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"Kuwaiti Government 025" (which brought the Houthi rebels for the peace talks in Stockholm) departed Stockholm back to Kuwait yesterday.
World’s 4th Biggest Defense Spender To Acquire “Israel Tech” As AD Systems Hog Spotlight Amid Russia-Ukraine, India-Pak Wars
By Sakshi Tiwari - May 12, 2025
After signing a historic deal with Israel in 2023 to purchase the Arrow-3, the world’s fourth-biggest defense spender is looking to purchase the Arrow-4, a next-generation air defense system currently under development.
According to SIPRI, Germany has emerged as the fourth biggest military spender after the United States, China, and Russia, and has surpassed India.
Lieutenant General Lutz Kohlhaus, the Vice Chief of Luftwaffe (the German Air Force), said on May 7 that the service wants to procure the Arrow-4 air defense system. The remarks were made during his opening speech at the Ground-Based Air Defense Summit in Berlin, as reported by Hartpunkt, a major German publication.
This appears to be a mere proposal right now, given that the German Ministry of Defense has not publicly acknowledged the Luftwaffe’s recommendation, and no official procurement timeline, budget, or contract details have been confirmed yet. However, the Luftwaffe Vice Chief said the decision to acquire the system has been communicated to Israel and the German Defense Ministry.
The Vice Chief said that the Luftwaffe will be able to cover the entire altitude spectrum of air defense in the future with the Arrow-4 and Arrow-3. Notably, the statement came shortly after the Inspector General of the Air Force received the first shipment of key equipment, including the communication element of the Arrow 3 system.
The German officials have repeatedly underlined the urgency of operationalising the Arrow-3 amid rising security threats in Europe. The Arrow-3 will be deployed at three locations across the country, with the first deployment planned for the military airfield at Holzdorf in eastern Germany, just south of Berlin. Construction is already underway at this site.
The alacrity in acquiring the Arrow-4 is noteworthy because the recent failure of the Israeli Arrow-3 in destroying a Houthi ballistic missile that struck the Ben Gurion Airport led to speculations that Germany may be alarmed and ask for assurances from the manufacturers of the anti-ballistic missile defense system that it has acquired for US$3.5 billion. However, the recent statement suggests that Berlin remains unfazed by the ‘rare’ miss and deeply committed to Israeli Arrow systems.
The plans to acquire the Arrow-4 align with Germany’s ongoing efforts to bolster air and missile defense, triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Germany’s role as a NATO logistical hub. The country is currently working on the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), which aims to create a multi-layered air defense network for itself and another European partner.
The German military has already procured the Patriot medium-range missile defense system, the IRIS-T short-range air defense system, and the Arrow-3. The next-generation Arrow-4 will add another layer to this network and fill a specific capability gap, potentially in endo-atmospheric interception, which is believed to be challenging due to atmospheric drag, heat, and missile maneuverability.
The German Air Force Vice Chief also noted that the Air Force will continue to buy the Patriot system and procure the F-35 fighter jet, adding that more European-based capability would be considered.
He stated that NATO countries operating American-origin equipment cannot conduct joint air warfare without Link 16, IFF Mode 5, or the standardized data flow, the standards for which would only be set by the US. Thus, diversification of military acquisition is required.
In addition to the Arrow-3 and Arrow-4, the Air Force is calling for the rapid procurement of six more IRIS-T-SLM systems to supplement the six previously ordered. It had also previously ordered eight 16 Patriot missile defense systems and three Arrow-3 systems. Kohlhaus noted that the country would have a total of 29 air defense systems (12 Patriot squadrons, 12 IRIS-T SLM/SLS, 1 Arrow 3 operational, 2 more by 2030).
File: Concept of Arrow-4 interceptor
What Is The Arrow-4?
Arrow 4 is an advanced missile defense system under development to counter ballistic and hypersonic threats. Unlike other systems in the German arsenal, Arrow-4 will have endo-exoatmospheric capabilities, which essentially means that it could intercept and destroy a target within and outside Earth’s atmosphere.
It is pertinent to note that Arrow 4’s primary focus will likely be endo-atmospheric interception, with low-exo-atmospheric capability as a secondary feature.
This is in stark contrast to the Arrow 3 system, which is known for its ability to destroy space-borne projectiles, including ballistic missiles and their warheads, during their mid-course phase, before they re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere.
Thus, the Arrow-4 would add another protective layer to Germany’s multi-layered air defense network. Germany’s acquisition of three Arrow 3 systems provides exo-atmospheric defense, while Arrow 4’s proposed acquisition would enhance terminal-phase coverage, complementing Patriot PAC-3 and IRIS-T SLM.
The Arrow 4 missile is being jointly developed by the Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) and the US Missile Defense Agency. Israel started conceptual work on Arrow-4 in 2017, but formal development was announced in February 2021 amid the burgeoning threat posed by Iran’s long-range missiles.
The Arrow-4 interceptor would be employed against evolving threats, including advanced ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and potentially nuclear-capable delivery systems.
One of the most significant features of the Arrow-4 interceptor is its ability to counter sophisticated threats, such as hypersonic missiles, which are very difficult to intercept due to their extremely high speed (five or more times the speed of sound) and unpredictable trajectory.
Since Germany’s missile defense aims to defeat potential threats from Russia, Arrow-4 would be a much-desired system, given that Moscow has various hypersonic missiles in its inventory.
Moreover, the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) and NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) emphasize hypersonic defense, making Arrow 4 strategically relevant.
With better propulsion systems, advanced seekers, and increased mobility than its predecessors, Arrow 4 is expected to have “unprecedented flight and interception capabilities.”
Though there is a paucity of information at this point, it is believed that Arrow 3 and Arrow 4 will be designed to destroy targets using kinetic energy or direct collision (hit-to-kill) instead of exploding near the hostile targets.
Additionally, an advantage of the Arrow 4 swivel missile is that it can be used with existing Arrow radars and firing devices, making it a cost-effective solution.
Defense Minister: 'We destroyed the airport in Sana'a, a message to Iran'
PM Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz address the IAF airstrikes on the Sana'a airport today in retaliation for the Houthi missile strike at Ben Gurion Airport.
Israel National News
1 minutes
May 6, 2025 at 6:30 PM (GMT+3)
YemenIsrael KatzBenjamin NetanyahuHouthis
Netanyahu and Katz at the Kirya
Iti Beit-On/GPO
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz today addressed the latest IDF attacks on Houthi targets in Yemen.
Netanyahu stated, "I have said many times that whoever attacks the State of Israel will pay the price. Yesterday I said that the Houthis' attack would not be met with a 'one-and-done' response but several responses. We gave one response yesterday: A severe strike on the port of Hodeidah. Today our planes attacked the airport in Sanaa, an airport that enables the terrorist army and allows for the entry by air to the terrorist state, which enables the firing of missiles at us."
He continued, "Our choice of when to respond, how to respond and what targets to strike – is a consideration that we are constantly making. This also stems from the Houthis' patron – Iran, without the approval and longtime support of which, the Houthis would be unable to make this reprehensible missile attack against us."
Netanyahu added, "President Trump said it a-month-and-a-half ago. I am also saying it today – we will settle accounts with whoever attacks the State of Israel. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the IDF Chief-of-Staff; you, Commander of the Air Force; the intelligence; our marvelous air and ground crews; our amazing pilots; and everyone who took part. Congratulations on a perfect operation."
