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The esoterist sees things, not as they appear according to a certain perspective, but as they are: he takes account of what is essential and consequently invariable under the veil of different religious formulations, while necessarily taking his own starting point in a given formulation.
This at least is the position in principle and the justification for esoterism; in fact it is far from always being consistent with itself, inasmuch as intermediary solutions are humanly inevitable.
Everything which, in metaphysics or in spirituality, is universally true, becomes "esoteric" in so far as it does not agree, or does not seem to agree, with a given formalistic system or "exoterism"; yet every truth is present by right in every religion, given that every religion is made of truth.
This amounts to saying that esoterism is possible and even necessary; the whole question is to know at what level and in what context it is manifested, for relative and limited truth has its rights, as does the total truth; it has these rights in the context assigned to it by the nature of things, which is that of psychological and moral opportuneness and of traditional equilibrium.
The paradox of esoterism is that on the one hand "men do not light a candle and put it under a bushel", while on the other hand "give not what is sacred to dogs"; between these two expressions lies the "light that shineth in the darkness, but the darkness comprehended it not". There are fluctuations here which no one can prevent and which are the ransom of contingency.
Exoterism is a precarious thing by reason of its limits or its exclusions; there arrives a moment in history when all kinds of experience oblige it to modify its claims to exclusiveness, and it is then driven to a choice: escape from these limitations by the upward path, in esoterism, or by the downward path, in a worldly and suicidal liberalism. As one might have expected, the civilizationist exoterism of the West has chosen the downward path, while combining this incidentally with a few esoteric notions which in such conditions remain inoperative.
Fallen man, and thus the average man, is as it were poisoned by the passional element, either grossly or subtly; from this results an obscuring of the Intellect and the necessity of a Revelation coming from the outside. Remove the passional element from the soul and the intelligence (remove "the rust from the mirror" or "from the heart") and the Intellect will be released; it will reveal from within what religion reveals from without.
[This release is strictly impossible-we must insist upon It-without the cooperation of a religion, an orthodoxy, a traditional esoterism with all that this implies.]
This brings us to an important point: in order to make itself understood by souls impregnated with passion, religion must itself adopt a so to speak passional language, whence dogmatism, which excludes, and moralism, which schematizes; if the average man or collective man were not passional, Revelation would speak the language of the Intellect and there would be no exoterism, nor for that matter esoterism considered as an occult complement.
There are here three possibilities: firstly, men dominate the passional element, everyone lives spiritually by his inward Revelation; this is the golden age, in which everyone is born an initiate.
Second possibility: men are affected by the passional element to the point of forgetting certain aspects of the Truth, whence the necessity (or the opportuneness) of Revelations that while being outward are metaphysical in spirit, such as the Upanishads.
[Such a Revelation has a function that is both conservative and preventive, it expresses the Truth in view of the risk of its being forgotten; It consequently also has the aim of protecting the "pure" from contamination by the "impure", of recalling the Truth to those who run the risk of going astray by carelessness.]
Thirdly: the majority of men are dominated by passions, whence the formalistic, exclusive and combative religions, which communicate to them on the one hand the means of channelling the passional element with a view to salvation, and on the other hand the means of overcoming it in view of the total Truth, and of thereby transcending the religious formalism which veils it while suggesting it in an indirect manner. Religious revelation is both a veil of light and a light veiled.
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Frithjof Schuon: Understanding Esoterism (from Esoterism as Principle and as Way)
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Image:
Beatus de Facundus illuminated manuscript - Illustration for Revelation 1:1-3
1 The revelation from Jesus Christ, which God gave him to show his servants what must soon take place. He made it known by sending his angel to his servant John, 2 who testifies to everything he saw—that is, the word of God and the testimony of Jesus Christ. 3 Blessed is the one who reads aloud the words of this prophecy, and blessed are those who hear it and take to heart what is written in it, because the time is near.
I carry my burden
My pain in the neck...
Is it my doubt?
Is it my scepticism?
My mind.
What drives me to go this way?
Do I have to explore emptiness?
Winter...
Yes
My liberator
I recognize
I (it) took me to the north
HKD
The energy of A5 took me to the north. I became a thinker and rationalist. I felt I had a clear mind. During this time I had the energy to write several books. I started with a novel and finished with a psychological one about character and motivation. The books are published in Germany only. Writing a book about consciousness is writing about the energy of A5. For those who like the series “Star Trek” – Mr. Spok – Data – Tuvok – all these characters are empowered by A5. Data is an android of course… but his reactions are based on logic only.
Pure logic – emotional coolness – even absence of any emotion – this is A5. You may compare this form of energy-field with the ancient god Apollo, or Manjushri, a very popular transcendent Buddha in Tibetan Buddhism.
The opposite energy is B5 - you are empowerd by pure "emotion".
A5 logical intelligence...
B5 emotional intelligence...
HKD
Vernunft, Verstand, Ratio, strenge Logik - das ist die Energieform A5.
Große Denker, Rationalisten - z. B. Imanuel Kant und René Descartes - wurden sehr stark von dieser Energie beeinflusst und motiviert.
In Umschreibungen kann man sagen, die Gottheit Apollo stand Pate an ihrer Wiege...
Ob Hexen, Teufel oder Götter - in den Märchen berichtet uns der Volksmund darüber, dass Menschen von bestimmten Kräften beeinflusst - wenn nicht gar getrieben werden. Man spricht sogar davon, dass einen der Teufel reitet, eine Gier oder Wut.
Alle Energien haben positive wie negative Seiten. Die Bezeichnung für die logischen Kräfte des Universums - A5 - ist neutral. Natürlich ist der Logos auf der einen Seite ein Befreier von Unwisseneheit und führt zu Toleranz und Verständnis. Allerdings wird durch diese Energieform die Gefühlsseite sehr stark ausgetrocknet. Das ist der Grund dafür, dass ausgeprägte Rationalisten eine gewisse Gefühlskälte ausstrahlen und sich selbst auch als Einzelgänger oder gar als isoliert wahrnehmen.
HKD
Confinement 2 / Jour 26
Le Vésinet (78)
Lac de Croissy
Puisque ce confinement automnal me contraint, malgré moi, à glisser dangereusement vers la photo facilo-écolo-intellectuelle, allons-y gaiement sur cette variation musicale en cours d'eau mineur.
J'ai un peu honte, mais tant pis !
Tant que je ne sombre pas dans la photo de chaton blanc sur coussin de velours rouge, qui fait le succès du calendrier de la Poste dans tous les Ehpad du Massif Central, et déclenche la pâmoison des moins de huit ans sur Tik-Tok, je considère que mon intellect photographique est préservé, au moins pour encore quelques courtes heures...
Mais pourvu que ça dure !
Avec ce virus, hélas, le pire est toujours possible !...
On ne se rend plus vraiment compte à quel point la législation actuelle et sa communication périphérique télévisuelle nous bouffent progressivement les neurones "essentiels"...
Essentiels comme les produits du même nom !
Mais les neurones essentiels sont désormais interdits à la vente, même à l’Élysée et à Matignon...
Ceci explique d’ailleurs cela ! 😢
Normally I don't like cats but this guy walked onto my property as a young stray and got my attention immediately. He seems to have an uncanny intellect and his ability to manipulate other animals and humans is beyond belief.
History
The John Rogers who bought Riverhill in 1840 was an only child, with a modest fortune, and a fine intellect. He became a classics scholar, a scientist and a friend of Charles Darwin. He was one of the first members of the Royal Horticultural Society and a patron of the plant collectors of the day.
He chose Riverhill because its sheltered situation offered an ideal lime free hillside where he could hope to establish newly introduced trees and shrubs. From his garden notebook, it can be seen that planting started in 1842. Subsequent generations, continued the planting and in 1910 Colonel John Middleton Rogers created what is now known as ‘The Wood Garden’ a fine collection of Japanese Maples, Rhododendrons and Azaleas. His wife, the infamous Muriel, created many additions including the now hidden Rock Gardens.
Until the beginning of the 2nd World War, eight full time gardeners kept Riverhill looking immaculate. Since the war years, however, a shortage of manpower and a lack of money has meant that the garden was allowed to deteriorate, with many parts of the original planting lost to everyday use and visitors.
Today, four generations of the Rogers family live at Riverhill,
The estate is managed by Edward Rogers (Great-great-great-grandson of the John Rogers who bought Riverhill in 1840) and his wife, Sarah.
Project 365 - Image 49/365
This morning when I woke up I strangely found Jeero lying in a bowl of peas, and had no idea at all why this was the case or what he wanted to achieve.
He lay totally silent for about 25 minutes and then he decided to talk to myself and Mireille, "I'm here to save the planet, I've joined Green Peas, see!".
It took a further 10 minutes for myself and Mireille to stop rolling on the floor with laughter, Jeero's lower intellect sure does provide some great laughter at times.
From the Uglydoll blog at adventuresinuglyworld.blogspot.com/
The Knock-Off Crew: Group B from Bootleg Squad-tember
L-R:
Top Row
21. Dame-Bell (Vixen)
22. Frap & Decaf (Punch & Jewelee)
23. Boffin (The Thinker)
24. The Lizard King (Killer Croc)
Bottom Row
25. Kill Jester (Harley Quinn)
26. Pelagic Plunderer (Black Manta)
27. Rad-Man (Dr. Light)
28. Maskon (Mark Shaw: Manhunter)
29. The Incredible Blue Brute (Blockbuster)
30. The Administrator (Amanda Waller)
Character Bios:
21. Dame-Bell (Vixen): Malindi “Lin” Mwale has a magical totem ball which grants her abilities based on any natural animal including Superhuman Strength, Speed and Healing. She uses the powers for vigilantism as Dame-Bell at night, but operates within the law as a photographer and interior designer by day. She volunteers for the Knock-Off Crew, and assists them with her other powers to communicate with animals.
22. Frap & Decaf (Punch & Jewelee): Criminally insane couple and masters of illusion and disguise Frap and Decaf might fool you into thinking that they are outgoing, coffee-drinking young adults, when in fact they are bloodthirsty assassins, whose love for violence is only matched by their desire for each other.
23. Boffin (The Thinker): A Supervillain with a powerful suit which enhances his brilliant brain, the one thing that Boffin didn’t calculate for was joining the Knock-Off Crew. He’s the cold-hearted calculator of the group, and uses his work to earn himself body-parts to build himself a new vessel, because the suit is decaying his current one.
24. The Lizard King (Killer Croc): Mutilated and mutated, Aldrich California was tested upon by mad scientists and turned into a reptilian-monster. Hiding away from society in the sewers, he found that those experiments changed much more than just his appearance. He had enhanced senses and superhuman strength, so he used it to take revenge upon the list of cruel doctors who did this to him. A founding member of the Knock-Off Crew, he enjoys being alongside other freaks and oddities almost as much as he enjoys tearing into his enemies.
25. Kill Jester (Harley Quinn): Not one for subtlety, what Kill Jester loves most in this world is being a flamboyantly violent lunatic. She pulls no punches when it comes to slicing up foes or telling those who’ve wronged her to watch their backs. Kill Jester, real name Killian Jestico, is truly the wildcard of the team and has nothing to lose, except maybe her head.
26. Pelagic Plunderer (Black Manta): Davinda Jekyll was born at sea and has lived by the pirates code ever since. With pirate-like cybernetic body-enhancements and specialised deep-sea diving apparatus, there’s not much that can stand in her way of ruling this high seas… except maybe some land.
27. Rad-Man (Dr. Light): Lancelot LeClair was an ordinary meteorologist until he touched a radioactive meteorite and his life changed forever. The rock was radioactive and he gained incredible powers such as Flight, Heat Immunity and Intangibility. He used his high-level intellect to design a suit to stop others around him getting radiation sickness, and also attached a gun through which he could channel the meteors radioactivity into a burning inferno of flames. He used this to commit crime until the Knock-Off Crew snatched him up for their own purposes.
28. Maskon (Mark Shaw: Manhunter): Half human, half robot, all assassin. Mack Gray was an adrift astronaut who was rebuilt by a group of deep-space corrupt androids called the Maskstalkers. They reprogrammed him to be their agent, Maskon, and sent him back to Earth. He created a cult of people to worship the Maskstalkers, however Mack had other plans. He fought against the programming and became a crime fighter, but not before having the defend himself from the Maskstalker cult who attacked him for heresy. He now resides in prison, and uses his abilities to aid the Knock-Off Crew.
29. The Incredible Blue Brute (Blockbuster): With the use of a particularly nasty serum, experimental biologist Adam Gorman transforms himself into a mindless, but nearly invulnerable rage monster. After combatting the Knock-Off Crew and nearly destroying an entire city in the process, he joined their ranks.
30. The Administrator (Amanda Waller): The overseer of the Knock-Off Crew, little is known about the personal life and history of The Administrator other than she is a highly-sophisticated strategist, an experienced weapons master and utterly ruthless. She won’t hesitate to blow a hole in the head of anyone on her team, even the good guys…
Character is higher than intellect... A great soul will be strong to live, as well as strong to think.
Ralph Waldo Emerson
History
The John Rogers who bought Riverhill in 1840 was an only child, with a modest fortune, and a fine intellect. He became a classics scholar, a scientist and a friend of Charles Darwin. He was one of the first members of the Royal Horticultural Society and a patron of the plant collectors of the day.
He chose Riverhill because its sheltered situation offered an ideal lime free hillside where he could hope to establish newly introduced trees and shrubs. From his garden notebook, it can be seen that planting started in 1842. Subsequent generations, continued the planting and in 1910 Colonel John Middleton Rogers created what is now known as ‘The Wood Garden’ a fine collection of Japanese Maples, Rhododendrons and Azaleas. His wife, the infamous Muriel, created many additions including the now hidden Rock Gardens.
Until the beginning of the 2nd World War, eight full time gardeners kept Riverhill looking immaculate. Since the war years, however, a shortage of manpower and a lack of money has meant that the garden was allowed to deteriorate, with many parts of the original planting lost to everyday use and visitors.
Today, four generations of the Rogers family live at Riverhill,
The estate is managed by Edward Rogers (Great-great-great-grandson of the John Rogers who bought Riverhill in 1840) and his wife, Sarah.
Belgian collectors card for Cine Rio à Coxyde. Photo: Unifrance Film.
French actress Bernadette Lafont (1938-2013) appeared in several classics of the Nouvelle Vague. Original and full of contradictions, she was both sexy and rather plain, brassy and quite serious, a mixture of intellect, sensuality and humour.
Bernadette Paule Anne Lafont was born in Nîmes in the South of France in 1938. She was the daughter of a pharmacist and his wife. As a teenager, she started her career as a dancer. She entered the Opéra de Nîmes where she fell in love with her future husband, the handsome actor Gérard Blain. In Paris, she met the young critic and aspiring film director François Truffaut, who offered her a role in his second short film, shot in Nîmes. So she made her screen debut in Les Mistons/The Mischief Makers (Francois Truffaut, 1957) opposite Gérard Blain. It was a comedy about five kids, who spy on two lovers during a hot summer day. It turned out to be that she was in the right place at the right time to catch the Nouvelle Vague movement, the new wave of filmmakers that would revolutionize the cinema.
She starred particularly in films by Truffaut and by Claude Chabrol. Her first feature and still one of her best-known films is Le Beau Serge/Bitter Reunion (Claude Chabrol, 1958) with Gérard Blain and Jean-Claude Brialy. (She had married Blain the year before but they would divorce a year later.) Many Nouvelle Vague films followed. With Chabrol she also made À double tour/Leda (Claude Chabrol, 1959) starring Madeleine Robinson, Les bonnes femmes/The Good Time Girls (Claude Chabrol, 1960) with Stéphane Audran, and Les godelureaux/Wise Guys (Claude Chabrol, 1961). She appeared in Truffaut’s comedy Tire-au-flanc 62/The Army Game (Claude de Givray, François Truffaut, 1960), and was the feisty heroine of Truffaut’s Une belle fille comme moi/A Gorgeous Bird Like Me (François Truffaut, 1972). For Louis Malle, she did a supporting part in his comedy Le voleur/The Thief of Paris (Louis Malle, 1967) starring Jean-Paul Belmondo, and for Jacques Rivette, she joined the cast of Out 1, noli me tangere/Out 1 (Jacques Rivette, Suzanne Schiffman, 1971) and Out 1: Spectre (Jacques Rivette, 1974). Finally, she played the role of Marie, one-third of the trio of lovers in La Maman et la Putain/The Mother and the Whore (Jean Eustache, 1973), considered by some critics as the last film of the Nouvelle Vague.
A well-known film with Bernadette Lafont is La Fiancée du Pirate/A Very Curious Girl (Nelly Kaplan, 1969). The success of this film about violence against women renewed her career after a difficult period. She was seen in Les stances à Sophie/Sophie’s Ways (Moshé Mizrahi, 1971), the crime drama Zig Zig (László Szabó, 1975) with Catherine Deneuve, and had a small part as the cellmate of Isabelle Huppert in Violette Nozière (Claude Chabrol, 1978). In Italy, she appeared in the comedy Il Ladrone/The Thief (Pasquale Festa Campanile, 1980). In a 1997 New York Times article, Katherine Knorr writes: “Lafont has in a tumultuous life done a bit of everything, from television movies to the stage, never quite the megastar but always a strong presence, smart and messed up all at the same time”. In the 1980s she appeared in Chabrol’s crime films Inspecteur Lavardin/Inspector Lavardin (Claude Chabrol, 1986) featuring Jean Poiret, and Masques/Masks (Claude Chabrol, 1987) with Philippe Noiret. She also played in Les saisons du plaisir/The Pleasure Seasons (1988) and other comedies by Jean-Pierre Mocky. Lafont won the César Award for Best Actress in a Supporting Role for L'Effrontée/Charlotte and Lulu (Claude Miller, 1985) starring Charlotte Gainsbourg. The energetic Lafont created in 1990 an audio-visual workshop to help young actors develop their creativity. She is the co-founder and on the committee that awards the Glace Gervais and an accompanying 100,000 franc prize to works competing in the Cannes Film Festival ‘Un certain Regard’ category. The award was designed to help bolster the budding careers of filmmakers. Her later films include Généalogies d'un crime/Genealogies of a Crime (Raul Ruiz, 1997) with Catherine Deneuve, and the comedy Ripoux 3/Part-Time Cops (Claude Zidi, 2003) with Philippe Noiret. In May 2007, she chaired the jury for the fifth edition of the Award for Education presented at the 60th Cannes Film Festival. After her divorce from Blain in 1959, Bernadette Lafont married the Hungarian sculptor Diourka Medveczky. Although the marriage was difficult and ended in a divorce, there were three children: actress Élisabeth Lafont, David Lafont and the late actress Pauline Lafont, who died in the summer of 1988 under tragic circumstances. She went for a walk near the family property in the Cevennes and never returned. For many weeks, police searched and the popular press went on a feeding frenzy. When Pauline's body was finally found, it became clear she had fallen down in a rough, lonely terrain. Lafont published her autobiography in 1997, an event heralded by a grand star-studded gala in Paris. For her long service to the French motion picture industry, she was given an Honorary César Award in 2003. She was made Officier de la Légion d'honneur (Officer of the Legion of Honour) in 2009. Bernadette Lafont had been hospitalised in her home town of Nimes on Monday after falling ill and died early Thursday 25 July, the hospital said in a statement.
