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Athens Eleftherios Venizelos airport..First flight 27/12/1997.On Sunday 14/08/2005 crashed into Varnava Mt. near Grammatikos city (Greece) while approaching Athens Int. Airport . The plane, Helios Flight ZU522 with 115 passengers and 6 crew, was en route from Larnaca, Cyprus, to Prague, Czech Republic, with stop at ATH.Helios' Boeing 737-300 5B-DBY underwent maintenance on the night prior to the accident. The pressurization system was checked, but after completion of the tests the Pressurization Mode Selector (PMS) was reportedly left in the "Manual" position instead of the "Auto" mode. In manual mode the crew had to manually open or close the outflow valves in order to control the cabin pressure. The outflow valves were one-third in the open position which meant that the cabin would not pressurize after takeoff. The PMS mode was apparently not noted during the pre-departure checks by the crew.

In the morning the 737 was to operate Flight 522 from Larnaca to Prague, Czech Republic with an intermediate stop at Athens, Greece. The flight departed Larnaca at 09:07 for the leg to Athens with a planned flying time of 1 hour and 23 minutes. As the airplane climbed over the Mediterranean the cabin altitude alert horn sounded. This occurred as the 737 passed through an altitude of 10,000 feet. Cabin altitude is usually held around 8,000 feet. The crew possibly thought it was an erroneous takeoff configuration warning because the sound is identical. Then, at 14,000 feet, the oxygen masks automatically deployed and a master caution light illuminated in the cockpit. Because of a lack of cooling air another alarm activated, indicating a temperature warning for the avionics bay.

The German captain and the Cypriot co-pilot tried to solve the problem but encountered some problems communicating with each other. They contacted the Helios´ maintenance base to seek advice. The engineer told that they needed to pull the circuit breaker to turn off the alarm. The radio contact ended as the aircraft climbed through 28 900 ft.

The circuit breaker was located in a cabinet behind the captain. The captain got up from his seat to look for the circuit breaker. The crew were not wearing their oxygen masks as their mindset and actions were determined by the preconception that the problems were not related to the lack of cabin pressure.

As the airplane was still climbing the lack of oxygen seriously impaired the flight crew. The captain probably became unconscious when he was trying to find the circuit breaker. The first officer was still in his seat when he also became unconscious. Because the plane's autopilot was programmed for FL340 the Boeing continued to climb until leveling out at that altitude some 19 minutes after takeoff. At 09:37 the 737 entered the Athens FIR but not contact was established with the flight. Over Rodos at about 09:52 the airplane entered the UL995 airway. At 10:21 the airplane passed the KEA VOR, which is located about 28 nm south of the Athens airport. The airplane then passed the Athens Airport and subsequently entered the KEA VOR holding pattern at 10:38. All efforts by Greek air traffic controllers to contact the pilots were futile. Around 11:00 two Greek F-16 fighter planes were scrambled from the Néa Anghialos air base. At 11:24, during the sixth holding pattern, the F-16's intercepted the airliner. The F-16 pilots reported that they were not able to observe the captain, while the first officer seemed to be unconscious and slumped over the controls.

At 11:49, the F-16's reported a person not wearing an oxygen mask entering the cockpit and occupying the captain's seat. The F-16 pilot tried to attract his attention without success. At 11:50, the left engine flamed out due to fuel depletion and the aircraft started descending. At 11:54, two Mayday messages were recorded on the CVR.

At 12:00, the right engine also flamed out at an altitude of approximately 7100 feet. The aircraft continued descending rapidly and impacted hilly terrain.

The same Boeing 737, 5B-DBY, suffered a loss of cabin pressure on December 20, 2004 during a flight from Warsaw to Larnaca. Three passengers needed medical treatment after landing in Larnaca. This incident was caused by a leaking door seal of the right hand rear door.

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Wonder Woman Major Esra Özatay, who is Squadron commander of Turkish Stars, wingman in number 4 and mother of two children, greets the crew before the flight

@bat.turn

www.instagram.com/p/BiZ6gWWl3sW/

#takeoff #cocpit #pilot #pilotslife #avgeek #avporn #aviation #sky #turkishairforce #Russianairforce #usaf #airshow #aircraft #instaaviation #instagramaviation #instapilot #instaplane #aviationphotography #instasky #militaryaviation #igaviation #igers #fighterpilot #master_caution #jetaircraft #fighterjet #flight #pilotlife #aviation

Turkish Stars first female pilot leader & Mother of two children Major Esra Özatay (Türk Hava Kuvvetleri’nin ilk kadın jet filo komutanı Binbaşı Esra Özatay oldu)

 

In October 1967 we landed in a rice paddy to pick up an American Sargent from a MAC V detachment who had been working with a South Vietnamese Popular Force. He had a bad facial wound. At zero altitude and zero air speed we received small arms fire. My gunner was shot in the back. A round lodged in my seat a couple of inches from my knee. The master caution light came on as did several other warning lights. Three days later, in another helicopter, I returned and picked up the dead popular force troops. But that's another story. Yashica 35mm rangefinder. Helicopter 66-794

For a recap, see “Main Bus B Undervolt: The Unluckiest Day" with the famous words back to mission control:

 

“Houston, we’ve had a problem. We’ve had a Main Bus B Undervolt.”