Defense Minister Katz stated, "The Houthi terrorist organization attempted to attack Ben-Gurion Airport and in response today we destroyed the airport in Sanaa. We also struck additional targets, in continuation of the attacks yesterday on the port of Hodeidah, as well as additional national infrastructure. Whoever harms us – we harm them seven-fold."
"This is also a warning to the head of the Iranian octopus: You bear direct responsibility for the attack by the Houthi tentacle against the State of Israel, and you will also be held accountable for the results," Katz said.
The Israeli navy conducted strikes on Yemen's Hodeidah port as part of an ongoing campaign against the Houthis. Israel urged evacuations from Houthi ports, responding to ongoing missile threats. Iran-backed groups continue resistance in the region, influencing wider geopolitical dynamics.
Devdiscourse News Desk | Updated: 10-06-2025 11:05 IST | Created: 10-06-2025 11:05 IST
Israeli Naval Strikes Target Yemen's Hodeidah Port Amid Rising Tensions
On Tuesday, the Israeli navy launched attacks on Yemen's Hodeidah port, intensifying a campaign that traditionally involves airstrikes, according to Israeli army radio reports.
Houthi-controlled Al Masirah TV reported that the strikes targeted the docks at Al Hodeidah port, although there were no immediate reports of casualties. The strikes follow the Israeli military's call for evacuations at various Houthi-controlled ports.
Since the onset of the Gaza war in October 2023, the Houthis, aligned with Iran, have targeted Israel and Red Sea shipping in support of the Palestinians, prompting Israeli retaliation and increasing tensions across the region.
Joyce sat next to me the other day, excited to announce that we had a hotel room on the beach at Virginia Beach this September 20-22. Rooms were not available until then. That room has a balcony over the beach so we can see the Beach Blast after Saturday’s air show at NAS Oceana. That air show continues with this F/A-18F and others from the base lighting up the twilight sky over the beach with their afterburners engaged. The beach will be alive with a decent band of Navy musicians, as well as Blue Angels pilots and crew, and the Navy SEAL parachute team, the Leapfrogs, mingling with the crowd. Navy, being the professionals they are, know how to have fun, too.
Speaking of fun, TAC DEMO pilot CDR Joshua Keever is accelerating hard around this smoke plume, showing the thrilling capability of the Super Hornet at last year’s air show. The Houthi rebels of late likely don’t find this view as thrilling… too bad.
IDF targets infrastructure for moving weapons between Lebanon and Syria
Infrastructure along Syria-Lebanon border, used to transfer weapons for the purpose of harming Israeli civilians, struck by IDF.
Israel National News
Israel National News
1 minutes
Sep 26, 2024 at 1:56 PM (GMT+3)
Northern Arrows
Strike in Syria (Illustrative)
Ali Syria/Flash90
The IDF on Thursday struck key infrastructure used for transferring weapons between Lebanon and Syria, a military statement read.
"A short while ago, IAF fighter jets struck infrastructure along the Syria-Lebanon border used by Hezbollah to transfer weapons from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which the terrorist organization used against Israeli civilians," the IDF reported.
"The IDF will continue to strike and act against the Hezbollah terrorist organization's attempts to arm itself and transfer weapons into Lebanon from Syrian territory."
"The IDF is continuing to operate to dismantle and degrade Hezbollah's capabilities and terrorist infrastructure."
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Why were Houthi militants in Syrian territory?
Earlier this month, Israel succeeded in infiltrating a Syrian missile manufacturing facility, removing equipment and documents, and booby-trapping the facility, Greek researcher and analyst Eva J. Koulouriotis said, quoting a "security source."
According to the source, Israeli forces "succeeded in entering a facility for missile manufacturing in Syria, taking a haul, and escaping after they destroyed it," Koulouriotis wrote, noting that the facility is affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Israel did not respond to the report.
According to Koulouriotis, Israeli special forces carried out the operation at the military facility, which is located six kilometers southwest of Masyaf in western Syria. She noted that the operation began with airstrikes, and afterwards the Israeli ground forces entered the facility.
"The raid lasted approximately one hour, during which the forces entered the facility, took documents and other important equipment, and at the end, booby-trapped it from within, with explosives, and escaped after it was destroyed," she added.
She stressed that the ballistic missiles and UAVs intended for both Hezbollah and the Syrian army are manufactured in the facility.
According to The New York Times, the site was a "center of weapons research and development, aided by Syria’s ally Iran." Activities at the site included "chemical, biological and potentially nuclear weapons as well as missiles used by Hezbollah."
US strikes dozens of Houthi sites in Yemen as broader campaign begins
By Noah Robertson
Mar 17, 2025 at 03:01 PM
This image taken from video provided by the U.S. Navy shows an aircraft launching from the carrier Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea before airstrikes in Sanaa, Yemen, on Saturday. (U.S. Navy via AP)
The U.S. military has struck more than 30 targets in Yemen since Saturday, part of the Trump administration’s new campaign of airstrikes targeting Iran-backed Houthi rebels, a terrorist group that has halted international shipping for more than a year.
The initial salvo, which began Saturday, targeted sites used to train militants, launch drones, build weapons and command operations, including some housing Houthi leadership, said Lt. Gen. Alex Grynkewich, the Joint Staff’s director for operations, in a Monday briefing.
U.S. Central Command continued strikes against the group Sunday and Monday, launching a campaign that may last weeks, officials said.
“We will use overwhelming lethal force until we have achieved our objective,” said Sean Parnell, a Pentagon spokesperson also at the briefing.
The Harry S. Truman carrier strike group is in the Red Sea and was part of Saturday’s mission. The Georgia cruise missile submarine has also been operating in the region.
The Trump administration has said the attacks are intended to end the Houthis’ menacing of international trade in the Red Sea, a vital waterway for global shipping. The group began targeting commercial ships shortly after Israel’s war in Gaza began in the fall of 2023, though it paused soon after that conflict reached a ceasefire this January.
However, the Houthis threatened last week to resume attacks, objecting to the amount of humanitarian aid Israel is letting into Gaza.
The Biden administration previously launched a multinational task force to reopen trade in the Red Sea and targeted the Houthis in similar large-scale strikes. The strikes largely failed to protect shipping lanes, and most companies opted to reroute away from the Red Sea rather than risk attack.
The operations also drew the ire of many Republicans, including some now staffing the Trump administration. National Security Adviser Mike Waltz previously argued the Biden administration was depleting its scarce stockpiles of munitions to fight a “ragtag bunch of terrorists.” The Trump administration’s nominee to run Pentagon policy, Elbridge Colby, posted similar dismay last year.
“It’s truly a mark of how off-kilter our foreign policy is that we are now embarking on ongoing military attacks in Yemen - Yemen! - without any real prospect they will be effective,” Colby posted in January 2024.
At Monday’s briefing, Parnell and Grynkewich argued the strikes carried out under the Trump administration will be different, saying they were hitting Houthi leadership and a broader set of targets than before. Citing security concerns, the pair didn’t offer much detail on how the attacks will force the Houthis to buckle, and what happens if they don’t.
Earlier Monday, President Trump posted on social media that the U.S. will now consider Iran — largely responsible for arming the Houthis — responsible for any future attacks.
“Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN,” the president posted on his Truth Social website, threatening “consequences” on Tehran.
Neither Parnell nor Grynkewich would confirm whether the U.S. military was considering attacks on Iranian ships or territory.
