fight in the war. Due to the non stop battle that Ron and his fellow soldiers fought, the war was won
When John returned from the war, he was shocked by the actions of the new vigilante "The Shadow". He agreed with what he was doing, but not how he was doing it. He did not want to anymore people suffer from the horrible deaths caused by The Shadow. After seeing multiple News Reports about The Shadow, he finally contacted the GCPD and traveled to Gotham to meet with the Commissioner. He was also introduced to Batman by the Commissioner. He was amazed by The Batman and how he was able to stop crimes with only his Mind, Gadgets, and his Fists. He took Batman's ways to heart, and vowed to only kill if absolutely necessary.
Since his trip to Gotham, he has moved there. He is the leader of the top Swat team in the city and does whatever he can to stop the horrific murders of The Shadow. He frequently reports in with Batman and The Commissioner, and together they try to find the whereabouts of The Shadow. Ron is now a full time member of the GCPD and and would gladly go back overseas to fight if another War was to come up.
_______________________________________________
I.
________________________________________________
[...] The shamanism is much older than all the world religions, he is as old as mankind. Many cave paintings from the Stone Age shamanic rituals are dar. We deal with our own roots as it were, if we now turn our attention to shamanic dreams. Many people today have a great yearning for the lost connection with these roots.
We have lost the one-sided by the full development of the intellect. We have said somewhat simplified, only used our left side of the face and put all the right areas out of service. This unused storage spaces of our options would be responsible for feelings, intuition, imagination, visual, symbolic way of thinking, intuition for the irrational.
Moreover, use our intellect, and I will not demonize the way, only the directed way of thinking, so we fixed a certain point that you want to see as sharp. It's the same principle as a telescope:
The price, however, you pay for this focus is a very narrow field of view. [...]____________________________________________
Source: Susanne Elsensohn - "Schamanismus und Traum"
Translated by Mr. Google!
________________________________________________