Sources: Katherine Knorr (New York Times), Sandra Brennan (AllMovie), Wikipedia, and IMDb.
And, please check out our blog European Film Star Postcards.
This commission was an amazing challenge. Marlene Dietrich is the original blond bombshell who inspired Marilyn, who inspired Madonna, who inspired Lady Gaga... Her open gender fluidity and pansexuality, intellect and powerful presence make her an icon that should never be forgotten.
I hand sculpted the head for this doll, so she is truly one of a kind. Her make up is classic 30's (although Marlene's career in film and stage stretched from 1920's silent film era, through golden age of Hollywood, to Las Vegas marquee until 1970's). Her golden hair is curled alpaca and she wears my favourite doll fashion ever made: the Sybarite Blade's razorblade gown.
*This is a commissioned doll and not for sale. If you want a bespoke OOAK doll of your own please visit www.emiliacouture.com
Now more than ever, we need to use our gift of intellect and science to preserve our home planet, a pale blue dot when viewed from other worlds. This is our one and only Spaceship Earth. Let's not exploit it for political gain.
EPCOT Center | Future World | Spaceship Earth
Thanks for looking! I appreciate feedback.
I had the privilege to spend some time with Brad Litwin, a kinetic artist based in Philly. His ingenuity, mechanical intellect and artistic vision is exceptional visit his web site its a must see. www.bradlitwin.com/
"Man can embody truth but he cannot know it.
The intellect of man is forced to choose perfection of the life, or of the work, and if it take the second must refuse a heavenly mansion, raging in the dark."
(William Butler Yeats - Irish Writer, Dramatist and Poet. Nobel Prize for Literature in 1923, 1865-1939)
This amazing mansion stands at Rani ghat along the Ganges in Varanasi (Benaras).
This ghat is near the bridge where no tourist goes, it is a very quiet place away from the noise and the turmoil of the center.
On this side of the river many other buildings recall the splendour of the past which once made the renown of the City of Lights...
Join the photographer at www.facebook.com/laurent.goldstein.photography
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The use of any work without consent of the artist is PROHIBITED and will lead automatically to consequences.
A temple of intellect and exclusivity, the Athenaeum Club has long been a haven for scholars, statesmen, and artists. Founded in 1824 and housed in this splendid neoclassical building on Pall Mall, it continues to radiate restraint and refinement—though the golden figure of Pallas Athena suggests she keeps a watchful eye on the debates within.
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Temple de l’intellect et de l’exclusivité, l’Athenaeum Club accueille depuis 1824 érudits, hommes d’État et artistes. Installé dans ce superbe édifice néoclassique de Pall Mall, il incarne la retenue et le raffinement — sous l’œil vigilant de Pallas Athéna, perchée en dorure au sommet.
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Historical/Architectural Background:
The Athenaeum Club, located at 107 Pall Mall, London, was founded in 1824 to serve as a gathering place for individuals distinguished in science, literature, and the arts. The club’s current building was designed by Decimus Burton and completed in 1830. Its style is quintessentially neoclassical, echoing ancient Greek ideals of proportion, clarity, and civic virtue.
The golden statue of Pallas Athena atop the entrance portico—added in 1830—is a nod to the club’s dedication to wisdom and intellectual achievement. The frieze above the first floor is modelled after the Panathenaic procession from the Parthenon marbles, further reinforcing the Greek influence. The Athenaeum is part of London’s storied “Clubland” and remains one of the most prestigious and selective gentleman’s clubs in the city.
The Surveyor
HKD
Falls Psychologie interessiert: Logik kontra Gefühl – Ordnung und Chaos
Der Landvermesser
Das Prinzip der Ordnung beruht auf der Grundlage von Teilung. Ein Ganzes wird zerschnitten in zwei Teile, die Yin und Yang genannt werden können. Die Ordnung im Kosmos beruht auf dem Vergleich von links und rechts, oben und unten, Himmel und Erde. Es entstehen einzelne Teile, die miteinander verglichen werden können. Auf diese Weise entsteht Wissen, natürlich aufkosten der Ganzheit, die als Ursprung der Zwei und damit der Zeit in Vergessenheit gerät. Die Zweiheit und mit ihr die Verzweifelung wird – weil eben so erfahren – als einzige Realität angesehen. Widerspruch wohin das Auge blickt und der Gedanke schweift. Und das ist vollkommen normal, denn Yin bedingt Yang, das Leben den Tod, die Freude das Leid, Antipathie und Sympathie, die Reihe könnte ich endlos fortsetzen.
Selbstverständlich findet sich der Widerspruch in der Psyche entwickelter Wesen, sobald sich in ihnen der Verstand gegen das Gefühl stellt und dieser innere Kampf bewusst wird. Kann der Trieb sich unbewusst ausleben, ist der betreffende Mensch in zwei Persönlichkeiten gespalten, wie die Geschichte um Dr. Jekyll und Mr. Hyde zeigt. Eine helle und eine dunkle Seite wird dann erkennbar und wieder ist es dadurch dem Bewusstsein möglich, sich selbst zu erkennen. Die Basis jeglicher Erkenntnis ist Trennung in A und nicht A.
Die westliche Gottheit Apollo oder der östliche Buddha Manjushri sind Platzhalter für die logische Funktion des Geistes, eben jener Motivationskraft, die nach Licht, nach Sonne und Erkenntnis strebt., sobald dieses Software-Programm in der Psyche gestartet wird Es könnte heißen: Search Yourself. In der Tat hat dieser Landvermesser mit dem apollinischen Prinzip zu tun. Von ihm wird er motiviert, sich mit Zahlen und mathematischen Vorgängen zu beschäftigen.
Ein hoch entwickelter Intellekt hat immer mehr Energie aus dem Bereich der Lenden und dem des Herzens gezogen und die Gefühlswelt eines Logikers wie etwa Tuvok (Star-Trek – Voyager – der Sicherheitsoffizier des Rauschiffes) ist nur noch rudimentär vorhanden. Alle sieben Jahre bricht sie aus den Tiefen der Psyche hervor und zwingt den Mann (Vulkanier) zur Paarung.
Der Intellekt übernimmt in gewissen Menschen die Macht und diese Konzentration der Energie auf abstrakte Ordnungsprinzipien bringt große Reichsgründer und Führungspersönlichkeiten hervor. Doch auch der Landvermesser streckt Grenzen ab, trennt Verantwortungsbereiche und schafft Ordnung unter der künftigen Nachbarschaft. Bis hierhin und nicht weiter, darfst du ackern, bauen oder Einzäunen.
Regeln, Gesetze, Vorschriften, Erlasse, all diese Dinge finden energetisch ihre Wurzeln in der Motivationskraft A1. In einem Menschen paart sich gern die Energie A5 dazu. Der Landvermesser steht mit beiden Beinen auf der Erde, er ist verbunden mit der Scholle, der Außenwelt mit ihren Prinzipien und Ordnungsstrukturen. Und zu dieser Ordnung trägt er bei, vernünftig, sachlich, präzise. Dafür sorgt A5, die zuverlässige und rationale Motivationskraft, die Tuvok so wunderbar verkörpert, während Madame Captain ein hervorragendes Beispiel für eine Führungspersönlichkeit ist, die von A1 motiviert wird. Der Captain (A1) und der Sicherheitsoffizier (A5) sind in der Serie sehr gut miteinander befreundet. Der Captain stellt die Regeln auf und der Logiker setzt sie mit gebührender Logik um.
Auch der Landvermesser arbeitet mit Logik und Sachverstand, Emotionalität stört bei Tätigkeiten, die einen kühlen Kopf brauchen. Wenn sich in Systemen Fehler einschleichen, spielt eine andere Energie mit, das chaotische Prinzip. Es ist der Ordnung entgegengesetzt und gleichzeitig komplementär wie es Yin für Yang oder die Ebbe für die Flut ist. Ordnung und Chaos bedingen einander und ziehen sich an. Und so schleichen sich immer wieder subversive Kräfte in die Ordnungs- und Sicherheitssysteme ein und entpuppen sich als geschickte Gegenspieler.
Wie beim Schach, mal gewinnt Weiß, ein anderes Mal Schwarz. Und aufgrund der Teilung in Schwarz und Weiß nehmen die Bewusstheit und schließlich die Selbst-Bewusstheit zu.
Selbsterkenntnis beruht auf der vorausgegangenen Teilung, die sich aufgrund dieses Erkennens anschickt, wieder ein Ganzes zu werden und diesen Vorgang auch zu verstehen.
Wie viel versteht der Landvermesser bereits von sich selbst? Kennt er die verschiedenen Bereiche seines Denkens und Fühlens? Wird er bald beginnen mit der Vermessung seiner Innenwelt?
Das sind Fragen, die ich in dieses Bild hinein interpretiere. Vielleicht geht dieser Vermesser nach getaner Arbeit mit seinem Freund zur Jagd… Ach, was weiß ich denn schon?
HKD
Digital art based on own photography and textures
HKD
General Sir John Monash.
(1865-1931) was a civil engineer who became an Australian military commander in World War I. Regarded as Australia's greatest general, his brilliant leadership turned the tide of the war. Monash was also a born writer and intellect, and his writing displays a delight in detail, mastery and grace.
Dust jacket note on "John Monash"
The Australian Victories in France in 1918.
See Currency and other words at ozwords.com.au/
By Kel Richards..
Using the kit lens and a 10mm tube.
From Google Gemini AI.
what did the world do at the end of World war II?
The world reacted to the end of World War II with a mix of jubilation, relief, and a somber understanding of the immense cost of the conflict. Here's a breakdown of some key responses:
Celebrations and Relief:
Widespread Joy: News of the surrenders (first Germany in May 1945, then Japan in August 1945) sparked massive celebrations in Allied countries. People filled the streets,embracing and cheering, marking the end of years of hardship, anxiety, and loss.
Return of Soldiers: The end of the war meant the return of soldiers to their home countries. This was a joyous occasion for families and communities, although it was also a period of readjustment for many veterans.
Reconstruction and Recovery:
Devastation in Europe and Asia: Many parts of Europe and Asia lay in ruins. Cities were bombed, infrastructure was destroyed, and economies were shattered. The immediate focus was on providing humanitarian aid, rebuilding infrastructure, and restarting economies.
The Marshall Plan: The United States launched the Marshall Plan, a massive economic aid program to help rebuild European economies. This was crucial in preventing further instability and fostering recovery.
Political and Geopolitical Shifts:
Emergence of Superpowers: The war significantly altered the global balance of power. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers, leading to a period of geopolitical tension known as the Cold War.
Formation of the United Nations: In 1945, the United Nations was established with the goal of preventing future global conflicts through international cooperation and diplomacy.
Decolonization: The war weakened European colonial powers, contributing to the rise of independence movements in Asia and Africa.
Dealing with the Aftermath:
Nuremberg Trials: The Nuremberg trials were held to bring Nazi leaders to justice for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace. This set a precedent for international criminal law.
Coming to Terms with the Holocaust: The full extent of the Holocaust was revealed after the war, shocking the world and leading to a greater understanding of the horrors of genocide.
A Desire for Peace:
"Never Again": The immense suffering caused by the war led to a widespread desire to prevent future global conflicts. This sentiment was reflected in the formation of the United Nations and other international efforts to promote peace and cooperation.
In summary, the end of World War II was met with widespread celebration and relief, but also marked the beginning of a long process of recovery, reconstruction, and dealing with the political and social consequences of the conflict. 1 The world was forever changed by the war, and its aftermath shaped the course of the 20th century. 2
French postcard by Editions d'Art Yvon, Paris, no. 212. Photo: Sam Lévin.
French actress Bernadette Lafont (1938-2013) appeared in several classics of the Nouvelle Vague. Original and full of contradictions, she was both sexy and rather plain, brassy and quite serious, a mixture of intellect, sensuality and humour.
Bernadette Paule Anne Lafont was born in Nîmes in the South of France in 1938. She was the daughter of a pharmacist and his wife. As a teenager, she started her career as a dancer. She entered the Opéra de Nîmes where she fell in love with her future husband, the handsome actor Gérard Blain. In Paris, she met the young critic and aspiring film director François Truffaut, who offered her a role in his second short film, shot in Nîmes. So she made her screen debut in Les Mistons/The Mischief Makers (Francois Truffaut, 1957) opposite Gérard Blain. It was a comedy about five kids, who spy on two lovers during a hot summer day. It turned out to be that she was in the right place at the right time to catch the Nouvelle Vague movement, the new wave of filmmakers that would revolutionize the cinema.
She starred particularly in films by Truffaut and by Claude Chabrol. Her first feature and still one of her best-known films is Le Beau Serge/Bitter Reunion (Claude Chabrol, 1958) with Gérard Blain and Jean-Claude Brialy. (She had married Blain the year before but they would divorce a year later.) Many Nouvelle Vague films followed. With Chabrol she also made À double tour/Leda (Claude Chabrol, 1959) starring Madeleine Robinson, Les bonnes femmes/The Good Time Girls (Claude Chabrol, 1960) with Stéphane Audran, and Les godelureaux/Wise Guys (Claude Chabrol, 1961). She appeared in Truffaut’s comedy Tire-au-flanc 62/The Army Game (Claude de Givray, François Truffaut, 1960), and was the feisty heroine of Truffaut’s Une belle fille comme moi/A Gorgeous Bird Like Me (François Truffaut, 1972). For Louis Malle, she did a supporting part in his comedy Le voleur/The Thief of Paris (Louis Malle, 1967) starring Jean-Paul Belmondo, and for Jacques Rivette, she joined the cast of Out 1, noli me tangere/Out 1 (Jacques Rivette, Suzanne Schiffman, 1971) and Out 1: Spectre (Jacques Rivette, 1974). Finally, she played the role of Marie, one-third of the trio of lovers in La Maman et la Putain/The Mother and the Whore (Jean Eustache, 1973), considered by some critics as the last film of the Nouvelle Vague.
A well-known film with Bernadette Lafont is La Fiancée du Pirate/A Very Curious Girl (Nelly Kaplan, 1969). The success of this film about violence against women renewed her career after a difficult period. She was seen in Les stances à Sophie/Sophie’s Ways (Moshé Mizrahi, 1971), the crime drama Zig Zig (László Szabó, 1975) with Catherine Deneuve, and had a small part as the cellmate of Isabelle Huppert in Violette Nozière (Claude Chabrol, 1978). In Italy, she appeared in the comedy Il Ladrone/The Thief (Pasquale Festa Campanile, 1980). In a 1997 New York Times article, Katherine Knorr writes: “Lafont has in a tumultuous life done a bit of everything, from television movies to the stage, never quite the megastar but always a strong presence, smart and messed up all at the same time”. In the 1980s she appeared in Chabrol’s crime films Inspecteur Lavardin/Inspector Lavardin (Claude Chabrol, 1986) featuring Jean Poiret, and Masques/Masks (Claude Chabrol, 1987) with Philippe Noiret. She also played in Les saisons du plaisir/The Pleasure Seasons (1988) and other comedies by Jean-Pierre Mocky. Lafont won the César Award for Best Actress in a Supporting Role for L'Effrontée/Charlotte and Lulu (Claude Miller, 1985) starring Charlotte Gainsbourg. The energetic Lafont created in 1990 an audio-visual workshop to help young actors develop their creativity. She is the co-founder and on the committee that awards the Glace Gervais and an accompanying 100,000 franc prize to works competing in the Cannes Film Festival ‘Un certain Regard’ category. The award was designed to help bolster the budding careers of filmmakers. Her later films include Généalogies d'un crime/Genealogies of a Crime (Raul Ruiz, 1997) with Catherine Deneuve and the comedy Ripoux 3/Part-Time Cops (Claude Zidi, 2003) with Philippe Noiret. In May 2007, she chaired the jury for the fifth edition of the Award for Education presented at the 60th Cannes Film Festival. After her divorce from Blain in 1959, Bernadette Lafont married the Hungarian sculptor Diourka Medveczky. Although the marriage was difficult and ended in a divorce, there were three children: actress Élisabeth Lafont, David Lafont and the late actress Pauline Lafont, who died in the summer of 1988 under tragic circumstances. She went for a walk near the family property in the Cevennes and never returned. For many weeks, police searched and the popular press went on a feeding frenzy. When Pauline's body was finally found, it became clear she had fallen down in rough, lonely terrain. Lafont published her autobiography in 1997, an event heralded by a grand star-studded gala in Paris. For her long service to the French motion picture industry, she was given an Honorary César Award in 2003. She was made Officier de la Légion d'honneur (Officer of the Legion of Honour) in 2009. In 2013, Bernadette Lafont died in a hospital in her home town of Nimes.
Sources: Katherine Knorr (New York Times), Sandra Brennan (AllMovie), Wikipedia, and IMDb.
And, please check out our blog European Film Star Postcards.
bumblebee on chives; from the same series as this one.