“All options are on the table at this time,” Parnell said.
About Noah Robertson
Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.
White House, DOD deny that Hegseth leaked military secrets in chat app.
Democrats lament “an astonishingly cavalier approach to national security.”
By Leo Shane III and Noah Robertson
Mar 25, 2025 at 09:44 AM
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth pauses during a television interview outside the White House on March 21. (Jacquelyn Martin/AP)
White House and Pentagon leaders are denying accusations that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth improperly shared military secrets and classified information outside of secure channels ahead of military airstrikes against Houthi targets earlier this month.
But lawmakers — including a few Republicans — are demanding more information about top administration officials’ use of a group chat on the commercial app Signal that accidentally included a journalist from The Atlantic in conversations ahead of the launch of the military operation, to see if any laws were broken.
Officials from the National Security Council have publicly acknowledged that numerous top administration officials used the app to communicate ahead of the first airstrikes on March 16. The participants list included Hegseth, National Security Adviser Michael Waltz, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, and Vice President JD Vance, among others.
It also included Atlantic Editor-in-Chief Jeffrey Goldberg, apparently added by mistake. In a story published Monday, Goldberg said the conversation included “operational details of forthcoming strikes on Yemen, including information about targets, weapons the U.S. would be deploying, and attack sequencing.”
RELATED
Top Trump officials accidentally shared war plans with media
Hegseth reportedly assured chat participants that “we are currently clean on OPSEC” despite the accidental inclusion of a journalist.
By Leo Shane III
White House officials dismissed concerns about the mistake on Tuesday. Press secretary Karoline Leavitt wrote on social media that “no ‘war plans’ were discussed” in the chat and disputed claims from Goldberg that he saw classified material on the thread.
Similarly, in a press gaggle Monday, Hegseth attacked Goldberg as a “deceitful journalist” and accused him of “peddling hoaxes” without directly addressing the use of the non-secure channel for operational planning.
He also called the attacks a success, and said that should be the focus of the issue.
Still, in a statement to reporters on Monday, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker, R-Miss., called the existence of the chat group “definitely a concern” and said he believes “that mistakes were made” by senior officials. He vowed to hold classified briefings on the issue in the coming days.
Democratic lawmakers said that doesn’t go far enough.
A group of 14 Democratic senators on Monday demanded disciplinary action against some or all of the chat group participants for an “egregious breach of public trust” in the information leak.
“It does not take much imagination to consider the likely ramifications if this information had been made public prior to the strike – or worse, if it had been shared with or visible to an adversary rather than a reporter who seems to have a better grasp of how to handle classified information than your National Security Advisor,” the senators wrote.
“This is an astonishingly cavalier approach to national security.”
House Armed Services Committee ranking member Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., said in a social media post that “it’s time to start seriously worrying about the competency of President Trump’s national security team.” Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va. and ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for Waltz and Hegseth to resign.
Trump, in an interview with NBC News on Tuesday, brushed aside the controversy, saying that “Waltz has learned a lesson, and he’s a good man.”
On Monday, in a press event with reporters, he joked that the information leak could not be too serious because the strikes against the Houthis were effective and lethal.
Potential violations
Military operations — especially those about to occur — are highly sensitive U.S. secrets, which can put service members and American intelligence methods at risk. And while many of the officials participating in the group have the authority to declassify information themselves, there’s no public indication that they took formal steps to that effect.
Trump himself has a history with classified information. In his first term, he posted a picture of a rocket explosion inside Iran on Twitter, the social app now known as X. The image was taken from a highly classified U.S. spy satellite, but the president chose to release it without a formal approval process, usually required to publish such information.
U.S. government regulations also prohibit the use of personal devices or commercial messaging apps like Signal to discuss national security information. And though Signal is an encrypted app, that doesn’t mean it’s secure. Foreign governments can hack into and monitor personal cell phones, recording every keystroke made on the device. Such a breach wouldn’t immediately be clear, a former senior national security official said, speaking anonymously to avoid potential retaliation.
“The White House Counsel’s Office has provided guidance on a number of different platforms for President Trump’s top officials to communicate as safely and efficiently as possible,” Leavitt wrote Monday. Her post didn’t address whether Signal was one such platform, or what it would mean for broader U.S. intelligence standards.
That said, the president could retroactively say that he had authorized group chats like the one Goldberg was invited to, shielding the officials involved. Trump argued in his interview with NBC Tuesday morning that there was no immediate consequence to the chat, calling the episode a “glitch.”
“There’s a very real world in which this whole thing happens and it’s embarrassing and its mortifying, but no one gets fired,” said Jamil Jaffer, head of George Mason University Antonin Scalia School of Law’s National Security Institute.
A Defense Department memorandum from October 2023 specifically instructs senior military leaders not to use “non-DOD accounts or personal email accounts, messaging systems or other non-public DOD information systems — except approved or authorized government contractor systems — to conduct official business involving controlled unclassified information” or for classified national security files.
Department officials have also not publicly announced Signal as an authorized platform for military personnel use.
On Tuesday, John Ratcliffe, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that Signal is “permissible to use for work purposes” for his agency provided that the messages are also preserved elsewhere to conform with public records standards.
Ratcliffe confirmed that he was also on the Houthi airstrike chat group. Both he and Gabbard insisted that no classified information from the intelligence community was shared in the conversation.
FBI officials said they are still reviewing the incident, and have not yet committed to a full investigation. Warner and other Senate Democrats are pushing for one, calling it critical to public confidence in the administration.
About Leo Shane III and Noah Robertson
Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.
Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.
Pretty exciting ‼️
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke for the first time on Thursday about the airstrike overnight on Houthi targets in Yemen.
According to Netanyahu, "We did this in response to the Houthis' repetitive attacks on civilian targets in Israel. Last night, they attacked a school in Ramat Gan.
"They don't attack just us, they attack the entire world. They attack the international shipping and trade routes. So when Israel operates against the Houthis, it works for the entire international community. The Americans understand this well, and so do many others."
He further stated: "After Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime in Syria, the Houthis are almost the only arm that the Iranian axis of evil has left. They are learning and they will learn that those who hurt Israel - pay a very heavy price."
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עומר מירון/ לע״מ, סאונד: יחזקאל קנדיל/ לע״מ
Related articles:
Footage shows pilots taking off for Yemen strike
Warhead from Houthi missile falls in Ramat Gan school
Smotrich: 'Very good things were done last night in Yemen'
New details on the bombings in Yemen
The main objective of the IDF airstrikes was to shut down all three ports controlled by the Houthis.
The Air Force attacked targets in the port of Hodeidah and the capital Sana'a, approximately 2,000 km from Israel. The Houthis have launched about 200 ballistic missiles and 170 drones towards Israel since the war began. Most were intercepted, but some managed to penetrate Israeli airspace. In July, a drone from Yemen caused the death of Evgeny Freder in Tel Aviv.
The first wave of the attack began at 3:15 AM in the coastal area of Yemen, with the second following at 4:30 AM in Sana'a. Fourteen fighter jets, covering more than 1,700 km, participated, targeting the ports of Ras Issa, Hodeidah, and the Al-Salif port. In total, eight tugboats were attacked. In Sana'a, fuel tanks, oil, and a power station were targeted.
We were on the same flight from Larnaca. She was returning from her grandfather’s funeral. I was traveling from Haifa via Larnaca to London. After the Houthis struck near Ben Gurion Airport with a rocket, most airlines stopped flying to London—and not just there.