 

“Roger, main B undervolt,” verified Lousma in mission control. “Okay, stand by, 13, we’re looking at it.”

 

More warning lights glowed: now two of the three fuel cells were dead and the No. 1 tank’s oxygen was steadily dwindling away. (F/C and O₂ Press lights above)

 

Fred Haise knew that Bus B was now virtually dead and quickly set to work reconnecting the command module’s systems to Bus A…only to discover that it, too, was quickly starved of electrical current.

 

As head of the White Team, Gene Kranz was the most senior of Apollo 13’s four flight directors and the shock which rippled through Mission Control was tangible. “The controllers,” he wrote, “felt they were toppling into an abyss.”

 

This Apollo Command Module annunciator panel, measuring 5.25 ̋ x 3.5 ̋ x 3 ̋, with a bank of 22 lighted indicators on the face, including: "H2O Sep Pump Fail," "Glycol Temp Low," "Pitch Gmbl Dr Fail," "F/C-Bus Disconnect," "H2 Press," "O2 Press," "SPS Press," "AC Bus 1 Fail," "AC Bus 1 Overload," "Inv 1 Temp Hi," and others. A Grimes parts label is affixed to the top, reading: “Annunciator, Event, Master Caution, Type I, NAA/S&ID Control No. ME434-0020-1002, Grimes Mfg. Co. S/N 10074 TSN 0010, Part No. 75-0056-3,” with a smaller label affixed to the bottom noting, "Date of Mfg. 1-66, Contract No. NAS9-150."

This was staged, but based on a real event.

 

FOD = Foreign Object Debris/Damage (Depending on how the word is used)

 

This was while we were on the TR just after 9/11. Our crews were flying into Afghanistan from the ship, a long haul. They would occasionally take snacks with them. One crew lost their bag of candy in the plane, and we had to tear up a perfectly good cockpit looking for the stuff.

 

This is a view of the throttle quadrant and control linkages and wiring harnesses below. The master caution panel and some other stuff would normally be where the console is open.

Ak47 Inflicted Owies!

 

In October 1967 we landed in a rice paddy to pick up an American Sargent from a MAC V detachment who had been working with a South Vietnamese Popular Force. He had a bad facial wound. At zero altitude and zero air speed we received small arms fire. My gunner was shot in the back. A round lodged in my seat a couple of inches from my knee. The master caution light came on as did several other warning lights. Three days later, in another helicopter, I returned and picked up the dead popular force troops. But that's another story. Yashica 35mm rangefinder. Helicopter 66-794

VERY difficult to find with the correct legends/colors.

Not 'quite fancy', but still, - a decently equipped airliner from the 80-90s.

Training is done. Good to go for another year.

 

As usual, it's been a sort of 'stressful fun' :)

 

Read a 'mini-essay' on the blog

CF CT-114 Tutor Instrument Panel. View of the Master Warning and Master Caution Lights.

Photo by: D. Maillet

Master Caution Reset Push Button

Fabrizio Romano affirms Liverpool are 'in talks' with Ibrahima Konate however Reds are cautioned about RB Leipzig star's physical issue record

Liverpool are in converses with sign Ibrahima Konate, says Fabrizio Romano, yet the exchange master cautions the arrangement is a long way from done at this stage.

 

Reports arose recently that the Reds are near making the RB Leipzig star their first marking of the forthcoming exchange window.

 

Romano disclosed to WONNA, Liverpool are in converses with the middle back's representative yet nothing has been marked at this point.

 

He added that the German club are not able to tune in to any proposals of under €40million (£34.2m), which is his revealed discharge provision.

 

The obtaining of Konate would be invited by Liverpool fans, who has been named as sufficient to play for any semblance of Barcelona and Real Madrid.

 

Romano additionally asserted the Merseyside club see him as 'a standout amongst other focus backs for what's to come'.

 

Konate would likewise support Liverpool's choices in guard, which has been extended various occasions this term with any semblance of Virgil van Dijk and Joe Gomez both supporting long haul wounds this term.

 

In any case, Romano cautioned that Konate, in spite of being 21 years of age, has amassed a decent measure of wounds as of now.

 

vip.wonnabetting.com/footballnews/fabrizio-romano-affirms...

Nuissance warnings, no actual system fault detected.

Master caution - Auto Thrust OFF

The sunlight on the dash momentarily made me think the Master Caution light was on again

Master Caution alert starts bleeping at me and it looks like my pressurization system is failing? I tried switching from Auto to Max Diff but didn't notice a change