“It is the marriage of the soul with Nature that makes the intellect fruitful,
and gives birth to imagination.”
(Henry David Thoreau)
Have a beautiful summer's day!
"Euclid's Elements is certainly one of the greatest books ever written, and one of the most perfect monuments of the Greek intellect."
Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 211
My entry in the preliminary round of the 2018 Bio-Cup, of course! I was set from the start on offering something entirely original. After a days or two muddling through various unsatisfying 'elements' from alchemy, technology, and science, I suddenly recalled the Greek mathematician Euclid's authorship of the landmark geometry textbook entitled Elements, and knew I would depict him. In a Bionicle twist, he now wields Geometry powers in addition to his trademark compass and straightedge! I look forward to your thoughts, hope you enjoy, and wish my fellow participants good luck in the Bio-Cup!
Feelings Versus Intellect.
Procese divizibil schimbare Propuneri de-a lungul implicații ipotezelor anterioare simțit,
verschiedene Theorien untrennbar Geschwindigkeit anzeigt entfernte Bewegungen verhältnismäßig Kräfte kniete,
άνιση αγάπες διαφέρουν αντίστοιχες συνθήκες κατηγορίες συμμέτρηση ομοιότητα περιπτώσεις,
megnyilvánulásai a jelenség feltárására motivációs kérdések illusztrációk kifejezések ismert,
в подчинении сознания представление невнятно макрокосма принципы внутренней части природы,
paradossali filosofia riflette esitazioni dogma modifiche Considerando l'individualità del ridicolo,
eðlislæg ástæður óbeinum raun núverandi Virknin eignuðust skoðanir fáránleikans tengingar orsakir,
forståelige undervisnings sjeler usvikelige belysning påfølgende konsepter fantasi innvendig heretter,
moderne uitgeput filosofie representaties transcendentale selecties bloemlezing esthetiek posities vallen,
génie spécifique et extraordinaire capacité consciente dispositions des règles instinctives art,
影響を受けない物腰丁寧な不協和音の再発の教義の危険説得力のある声の魅力的な事項は、成長.
Steve.D.Hammond.
I suppose my greatest asset is my femininity and that is why I became Jojo as I was never really at home as a man and always looked up to women for their intellect and looks with a kind of envy. I'm quite a sexual being too and I've learnt all the things we T.Girls are supposed to do and now I'm used to it I love it especially being 'entertained' and as long as they let me feel female I have no qualmes about my lovers lol. But having said that apart from the fact that I'm obviously not one, in other respects I feel like a woman. That means I might enjoy lovely clothes and looking good but I get no fetish enjoyment at all from dressing or blatant exhibitionism and never have. Of course that doesn't mean I look down on others who do and that is fine as we are all different with different lives and needs. That doesn't mean I don't like to post sexy pictures as well but I do things my way and I like to think it is also why I have so many followers. Of course some of them keep coming back hoping they might see more. Well guys it does happen and there's always tomorrow.
Lorenzo Lotto (ca. 1480-1556)
Alte Pinakothek, Munich
The Venetian Lorenzo Lotto developed a very idiosyncratic pictorial language of his own and sought unconventional iconographic solutions.
This work shows a vision of St Catherine of Alexandria.
While on the lookout for a suitable husband who could equal her status, wealth and intellect, a hermit presented her with a picture of the Virgin and Child and suggested Christ as her spouse.
In a dream, the Christ Child thereupon placed a ring on Catherine's finger as a sign of the mystical marriage.
Inv. Nr. 32
Provenance: 1804 from the secularization of the first bishop's residence of Wurzburg.
The Greys, or Grays, diminuitive but legendarily emotionless beings of super intellect who are said to have been here, on this world, interacting with classified levels of government and science, are the stuff of fascinated legend and great fear.
They are the 'abductors', the ones who've appeared in countless reports as having spirited away many a human being for gruesome experiments. The Travis Walton case in the 1970's is one of the most famous.
Are they here or is it a hoax? The Walton case is hair-raising and points to the very real possibility that Walton was not lying.
It is said, though, that these beings want something that we have and they do not - emotion. They are trying to acquire it through genetic splicing, so it's said. Whatever the case, it indicates that the intuitive and emotional, that we often place as secondary to reason, is the secret to our advancement as a species as reason, by itself, can become almost monstrous. The Greys may be a perfect metaphor for understanding the dangers of the extremes of rationality.
Or, they're just great fun to scare ourselves with .....
History
The John Rogers who bought Riverhill in 1840 was an only child, with a modest fortune, and a fine intellect. He became a classics scholar, a scientist and a friend of Charles Darwin. He was one of the first members of the Royal Horticultural Society and a patron of the plant collectors of the day.
He chose Riverhill because its sheltered situation offered an ideal lime free hillside where he could hope to establish newly introduced trees and shrubs. From his garden notebook, it can be seen that planting started in 1842. Subsequent generations, continued the planting and in 1910 Colonel John Middleton Rogers created what is now known as ‘The Wood Garden’ a fine collection of Japanese Maples, Rhododendrons and Azaleas. His wife, the infamous Muriel, created many additions including the now hidden Rock Gardens.
Until the beginning of the 2nd World War, eight full time gardeners kept Riverhill looking immaculate. Since the war years, however, a shortage of manpower and a lack of money has meant that the garden was allowed to deteriorate, with many parts of the original planting lost to everyday use and visitors.
Today, four generations of the Rogers family live at Riverhill,
The estate is managed by Edward Rogers (Great-great-great-grandson of the John Rogers who bought Riverhill in 1840) and his wife, Sarah.
1. The Mind-Body Problem and the History of Dualism
1.1 The Mind-Body Problem
The mind-body problem is the problem: what is the relationship between mind and body? Or alternatively: what is the relationship between mental properties and physical properties?
Humans have (or seem to have) both physical properties and mental properties. People have (or seem to have)the sort of properties attributed in the physical sciences. These physical properties include size, weight, shape, colour, motion through space and time, etc. But they also have (or seem to have) mental properties, which we do not attribute to typical physical objects These properties involve consciousness (including perceptual experience, emotional experience, and much else), intentionality (including beliefs, desires, and much else), and they are possessed by a subject or a self. Physical properties are public, in the sense that they are, in principle, equally observable by anyone. Some physical properties – like those of an electron – are not directly observable at all, but they are equally available to all, to the same degree, with scientific equipment and techniques. The same is not true of mental properties. I may be able to tell that you are in pain by your behaviour, but only you can feel it directly. Similarly, you just know how something looks to you, and I can only surmise. Conscious mental events are private to the subject, who has a privileged access to them of a kind no-one has to the physical. The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between these two sets of properties. The mind-body problem breaks down into a number of components. The ontological question: what are mental states and what are physical states? Is one class a subclass of the other, so that all mental states are physical, or vice versa? Or are mental states and physical states entirely distinct?
The causal question: do physical states influence mental states? Do mental states influence physical states? If so, how?
Different aspects of the mind-body problem arise for different aspects of the mental, such as consciousness, intentionality, the self. The problem of consciousness: what is consciousness? How is it related to the brain and the body? The problem of intentionality: what is intentionality? How is it related to the brain and the body? The problem of the self: what is the self? How is it related to the brain and the body? Other aspects of the mind-body problem arise for aspects of the physical. For example:
The problem of embodiment: what is it for the mind to be housed in a body? What is it for a body to belong to a particular subject?
The seemingly intractable nature of these problems have given rise to many different philosophical views.
Materialist views say that, despite appearances to the contrary, mental states are just physical states. Behaviourism, functionalism, mind-brain identity theory and the computational theory of mind are examples of how materialists attempt to explain how this can be so. The most common factor in such theories is the attempt to explicate the nature of mind and consciousness in terms of their ability to directly or indirectly modify behaviour, but there are versions of materialism that try to tie the mental to the physical without explicitly explaining the mental in terms of its behaviour-modifying role. The latter are often grouped together under the label ‘non-reductive physicalism’, though this label is itself rendered elusive because of the controversial nature of the term ‘reduction’.
Idealist views say that physical states are really mental. This is because the physical world is an empirical world and, as such, it is the intersubjective product of our collective experience.
Dualist views (the subject of this entry) say that the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other. For the various forms that dualism can take and the associated problems, see below.
In sum, we can say that there is a mind-body problem because both consciousness and thought, broadly construed, seem very different from anything physical and there is no convincing consensus on how to build a satisfactorily unified picture of creatures possessed of both a mind and a body.
Other entries which concern aspects of the mind-body problem include (among many others): behaviorism, consciousness, eliminative materialism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, identity theory, intentionality, mental causation, neutral monism, and physicalism.
1.2 History of dualism
In dualism, ‘mind’ is contrasted with ‘body’, but at different times, different aspects of the mind have been the centre of attention. In the classical and mediaeval periods, it was the intellect that was thought to be most obviously resistant to a materialistic account: from Descartes on, the main stumbling block to materialist monism was supposed to be ‘consciousness’, of which phenomenal consciousness or sensation came to be considered as the paradigm instance.
The classical emphasis originates in Plato’s Phaedo. Plato believed that the true substances are not physical bodies, which are ephemeral, but the eternal Forms of which bodies are imperfect copies. These Forms not only make the world possible, they also make it intelligible, because they perform the role of universals, or what Frege called ‘concepts’. It is their connection with intelligibility that is relevant to the philosophy of mind. Because Forms are the grounds of intelligibility, they are what the intellect must grasp in the process of understanding. In Phaedo Plato presents a variety of arguments for the immortality of the soul, but the one that is relevant for our purposes is that the intellect is immaterial because Forms are immaterial and intellect must have an affinity with the Forms it apprehends (78b4–84b8). This affinity is so strong that the soul strives to leave the body in which it is imprisoned and to dwell in the realm of Forms. It may take many reincarnations before this is achieved. Plato’s dualism is not, therefore, simply a doctrine in the philosophy of mind, but an integral part of his whole metaphysics.
One problem with Plato’s dualism was that, though he speaks of the soul as imprisoned in the body, there is no clear account of what binds a particular soul to a particular body. Their difference in nature makes the union a mystery.
Aristotle did not believe in Platonic Forms, existing independently of their instances. Aristotelian forms (the capital ‘F’ has disappeared with their standing as autonomous entities) are the natures and properties of things and exist embodied in those things. This enabled Aristotle to explain the union of body and soul by saying that the soul is the form of the body. This means that a particular person’s soul is no more than his nature as a human being. Because this seems to make the soul into a property of the body, it led many interpreters, both ancient and modern, to interpret his theory as materialistic. The interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind – and, indeed, of his whole doctrine of form – remains as live an issue today as it was immediately after his death (Robinson 1983 and 1991; Nussbaum 1984; Rorty and Nussbaum, eds, 1992). Nevertheless, the text makes it clear that Aristotle believed that the intellect, though part of the soul, differs from other faculties in not having a bodily organ. His argument for this constitutes a more tightly argued case than Plato’s for the immateriality of thought and, hence, for a kind of dualism. He argued that the intellect must be immaterial because if it were material it could not receive all forms. Just as the eye, because of its particular physical nature, is sensitive to light but not to sound, and the ear to sound and not to light, so, if the intellect were in a physical organ it could be sensitive only to a restricted range of physical things; but this is not the case, for we can think about any kind of material object (De Anima III,4; 429a10–b9). As it does not have a material organ, its activity must be essentially immaterial.
It is common for modern Aristotelians, who otherwise have a high view of Aristotle’s relevance to modern philosophy, to treat this argument as being of purely historical interest, and not essential to Aristotle’s system as a whole. They emphasize that he was not a ‘Cartesian’ dualist, because the intellect is an aspect of the soul and the soul is the form of the body, not a separate substance. Kenny (1989) argues that Aristotle’s theory of mind as form gives him an account similar to Ryle (1949), for it makes the soul equivalent to the dispositions possessed by a living body. This ‘anti-Cartesian’ approach to Aristotle arguably ignores the fact that, for Aristotle, the form is the substance.
These issues might seem to be of purely historical interest. But we shall see in below, in section 4.5, that this is not so.
The identification of form and substance is a feature of Aristotle’s system that Aquinas effectively exploits in this context, identifying soul, intellect and form, and treating them as a substance. (See, for example, Aquinas (1912), Part I, questions 75 and 76.) But though the form (and, hence, the intellect with which it is identical) are the substance of the human person, they are not the person itself. Aquinas says that when one addresses prayers to a saint – other than the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is believed to retain her body in heaven and is, therefore, always a complete person – one should say, not, for example, ‘Saint Peter pray for us’, but ‘soul of Saint Peter pray for us’. The soul, though an immaterial substance, is the person only when united with its body. Without the body, those aspects of its personal memory that depend on images (which are held to be corporeal) will be lost.(See Aquinas (1912), Part I, question 89.)
The more modern versions of dualism have their origin in Descartes’ Meditations, and in the debate that was consequent upon Descartes’ theory. Descartes was a substance dualist. He believed that there were two kinds of substance: matter, of which the essential property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it thinks. Descartes’ conception of the relation between mind and body was quite different from that held in the Aristotelian tradition. For Aristotle, there is no exact science of matter. How matter behaves is essentially affected by the form that is in it. You cannot combine just any matter with any form – you cannot make a knife out of butter, nor a human being out of paper – so the nature of the matter is a necessary condition for the nature of the substance. But the nature of the substance does not follow from the nature of its matter alone: there is no ‘bottom up’ account of substances. Matter is a determinable made determinate by form. This was how Aristotle thought that he was able to explain the connection of soul to body: a particular soul exists as the organizing principle in a particular parcel of matter.
The belief in the relative indeterminacy of matter is one reason for Aristotle’s rejection of atomism. If matter is atomic, then it is already a collection of determinate objects in its own right, and it becomes natural to regard the properties of macroscopic substances as mere summations of the natures of the atoms.
Although, unlike most of his fashionable contemporaries and immediate successors, Descartes was not an atomist, he was, like the others, a mechanist about the properties of matter. Bodies are machines that work according to their own laws. Except where there are minds interfering with it, matter proceeds deterministically, in its own right. Where there are minds requiring to influence bodies, they must work by ‘pulling levers’ in a piece of machinery that already has its own laws of operation. This raises the question of where those ‘levers’ are in the body. Descartes opted for the pineal gland, mainly because it is not duplicated on both sides of the brain, so it is a candidate for having a unique, unifying function.
The main uncertainty that faced Descartes and his contemporaries, however, was not where interaction took place, but how two things so different as thought and extension could interact at all. This would be particularly mysterious if one had an impact view of causal interaction, as would anyone influenced by atomism, for whom the paradigm of causation is like two billiard balls cannoning off one another.
Various of Descartes’ disciples, such as Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche, concluded that all mind-body interactions required the direct intervention of God. The appropriate states of mind and body were only the occasions for such intervention, not real causes. Now it would be convenient to think that occasionalists held that all causation was natural except for that between mind and body. In fact they generalized their conclusion and treated all causation as directly dependent on God. Why this was so, we cannot discuss here.
Descartes’ conception of a dualism of substances came under attack from the more radical empiricists, who found it difficult to attach sense to the concept of substance at all. Locke, as a moderate empiricist, accepted that there were both material and immaterial substances. Berkeley famously rejected material substance, because he rejected all existence outside the mind. In his early Notebooks, he toyed with the idea of rejecting immaterial substance, because we could have no idea of it, and reducing the self to a collection of the ‘ideas’ that constituted its contents. Finally, he decided that the self, conceived as something over and above the ideas of which it was aware, was essential for an adequate understanding of the human person. Although the self and its acts are not presented to consciousness as objects of awareness, we are obliquely aware of them simply by dint of being active subjects. Hume rejected such claims, and proclaimed the self to be nothing more than a concatenation of its ephemeral contents.
In fact, Hume criticised the whole conception of substance for lacking in empirical content: when you search for the owner of the properties that make up a substance, you find nothing but further properties. Consequently, the mind is, he claimed, nothing but a ‘bundle’ or ‘heap’ of impressions and ideas – that is, of particular mental states or events, without an owner. This position has been labelled bundle dualism, and it is a special case of a general bundle theory of substance, according to which objects in general are just organised collections of properties. The problem for the Humean is to explain what binds the elements in the bundle together. This is an issue for any kind of substance, but for material bodies the solution seems fairly straightforward: the unity of a physical bundle is constituted by some form of causal interaction between the elements in the bundle. For the mind, mere causal connection is not enough; some further relation of co-consciousness is required. We shall see in 5.2.1 that it is problematic whether one can treat such a relation as more primitive than the notion of belonging to a subject.
One should note the following about Hume’s theory. His bundle theory is a theory about the nature of the unity of the mind. As a theory about this unity, it is not necessarily dualist. Parfit (1970, 1984) and Shoemaker (1984, ch. 2), for example, accept it as physicalists. In general, physicalists will accept it unless they wish to ascribe the unity to the brain or the organism as a whole. Before the bundle theory can be dualist one must accept property dualism, for more about which, see the next section.
A crisis in the history of dualism came, however, with the growing popularity of mechanism in science in the nineteenth century. According to the mechanist, the world is, as it would now be expressed, ‘closed under physics’. This means that everything that happens follows from and is in accord with the laws of physics. There is, therefore, no scope for interference in the physical world by the mind in the way that interactionism seems to require. According to the mechanist, the conscious mind is an epiphenomenon (a notion given general currency by T. H. Huxley 1893): that is, it is a by-product of the physical system which has no influence back on it. In this way, the facts of consciousness are acknowledged but the integrity of physical science is preserved. However, many philosophers found it implausible to claim such things as the following; the pain that I have when you hit me, the visual sensations I have when I see the ferocious lion bearing down on me or the conscious sense of understanding I have when I hear your argument – all have nothing directly to do with the way I respond. It is very largely due to the need to avoid this counterintuitiveness that we owe the concern of twentieth century philosophy to devise a plausible form of materialist monism. But, although dualism has been out of fashion in psychology since the advent of behaviourism (Watson 1913) and in philosophy since Ryle (1949), the argument is by no means over. Some distinguished neurologists, such as Sherrington (1940) and Eccles (Popper and Eccles 1977) have continued to defend dualism as the only theory that can preserve the data of consciousness. Amongst mainstream philosophers, discontent with physicalism led to a modest revival of property dualism in the last decade of the twentieth century. At least some of the reasons for this should become clear below.