She sat next to me and shared some gozinaki [Georgian nut brittle] with me. Whenever I see beautiful people, my first thought is that I’ll photograph them. We got to talking and spent four hours telling each other about our lives.
‘You know, there were plenty of empty seats when I booked my ticket,’ she said, ‘but I thought, "It’s fate," and clicked the square right next to yours. So we didn’t meet by chance. There’s a reason for everything.’
We exchanged numbers. And yes—I did photograph her. And she’s extraordinary
George's Island in foreground.
Carrier in action www.nytimes.com/card/2024/03/18/world/houthis-red-sea-yem...
Pretty exciting ‼️
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke for the first time on Thursday about the airstrike overnight on Houthi targets in Yemen.
According to Netanyahu, "We did this in response to the Houthis' repetitive attacks on civilian targets in Israel. Last night, they attacked a school in Ramat Gan.
"They don't attack just us, they attack the entire world. They attack the international shipping and trade routes. So when Israel operates against the Houthis, it works for the entire international community. The Americans understand this well, and so do many others."
He further stated: "After Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime in Syria, the Houthis are almost the only arm that the Iranian axis of evil has left. They are learning and they will learn that those who hurt Israel - pay a very heavy price."
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Related articles:
Footage shows pilots taking off for Yemen strike
Warhead from Houthi missile falls in Ramat Gan school
Smotrich: 'Very good things were done last night in Yemen'
New details on the bombings in Yemen
The main objective of the IDF airstrikes was to shut down all three ports controlled by the Houthis.
The Air Force attacked targets in the port of Hodeidah and the capital Sana'a, approximately 2,000 km from Israel. The Houthis have launched about 200 ballistic missiles and 170 drones towards Israel since the war began. Most were intercepted, but some managed to penetrate Israeli airspace. In July, a drone from Yemen caused the death of Evgeny Freder in Tel Aviv.
The first wave of the attack began at 3:15 AM in the coastal area of Yemen, with the second following at 4:30 AM in Sana'a. Fourteen fighter jets, covering more than 1,700 km, participated, targeting the ports of Ras Issa, Hodeidah, and the Al-Salif port. In total, eight tugboats were attacked. In Sana'a, fuel tanks, oil, and a power station were targeted.
Pretty exciting ‼️
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke for the first time on Thursday about the airstrike overnight on Houthi targets in Yemen.
According to Netanyahu, "We did this in response to the Houthis' repetitive attacks on civilian targets in Israel. Last night, they attacked a school in Ramat Gan.
"They don't attack just us, they attack the entire world. They attack the international shipping and trade routes. So when Israel operates against the Houthis, it works for the entire international community. The Americans understand this well, and so do many others."
He further stated: "After Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime in Syria, the Houthis are almost the only arm that the Iranian axis of evil has left. They are learning and they will learn that those who hurt Israel - pay a very heavy price."
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עומר מירון/ לע״מ, סאונד: יחזקאל קנדיל/ לע״מ
Related articles:
Footage shows pilots taking off for Yemen strike
Warhead from Houthi missile falls in Ramat Gan school
Smotrich: 'Very good things were done last night in Yemen'
New details on the bombings in Yemen
The main objective of the IDF airstrikes was to shut down all three ports controlled by the Houthis.
The Air Force attacked targets in the port of Hodeidah and the capital Sana'a, approximately 2,000 km from Israel. The Houthis have launched about 200 ballistic missiles and 170 drones towards Israel since the war began. Most were intercepted, but some managed to penetrate Israeli airspace. In July, a drone from Yemen caused the death of Evgeny Freder in Tel Aviv.
The first wave of the attack began at 3:15 AM in the coastal area of Yemen, with the second following at 4:30 AM in Sana'a. Fourteen fighter jets, covering more than 1,700 km, participated, targeting the ports of Ras Issa, Hodeidah, and the Al-Salif port. In total, eight tugboats were attacked. In Sana'a, fuel tanks, oil, and a power station were targeted.
Israel strikes Houthi ports across Yemen, 'Galaxy Leader' ship
The IDF struck three ports, a power station, and a ship used for terrorist purposes in the Red Sea, Defense Minister Katz noted.
Houthi supporters burn Israeli and US flags in solidarity with Palestinians and Iran, in Sanaa, Yemen June 20, 2025
Houthi supporters burn Israeli and US flags in solidarity with Palestinians and Iran, in Sanaa, Yemen June 20, 2025
(photo credit: REUTERS/KHALED ABDULLAH)
ByJERUSALEM POST STAFF
JULY 7, 2025 00:34
Updated: JULY 7, 2025 01:23
The IDF struck three Houthi-controlled naval ports, a power station, and a ship used for terror purposes docked in Yemen early Monday morning.
The Israel Air Force attacked the Hodeidah, Ras Issa, and Al-Salif ports. In a statement, the IDF noted that these three ports were "used by the Houthi terrorist regime to transfer weapons of the Iranian regime that are used to carry out terrorist plots against the State of Israel and its allies."
Defense Minister Israel Katz said that the strikes were part of an IDF operation to eliminate Houthi terror infrastructure in Yemen.
According to the IDF, the Houthis installed a radar system on the Galaxy Leader and use it to track ships in the Red Sea. The vessel was hijacked by the Houthis in 2023; it is reportedly leased by a British company that is partially owned by an Israeli national, but it sails under the flag of the Bahamas.
The Galaxy Leader's crew was not heard from for months after they had been taken by the Houthis, and were released in January 2025.
Houthi channels claimed that the group confronted the Israeli strike with missiles.
The Monday morning attack comes after the Houthis targeted an international commercial vessel for the first time in months.
The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported that the incident happened about 50 nautical miles south of Hodeidah. The Magic Seas was first targeted on Sunday by gunfire and self-propelled grenades launched from eight small boats, with armed security on the ship returning fire.
All of the crew were later rescued and taken to safety.
Al-Masirah TV noted at the time that the release was carried out “in support of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza” which had entered into effect at the time and would last until mid-March.
nice hair
utter nonsense
the New York Times reported that Hegseth shared details of a US attack on Yemeni Houthi rebels last month in a second Signal chat that he created himself and included his wife, his brother and about a dozen other people.
Kamera: Nikon FM
Linse: Nikkor-S Auto 55mm f1.2 (1970)
Film: Rollei P&R 640 @ box speed
Kjemi: Rodinal (1:25 / 13:30 min. @ 20°C)
-Monday 26 February 2024: What an eventful day - so many things happening all at once - all of which deserves looking further into:
- US Air Force soldier Aaron Bushnell self-immolates in a shocking protest outside the Israeli embassy in Washington D.C and dies from his injuries.
- Palestinian prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh (b. 1958) and his PA government resigns.
- Jordanian Air-Force airdrops humanitarian aid of food and other supplies in Gaza
- Last day of the ICJ hearing on the legality of Israeli occupation of West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.
- Final day for Israel to deliver their report to the ICJ in the South Africa vs. Israel genocide case on what measures they have been taking in order to prevent genocide - it was delivered just hours before the deadline.
While we try to digest the rapid bombardment of suddenly fast-forward development, news and unexpected flux - for a better understanding of the context, I want to share with you a worthwile broadcast which goes deeper into the history of Palestine, the PLO and the PA:
COLONIAL LAW AND THE ERASURE OF PALESTINE
by Chris Hedges (b. 1956), The Real News Network February 2, 2024 [See and listen here]
For a century, international law derived from British colonial rule has been premised on the non-existence of Palestinians as a people.
In Palestine, the law has been used as a tool of oppression to legitimize and advance the dispossession of the Palestinian people for more than a century. From the theft of Palestinian land by legal mechanisms to the non-recognition of Palestinians as a people with the inalienable right of self-determination, the law is yet another weapon wielded against the Palestinian people by Israel and its patrons. Activist, attorney, and Rutgers University professor Noura Erakat joins The Chris Hedges Report to discuss the use of lawfare against Palestine and her new book, Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine.
Studio Production: Cameron Granadino
Post-Production: Adam Coley
TRANSCRIPT
The following is a rushed transcript and may contain errors. A proofread version will be made available as soon as possible.
Chris Hedges:
“Time and time again,” the human rights attorney, Noura Erakat (b. 1980), writes, “we see evidence of the laws assumed insignificance in the dispossession of Palestinians. Great Britain remained committed to establishing a Jewish national homeland and Palestine, despite its legal duties as the mandatory power to shepherd local Arab peoples to independence. The permanent mandates commission remained committed to the incorporation of the Balfour Declaration into the Mandate for Palestine in contravention of the covenant of the League of Nations, which in discussing the dispossession of the communities formally belonging to the Turkish empire, stated that the wishes of these communities must be a primary consideration.”
“The United Nations proposed a partition of Palestine without legal consultation and in disregard of the existing populations wellbeing and development, which the same covenant had declared to be a sacred trust of civilization. Zionist militias established Israel by force without regard to the partition plans stipulated borders.”
“The United Nations accepted Israel as a member despite the state’s violation of the non-discrimination clauses of the partition plan and of the UN’s own condition that Israel permit the return of forcibly displaced Palestinian refugees. The very origins of the Palestinian Israeli conflict,” Erakat continues, “suggests that it is characterized by outright lawlessness and yet few conflicts have been as defined by astute attention to law and legal controversy as this one.”
“Do Jews have a right to self-determination in a territory in which they did not reside but settled? Are Palestinians a nation with the right to self-determination or are they merely a heterogeneous polity of Arabs eligible for minority rights? Did the United Nations have the authority to propose partition in contravention of the will of the local population? Are the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip occupied as a matter of law that is, are they recognized as such by law?”
Does Israel have the right in law to self-defense against the Palestinians living in the occupied territories? Do Palestinians have the right to use armed force against Israel? Is the root of Israel’s separation barrier built predominantly in the West Bank illegal? Is Israel an apartheid regime?
Joining me, discussing these issues examined in her book, Justice For Some: Law and The Question of Palestine, is the human rights attorney and assistant professor at Rutgers University, Noura Erakat (b. 1980).
You begin the book, I think making a crucial point, and that is that the entire legal system, and this predates the establishment of the state of Israel under the British mandate, is grounded in the denial of sovereignty to the Palestinian people. And I, as we said before I went on air, reminded me very much of the construction of the American legal system, another settler colonial project, basing it on Locke’s primacy of property. So you build a legal system on a distortion. And this was something that the British imposed. Let’s go back and look at that.
Noura Erakat:
Absolutely. And so I think that the invocation of John Locke (1632-1704) is very apt here. Specifically as we were discussing earlier, Locke theorizes the social contract as was later applied in the United States as a social contract for settlers only through the exclusion of indigenous peoples and their erasure. And here what you’re describing as the perversion and the denial of sovereignty to Palestinians is what I capture as a colonial erasure, the erasure of the juridical status of Palestinians as a international people with the right to self-determination. There was never a denial that there were people on these lands, but that there was an outright denial whether these people constituted a political community with the right to exercise self-determination, what we’re using interchangeably here with sovereignty, though I would caution that sovereignty has come to take on quite new meaning beyond just statehood and self-governance. But in so far as we’re discussing this particular moment, it’s the aftermath of the First World War.
And the British have basically promised Palestine to its native peoples and promised self-determination across the former Ottoman territory is what they describe as the area a mandate. They’ve also promised Palestine and designated it as a site of Jewish settlement as captured by the Balfour Declaration, which was approved by British Parliament in 1917. That later becomes the Preambular text for the Palestine mandate, which governs the regulation of this mandate territory. Now, in so doing, and this is why I examine the language of the Balfour Declaration, the declaration itself only recognizes Jews was having a right to self-determination when they designated as a site of settlement and recognizes the original inhabitants, but only describes them as having a right to civil and religious rights. So they have the right to practice their religion freely and to move about freely, but they do not have a right to political rights.
And that’s what I capture as the colonial erasure. Once the British do that, and now it’s incorporated in the Palestine mandate in 1921, it becomes, I suggest, not just British colonial prerogative as the mandatory power. It now becomes international law and policy by which the entire permanent mandate commission, which is overseeing the governance of all the mandates. Now remember the mandates are set up as being trusteeships that will be shepherded to self-determination. But as Timothy Mitchell points out, this was about the consent of the governed. That self-determination here only meant that the governed decided who would be their mandatory power. But this becomes an other way to continue French and British colonial penetration into the Middle East and North Africa without necessarily granting independence to these peoples who have to fight for their independence. But even within that construction, they set apart Palestine as a part of international law and policy.
They set it apart from the other class A mandates in saying unlike those mandates that are being shepherded to independents that have a provisional government, that are able to represent themselves, Palestine because of its designation as a side of Jewish settlement has to be now developed in another way. And so they suppress any form of Palestinian sovereignty and self-determination even in contravention of the League of Nations covenant, which regulates the mandate territories, the mandates themselves that says, for example, “You cannot contravene the wishes of the original inhabitants.” Well, obviously we know that the inhabitants rejected Zionism and wanted self-determination, that there should be some sort of self-government, but they wouldn’t allow representative self-government because if they did, that would contravene the Balfour Declaration.
And now the Balfour Declaration was part of the Palestine mandate, which was international law. The PMC resolves this in basically saying, “Why don’t we first prioritize the settlement of Jewish persons and then we’ll move on to resolve the issue of the rights of the original inhabitants?”
And this points out to something interesting, Chris, which is often I think we give too much credit to Britain and to this imperial access of having a plan, that they planned that there would be a Jewish state. And I don’t think so. I don’t think so. I think that they wanted to thwart self-determination in general and maintain Palestine as a site where they can continually justify their intervention and their colonial penetration in order to basically compete with the French in the MENA region as well as to justify their presence through some sort of colonial benevolence.
And what crystallizes later is why this becomes the demand. Now, the Zionist demand for a Jewish state is not something that they necessarily intended and why it becomes a blunder. This becomes a blunderous policy for them as we see in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the British leave and they give this to the United Nations and they say, “We don’t know what to do anymore. We can’t resolve this. We’ve made too many promises, we’ve created a bit of a Frankenstein here.” But all that to say is that it was through their 30 years of that mandatory authority that they create the conditions that basically make ripe Zionist militias to then establish a Jewish state themselves, a Zionist state with a solid Jewish demographic majority that is contingent on the removal and dispossession of the original Palestinian people.