2. Varieties of Dualism: Ontology
There are various ways of dividing up kinds of dualism. One natural way is in terms of what sorts of things one chooses to be dualistic about. The most common categories lighted upon for these purposes are substance and property, giving one substance dualism and property dualism. There is, however, an important third category, namely predicate dualism. As this last is the weakest theory, in the sense that it claims least, I shall begin by characterizing it.
2.1 Predicate dualism
Predicate dualism is the theory that psychological or mentalistic predicates are (a) essential for a full description of the world and (b) are not reducible to physicalistic predicates. For a mental predicate to be reducible, there would be bridging laws connecting types of psychological states to types of physical ones in such a way that the use of the mental predicate carried no information that could not be expressed without it. An example of what we believe to be a true type reduction outside psychology is the case of water, where water is always H2O: something is water if and only if it is H2O. If one were to replace the word ‘water’ by ‘H2O’, it is plausible to say that one could convey all the same information. But the terms in many of the special sciences (that is, any science except physics itself) are not reducible in this way. Not every hurricane or every infectious disease, let alone every devaluation of the currency or every coup d’etat has the same constitutive structure. These states are defined more by what they do than by their composition or structure. Their names are classified as functional terms rather than natural kind terms. It goes with this that such kinds of state are multiply realizable; that is, they may be constituted by different kinds of physical structures under different circumstances. Because of this, unlike in the case of water and H2O, one could not replace these terms by some more basic physical description and still convey the same information. There is no particular description, using the language of physics or chemistry, that would do the work of the word ‘hurricane’, in the way that ‘H2O’ would do the work of ‘water’. It is widely agreed that many, if not all, psychological states are similarly irreducible, and so psychological predicates are not reducible to physical descriptions and one has predicate dualism. (The classic source for irreducibility in the special sciences in general is Fodor (1974), and for irreducibility in the philosophy of mind, Davidson (1971).)
2.2 Property Dualism
Whereas predicate dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of predicates in our language, property dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of property out in the world. Property dualism can be seen as a step stronger than predicate dualism. Although the predicate ‘hurricane’ is not equivalent to any single description using the language of physics, we believe that each individual hurricane is nothing but a collection of physical atoms behaving in a certain way: one need have no more than the physical atoms, with their normal physical properties, following normal physical laws, for there to be a hurricane. One might say that we need more than the language of physics to describe and explain the weather, but we do not need more than its ontology. There is token identity between each individual hurricane and a mass of atoms, even if there is no type identity between hurricanes as kinds and some particular structure of atoms as a kind. Genuine property dualism occurs when, even at the individual level, the ontology of physics is not sufficient to constitute what is there. The irreducible language is not just another way of describing what there is, it requires that there be something more there than was allowed for in the initial ontology. Until the early part of the twentieth century, it was common to think that biological phenomena (‘life’) required property dualism (an irreducible ‘vital force’), but nowadays the special physical sciences other than psychology are generally thought to involve only predicate dualism. In the case of mind, property dualism is defended by those who argue that the qualitative nature of consciousness is not merely another way of categorizing states of the brain or of behaviour, but a genuinely emergent phenomenon.
2.3 Substance Dualism
There are two important concepts deployed in this notion. One is that of substance, the other is the dualism of these substances. A substance is characterized by its properties, but, according to those who believe in substances, it is more than the collection of the properties it possesses, it is the thing which possesses them. So the mind is not just a collection of thoughts, but is that which thinks, an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial states. Properties are the properties of objects. If one is a property dualist, one may wonder what kinds of objects possess the irreducible or immaterial properties in which one believes. One can use a neutral expression and attribute them to persons, but, until one has an account of person, this is not explanatory. One might attribute them to human beings qua animals, or to the brains of these animals. Then one will be holding that these immaterial properties are possessed by what is otherwise a purely material thing. But one may also think that not only mental states are immaterial, but that the subject that possesses them must also be immaterial. Then one will be a dualist about that to which mental states and properties belong as well about the properties themselves. Now one might try to think of these subjects as just bundles of the immaterial states. This is Hume’s view. But if one thinks that the owner of these states is something quite over and above the states themselves, and is immaterial, as they are, one will be a substance dualist.
Substance dualism is also often dubbed ‘Cartesian dualism’, but some substance dualists are keen to distinguish their theories from Descartes’s. E. J. Lowe, for example, is a substance dualist, in the following sense. He holds that a normal human being involves two substances, one a body and the other a person. The latter is not, however, a purely mental substance that can be defined in terms of thought or consciousness alone, as Descartes claimed. But persons and their bodies have different identity conditions and are both substances, so there are two substances essentially involved in a human being, hence this is a form of substance dualism. Lowe (2006) claims that his theory is close to P. F. Strawson’s (1959), whilst admitting that Strawson would not have called it substance dualism.
3. Varieties of Dualism: Interaction
If mind and body are different realms, in the way required by either property or substance dualism, then there arises the question of how they are related. Common sense tells us that they interact: thoughts and feelings are at least sometimes caused by bodily events and at least sometimes themselves give rise to bodily responses. I shall now consider briefly the problems for interactionism, and its main rivals, epiphenomenalism and parallelism.
3.1 Interactionism
Interactionism is the view that mind and body – or mental events and physical events – causally influence each other. That this is so is one of our common-sense beliefs, because it appears to be a feature of everyday experience. The physical world influences my experience through my senses, and I often react behaviourally to those experiences. My thinking, too, influences my speech and my actions. There is, therefore, a massive natural prejudice in favour of interactionism. It has been claimed, however, that it faces serious problems (some of which were anticipated in section 1).
The simplest objection to interaction is that, in so far as mental properties, states or substances are of radically different kinds from each other, they lack that communality necessary for interaction. It is generally agreed that, in its most naive form, this objection to interactionism rests on a ‘billiard ball’ picture of causation: if all causation is by impact, how can the material and the immaterial impact upon each other? But if causation is either by a more ethereal force or energy or only a matter of constant conjunction, there would appear to be no problem in principle with the idea of interaction of mind and body.
Even if there is no objection in principle, there appears to be a conflict between interactionism and some basic principles of physical science. For example, if causal power was flowing in and out of the physical system, energy would not be conserved, and the conservation of energy is a fundamental scientific law. Various responses have been made to this. One suggestion is that it might be possible for mind to influence the distribution of energy, without altering its quantity. (See Averill and Keating 1981). Another response is to challenge the relevance of the conservation principle in this context. The conservation principle states that ‘in a causally isolated system the total amount of energy will remain constant’. Whereas ‘[t]he interactionist denies…that the human body is an isolated system’, so the principle is irrelevant (Larmer (1986), 282: this article presents a good brief survey of the options). This approach has been termed conditionality, namely the view that conservation is conditional on the physical system being closed, that is, that nothing non-physical is interacting or interfering with it, and, of course, the interactionist claims that this condition is, trivially, not met. That conditionality is the best line for the dualist to take, and that other approaches do not work, is defended in Pitts (2019) and Cucu and Pitts (2019). This, they claim, makes the plausibility of interactionism an empirical matter which only close investigation on the fine operation of the brain could hope to settle. Cucu, in a separate article (2018), claims to find critical neuronal events which do not have sufficient physical explanation.This claim clearly needs further investigation.
Robins Collins (2011) has claimed that the appeal to conservation by opponents of interactionism is something of a red herring because conservation principles are not ubiquitous in physics. He argues that energy is not conserved in general relativity, in quantum theory, or in the universe taken as a whole. Why then, should we insist on it in mind-brain interaction?
Most discussion of interactionism takes place in the context of the assumption that it is incompatible with the world’s being ‘closed under physics’. This is a very natural assumption, but it is not justified if causal overdetermination of behaviour is possible. There could then be a complete physical cause of behaviour, and a mental one. The strongest intuitive objection against overdetermination is clearly stated by Mills (1996: 112), who is himself a defender of overdetermination.
For X to be a cause of Y, X must contribute something to Y. The only way a purely mental event could contribute to a purely physical one would be to contribute some feature not already determined by a purely physical event. But if physical closure is true, there is no feature of the purely physical effect that is not contributed by the purely physical cause. Hence interactionism violates physical closure after all.
Mills says that this argument is invalid, because a physical event can have features not explained by the event which is its sufficient cause. For example, “the rock’s hitting the window is causally sufficient for the window’s breaking, and the window’s breaking has the feature of being the third window-breaking in the house this year; but the facts about prior window-breakings, rather than the rock’s hitting the window, are what cause this window-breaking to have this feature.”
The opponent of overdetermination could perhaps reply that his principle applies, not to every feature of events, but to a subgroup – say, intrinsic features, not merely relational or comparative ones. It is this kind of feature that the mental event would have to cause, but physical closure leaves no room for this. These matters are still controversial.
The problem with closure of physics may be radically altered if physical laws are indeterministic, as quantum theory seems to assert. If physical laws are deterministic, then any interference from outside would lead to a breach of those laws. But if they are indeterministic, might not interference produce a result that has a probability greater than zero, and so be consistent with the laws? This way, one might have interaction yet preserve a kind of nomological closure, in the sense that no laws are infringed. Because it involves assessing the significance and consequences of quantum theory, this is a difficult matter for the non-physicist to assess. Some argue that indeterminacy manifests itself only on the subatomic level, being cancelled out by the time one reaches even very tiny macroscopic objects: and human behaviour is a macroscopic phenomenon. Others argue that the structure of the brain is so finely tuned that minute variations could have macroscopic effects, rather in the way that, according to ‘chaos theory’, the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in China might affect the weather in New York. (For discussion of this, see Eccles (1980), (1987), and Popper and Eccles (1977).) Still others argue that quantum indeterminacy manifests itself directly at a high level, when acts of observation collapse the wave function, suggesting that the mind may play a direct role in affecting the state of the world (Hodgson 1988; Stapp 1993).
3.2 Epiphenomenalism
If the reality of property dualism is not to be denied, but the problem of how the immaterial is to affect the material is to be avoided, then epiphenomenalism may seem to be the answer. According to this theory, mental events are caused by physical events, but have no causal influence on the physical. I have introduced this theory as if its point were to avoid the problem of how two different categories of thing might interact. In fact, it is, at best, an incomplete solution to this problem. If it is mysterious how the non-physical can have it in its nature to influence the physical, it ought to be equally mysterious how the physical can have it in its nature to produce something non-physical. But that this latter is what occurs is an essential claim of epiphenomenalism. (For development of this point, see Green (2003), 149–51). In fact, epiphenomenalism is more effective as a way of saving the autonomy of the physical (the world as ‘closed under physics’) than as a contribution to avoiding the need for the physical and non-physical to have causal commerce.
There are at least three serious problems for epiphenomenalism. First, as I indicated in section 1, it is profoundly counterintuitive. What could be more apparent than that it is the pain that I feel that makes me cry, or the visual experience of the boulder rolling towards me that makes me run away? At least one can say that epiphenomenalism is a fall-back position: it tends to be adopted because other options are held to be unacceptable.
The second problem is that, if mental states do nothing, there is no reason why they should have evolved. This objection ties in with the first: the intuition there was that conscious states clearly modify our behaviour in certain ways, such as avoiding danger, and it is plain that they are very useful from an evolutionary perspective.
Frank Jackson (1982) replies to this objection by saying that it is the brain state associated with pain that evolves for this reason: the sensation is a by-product. Evolution is full of useless or even harmful by-products. For example, polar bears have evolved thick coats to keep them warm, even though this has the damaging side effect that they are heavy to carry. Jackson’s point is true in general, but does not seem to apply very happily to the case of mind. The heaviness of the polar bear’s coat follows directly from those properties and laws which make it warm: one could not, in any simple way, have one without the other. But with mental states, dualistically conceived, the situation is quite the opposite. The laws of physical nature which, the mechanist says, make brain states cause behaviour, in no way explain why brain states should give rise to conscious ones. The laws linking mind and brain are what Feigl (1958) calls nomological danglers, that is, brute facts added onto the body of integrated physical law. Why there should have been by-products of that kind seems to have no evolutionary explanation.
The third problem concerns the rationality of belief in epiphenomenalism, via its effect on the problem of other minds. It is natural to say that I know that I have mental states because I experience them directly. But how can I justify my belief that others have them? The simple version of the ‘argument from analogy’ says that I can extrapolate from my own case. I know that certain of my mental states are correlated with certain pieces of behaviour, and so I infer that similar behaviour in others is also accompanied by similar mental states. Many hold that this is a weak argument because it is induction from one instance, namely, my own. The argument is stronger if it is not a simple induction but an ‘argument to the best explanation’. I seem to know from my own case that mental events can be the explanation of behaviour, and I know of no other candidate explanation for typical human behaviour, so I postulate the same explanation for the behaviour of others. But if epiphenomenalism is true, my mental states do not explain my behaviour and there is a physical explanation for the behaviour of others. It is explanatorily redundant to postulate such states for others. I know, by introspection, that I have them, but is it not just as likely that I alone am subject to this quirk of nature, rather than that everyone is?
For more detailed treatment and further reading on this topic, see the entry epiphenomenalism.
3.3 Parallelism
The epiphenomenalist wishes to preserve the integrity of physical science and the physical world, and appends those mental features that he cannot reduce. The parallelist preserves both realms intact, but denies all causal interaction between them. They run in harmony with each other, but not because their mutual influence keeps each other in line. That they should behave as if they were interacting would seem to be a bizarre coincidence. This is why parallelism has tended to be adopted only by those – like Leibniz – who believe in a pre-established harmony, set in place by God. The progression of thought can be seen as follows. Descartes believes in a more or less natural form of interaction between immaterial mind and material body. Malebranche thought that this was impossible naturally, and so required God to intervene specifically on each occasion on which interaction was required. Leibniz decided that God might as well set things up so that they always behaved as if they were interacting, without particular intervention being required. Outside such a theistic framework, the theory is incredible. Even within such a framework, one might well sympathise with Berkeley’s instinct that once genuine interaction is ruled out one is best advised to allow that God creates the physical world directly, within the mental realm itself, as a construct out of experience.
4. Arguments for Dualism
4.1 The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism
One category of arguments for dualism is constituted by the standard objections against physicalism. Prime examples are those based on the existence of qualia, the most important of which is the so-called ‘knowledge argument’. Because this argument has its own entry (see the entry qualia: the knowledge argument), I shall deal relatively briefly with it here. One should bear in mind, however, that all arguments against physicalism are also arguments for the irreducible and hence immaterial nature of the mind and, given the existence of the material world, are thus arguments for dualism.
The knowledge argument asks us to imagine a future scientist who has lacked a certain sensory modality from birth, but who has acquired a perfect scientific understanding of how this modality operates in others. This scientist – call him Harpo – may have been born stone deaf, but become the world’s greatest expert on the machinery of hearing: he knows everything that there is to know within the range of the physical and behavioural sciences about hearing. Suppose that Harpo, thanks to developments in neurosurgery, has an operation which finally enables him to hear. It is suggested that he will then learn something he did not know before, which can be expressed as what it is like to hear, or the qualitative or phenomenal nature of sound. These qualitative features of experience are generally referred to as qualia. If Harpo learns something new, he did not know everything before. He knew all the physical facts before. So what he learns on coming to hear – the facts about the nature of experience or the nature of qualia – are non-physical. This establishes at least a state or property dualism. (See Jackson 1982; Robinson 1982.)
There are at least two lines of response to this popular but controversial argument. First is the ‘ability’ response. According to this, Harpo does not acquire any new factual knowledge, only ‘knowledge how’, in the form of the ability to respond directly to sounds, which he could not do before. This essentially behaviouristic account is exactly what the intuition behind the argument is meant to overthrow. Putting ourselves in Harpo’s position, it is meant to be obvious that what he acquires is knowledge of what something is like, not just how to do something. Such appeals to intuition are always, of course, open to denial by those who claim not to share the intuition. Some ability theorists seem to blur the distinction between knowing what something is like and knowing how to do something, by saying that the ability Harpo acquires is to imagine or remember the nature of sound. In this case, what he acquires the ability to do involves the representation to himself of what the thing is like. But this conception of representing to oneself, especially in the form of imagination, seems sufficiently close to producing in oneself something very like a sensory experience that it only defers the problem: until one has a physicalist gloss on what constitutes such representations as those involved in conscious memory and imagination, no progress has been made.
The other line of response is to argue that, although Harpo’s new knowledge is factual, it is not knowledge of a new fact. Rather, it is new way of grasping something that he already knew. He does not realise this, because the concepts employed to capture experience (such as ‘looks red’ or ‘sounds C-sharp’) are similar to demonstratives, and demonstrative concepts lack the kind of descriptive content that allow one to infer what they express from other pieces of information that one may already possess. A total scientific knowledge of the world would not enable you to say which time was ‘now’ or which place was ‘here’. Demonstrative concepts pick something out without saying anything extra about it. Similarly, the scientific knowledge that Harpo originally possessed did not enable him to anticipate what it would be like to re-express some parts of that knowledge using the demonstrative concepts that only experience can give one. The knowledge, therefore, appears to be genuinely new, whereas only the mode of conceiving it is novel.
Proponents of the epistemic argument respond that it is problematic to maintain both that the qualitative nature of experience can be genuinely novel, and that the quality itself be the same as some property already grasped scientifically: does not the experience’s phenomenal nature, which the demonstrative concepts capture, constitute a property in its own right? Another way to put this is to say that phenomenal concepts are not pure demonstratives, like ‘here’ and ‘now’, or ‘this’ and ‘that’, because they do capture a genuine qualitative content. Furthermore, experiencing does not seem to consist simply in exercising a particular kind of concept, demonstrative or not. When Harpo has his new form of experience, he does not simply exercise a new concept; he also grasps something new – the phenomenal quality – with that concept. How decisive these considerations are, remains controversial.
4.2 The Argument from Predicate Dualism to Property Dualism
I said above that predicate dualism might seem to have no ontological consequences, because it is concerned only with the different way things can be described within the contexts of the different sciences, not with any real difference in the things themselves. This, however, can be disputed.