Chris Hedges:
Well, at the inception, the Jews and Palestine who were a small minority were essentially seen as colonial administrators. And during the Arab Revolt, 37, 38, 39, the British were arming the Zionist militias as auxiliary units. You’re write, all of it backfired. But from the inception, and this was I think the underlying point of the Balfour administration, it was through the Jewish community that essentially they were going to maintain this colony. Isn’t that correct?
Noura Erakat:
Yeah, very interesting here. This is also part of a broader colonial trope that they wanted to protect the minority Jewish population as a religious population, and it’s under this kind of benevolent auspices that they can justify their own intervention, right? But they wanted, for example, to maintain direct access and build a railroad from Haifa to Baghdad as part of a broader British vision, that this wasn’t about creating a homeland for Jews, for the British as much as it was about achieving their policy as you’re describing. A few things about the Great Revolt. The Great Revolt is so significant, not only because here the British are arming the Jewish Yeshu, the Zionists and training them in this moment leaving arms to them. At the same time, Rashid Khalidi (b. 1948) points out to us that through the course of the Great Revolt, the British actually end up decimating 10% of the male adult population either through imprisonment, exile, or outright killing.
And so this makes the Palestinians, in fact, some 10 years later when now they’re facing off with the Zionist militias in the falling apart of the partition plan, unable to resist I think more forcefully. So that’s absolutely significant.
The second thing I’ll say about the Great Revolt is that it changed British policy that whereas the British refused to reexamine their commitment to Zionism between 1917 and 1936 in the aftermath of the Great Revolt because they realized that they could not resolve this forcefully, they could not partition Palestine as a matter of force, that the Palestinians refused that outcome, that it would have to be done by force. They actually revised their Zionist policy for the first time when they issue the white paper and they walk back that policy and now say that the future will be determined by a referendum and that there will somehow be an Arab federal state instead. Obviously, none of this comes to fruition, not least of which because the Second World War begins.
Chris Hedges:
And I just, as you point out in your book, the Arab Revolt was actually quite successful. I think they even occupied, as you say, Jerusalem for five days, huge parts of the country. And the British declared martial law and brought in, was it a hundred thousand or 200,000 British troops? So it required Draconian British military power, in essence to crush these aspirations. And then as you point out, left the Palestinians weakened. You had a Jewish brigade of course in World War II incorporated into the British Army, and then they pushed through the seizure of land, 78% of land 1948 when they created the state of Israel, which is an important part.
Noura Erakat:
Before you go there, Chris, I just want to point out this point about martial law significant in three ways, I should say. Number one, the martial law regime that the British apply during the Great Revolt in order to basically crush the Palestinian insurgency and uprising is something that they’re applying across their colonial geographies and their colonial holdings, whether it be in Malay, in Kenya, in India, this is a form of their suspending all civil rights in order to be able to exercise whatever they deem necessary for their national interests. And so the colonial legacy, here, I say that to just emphasize that as exceptional as many aspects of the Palestinian struggle for liberation are, that it’s actually quite common and emblematic of a broader colonial history. The second thing that I want to point out is that upon its establishment, Israel, one of the first act of the Knesset is to adopt Britain’s emergency regime, almost verbatim, almost verbatim, for the purpose of achieving its settler colonial ambitions.
Of course, they become sovereign over 78% of Palestinian lands, but those lands still belong to Palestinians. It takes 12 years until 1960 in four phase plan where now the state of Israel, no longer the Zionist militias, are now the state forces, are incrementally taking that land through a regime of immigration law, property law, and emergency rule of which the military law is central as it’s applied solely to the Palestinian population that remains, that eventually become citizens of the state as well.
And then the third thing that I’ll say about that martial law is that once they lift the martial law, in 1966, this is precisely what now they apply to the Palestinians and the West Bank in Gaza to continue that settler colonial expansion. So the legacy, this broad global legacy of martial rule in order to achieve their colonial ambitions becomes a central organizing technology of Israeli governance in order to fulfill its own settler colonial ambitions, both within what becomes Israel as well as in what we describe as the occupied territories in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.
Chris Hedges:
So there were two key points I picked up from your book. One, this continuum between a legal system set up by the British settler Colonial project and the Israeli settler colonial project really almost seamless and premised on exactly the same point that the Palestinians have no sovereignty, the Palestinians, Golda Meir (1898-1978), I think said they don’t exist as a people. And so just the same legal tools that the British were using to dispossess and strip Palestinians of basic rights are no different from the tools that Israel uses. Is that correct?
Noura Erakat:
I’ll modify that slightly. And also, unfortunately, [inaudible 00:18:35] D. Muir says this in an interview with the International Herald Tribune where she says, “It’s not as if there was a land with a people that we dispossessed. It was a land without a people for a people without a land.” This is emphasizing that colonial erasure, Golda Meir, Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952), Arthur Ruppin (1876-1943), all of these founding figures, Zionist figures understand full well there are Palestinians, they just do not recognize them as a political community.
There’s this continuing discourse of savagery, barbarism, lack of civilization, do not know how to rule themselves. It’s a colonial project. Zionism is very much a settler colonial project, which makes this revisionism that we’re seeing today, describing it as a national self-determination movement, or worse as the greatest form of anti-colonial revolt. So laughable because it is exalted, self exalted as a colonial project. The other thing I’ll just modify slightly is that insofar as the British were concerned, it wasn’t just that they were targeting Palestinians, they were also suppressing any form of national self-determination because of their imperial interest.
They wanted to stay there, they didn’t want to leave. But the infrastructure that they set up for us, this emergency infrastructure in particular is what Zionists adopt in Toto, almost verbatim, when the Israel establishes itself and they do so whereas when the British passed, they actually impose the martial law and the emergency regime on everyone. The Jewish Zionists as well as Palestinians, when Israel adopts it in the Knesset, it’s imposed on Palestinians only in order to continue now a specific form of dispossession. What the British do is engage in immigration, which is engage in a discriminatory form of immigration that just doesn’t regulate the immigration of Jewish settlers. And also a land regime where we’re seeing a tremendous sale of lands that’s also unregulated, not regulating the market properly so that Palestinians are not necessarily stripped forcefully what they’re stripped of as their political right, their political right to represent themselves, their political right to organize their political right to make decisions on what this looks like.
But not in the same way of once Israel is established. At that point, the law is retooled specifically to transform Palestinian lands into Israel lands. And once in the form of Israel lands, that’s just the cover because if you say Israel, that means that, oh, everybody who’s a citizen of Israel. But in fact, it’s a cover to say Jewish national lands in particular because upon its establishment in 1950 and 1952, Israel bifurcates Jewish nationality from Israeli citizenship. And this is key. This is key especially to those who discuss apartheid because Israel doesn’t become an apartheid regime for failing to establish a Palestinian state and truncating Zionist sovereignty across the 1949 Armistice lines or what we know as the 1967 lines. Israel is predicated on a discriminatory framework that bifurcates Jewish nationality through which all rights flow.
This is an extraterritorial right that promises any Jewish person within outside, who’s never even heard of the state, who might be born today, to land, to employment, to housing, to education, to governance in a way that will never become accessible even to the Palestinian inhabitants that never leave. 20% of Israel’s population are the Palestinians that stay through the 1948 war, but even they don’t have those same rights. They’re only entitled to Israeli citizenship. And there’s a two-tiered system, one of nationality and citizenship, and one of citizenship only, and citizenship only is a form of second class citizenship or a fifth pillar. And so this too is part of a legal edifice that defines the state and its establishment.