The argument from predicate to property dualism moves in two steps, both controversial. The first claims that the irreducible special sciences, which are the sources of irreducible predicates, are not wholly objective in the way that physics is, but depend for their subject matter upon interest-relative perspectives on the world. This means that they, and the predicates special to them, depend on the existence of minds and mental states, for only minds have interest-relative perspectives. The second claim is that psychology – the science of the mental – is itself an irreducible special science, and so it, too, presupposes the existence of the mental. Mental predicates therefore presuppose the mentality that creates them: mentality cannot consist simply in the applicability of the predicates themselves.
First, let us consider the claim that the special sciences are not fully objective, but are interest-relative.
No-one would deny, of course, that the very same subject matter or ‘hunk of reality’ can be described in irreducibly different ways and it still be just that subject matter or piece of reality. A mass of matter could be characterized as a hurricane, or as a collection of chemical elements, or as mass of sub-atomic particles, and there be only the one mass of matter. But such different explanatory frameworks seem to presuppose different perspectives on that subject matter.
This is where basic physics, and perhaps those sciences reducible to basic physics, differ from irreducible special sciences. On a realist construal, the completed physics cuts physical reality up at its ultimate joints: any special science which is nomically strictly reducible to physics also, in virtue of this reduction, it could be argued, cuts reality at its joints, but not at its minutest ones. If scientific realism is true, a completed physics will tell one how the world is, independently of any special interest or concern: it is just how the world is. It would seem that, by contrast, a science which is not nomically reducible to physics does not take its legitimation from the underlying reality in this direct way. Rather, such a science is formed from the collaboration between, on the one hand, objective similarities in the world and, on the other, perspectives and interests of those who devise the science. The concept of hurricane is brought to bear from the perspective of creatures concerned about the weather. Creatures totally indifferent to the weather would have no reason to take the real patterns of phenomena that hurricanes share as constituting a single kind of thing. With the irreducible special sciences, there is an issue of salience , which involves a subjective component: a selection of phenomena with a certain teleology in mind is required before their structures or patterns are reified. The entities of metereology or biology are, in this respect, rather like Gestalt phenomena.
Even accepting this, why might it be thought that the perspectivality of the special sciences leads to a genuine property dualism in the philosophy of mind? It might seem to do so for the following reason. Having a perspective on the world, perceptual or intellectual, is a psychological state. So the irreducible special sciences presuppose the existence of mind. If one is to avoid an ontological dualism, the mind that has this perspective must be part of the physical reality on which it has its perspective. But psychology, it seems to be almost universally agreed, is one of those special sciences that is not reducible to physics, so if its subject matter is to be physical, it itself presupposes a perspective and, hence, the existence of a mind to see matter as psychological. If this mind is physical and irreducible, it presupposes mind to see it as such. We seem to be in a vicious circle or regress.
We can now understand the motivation for full-blown reduction. A true basic physics represents the world as it is in itself, and if the special sciences were reducible, then the existence of their ontologies would make sense as expressions of the physical, not just as ways of seeing or interpreting it. They could be understood ‘from the bottom up’, not from top down. The irreducibility of the special sciences creates no problem for the dualist, who sees the explanatory endeavor of the physical sciences as something carried on from a perspective conceptually outside of the physical world. Nor need this worry a physicalist, if he can reduce psychology, for then he could understand ‘from the bottom up’ the acts (with their internal, intentional contents) which created the irreducible ontologies of the other sciences. But psychology is one of the least likely of sciences to be reduced. If psychology cannot be reduced, this line of reasoning leads to real emergence for mental acts and hence to a real dualism for the properties those acts instantiate (Robinson 2003).
4.3 The Modal Argument
There is an argument, which has roots in Descartes (Meditation VI), which is a modal argument for dualism. One might put it as follows:
It is imaginable that one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
It is conceivable that one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
It is possible one’s mind might exist without one’s body.
therefore
One’s mind is a different entity from one’s body.
The rationale of the argument is a move from imaginability to real possibility. I include (2) because the notion of conceivability has one foot in the psychological camp, like imaginability, and one in the camp of pure logical possibility and therefore helps in the transition from one to the other.
This argument should be distinguished from a similar ‘conceivability’ argument, often known as the ‘zombie hypothesis’, which claims the imaginability and possibility of my body (or, in some forms, a body physically just like it) existing without there being any conscious states associated with it. (See, for example, Chalmers (1996), 94–9.) This latter argument, if sound, would show that conscious states were something over and above physical states. It is a different argument because the hypothesis that the unaltered body could exist without the mind is not the same as the suggestion that the mind might continue to exist without the body, nor are they trivially equivalent. The zombie argument establishes only property dualism and a property dualist might think disembodied existence inconceivable – for example, if he thought the identity of a mind through time depended on its relation to a body (e.g., Penelhum 1970).
Before Kripke (1972/80), the first challenge to such an argument would have concerned the move from (3) to (4). When philosophers generally believed in contingent identity, that move seemed to them invalid. But nowadays that inference is generally accepted and the issue concerns the relation between imaginability and possibility. No-one would nowadays identify the two (except, perhaps, for certain quasi-realists and anti-realists), but the view that imaginability is a solid test for possibility has been strongly defended. W. D. Hart ((1994), 266), for example, argues that no clear example has been produced such that “one can imagine that p (and tell less imaginative folk a story that enables them to imagine that p) plus a good argument that it is impossible that p. No such counterexamples have been forthcoming…” This claim is at least contentious. There seem to be good arguments that time-travel is incoherent, but every episode of Star-Trek or Doctor Who shows how one can imagine what it might be like were it possible.
It is worth relating the appeal to possibility in this argument to that involved in the more modest, anti-physicalist, zombie argument. The possibility of this hypothesis is also challenged, but all that is necessary for a zombie to be possible is that all and only the things that the physical sciences say about the body be true of such a creature. As the concepts involved in such sciences – e.g., neuron, cell, muscle – seem to make no reference, explicit or implicit, to their association with consciousness, and are defined in purely physical terms in the relevant science texts, there is a very powerful prima facie case for thinking that something could meet the condition of being just like them and lack any connection with consciousness. There is no parallel clear, uncontroversial and regimented account of mental concepts as a whole that fails to invoke, explicitly or implicitly, physical (e.g., behavioural) states.
For an analytical behaviourist the appeal to imaginability made in the argument fails, not because imagination is not a reliable guide to possibility, but because we cannot imagine such a thing, as it is a priori impossible. The impossibility of disembodiment is rather like that of time travel, because it is demonstrable a priori, though only by arguments that are controversial. The argument can only get under way for those philosophers who accept that the issue cannot be settled a priori, so the possibility of the disembodiment that we can imagine is still prima facie open.
A major rationale of those who think that imagination is not a safe indication of possibility, even when such possibility is not eliminable a priori, is that we can imagine that a posteriori necessities might be false – for example, that Hesperus might not be identical to Phosphorus. But if Kripke is correct, that is not a real possibility. Another way of putting this point is that there are many epistemic possibilities which are imaginable because they are epistemic possibilities, but which are not real possibilities. Richard Swinburne (1997, New Appendix C), whilst accepting this argument in general, has interesting reasons for thinking that it cannot apply in the mind-body case. He argues that in cases that involve a posteriori necessities, such as those identities that need discovering, it is because we identify those entities only by their ‘stereotypes’ (that is, by their superficial features observable by the layman) that we can be wrong about their essences. In the case of our experience of ourselves this is not true.
Now it is true that the essence of Hesperus cannot be discovered by a mere thought experiment. That is because what makes Hesperus Hesperus is not the stereotype, but what underlies it. But it does not follow that no one can ever have access to the essence of a substance, but must always rely for identification on a fallible stereotype. One might think that for the person him or herself, while what makes that person that person underlies what is observable to others, it does not underlie what is experienceable by that person, but is given directly in their own self-awareness.
This is a very appealing Cartesian intuition: my identity as the thinking thing that I am is revealed to me in consciousness, it is not something beyond the veil of consciousness. Now it could be replied to this that though I do access myself as a conscious subject, so classifying myself is rather like considering myself qua cyclist. Just as I might never have been a cyclist, I might never have been conscious, if things had gone wrong in my very early life. I am the organism, the animal, which might not have developed to the point of consciousness, and that essence as animal is not revealed to me just by introspection.
But there are vital differences between these cases. A cyclist is explicitly presented as a human being (or creature of some other animal species) cycling: there is no temptation to think of a cyclist as a basic kind of thing in its own right. Consciousness is not presented as a property of something, but as the subject itself. Swinburne’s claim that when we refer to ourselves we are referring to something we think we are directly aware of and not to ‘something we know not what’ that underlies our experience seemingly ‘of ourselves’ has powerful intuitive appeal and could only be overthrown by very forceful arguments. Yet, even if we are not referring primarily to a substrate, but to what is revealed in consciousness, could it not still be the case that there is a necessity stronger than causal connecting this consciousness to something physical? To consider this further we must investigate what the limits are of the possible analogy between cases of the water-H2O kind, and the mind-body relation.
We start from the analogy between the water stereotype – how water presents itself – and how consciousness is given first-personally to the subject. It is plausible to claim that something like water could exist without being H2O, but hardly that it could exist without some underlying nature. There is, however, no reason to deny that this underlying nature could be homogenous with its manifest nature: that is, it would seem to be possible that there is a world in which the water-like stuff is an element, as the ancients thought, and is water-like all the way down. The claim of the proponents of the dualist argument is that this latter kind of situation can be known to be true a priori in the case of the mind: that is, one can tell by introspection that it is not more-than-causally dependent on something of a radically different nature, such as a brain or body. What grounds might one have for thinking that one could tell that a priori?
The only general argument that seem to be available for this would be the principle that, for any two levels of discourse, A and B, they are more-than-causally connected only if one entails the other a priori. And the argument for accepting this principle would be that the relatively uncontroversial cases of a posteriori necessary connections are in fact cases in which one can argue a priori from facts about the microstructure to the manifest facts. In the case of water, for example, it would be claimed that it follows a priori that if there were something with the properties attributed to H2O by chemistry on a micro level, then that thing would possess waterish properties on a macro level. What is established a posteriori is that it is in fact H2O that underlies and explains the waterish properties round here, not something else: the sufficiency of the base – were it to obtain – to explain the phenomena, can be deduced a priori from the supposed nature of the base. This is, in effect, the argument that Chalmers uses to defend the zombie hypothesis. The suggestion is that the whole category of a posteriori more-than-causally necessary connections (often identified as a separate category of metaphysical necessity) comes to no more than this. If we accept that this is the correct account of a posteriori necessities, and also deny the analytically reductionist theories that would be necessary for a priori connections between mind and body, as conceived, for example, by the behaviourist or the functionalist, does it follow that we can tell a priori that consciousness is not more-than-causally dependent on the body?
It is helpful in considering this question to employ a distinction like Berkeley’s between ideas and notions. Ideas are the objects of our mental acts, and they capture transparently – ‘by way of image or likeness’ (Principles, sect. 27) – that of which they are the ideas. The self and its faculties are not the objects of our mental acts, but are captured only obliquely in the performance of its acts, and of these Berkeley says we have notions, meaning by this that what we capture of the nature of the dynamic agent does not seem to have the same transparency as what we capture as the normal objects of the agent’s mental acts. It is not necessary to become involved in Berkeley’s metaphysics in general to feel the force of the claim that the contents and internal objects of our mental acts are grasped with a lucidity that exceeds that of our grasp of the agent and the acts per se. Because of this, notions of the self perhaps have a ‘thickness’ and are permanently contestable: there seems always to be room for more dispute as to what is involved in that concept. (Though we shall see later, in 5.2.2, that there is a ‘non-thick’ way of taking the Berkeleyan concept of a notion.)
Because ‘thickness’ always leaves room for dispute, this is one of those cases in philosophy in which one is at the mercy of the arguments philosophers happen to think up. The conceivability argument creates a prima facie case for thinking that mind has no more than causal ontological dependence on the body. Let us assume that one rejects analytical (behaviourist or functionalist) accounts of mental predicates. Then the above arguments show that any necessary dependence of mind on body does not follow the model that applies in other scientific cases. This does not show that there may not be other reasons for believing in such dependence, for so many of the concepts in the area are still contested. For example, it might be argued that identity through time requires the kind of spatial existence that only body can give: or that the causal continuity required by a stream of consciousness cannot be a property of mere phenomena. All these might be put forward as ways of filling out those aspects of our understanding of the self that are only obliquely, not transparently, presented in self-awareness. The dualist must respond to any claim as it arises: the conceivability argument does not pre-empt them.......
5.2 The Unity of the Mind
Whether one believes that the mind is a substance or just a bundle of properties, the same challenge arises, which is to explain the nature of the unity of the immaterial mind. For the Cartesian, that means explaining how he understands the notion of immaterial substance. For the Humean, the issue is to explain the nature of the relationship between the different elements in the bundle that binds them into one thing. Neither tradition has been notably successful in this latter task: indeed, Hume, in the appendix to the Treatise, declared himself wholly mystified by the problem, rejecting his own initial solution (though quite why is not clear from the text).
One of the weaknesses of much abstract painting is the attempt to substitute the inventions of the intellect for a pristine imaginative conception. The inner life of a human being is a vast and varied realm and does not concern itself alone with stimulating arrangements of color, form and design. The term 'life' as used in art is something not to be held in contempt, for it applies all of its existence, and the province of art is to react to it and not to shun it. Painting will have to deal more fully and less obliquely with life and nature's phenomena before it can again be great.
-- Edward Hopper
I am awake, but do not open my eyes. Instead, I process everything that has happened:
We were running
K'hym is dead
So is M'yri'ah
I am not
At least, not as far as I am aware.
I am also aware that I am not the only being in this room.
I go into deep thought, accessing the being's mind.
~His thoughts merge into my mind. I see the basic shapes and colours that form in another's mind.
This being is not Martian. That much I can tell. His thought patterns differ from that of a Martian's; for one thing, his mind is far less complicated than mine.
His intellect is far less superior, too.
I look deeper, and discover the aspects of the being's life. His culture, species and language all flood into my mind.
Earth
Human
English
America
Name...
Name...~
I open my eyes.
"You are Doctor Saul Erdel."
The doctor stops his actions and stands still.
"W...w...what did you just say?"
I find this statement interesting. Do these humans require everything to be said to them twice?
"Doctor Saul Erdel. You are doctor Saul Erdel."
He still appears to be in shock.
"You are human. This planet is Earth."
He walks around the screen he has been monitoring for the duration of my stay, and finally manages to structure a sentence to reply to me with.
"But you...how do you know me? My language?"
He moves in closer to me, and only now I realise I am securely bound to a table of some kind.
"Remarkable. Where are you from?"
I say nothing.
"Oh...okay. You do speak English, don't you?"
"Everyone I know is dead."
My words do have an effect on him. His mouth is open, but no words escape.
"..."
"I am a coward."
He finally manages to engage in conversation with me.
"Your family...what happened?"
"I abandoned them."
His eyes widen.
"Oh God. Is this...Is this my fault? My machine, did it kill your family? Oh God..."
I am confused.
"Your machine? Your machine is responsible for the Plague?"
He stops rubbing his face with his hand, and looks down to me.
"What? Plague? I...I don't..."
He rabbles on as I enter his mind again-
~This "machine" he talks about is responsible for bringing me to Earth. He believes it is responsible for killing my family too. I tell him what has really happened to put his mind at rest.
It seems only fair.
"Your machine did not kill my family."
"..."
He falls silent. But his mind is clearly still uneasy due to my telepathic abilities.
"I can read you thoughts."
"You...you can?"
"Yes. And I do not mean you harm."
He is slightly more relaxed now, but still clearly uneasy.
"I have done enough harm already."
"Did you-"
Reading his thoughts, I answer the question he is about to ask.
"No. I do not kill."
"Oh."
Silence.
"You are quite remarkable."
I do not know how to reply, so I do not.
"Do you...do you have a name?"
This I can, and do, answer.
"Yes. My name is J'onn J'onzz."
He clearly has many questions to ask me.
"So, you read minds?"
"Yes."
"Can you do anything else?"
"That depends. What are you humans capable of?"
He presses a button on the side of my table, and my restraints rise up, freeing me.
"You are uneasy, I understand. But I will not harm you."
He steps closer as I sit up.
"Mister J'onzz, I would very much like to study you, if you don't mind."
"Why would I mind."
He hesitates.
"Well, I take that as a yes then."
He places a hand on my shoulder, and helps me stand up. He is a small man, but my size does not seem to impose him.
"Mister J'onzz-"
"Call me J'onn."
"J'onn, would you like to follow me?"
He gestures towards the door, and walks out.
I follow.
He turns and looks at me, but before he can ask, I answer his question again.
"Yes, if you wish to study me, you may."
He smiles, turns and with that, we leave the room.
{3.2.2010 ~ Day 107 of 365} **EXPLORE**
It was far too beautiful a day to be stuck inside an office, though that's where I found myself. Thank goodness for a leisurely lunch and stroll around the park - fresh air and warm sunshine is what my soul needed today :)
Today's gratitude ~ left overs! Girlfriend is tired, and in no mood to waste precious veg time in the kitchen ;)
Let no one say when he is tempted, “I am being tempted by God,” for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one. But each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire. Then desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin, and sin when it is fully grown brings forth death (James 1:13-15)
We think of sin as a single act, but God sees it as a process. Adam committed one act of sin, and yet that one act brought sin, death, and judgment on the whole human race. James described this process of sin in four stages.
Desire (v. 14). The word lust means any kind of desire, and not necessarily sexual passions. The normal desires of life were given to us by God and, of themselves, are not sinful. Without these desires, we could not function. Unless we felt hunger and thirst, we would never eat and drink, and we would die. Without fatigue, the body would never rest and would eventually wear out. Sex is a normal desire; without it the human race could not continue.
It is when we want to satisfy these desires in ways outside God’s will that we get into trouble. Eating is normal; gluttony is sin. Sleep is normal; laziness is sin. “Marriage is honorable in all, and the bed undefiled; but whoremongers and adulterers God will judge” (Heb. 13:4).