Chris Hedges:
In the book, you talk about the legal recourses that Palestinians, in particular the PLO, and what I found interesting is that while they didn’t achieve their ultimate objective, they often achieve secondary objectives that benefited the Palestinian people almost by default. Can you explain that?
Noura Erakat:
Well, you’re leaving it very open-ended because as you know, I divide the book into five critical junctures. Each of those junctures is really catalyzed by some sort of violent confrontation that becomes an opportunity to recalibrate the balance of power. And in each of these episodes, that relationship between power and law becomes formative in both defining how we understand the question of what becomes the question of Palestine as articulated by the United Nations in 1948, it suddenly becomes a question, and defines the meaning of law in particular. So what the Palestinians do, and those junctures are 1917, in the aftermath of the first World War, 1967, the 1967 war, 1973, the October 1973 war, 1987, the First Palestinian Intifada and 2000, the Second Palestinian Intifada, which also shapes and defines ongoing warfare to this day when Israel shifts from a policy of occupation to explicit warfare against the Palestinians who live under its occupation.
So I say that all to lay out the audience, that I’ll just focus on the juncture and the aftermath of the 1973 war. When I articulate in the book that this was really the apex of when the Palestinian Liberation Organization due to the law astutely to achieve its national ambitions. Now, this is also nuanced because at this time in 1973, the PLO as defined by its militia forces who take over the PLO in 1968, their goal is full liberation. They want to liberate all of Palestine. They have no ambitions for a state. There’s no articulation of that. This is a decolonization movement they want to liberate. They want to free the land. In the aftermath of the 1973 war, and specifically we see this very explicitly in ’74, we might see it earlier, but very explicitly in ’74, there is now a seed planted that envisions the establishment of a truncated Palestinian state as either the stepping stone of full liberation or the final solution.
We don’t see that question resolved until 1988 when the Palestinians now enter Oslo. So I’m just setting this up for the audience to be able to explain that even we say, what do Palestinians want? At this point there’s a lot of nuance. There’s an explicit agenda of full liberation, but there’s also now a latent agenda by some elements of the PLO led by Fatah, and I would say even a very conservative element of Fatah, not all of Fatah at this time. So now what? Okay, so in ’74, the Palestinians basically make their first foray into the United Nations. Their objective is actually not to enter the United Nations. They want to enter the Middle East peace process now being shepherded by the Soviet Union, but by primarily the United States, by Nixon, who’s both the Secretary of State and the head of the National Security Council, who in pursuance of Zionist goals as well as US national interest, disaggregates the Arab Israeli question, or the Arab Israeli conflict, I should say, into an Egyptian Israeli track, a Lebanese Israeli track, a Jordanian Israeli track, a Syrian Israeli track, and leaves out the Palestinians altogether.
What the PLO really wants is to be able to negotiate on behalf of themselves and not by proxy. Failure to be able to incorporate themselves into that negotiating process, now they set their sights on the United Nations, and that’s when they enter in ’74 to pass Resolution 3236 and 3237, which together both affirms their Juridical status as a people when it says that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and not merely a [inaudible 00:28:23] of refugees in need of humanitarian assistance and establishes a corrective to Resolution 242, which doubles down on their erasure by describing them as refugees only, and establishes a quid pro quo arrangement whereby Israel will enjoy permanent peace in recognition for returning all of the territories. And so this is seen as an instrument of defeat. So that’s the first kind of what, I guess, one might describe as that’s not exactly what they wanted.
What they wanted was to enter into the negotiations. This is what they do, which is also very successful. That didn’t advance their cause as much. And in the summer of ’75, they decided that they wanted to expel Israel from the United Nations in the same way that the non-aligned movement had expelled South Africa and unseated it from the United Nations. But in their effort to do so, they were primarily blocked by Egypt under the leadership of Anwar El-Sadat (1918-1981), who saw that the only pathway forward was through some sort of US alliance in order to get the Sinai back to recoup the Sinai and wanted to continue negotiations with Israel. So actually stymied this initiative to unseat Israel from the United Nations. Instead, what the Palestinians do in the summer of ’75 at the International Women’s Conference, at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, at the non-aligned movement, amongst the organization of African Union is basically a condemnation of Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination.
That wasn’t the primary goal, but that was the consensus. So they come back to the general assembly and now work to create one of the most significant, I think, legal achievements when they amend the decade against racism that was targeting apartheid in Namibia and South Africa to also include a condemnation of Zionism. And we get Resolution 3379 that declares that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination that would only be rescinded by the PLO itself in 1991. And so I would say that these are just a few examples of what… I think I’m responding to your question of perhaps what Palestinians had sought and what they do instead using these legal maneuvers. And obviously all of this entry of foray is also restricting the Palestinians themselves, but it’s a restriction that they welcome in order to advance their other goals.
Chris Hedges:
Let’s talk about Oslo. You opened that chapter quoting Edward Said (1935-2003), who calls it a Palestinian Versailles, and really, I think, you make a very persuasive argument that it destroys the PLO as an effective resistance organization.
Noura Erakat:
When I started this chapter, I really was starting it and interested in it as a legal scholar, and I thought to myself, one of the offerings that I can make is to explain to a non-specialist, what did Oslo do in order to permanently subjugate Palestinians? Because that’s what it is. Oslo is a sovereignty trap. It doesn’t promise, there’s never even a mention of the Palestinian state. None of its negotiating terms promises an eventual outcome of a Palestinian state. Palestinians don’t get anything. And so I wanted to explain that, how does Israel create this new administration under Oslo to regulate access to water, access to land, access to movement? How does Oslo set up all of these strictures? But when I read the actual documents, the Declaration of Principles, also known as Oslo 1, when you read Oslo 2, that sets up this jurisdictional regime of area A, B, and C, when you read why and Taba and so on, it’s so obvious how Palestinians are subjugated that I thought to myself, well, you don’t need to be a legal expert to have this takeaway, you just need to be literate.
So instead, I decide to answer a question I don’t know the answer to yet, which is why? Why would the PLO enter into something so obviously devastating and self-defeating. And in trying to answer that question, what becomes clearer to me anyway, is that this really is about salvaging the PLO, that that’s what was being done. The PLO after its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982 in removal to Tunisia, is now no longer has a solid base where it almost oversees, one would say the infrastructure of a para state with a significant refugee population within Lebanon that constitutes an entire institution of representation and services and functioning, and also it doesn’t have the grounds for cross border attacks. That’s a significant blow. By 1987, they continue to weaken, not least because of the emergence of opposition like Hamas, that now becomes even more popular than the PLO struggle, as well as the fact that now there’s an organic movement within the West Bank in Gaza that’s leading an Intifada, an uprising so that the center of gravity shifts from the Palestinian diaspora to Palestinian lands themselves.
And this is undermining the PLO’s authority together with the fact now by the time Arafat throws his hat in and supports Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait, which in retribution Gulf states, Kuwait, number one basically says Palestinians out. And now there’s a whole loss of remittances to the Palestinians, as well as the fact that anybody that wants to support Palestine is going to support opposition and not the PLO itself. So all of these things come together to basically shape a moment where the PLO was at the edge of irrelevance, at the edge of irrelevance. And entering into the negotiations, they had a very adept team at Madrid, Washington, that saw the writing on the wall [foreign language 00:35:33] are very clear in their legal analysis in mourning that Israel is basically offering the same thing that was offered in the 1978 Middle East peace process in the negotiation between Sadat and Begin leading up to the 1979 permanent Egyptian Israeli peace, which is an autonomy framework.