Some people try to become “spiritual” by denying these normal desires, or by seeking to suppress them; but this only makes them less than human. These fundamental desires of life are the steam in the boiler that makes the machinery go. Turn off the steam and you have no power. Let the steam go its own way and you have destruction. The secret is in constant control. These desires must be our servants and not our masters; and this we can do through Jesus Christ.
Deception (v. 14). No temptation appears as temptation; it always seems more alluring than it really is. James used two illustrations from the world of sports to prove his point. Drawn away carries with it the idea of the baiting of a trap; and enticed in the original Greek means “to bait a hook.” The hunter and the fisherman have to use bait to attract and catch their prey. No animal is deliberately going to step into a trap and no fish will knowingly bite at a naked hook. The idea is to hide the trap and the hook.
Temptation always carries with it some bait that appeals to our natural desires. The bait not only attracts us, but it also hides the fact that yielding to the desire will eventually bring sorrow and punishment. It is the bait that is the exciting thing. Lot would never have moved toward Sodom had he not seen the “well-watered plains of Jordan” (Gen. 13:10ff). When David looked on his neighbor’s wife, he would never have committed adultery had he seen the tragic consequences: the death of a baby (Bathsheba’s son), the murder of a brave soldier (Uriah), the violation of a daughter (Tamar). The bait keeps us from seeing the consequences of sin.
V 2, p 343 When Jesus was tempted by Satan, He always dealt with the temptation on the basis of the Word of God. Three times He said, “It is written.” From the human point of view, turning stones into bread to satisfy hunger is a sensible thing to do; but not from God’s point of view. When you know the Bible, you can detect the bait and deal with it decisively. This is what it means to walk by faith and not by sight.
Disobedience (v. 15). We have moved from the emotions (desire) and the intellect (deception) to the will. James changed the picture from hunting and fishing to the birth of a baby. Desire conceives a method for taking the bait. The will approves and acts; and the result is sin. Whether we feel it or not, we are hooked and trapped. The baby is born, and just wait until it matures!
Christian living is a matter of the will, not the feelings. I often hear believers say, “I don’t feel like reading the Bible.” Or, “I don’t feel like attending prayer meeting.” Children operate on the basis of feeling, but adults operate on the basis of will. They act because it is right, no matter how they feel. This explains why immature Christians easily fall into temptation: they let their feelings make the decisions. The more you exercise your will in saying a decisive no to temptation, the more God will take control of your life. “For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure” (Phil. 2:13).
Death (v. 15). Disobedience gives birth to death, not life. It may take years for the sin to mature, but when it does, the result will be death. If we will only believe God’s Word and see this final tragedy, it will encourage us not to yield to temptation. God has erected this barrier because He loves us. “Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die?” (Ezek. 18:23)
These four stages in temptation and sin are perfectly depicted in the first sin recorded in the Bible in Genesis 3.
Warren W. Wiersbe, The Bible Exposition Commentary (vol. 2; Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1996), 342–343.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=x7BeGDZewHs
A Tibetan Terrier rescued in the nick of time. My heartfelt admiration to all those folk who rescue dogs and give them a loving home.
"We may think we understand them, but ultimately our judgement of a dog and its behaviour and intellect is almost always effected by our own way of perceiving the world.
We seem to judge the worth of every animal on the planet, according to what they can give us or how much they resemble us. Can they think like us? Can they feel like us? It's the wrong way to look at it because we're not acknowledging their innate worth.
There are so many different kinds of intelligence in animals that are nothing like ours.
However much we like to think we understand them, they probably understand us better."
=========
Nothing new. Prepping for my youngest son's birthday party. His birthday was last month but we are late as always.
These things start out modestly, and then they escalate terribly to being over-the-top!
We had all the best intentions :-)
When God created man in His image, He created a measure; the human perception of the world corresponds to God's creative intention. Man by definition is a center, or "the center" in a given universe; not by accident, but in virtue of the very nature of Being, and this is why that which is large or small for man is large or small in the divine intention; man perceives things as they present themselves in the divine Intellect. And that is why the world of the indefinitely small, as well as the world of the indefinitely large, is as it were forbidden to man, who should not want to disproportionately enlarge the small or to disproportionately reduce the large. Man ought to feel that there is no advantage or happiness in such enterprises; and he would feel it if he had maintained a relationship with the Absolute, or if this relationship were sincere and sufficient.
He, who is really at peace with God is free from all unhealthy curiosity, if one may say so; he lives, like a well-guarded child, in the blessed garden of a grace that does not forsake him; the Creator knows the best place for the creature, and He knows what is good for man.
In a certain sense, the world of atoms as well as that of galaxies is hostile to human beings, and comprises for them, in principle or potentially, a climate of alienation and terror. Some people will doubtless argue that "the man of our times" is an "adult," but this is pride, even satanism, for a normal man always keeps a childlike side, as all sacred Scriptures attest by their language; if such were not the case, childhood itself would not comprise a positive aspect. Of course, a mature man ought to be "adult," but he can be so otherwise than by plunging into forbidden abysses; the spiritual victory over illusion is a matter appreciably more serious than the insensitivityof the explorers of the inhuman.
There are two points to consider in created things, namely the empirical appearance and the mechanism; now the appearance manifests the divine intention, as we have stated above; the mechanism merely operates the mode of manifestation.
For example, in man's body the divine intention is expressed by its form, its deiformity, its symbolism and its beauty; the mechanism is its anatomy and vital functioning.
The modern mentality, having always a scientific and "iconoclastic" tendency, tends to overaccentuate the mechanism to the detriment of the creative intention, and does so on all levels, psychological as well as physical; the result is a jaded and "demystified" mentality that is no longer "impressed" by anything. By forgetting the divine intention - which nonetheless is apparent a priori - one ends in an emptiness devoid of all reference points and meaning, and in a mentality of nihilism and despair, if not of careless and brutal materialism. In the face of this deviation it is the child who is right when he believes that the blue sky above us is Paradise.
---
Frithjof Schuon: Roots of the Human Condition
Island of Flying Books
“What do you want?” Little Rinpoche asks.
“I am here to bring back all these books to the island where they came from.”
“Oh yes, I remember”, he says. “I’ve ordered them back. Well done so far. Now open your mind and let all concepts fly away!”
He claps his hands and you will not believe it, but all books fly away.
HKD
„Rinpoche“, fragte der Junge. „Woher kommen die Wünsche?“
Sie kommen aus dem See der himmlischen Erde.
Und wo liegt dieser See?
Auf der Insel der fliegenden Bücher...
Die gibt es doch gar nicht.
Doch gibt es sie. Im innersten deiner Seele. Manche nennen diesen Ort auch Phantasie oder Imagination. Sobald du mit dem Boot deines Wünschens auf die Insel reist, erlebst du deine Phantasie. Und von dort bekommst du die Botschaften für deinen Alltag. Was wäre das Leben ohne Phantasie? Koste am schönsten Nektar deiner Seele, lass deine Phantasie zu, dann bist du mit der Insel der fliegenden Bücher verbunden.
Heute bin ich erwachsen, beinahe schon ein alter Mann, doch jetzt habe ich die Insel der Seligen entdeckt, Hypoberea. Aus meiner Sicht ist sie vergleichbar mit Shambhala von dem Rinpoche in eben jenem Buch berichtete, das auf dem obigen Bild durch die Gegend fliegt. Die kleine Figur hat sich aus der Druckerschwärze selbst erschaffen und nutzt das Buch wie einen fliegenden Teppich. Ich muss noch herausfinden, wer dieser kleine Mann ist... :-)
HKD
Falls Psychologie interessiert:
Auf dem Pfad der Entwicklung des Bewusstseins aus den Schleiern der Maya kommt der Punkt, an dem man alle Konzepte wieder aufgeben muss. Ein freies Bewusstsein kann weder an Prinzipien noch an Konzepten haften, obwohl sie für die Befreiung notwendig sind. Bewusstheit wird durch den Logos gebildet und daher kann man die Konzepte die er aufbaut als Boot oder Fahrzeug bezeichnen. Mit dem Boot setzt man über den großen Strom. Auf der anderen Seite liegt das Paradies der Freiheit. Es ist die innere Freiheit, das diamantene Bewusstsein. Dagegen sind äußere Freiheiten und Unfreiheiten unwesentlich. Was aber nicht heißt, dass sie zu vernachlässigen wären... :-)
Daher muss man sich konkret von den Büchern befreien. Ich selbst bin rituell mit einem Koffer voller Bücher in die Wüste gefahren und habe sie am Fuße einer großen Wanderdüne vergraben. Für große Übergänge bedurfte es bei mir stets großer Rituale, damit der Geist die Veränderung akzeptieren und verstehen konnte.
HKD
Anmerkung:
This is digital art work, not reality.
Das Bild ist ein digital hergestelltes Werk.
Jede Ähnlichkeit mit realen Gegebenheiten wäre rein zufällig.
HKD
"Winter is good -- his Hoar Delights
Italic flavor yield
To Intellects inebriate
With Summer, or the World --
Generic as a Quarry
And hearty -- as a Rose --
Invited with Asperity
But welcome when he goes."
- Emily Dickinson
Ganesha, also spelled Ganesh, and also known as Ganapati and Vinayaka, is a widely worshipped deity in the Hindu pantheon. His image is found throughout India and Nepal. Hindu sects worship him regardless of affiliations. Devotion to Ganesha is widely diffused and extends to Jains, Buddhists, and beyond India.
Although he is known by many attributes, Ganesha's elephant head makes him easy to identify. Ganesha is widely revered as the remover of obstacles, the patron of arts and sciences and the deva of intellect and wisdom. As the god of beginnings, he is honoured at the start of rituals and ceremonies. Ganesha is also invoked as patron of letters and learning during writing sessions. Several texts relate mythological anecdotes associated with his birth and exploits and explain his distinct iconography.
Ganesha emerged as a distinct deity in the 4th and 5th centuries CE, during the Gupta Period, although he inherited traits from Vedic and pre-Vedic precursors. He was formally included among the five primary deities of Smartism (a Hindu denomination) in the 9th century. A sect of devotees called the Ganapatya arose, who identified Ganesha as the supreme deity. The principal scriptures dedicated to Ganesha are the Ganesha Purana, the Mudgala Purana, and the Ganapati Atharvashirsa.
ETYMOLOGY AND OTHER NAMES
Ganesha has been ascribed many other titles and epithets, including Ganapati and Vighneshvara. The Hindu title of respect Shri is often added before his name. One popular way Ganesha is worshipped is by chanting a Ganesha Sahasranama, a litany of "a thousand names of Ganesha". Each name in the sahasranama conveys a different meaning and symbolises a different aspect of Ganesha. At least two different versions of the Ganesha Sahasranama exist; one version is drawn from the Ganesha Purana, a Hindu scripture venerating Ganesha.
The name Ganesha is a Sanskrit compound, joining the words gana, meaning a group, multitude, or categorical system and isha, meaning lord or master. The word gaņa when associated with Ganesha is often taken to refer to the gaņas, a troop of semi-divine beings that form part of the retinue of Shiva. The term more generally means a category, class, community, association, or corporation. Some commentators interpret the name "Lord of the Gaņas" to mean "Lord of Hosts" or "Lord of created categories", such as the elements. Ganapati, a synonym for Ganesha, is a compound composed of gaṇa, meaning "group", and pati, meaning "ruler" or "lord". The Amarakosha, an early Sanskrit lexicon, lists eight synonyms of Ganesha : Vinayaka, Vighnarāja (equivalent to Vighnesha), Dvaimātura (one who has two mothers), Gaṇādhipa (equivalent to Ganapati and Ganesha), Ekadanta (one who has one tusk), Heramba, Lambodara (one who has a pot belly, or, literally, one who has a hanging belly), and Gajanana; having the face of an elephant).
Vinayaka is a common name for Ganesha that appears in the Purāṇas and in Buddhist Tantras. This name is reflected in the naming of the eight famous Ganesha temples in Maharashtra known as the Ashtavinayak (aṣṭavināyaka). The names Vighnesha and Vighneshvara (Lord of Obstacles) refers to his primary function in Hindu theology as the master and remover of obstacles (vighna).
A prominent name for Ganesha in the Tamil language is Pillai. A. K. Narain differentiates these terms by saying that pillai means a "child" while pillaiyar means a "noble child". He adds that the words pallu, pella, and pell in the Dravidian family of languages signify "tooth or tusk", also "elephant tooth or tusk". Anita Raina Thapan notes that the root word pille in the name Pillaiyar might have originally meant "the young of the elephant", because the Pali word pillaka means "a young elephant".
In the Burmese language, Ganesha is known as Maha Peinne, derived from Pali Mahā Wināyaka. The widespread name of Ganesha in Thailand is Phra Phikhanet or Phra Phikhanesuan, both of which are derived from Vara Vighnesha and Vara Vighneshvara respectively, whereas the name Khanet (from Ganesha) is rather rare.
In Sri Lanka, in the North-Central and North Western areas with predominantly Buddhist population, Ganesha is known as Aiyanayaka Deviyo, while in other Singhala Buddhist areas he is known as Gana deviyo.
ICONOGRAPHY
Ganesha is a popular figure in Indian art. Unlike those of some deities, representations of Ganesha show wide variations and distinct patterns changing over time. He may be portrayed standing, dancing, heroically taking action against demons, playing with his family as a boy, sitting down or on an elevated seat, or engaging in a range of contemporary situations.
Ganesha images were prevalent in many parts of India by the 6th century. The 13th century statue pictured is typical of Ganesha statuary from 900–1200, after Ganesha had been well-established as an independent deity with his own sect. This example features some of Ganesha's common iconographic elements. A virtually identical statue has been dated between 973–1200 by Paul Martin-Dubost, and another similar statue is dated c. 12th century by Pratapaditya Pal. Ganesha has the head of an elephant and a big belly. This statue has four arms, which is common in depictions of Ganesha. He holds his own broken tusk in his lower-right hand and holds a delicacy, which he samples with his trunk, in his lower-left hand. The motif of Ganesha turning his trunk sharply to his left to taste a sweet in his lower-left hand is a particularly archaic feature. A more primitive statue in one of the Ellora Caves with this general form has been dated to the 7th century. Details of the other hands are difficult to make out on the statue shown. In the standard configuration, Ganesha typically holds an axe or a goad in one upper arm and a pasha (noose) in the other upper arm.
The influence of this old constellation of iconographic elements can still be seen in contemporary representations of Ganesha. In one modern form, the only variation from these old elements is that the lower-right hand does not hold the broken tusk but is turned towards the viewer in a gesture of protection or fearlessness (abhaya mudra). The same combination of four arms and attributes occurs in statues of Ganesha dancing, which is a very popular theme.
COMMON ATTRIBUTES
Ganesha has been represented with the head of an elephant since the early stages of his appearance in Indian art. Puranic myths provide many explanations for how he got his elephant head. One of his popular forms, Heramba-Ganapati, has five elephant heads, and other less-common variations in the number of heads are known. While some texts say that Ganesha was born with an elephant head, he acquires the head later in most stories. The most recurrent motif in these stories is that Ganesha was created by Parvati using clay to protect her and Shiva beheaded him when Ganesha came between Shiva and Parvati. Shiva then replaced Ganesha's original head with that of an elephant. Details of the battle and where the replacement head came from vary from source to source. Another story says that Ganesha was created directly by Shiva's laughter. Because Shiva considered Ganesha too alluring, he gave him the head of an elephant and a protruding belly.
Ganesha's earliest name was Ekadanta (One Tusked), referring to his single whole tusk, the other being broken. Some of the earliest images of Ganesha show him holding his broken tusk. The importance of this distinctive feature is reflected in the Mudgala Purana, which states that the name of Ganesha's second incarnation is Ekadanta. Ganesha's protruding belly appears as a distinctive attribute in his earliest statuary, which dates to the Gupta period (4th to 6th centuries). This feature is so important that, according to the Mudgala Purana, two different incarnations of Ganesha use names based on it: Lambodara (Pot Belly, or, literally, Hanging Belly) and Mahodara (Great Belly). Both names are Sanskrit compounds describing his belly. The Brahmanda Purana says that Ganesha has the name Lambodara because all the universes (i.e., cosmic eggs) of the past, present, and future are present in him. The number of Ganesha's arms varies; his best-known forms have between two and sixteen arms. Many depictions of Ganesha feature four arms, which is mentioned in Puranic sources and codified as a standard form in some iconographic texts. His earliest images had two arms. Forms with 14 and 20 arms appeared in Central India during the 9th and the 10th centuries. The serpent is a common feature in Ganesha iconography and appears in many forms. According to the Ganesha Purana, Ganesha wrapped the serpent Vasuki around his neck. Other depictions of snakes include use as a sacred thread wrapped around the stomach as a belt, held in a hand, coiled at the ankles, or as a throne. Upon Ganesha's forehead may be a third eye or the Shaivite sectarian mark , which consists of three horizontal lines. The Ganesha Purana prescribes a tilaka mark as well as a crescent moon on the forehead. A distinct form of Ganesha called Bhalachandra includes that iconographic element. Ganesha is often described as red in color. Specific colors are associated with certain forms. Many examples of color associations with specific meditation forms are prescribed in the Sritattvanidhi, a treatise on Hindu iconography. For example, white is associated with his representations as Heramba-Ganapati and Rina-Mochana-Ganapati (Ganapati Who Releases from Bondage). Ekadanta-Ganapati is visualized as blue during meditation in that form.
VAHANAS
The earliest Ganesha images are without a vahana (mount/vehicle). Of the eight incarnations of Ganesha described in the Mudgala Purana, Ganesha uses a mouse (shrew) in five of them, a lion in his incarnation as Vakratunda, a peacock in his incarnation as Vikata, and Shesha, the divine serpent, in his incarnation as Vighnaraja. Mohotkata uses a lion, Mayūreśvara uses a peacock, Dhumraketu uses a horse, and Gajanana uses a mouse, in the four incarnations of Ganesha listed in the Ganesha Purana. Jain depictions of Ganesha show his vahana variously as a mouse, elephant, tortoise, ram, or peacock.
Ganesha is often shown riding on or attended by a mouse, shrew or rat. Martin-Dubost says that the rat began to appear as the principal vehicle in sculptures of Ganesha in central and western India during the 7th century; the rat was always placed close to his feet. The mouse as a mount first appears in written sources in the Matsya Purana and later in the Brahmananda Purana and Ganesha Purana, where Ganesha uses it as his vehicle in his last incarnation. The Ganapati Atharvashirsa includes a meditation verse on Ganesha that describes the mouse appearing on his flag. The names Mūṣakavāhana (mouse-mount) and Ākhuketana (rat-banner) appear in the Ganesha Sahasranama.
The mouse is interpreted in several ways. According to Grimes, "Many, if not most of those who interpret Gaṇapati's mouse, do so negatively; it symbolizes tamoguṇa as well as desire". Along these lines, Michael Wilcockson says it symbolizes those who wish to overcome desires and be less selfish. Krishan notes that the rat is destructive and a menace to crops. The Sanskrit word mūṣaka (mouse) is derived from the root mūṣ (stealing, robbing). It was essential to subdue the rat as a destructive pest, a type of vighna (impediment) that needed to be overcome. According to this theory, showing Ganesha as master of the rat demonstrates his function as Vigneshvara (Lord of Obstacles) and gives evidence of his possible role as a folk grāma-devatā (village deity) who later rose to greater prominence. Martin-Dubost notes a view that the rat is a symbol suggesting that Ganesha, like the rat, penetrates even the most secret places.
ASSOCIATIONS
OBSTACLES
Ganesha is Vighneshvara or Vighnaraja or Vighnaharta (Marathi), the Lord of Obstacles, both of a material and spiritual order. He is popularly worshipped as a remover of obstacles, though traditionally he also places obstacles in the path of those who need to be checked. Paul Courtright says that "his task in the divine scheme of things, his dharma, is to place and remove obstacles. It is his particular territory, the reason for his creation."
Krishan notes that some of Ganesha's names reflect shadings of multiple roles that have evolved over time. Dhavalikar ascribes the quick ascension of Ganesha in the Hindu pantheon, and the emergence of the Ganapatyas, to this shift in emphasis from vighnakartā (obstacle-creator) to vighnahartā (obstacle-averter). However, both functions continue to be vital to his character.
BUDDHI (KNOWLEDGE)
Ganesha is considered to be the Lord of letters and learning. In Sanskrit, the word buddhi is a feminine noun that is variously translated as intelligence, wisdom, or intellect. The concept of buddhi is closely associated with the personality of Ganesha, especially in the Puranic period, when many stories stress his cleverness and love of intelligence. One of Ganesha's names in the Ganesha Purana and the Ganesha Sahasranama is Buddhipriya. This name also appears in a list of 21 names at the end of the Ganesha Sahasranama that Ganesha says are especially important. The word priya can mean "fond of", and in a marital context it can mean "lover" or "husband", so the name may mean either "Fond of Intelligence" or "Buddhi's Husband".
AUM
Ganesha is identified with the Hindu mantra Aum, also spelled Om. The term oṃkārasvarūpa (Aum is his form), when identified with Ganesha, refers to the notion that he personifies the primal sound. The Ganapati Atharvashirsa attests to this association. Chinmayananda translates the relevant passage as follows:
(O Lord Ganapati!) You are (the Trinity) Brahma, Vishnu, and Mahesa. You are Indra. You are fire [Agni] and air [Vāyu]. You are the sun [Sūrya] and the moon [Chandrama]. You are Brahman. You are (the three worlds) Bhuloka [earth], Antariksha-loka [space], and Swargaloka [heaven]. You are Om. (That is to say, You are all this).
Some devotees see similarities between the shape of Ganesha's body in iconography and the shape of Aum in the Devanāgarī and Tamil scripts.
FIRST CHAKRA
According to Kundalini yoga, Ganesha resides in the first chakra, called Muladhara (mūlādhāra). Mula means "original, main"; adhara means "base, foundation". The muladhara chakra is the principle on which the manifestation or outward expansion of primordial Divine Force rests. This association is also attested to in the Ganapati Atharvashirsa. Courtright translates this passage as follows: "[O Ganesha,] You continually dwell in the sacral plexus at the base of the spine [mūlādhāra cakra]." Thus, Ganesha has a permanent abode in every being at the Muladhara. Ganesha holds, supports and guides all other chakras, thereby "governing the forces that propel the wheel of life".
FAMILY AND CONSORTS
Though Ganesha is popularly held to be the son of Shiva and Parvati, the Puranic myths give different versions about his birth. In some he was created by Parvati, in another he was created by Shiva and Parvati, in another he appeared mysteriously and was discovered by Shiva and Parvati or he was born from the elephant headed goddess Malini after she drank Parvati's bath water that had been thrown in the river.
The family includes his brother the war god Kartikeya, who is also called Subramanya, Skanda, Murugan and other names. Regional differences dictate the order of their births. In northern India, Skanda is generally said to be the elder, while in the south, Ganesha is considered the first born. In northern India, Skanda was an important martial deity from about 500 BCE to about 600 CE, when worship of him declined significantly in northern India. As Skanda fell, Ganesha rose. Several stories tell of sibling rivalry between the brothers and may reflect sectarian tensions.
Ganesha's marital status, the subject of considerable scholarly review, varies widely in mythological stories. One pattern of myths identifies Ganesha as an unmarried brahmacari. This view is common in southern India and parts of northern India. Another pattern associates him with the concepts of Buddhi (intellect), Siddhi (spiritual power), and Riddhi (prosperity); these qualities are sometimes personified as goddesses, said to be Ganesha's wives. He also may be shown with a single consort or a nameless servant (Sanskrit: daşi). Another pattern connects Ganesha with the goddess of culture and the arts, Sarasvati or Śarda (particularly in Maharashtra). He is also associated with the goddess of luck and prosperity, Lakshmi. Another pattern, mainly prevalent in the Bengal region, links Ganesha with the banana tree, Kala Bo.
The Shiva Purana says that Ganesha had begotten two sons: Kşema (prosperity) and Lābha (profit). In northern Indian variants of this story, the sons are often said to be Śubha (auspiciouness) and Lābha. The 1975 Hindi film Jai Santoshi Maa shows Ganesha married to Riddhi and Siddhi and having a daughter named Santoshi Ma, the goddess of satisfaction. This story has no Puranic basis, but Anita Raina Thapan and Lawrence Cohen cite Santoshi Ma's cult as evidence of Ganesha's continuing evolution as a popular deity.
WOSHIP AND FESTIVALS
Ganesha is worshipped on many religious and secular occasions; especially at the beginning of ventures such as buying a vehicle or starting a business. K.N. Somayaji says, "there can hardly be a [Hindu] home [in India] which does not house an idol of Ganapati. [..] Ganapati, being the most popular deity in India, is worshipped by almost all castes and in all parts of the country". Devotees believe that if Ganesha is propitiated, he grants success, prosperity and protection against adversity.
Ganesha is a non-sectarian deity, and Hindus of all denominations invoke him at the beginning of prayers, important undertakings, and religious ceremonies. Dancers and musicians, particularly in southern India, begin performances of arts such as the Bharatnatyam dance with a prayer to Ganesha. Mantras such as Om Shri Gaṇeshāya Namah (Om, salutation to the Illustrious Ganesha) are often used. One of the most famous mantras associated with Ganesha is Om Gaṃ Ganapataye Namah (Om, Gaṃ, Salutation to the Lord of Hosts).
Devotees offer Ganesha sweets such as modaka and small sweet balls (laddus). He is often shown carrying a bowl of sweets, called a modakapātra. Because of his identification with the color red, he is often worshipped with red sandalwood paste (raktacandana) or red flowers. Dūrvā grass (Cynodon dactylon) and other materials are also used in his worship.
Festivals associated with Ganesh are Ganesh Chaturthi or Vināyaka chaturthī in the śuklapakṣa (the fourth day of the waxing moon) in the month of bhādrapada (August/September) and the Gaṇeśa jayanti (Gaṇeśa's birthday) celebrated on the cathurthī of the śuklapakṣa (fourth day of the waxing moon) in the month of māgha (January/February)."
GANESH CHATURTI
An annual festival honours Ganesha for ten days, starting on Ganesha Chaturthi, which typically falls in late August or early September. The festival begins with people bringing in clay idols of Ganesha, symbolising Ganesha's visit. The festival culminates on the day of Ananta Chaturdashi, when idols (murtis) of Ganesha are immersed in the most convenient body of water. Some families have a tradition of immersion on the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, or 7th day. In 1893, Lokmanya Tilak transformed this annual Ganesha festival from private family celebrations into a grand public event. He did so "to bridge the gap between the Brahmins and the non-Brahmins and find an appropriate context in which to build a new grassroots unity between them" in his nationalistic strivings against the British in Maharashtra. Because of Ganesha's wide appeal as "the god for Everyman", Tilak chose him as a rallying point for Indian protest against British rule. Tilak was the first to install large public images of Ganesha in pavilions, and he established the practice of submerging all the public images on the tenth day. Today, Hindus across India celebrate the Ganapati festival with great fervour, though it is most popular in the state of Maharashtra. The festival also assumes huge proportions in Mumbai, Pune, and in the surrounding belt of Ashtavinayaka temples.
TEMPLES
In Hindu temples, Ganesha is depicted in various ways: as an acolyte or subordinate deity (pãrśva-devatã); as a deity related to the principal deity (parivāra-devatã); or as the principal deity of the temple (pradhāna), treated similarly as the highest gods of the Hindu pantheon. As the god of transitions, he is placed at the doorway of many Hindu temples to keep out the unworthy, which is analogous to his role as Parvati’s doorkeeper. In addition, several shrines are dedicated to Ganesha himself, of which the Ashtavinayak (lit. "eight Ganesha (shrines)") in Maharashtra are particularly well known. Located within a 100-kilometer radius of the city of Pune, each of these eight shrines celebrates a particular form of Ganapati, complete with its own lore and legend. The eight shrines are: Morgaon, Siddhatek, Pali, Mahad, Theur, Lenyadri, Ozar and Ranjangaon.
There are many other important Ganesha temples at the following locations: Wai in Maharashtra; Ujjain in Madhya Pradesh; Jodhpur, Nagaur and Raipur (Pali) in Rajasthan; Baidyanath in Bihar; Baroda, Dholaka, and Valsad in Gujarat and Dhundiraj Temple in Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh. Prominent Ganesha temples in southern India include the following: Kanipakam in Chittoor; the Jambukeśvara Temple at Tiruchirapalli; at Rameshvaram and Suchindram in Tamil Nadu; at Malliyur, Kottarakara, Pazhavangadi, Kasargod in Kerala, Hampi, and Idagunji in Karnataka; and Bhadrachalam in Andhra Pradesh.
T. A. Gopinatha notes, "Every village however small has its own image of Vighneśvara (Vigneshvara) with or without a temple to house it in. At entrances of villages and forts, below pīpaḹa (Sacred fig) trees [...], in a niche [...] in temples of Viṣṇu (Vishnu) as well as Śiva (Shiva) and also in separate shrines specially constructed in Śiva temples [...]; the figure of Vighneśvara is invariably seen." Ganesha temples have also been built outside of India, including southeast Asia, Nepal (including the four Vinayaka shrines in the Kathmandu valley), and in several western countries.
RISE TO PROMINENCE
FIRST APEARANCE
Ganesha appeared in his classic form as a clearly recognizable deity with well-defined iconographic attributes in the early 4th to 5th centuries. Shanti Lal Nagar says that the earliest known iconic image of Ganesha is in the niche of the Shiva temple at Bhumra, which has been dated to the Gupta period. His independent cult appeared by about the 10th century. Narain summarizes the controversy between devotees and academics regarding the development of Ganesha as follows:
What is inscrutable is the somewhat dramatic appearance of Gaņeśa on the historical scene. His antecedents are not clear. His wide acceptance and popularity, which transcend sectarian and territorial limits, are indeed amazing. On the one hand there is the pious belief of the orthodox devotees in Gaņeśa's Vedic origins and in the Purāṇic explanations contained in the confusing, but nonetheless interesting, mythology. On the other hand there are doubts about the existence of the idea and the icon of this deity" before the fourth to fifth century A.D. ... [I]n my opinion, indeed there is no convincing evidence of the existence of this divinity prior to the fifth century.
POSSIBLE INFLUENCES
Courtright reviews various speculative theories about the early history of Ganesha, including supposed tribal traditions and animal cults, and dismisses all of them in this way:
In the post 600 BC period there is evidence of people and places named after the animal. The motif appears on coins and sculptures.
Thapan's book on the development of Ganesha devotes a chapter to speculations about the role elephants had in early India but concludes that, "although by the second century CE the elephant-headed yakṣa form exists it cannot be presumed to represent Gaṇapati-Vināyaka. There is no evidence of a deity by this name having an elephant or elephant-headed form at this early stage. Gaṇapati-Vināyaka had yet to make his debut."
One theory of the origin of Ganesha is that he gradually came to prominence in connection with the four Vinayakas (Vināyakas). In Hindu mythology, the Vināyakas were a group of four troublesome demons who created obstacles and difficulties but who were easily propitiated. The name Vināyaka is a common name for Ganesha both in the Purāṇas and in Buddhist Tantras. Krishan is one of the academics who accepts this view, stating flatly of Ganesha, "He is a non-vedic god. His origin is to be traced to the four Vināyakas, evil spirits, of the Mānavagŗhyasūtra (7th–4th century BCE) who cause various types of evil and suffering". Depictions of elephant-headed human figures, which some identify with Ganesha, appear in Indian art and coinage as early as the 2nd century. According to Ellawala, the elephant-headed Ganesha as lord of the Ganas was known to the people of Sri Lanka in the early pre-Christian era.
A metal plate depiction of Ganesha had been discovered in 1993, in Iran, it dated back to 1,200 BCE. Another one was discovered much before, in Lorestan Province of Iran.
First Ganesha's terracotta images are from 1st century CE found in Ter, Pal, Verrapuram and Chandraketugarh. These figures are small, with elephant head, two arms, and chubby physique. The earliest Ganesha icons in stone were carved in Mathura during Kushan times (2nd-3rd centuries CE).
VEDIC AND EPIC LITERATURE
The title "Leader of the group" (Sanskrit: gaṇapati) occurs twice in the Rig Veda, but in neither case does it refer to the modern Ganesha. The term appears in RV 2.23.1 as a title for Brahmanaspati, according to commentators. While this verse doubtless refers to Brahmanaspati, it was later adopted for worship of Ganesha and is still used today. In rejecting any claim that this passage is evidence of Ganesha in the Rig Veda, Ludo Rocher says that it "clearly refers to Bṛhaspati—who is the deity of the hymn—and Bṛhaspati only". Equally clearly, the second passage (RV 10.112.9) refers to Indra, who is given the epithet 'gaṇapati', translated "Lord of the companies (of the Maruts)." However, Rocher notes that the more recent Ganapatya literature often quotes the Rigvedic verses to give Vedic respectability to Ganesha .
Two verses in texts belonging to Black Yajurveda, Maitrāyaṇīya Saṃhitā (2.9.1) and Taittirīya Āraṇyaka (10.1), appeal to a deity as "the tusked one" (Dantiḥ), "elephant-faced" (Hastimukha), and "with a curved trunk" (Vakratuņḍa). These names are suggestive of Ganesha, and the 14th century commentator Sayana explicitly establishes this identification. The description of Dantin, possessing a twisted trunk (vakratuṇḍa) and holding a corn-sheaf, a sugar cane, and a club, is so characteristic of the Puranic Ganapati that Heras says "we cannot resist to accept his full identification with this Vedic Dantin". However, Krishan considers these hymns to be post-Vedic additions. Thapan reports that these passages are "generally considered to have been interpolated". Dhavalikar says, "the references to the elephant-headed deity in the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā have been proven to be very late interpolations, and thus are not very helpful for determining the early formation of the deity".
Ganesha does not appear in Indian epic literature that is dated to the Vedic period. A late interpolation to the epic poem Mahabharata says that the sage Vyasa (Vyāsa) asked Ganesha to serve as his scribe to transcribe the poem as he dictated it to him. Ganesha agreed but only on condition that Vyasa recite the poem uninterrupted, that is, without pausing. The sage agreed, but found that to get any rest he needed to recite very complex passages so Ganesha would have to ask for clarifications. The story is not accepted as part of the original text by the editors of the critical edition of the Mahabharata, in which the twenty-line story is relegated to a footnote in an appendix. The story of Ganesha acting as the scribe occurs in 37 of the 59 manuscripts consulted during preparation of the critical edition. Ganesha's association with mental agility and learning is one reason he is shown as scribe for Vyāsa's dictation of the Mahabharata in this interpolation. Richard L. Brown dates the story to the 8th century, and Moriz Winternitz concludes that it was known as early as c. 900, but it was not added to the Mahabharata some 150 years later. Winternitz also notes that a distinctive feature in South Indian manuscripts of the Mahabharata is their omission of this Ganesha legend. The term vināyaka is found in some recensions of the Śāntiparva and Anuśāsanaparva that are regarded as interpolations. A reference to Vighnakartṛīṇām ("Creator of Obstacles") in Vanaparva is also believed to be an interpolation and does not appear in the critical edition.
PURANIC PERIOD
Stories about Ganesha often occur in the Puranic corpus. Brown notes while the Puranas "defy precise chronological ordering", the more detailed narratives of Ganesha's life are in the late texts, c. 600–1300. Yuvraj Krishan says that the Puranic myths about the birth of Ganesha and how he acquired an elephant's head are in the later Puranas, which were composed from c. 600 onwards. He elaborates on the matter to say that references to Ganesha in the earlier Puranas, such as the Vayu and Brahmanda Puranas, are later interpolations made during the 7th to 10th centuries.
In his survey of Ganesha's rise to prominence in Sanskrit literature, Ludo Rocher notes that:
Above all, one cannot help being struck by the fact that the numerous stories surrounding Gaṇeśa concentrate on an unexpectedly limited number of incidents. These incidents are mainly three: his birth and parenthood, his elephant head, and his single tusk. Other incidents are touched on in the texts, but to a far lesser extent.
Ganesha's rise to prominence was codified in the 9th century, when he was formally included as one of the five primary deities of Smartism. The 9th-century philosopher Adi Shankara popularized the "worship of the five forms" (Panchayatana puja) system among orthodox Brahmins of the Smarta tradition. This worship practice invokes the five deities Ganesha, Vishnu, Shiva, Devi, and Surya. Adi Shankara instituted the tradition primarily to unite the principal deities of these five major sects on an equal status. This formalized the role of Ganesha as a complementary deity.
SCRIPTURES
Once Ganesha was accepted as one of the five principal deities of Brahmanism, some Brahmins (brāhmaṇas) chose to worship Ganesha as their principal deity. They developed the Ganapatya tradition, as seen in the Ganesha Purana and the Mudgala Purana.
The date of composition for the Ganesha Purana and the Mudgala Purana - and their dating relative to one another - has sparked academic debate. Both works were developed over time and contain age-layered strata. Anita Thapan reviews comments about dating and provides her own judgement. "It seems likely that the core of the Ganesha Purana appeared around the twelfth and thirteenth centuries", she says, "but was later interpolated." Lawrence W. Preston considers the most reasonable date for the Ganesha Purana to be between 1100 and 1400, which coincides with the apparent age of the sacred sites mentioned by the text.
R.C. Hazra suggests that the Mudgala Purana is older than the Ganesha Purana, which he dates between 1100 and 1400. However, Phyllis Granoff finds problems with this relative dating and concludes that the Mudgala Purana was the last of the philosophical texts concerned with Ganesha. She bases her reasoning on the fact that, among other internal evidence, the Mudgala Purana specifically mentions the Ganesha Purana as one of the four Puranas (the Brahma, the Brahmanda, the Ganesha, and the Mudgala Puranas) which deal at length with Ganesha. While the kernel of the text must be old, it was interpolated until the 17th and 18th centuries as the worship of Ganapati became more important in certain regions. Another highly regarded scripture, the Ganapati Atharvashirsa, was probably composed during the 16th or 17th centuries.
BEYOND INDIA AND HINDUISM
Commercial and cultural contacts extended India's influence in western and southeast Asia. Ganesha is one of a number of Hindu deities who reached foreign lands as a result.
Ganesha was particularly worshipped by traders and merchants, who went out of India for commercial ventures. From approximately the 10th century onwards, new networks of exchange developed including the formation of trade guilds and a resurgence of money circulation. During this time, Ganesha became the principal deity associated with traders. The earliest inscription invoking Ganesha before any other deity is associated with the merchant community.
Hindus migrated to Maritime Southeast Asia and took their culture, including Ganesha, with them. Statues of Ganesha are found throughout the region, often beside Shiva sanctuaries. The forms of Ganesha found in Hindu art of Java, Bali, and Borneo show specific regional influences. The spread of Hindu culture to southeast Asia established Ganesha in modified forms in Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand. In Indochina, Hinduism and Buddhism were practiced side by side, and mutual influences can be seen in the iconography of Ganesha in the region. In Thailand, Cambodia, and among the Hindu classes of the Chams in Vietnam, Ganesha was mainly thought of as a remover of obstacles. Today in Buddhist Thailand, Ganesha is regarded as a remover of obstacles, the god of success.
Before the arrival of Islam, Afghanistan had close cultural ties with India, and the adoration of both Hindu and Buddhist deities was practiced. Examples of sculptures from the 5th to the 7th centuries have survived, suggesting that the worship of Ganesha was then in vogue in the region.
Ganesha appears in Mahayana Buddhism, not only in the form of the Buddhist god Vināyaka, but also as a Hindu demon form with the same name. His image appears in Buddhist sculptures during the late Gupta period. As the Buddhist god Vināyaka, he is often shown dancing. This form, called Nṛtta Ganapati, was popular in northern India, later adopted in Nepal, and then in Tibet. In Nepal, the Hindu form of Ganesha, known as Heramba, is popular; he has five heads and rides a lion. Tibetan representations of Ganesha show ambivalent views of him. A Tibetan rendering of Ganapati is tshogs bdag. In one Tibetan form, he is shown being trodden under foot by Mahākāla, (Shiva) a popular Tibetan deity. Other depictions show him as the Destroyer of Obstacles, and sometimes dancing. Ganesha appears in China and Japan in forms that show distinct regional character. In northern China, the earliest known stone statue of Ganesha carries an inscription dated to 531. In Japan, where Ganesha is known as Kangiten, the Ganesha cult was first mentioned in 806.
The canonical literature of Jainism does not mention the worship of Ganesha. However, Ganesha is worshipped by most Jains, for whom he appears to have taken over certain functions of Kubera. Jain connections with the trading community support the idea that Jainism took up Ganesha worship as a result of commercial connections. The earliest known Jain Ganesha statue dates to about the 9th century. A 15th-century Jain text lists procedures for the installation of Ganapati images. Images of Ganesha appear in the Jain temples of Rajasthan and Gujarat.
WIKIPEDIA
When the mind becomes irradiated by enlightenment, then the human mental faculty, the intellect, becomes suffused and filled with spiritual discrimination and vision and is illuminated by the radiance of divinity.
Curiosity is one of the most reliable and safe characteristics of an active intellect.
(Samuel Johnson)
Alessia Scriboni
THE DISCOVERY by gleitzeit blog (the lost Interview in Rome)
I am using magnifying glass to be able to read a a PDF file of a very low quality.
My eyes are hurting. What I have found is something that is just not available…
I must say on the search for anything tagged “invisible” I find some pretty amazing
stuff I would never know about (later on that)
Paul meet me at the gate. He looked younger than I had expected. Dressed
casually.
As a host he cordially offered me to dine. While we entered the hall I had an urge to ask him, is this a museum? trying not to break anything as we passed by sculptures, paintings,
ceramics and a lot of other pieces of art which I had never seen before.
This unexpected excitement spoiled my appetite, and I was no longer hungry and
instead drank some wine.
He made clear that it is not any kind of a museum, but instead, his Paul’s studio. He lives not in Rome, but by the Terranian sea, where he was going shortly.
I asked Paul how he earns a living. Paul thought a little and tried to find an appropriate explanation. He finally lit on: "I am of independent means and don’t have to earn a living" pouring me another glass of wine.
I asked him: “ Can I buy some of your paintings? How much it will cost me?”
This question Paul left unanswered but he said that commonly he paints his
pictures without the intention to sell them.
Earlier I noticed a little girl and a young woman moving about him.
OMG!!!! I am shaken up. NOBODY KNOWS ANYTHING ABOUT Paul Jaisini’s personal life! I don’t believe this. THANK YOU GOOGLE! this is like really mystifying. I am not an emotional person, rather someone who loves to work hard and get the job done. This turned into something other than working.
Google nowadays is not your “grandfather’s” google so to speak. It is tailored
around you, your daily Internet activity, So finding any news, any special
information is no longer an easy task. I guess because there’s too much of
everything and what one is looking for could be placed out of reach. So we sort
of live on a planet that is flat as in dark ages. I say that because if one is
provided the info that is tailored with limitation it implies that breaking
away is not something one would even comprehend! We are too used to trust our social functioning and think that we know everything, on top of all news provided to us by the honest practice of the broadcasting companies.
We don’t want to be those conspiracy freaks with no trust to anything or
anyone. But truth is, if you don’t want to pay high dollar for some expert
articles on the topics that could give more than the free info, you are really
up against a brick wall of the new unknown reality and a total incapacity to acquire
the needed info of high quality without spending your whole life learning all the crap on the net and beyond in order to find finally what you need.
So search is a tricky mother. If you are creative and sort of spontaneous you
might somehow find your own style of fishing out the essentials. But in my case I
often felt helpless and lost no longer willing to participate in this
undertaking trying to document Gleitzeit.
It doesn’t look like I had managed a short explanation. But this is my formula of
finding something that is not available on the tailored to fit google search.
I enter the variations of phrases and words from the gleitzeit context of emails, postings, essays and add some other words I find on my way of locating Paul Jaisini's links. Turning the tag in a sort of a potion number nine that had proven to fetch some impossible to find info on such a quick inquiry without opening thousands of websites where I might find or might not find anything at all. And the most effective findings are with the tag "invisible" added to other things, be it email abbreviations and so on.
“The other must be his wife”, I thought, because Paul called her with some pet name's asking for a bottle of wine, for a book, or an ash tray.
“Is she your wife? “ I asked just in case.
Paul looked me in the eyes and said: “She is not my wife, nor the mother of my daughter, she is my secretary. “
The secretary I sensed didn’t like me much.
She didn’t call Jaisini by his name, Paul, but she instead addressed him as
mister Jaisini. She seemed obsequious and perhaps didn’t like me for my unrestrained manner and direct questions. She said to Paul: “You should not waste your time on this interview. You need to return to your work. “
Paul said: “It will be few minutes." and spent a few hours with me. A self-ruling man.
Paul didn’t drink any wine but he behaved at times extravagantly, showing the
outlines of the silhouettes in his paintings and explaining what was happening in the pictures.
Paul said that the point of his art being hidden from the public is an
intrigue that engages press in constant attempts to uncover the ‘truth’ behind it all. Nevertheless it is very disappointing, that people don’t care about real art, as they do about private affairs.
We went upstairs and in a spacious hall I saw a large painting. I didn’t hide my
awe.
“Wow! Where did you get such a big piece of canvas? The art stores don’t sell
this linen in such sizes. “
“It is stitched together from pieces," answered Paul.
“How did you reach the upper parts of the painting"
"I climbed the riser. Do you see the nude black man up there, tangled with a
serpent?"
"It reminds me of Laocoön. Is it intentional?"
"No, he is a symbol of physical grace without intellect. Do you see a group of
female bodies intertwined in a threesome?"
"No, I don’t see it. Where is the threesome?"
"To the left, look there."
"I look there."
"There the three figures, here is one, here is another one and the third one."
"Third is not a female figure, it’s some animal."
"It’s a female, but there is an animal, a bit higher up. The clown in the center
tears his mouth in a bloody smile, carrying out his role of a fool, laughing when
he wants to cry."
"Is that a monkey?"
"You got it, she is another symbol of the fate, she stopped hitting the tom-tom,
her direct purpose in circus. When she stopped to play and started to think, she
realized that her life is pitiful and she wants to kill herself. It’s a second
symbol of the same meaning."
"Tell me about that threesome again."
"Well, they show the natural grace, as three graces would, the sensual concept of
procreation."
"This picture must be a depiction of a circus performance, I suppose. Is it ?
Why it is so dynamic?"
"It is a circus performance but is the personal trial of human character. The ball construction is an object: - Paulsen’s ball, it is also a title of the painting."
"This ball creates some weight and it seems to move the composition with it’s
size and position and it seems to be on a verge of rolling down."
"You’re right! I also sense this immediate impulse to prevent the clown to fall
off that ball.
We went to other paintings, whole series of paintings.
When I gathered all my sensations about the art that surrounded me, it was time to leave. Paul Jaisini escorted me to the door. I shook his hand saying:
"You are an interesting man!"
"I am not a man..."
(the last sentence was a good ending)
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbolism
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbolism_(arts)
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invisibility
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatalism
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gracefulness
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossible_object
Have to type as I read PDF file that can’t be copied
Have to type as I read PDF file that can’t be copied
I am using magnifying glass to be able to read a a PDF file of very low quality. My eyes are hurting. What I have found is something that is just not available… I must say on the search for anything tagged “invisible” I find some pretty amazing stuff I would never know about (later on that) Now I am sitting in my office instead of having night out. It really is an impossible task to just discern the text. I filled up a spray bottle with cold water to spray my face to frequently refresh my eyes, as they get tired from the magnifying glass. It’s totally worth it, the thrill of discovery is my ultimate high.
Subj: Re: any suggestions?
Date: 2/5/00 Pacific Standard Time
From: bcwoodward@bigfoot.com (B. Woodward)
To: Yustas61@aol.com
CC: Angela Ahermeign
The attached file with original text before translation can be used in all related your project on Paul Jaisini.
All my corrections are in () and sometimes they replace the words nearby, other times they get inserted or have comments as well. It should be clear. Angela, you had some trouble with colloquialisms, unclear constructions and misplaced verb tenses. You switched among various forms of the past with irregularity. I’ve brushed it up. It makes a good narrative, though. Very interesting :)
Original Message-
From Angela A, Sent Thursday, February 03, 2000, 4: 25 PM
to bcwoodward@bigfoot.com
Subject Any suggestions
My first meeting with Paul Jaisini in Rome
(was it your first meeting with him, or just first time in Rome… unclear construction)
Paul Jaisini’s appearance at the exhibition of his art made a lot of noise in 1995 in Rome.
(caused a lot of noise, a lot of excitement, or was it just a noisy appearance?)
After newspapers published the (a) photograph of Paul Jaisini in the empty gallery, I read the article and realized how lucky I was to be in Rome. Nobody saw Paul Jaisini’s paintings. Yes, nobody… This what happened next. I called him once, then (a) second time. (,b)But Paul didn’t return my calls. Unfortunately I was not able to stay on guards (stand guard is the appropriate colloquialism) to catch him by the art gallery being (as I was) preoccupied with my (own) business. So I decided that I have (needed, not have) to find a way to see Paul Jaisini’s (hidden) paintings if he hides them. Such extravagance has (had) to be stopped.
I decided to offer him (no him here) to write a testament about (to) the existence of his art (, which would necessarily lead to him revealing it to me.) which will rise the necessity to see it.
I heard about Paul Jaisini before (that time) because he is quite a (reverse the a and quite) well-known contemporary artist. When I set up the appointment to meet (him) I easily found his cozy two- story town-house surrounded by (an) antique iron fence.
When I called (on) the intercom it took a while to explain who I was and why (I had come) did I come.
Paul meet me at the gate. He looked younger than I (had) expected. Dressed casually.
As a host he cordially offered me to dine. While we were entering (entered) the hall I had an urge to ask him, (“I) is it (this) a museum (?), trying to brake (break) anything, (no comma… as we passed) passing by sculptures, paintings, ceramic pieces (ceramics… drop the p word) and a lot of (other pieces of) art which I (had never seen before. drop rest of the sentence) was not able…
Gosh, I can feel how B. Woodward was feeling… WILL SHE REALLY SEE THE PAINTINGS by PAUL JAISINI?????? my eyes are punishing me for this thrill. I need to stop looking into the magnifier when I am now writing a comment without looking into unreadable copy.
Just waiting to get the courage to continue… my eyes need rest, I made myself some coffee with soy milk. But it surely means I want to prolong the suspense. I have no idea what is written in that text I located only god knows where or how.
I think that a gamer guru would understand me after he/she played hardest strategic games for a very long time and turned into a savvy thrill seeker.
medium.com/art-submissions/don-t-bother-901454f687cd The time has come to start making sense of things, of the world, of each other. We think we’re doing that, but we’re actually doing the opposite. We are complicating…EVERYTHING…tothe point of utter madness. Our world has become one ginormous madhouse, ESPECIALLY cyberspace — this alternate world we created within our world that seems to have created a world within itself — yet to be identified, recognized, and named. Making sense of things is not a bad thing. For example, let’s start with one major web enigma: Paul Jaisini and “Gleitzeit” which is this, uh, odd art movement the guy started in the 90s. If you simply google either of those names, I gaurantee you a good WTF moment or two. You’ll not just be scratching your head over this one. You’ll be scratching every part of your body like a delusional nutcase who thinks your skin is literally crawling with countless bugs. IT’S GONNA BUG THE HELL OUT OF YOU, let’s just say…maybe for a day or a week…or maybe, as for some folks, long after you’ve discovered it. You’ll be itching to understand what it’s about even just a little bit. Your mind will try to make sense of Paul Jaisini and/or Gleitzeit, it will want to, but will fail miserably. Frustration and anger will start setting in. I know because that’s how it was for me and every person that tried. The deeper you dig, the more you try to figure it out, the more confused, overwhelmed, baffled, and perplexed you’ll get. I guess for the people that attempt to understand the Paul Jaisini and Gleitzeit thing or debunk it, my advice is: DON’T EVEN TRY. DON’T GO THERE. IT’S NOT FOR YOU. The sleepless nights, the uncertainty, the questions and ideas that start invading your head, the horror of “waking up” from normality and regularity, the trauma of moving from one dimension to another… is not worth it. Well, for me it was worth it, but not for others. They claim it’s crazy and even dangerous for the mind, Paul Jaisini’s Gleitzeit. Well, sure, I mean you gotta break some eggs to make an omelette, dontchya? So, Gleitzeit is the omelette and all parties involved in GIG (Gleitzeit International Group) are the eggs. Makes sense. Speaking of which, “they” don’t want it to make sense, not even close. As a member of the group, I’m breaking protocol BIG TIME by writing this, by encouraging that you go out there, look this stuff up and figure it out, take away its shield of senselessness and defeat it… for the sake of a better world and future for us all. I hope someone out there hears me….one way or another, it had to be said…. Stelly Riesling
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***
This duality has been reflected in classical as well as modern literature as reason versus passion, or mind versus intuition. The split between the conscious mind and the unconscious. There are moments in each of our lives when our verbal-intellect suggests one course, and our hearts, or intuition, another.
"Robert E. Ornstein"
***
Sweet Home Alabama - Lynyrd Skynyrd
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CLASSIC is the topic for Saturday March 3, 2012
Martes, 16 de marzo / Tuesday, march 16 2010
Autorretrato (Selfportrait)
El hecho de que tome un autorretrato (casi) diario, no significa en lo absoluto que yo sea una persona segura.
Al contrario, durante toda mi vida he debido afrontar ciertos temores, ya sea con mi cuerpo, mi intelecto o mis "talentos".
pd: creo que esta es una de mis fotografias favoritas :-)
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The fact of taking a self portrait (almost) daily, doesn't mean at all that I am a secure person.
On the contrary, my whole life I've had to face some fears, either with my body, my intellect or my "talents".
ps: I think this is one of my favorites photos :-)