That’s all they’re offering. They offered the same thing in ’78. The only difference now when they’re offering it in the lead up to the adoption of the Declaration of principles is that they’re saying that Palestinians will not only be able to govern themselves on these different plot of lands, but can also govern certain plots of land, but only there. They still won’t be able to exercise jurisdiction. And instead of electing a local government to do it, they’ll allow the PLO to do it. Those are literally the only differences between ’78 and what we ultimately see in ’93. One of the interesting things about doing this work, Chris, and this research, is that the legal literature is dominated by Israeli scholars, especially on these questions. So part of the work that I was doing was also helping to create a Palestinian archive to advance these legal arguments.
And doing that meant that I interviewed the interlocutors that were there. I interviewed the negotiators themselves, so Camille Mansour (b. 1945), who was there and was a negotiator and is a legal scholar. It’s his words where he illuminates that if you lose Palestinian representation, we go back to being just no people anymore. We had to save the PLO in order to save our status as a juridical people. But in exchange for that recognition, we basically relinquished Palestine.
The rescindment of the 1975 resolution declaring Zionism is a form of racism, is emblematic. The amendment of the charter that says that Palestinians will no longer resort to armed force when Israel is not making similar concessions. It doesn’t say we’re not resorting to armed force. The recognition of Israel. Palestinians recognize Israel. There’s no mutual recognition of a Palestine. And so Palestinians basically see and surrender what should have remained on the table as part of their negotiating leverage as a condition for entering into Oslo, which becomes the trap that they remained frankly ensconed within. Although we obviously see many, many cracks and Oslo has been dead, even though many have tried to keep it up on stilts. But that’s what’s happening. That’s what people are celebrating in 1993, even though though Edward Said, Haidar Abdel-Shafi, Nabil Shaath, and many others recognized as an instrument of defeat, this Palestine, it’s done, Palestine has been lost. And even Hanan Ashrawi (b. 1946), Dr. Hahan Ashrawi, who recognizes what a loss this is, also agrees that it was still worthwhile because they didn’t want to relinquish the status of the PLO. And so people are not stupid.
This was a very logical decision. The PNC approves Oslo, approves the DOP. So this is also not necessarily just betrayal by the PLO, even though it is betrayal by the negotiating team in Oslo, which was the back channel secret negotiation, but the negotiators in Washington had no idea about. But just adding nuance here that there was a lot. The PLO in its own documentation says that they entered into Oslo and Dr. Nabil Shaath (b. 1938), who’s also one of my interlocutors, says, “We knew it was bad, but we entered on good faith.” And that faith obviously didn’t bear out for them. It didn’t do what they had hoped.
Chris Hedges:
There was a lot of corruption. I was in Gaza after Oslo and the PLO leadership were importing their duty free Mercedes and building villas. As you point out in the book, the PA (Palestinian Authority) spends most of its budget on internal security functioning in essence as a colonial police force, the hierarchy that’s willing to do that dirty work can live very well. But we’ve now reached a point, and of course in the elections in 2006, the PA lost, Hamas won even in the West Bank. So in many ways, I don’t know if you would agree, it’s nullified itself as a credible movement on behalf of the Palestinian people at this point. Would you agree?
Noura Erakat:
100%. I think that this is consensus amongst Palestinians, which is what’s so troubling that the PA, even according to Oslo, the PA is only meant to be an administrative body. It should deliver mail. It should pick up the trash. It should complete administrative functions. It was never appointed to lead the Palestinian liberation movement, which should have remained within the purview of the PLO. But we see a collapse of the PA in the PLO in a way that blurs these lines on the firsthand. And then instead what we see, it was supposed to have a temporary function until we moved into permanent status negotiations and the establishment of the Palestinian state. There’s never a mention of the Palestinian state, Chris. Even the negotiators themselves, Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1995) who is hailed as the peacemaker and assassinated for his willingness to enter into Oslo by an Israeli settler.
Even he says there will never be a Palestinian state. So this temporary arrangement should have only lasted for five years. Let alone now we’re above three decades, and the PA has been a very, very significant instrument part and parcel of Israel’s occupation regime. It is doing the work on behalf of Israel. It is coordinating security with Israel. It is arresting Palestinians. It is providing intelligence on where Palestinians are. It is actually entering into Palestinian public squares to beat Palestinians to suppress their protests, even now against the genocide in Gaza. Just think. Just think the fact that the public sector is bloated, but the primary part of the Palestinian public sector is the security sector. And that security sector is basically policing Palestinians to protect Israel settlement enterprises. I had said before, and I’m saying now again, that in contrast, there’s no dedication, for example, to invest in the agricultural sector.
Had the PA now collapsed with a PLO invested in an agricultural sector, it might’ve been able to create and cultivate an economy that can engage in boycott of Israeli goods even rather than be flooded with Israeli goods into the market. But this also goes hand in hand with the fact that the PLO has never even endorsed boycott. There’s still committed, even if it’s a state led, a truncated Palestinian state, to that structure at the expense of liberation. And why at the expense of liberation, because this is not inclusive of all Palestinians. It’s not inclusive of the Palestinian refugees. It’s certainly not inclusive of the Palestinians who are citizens of Israel, and it doesn’t have a vision of how is it that Palestinians are going to be free from Israeli dominance as opposed to what they’re banking on, which is an autonomy arrangement whereby they will forever receive certain incremental privileges from Israel and its patron, the United States, in exchange for being good natives.
And this is the trap that we remain in, and it puts Palestinians… It makes our struggles so much harder. And many people are asking, how is Gaza? And the West Bank too. I mean, obviously the West Bank is being subject to untold and unprecedented violence from the beginning of this year, but especially since early October. But Palestinians are not even able to mount a significant and a robust resistance to protect themselves because not only are they being attacked by Israel and their settler vigilantes who are being armed, but they’re also being attacked and policed by the Palestinian authority.
Chris Hedges:
You compare the PLO to the Namibians and you make some, I think, really important points about how they were far more astute. They rejected the South African peace process as an alternative. SWAPO refused to enter South Africa’s exclusive sphere of influence and maintain an adversarial position, unlike the PLO, which has committed to US mediated bilateral talks for 25 years, SWAPO never relinquished its right to the use of force, and it never ceased its armed struggle. Talk about the difference because they were far more successful. And then of course you had Cuban troops stationed in Angola.
Noura Erakat:
I bring up Namibia in the conclusion because there is, especially in the realm of Palestine, and we see this now because of the South Africa application at the ICJ, there is a way because of the failure of politics really, and a failure of a Palestinian leadership to articulate some sort of a political program and a resistance vision. And resistance here, I mean robustly like diplomatic resistance, economic resistance, popular resistance, cultural resistance, delegitimizing, a Zionist colonial project. Nothing. There’s nothing. And in the absence of that, unfortunately, human rights and rights-based programs have taken up an inordinate amount of space in a way that even supplants the language of politics that now Palestinian politics are hollowed out instead with principles of law, which is detrimental, is detrimental because the law is only a tool. That very same law like human rights law that Palestinians use to assert their right to family and their right to not be harmed.
Settlers in the West Bank are invoking that same body of law to say that it’s their human right to maintain these lands and to be protected and to be free of Israeli state violence. The law will set up a battleground only, but that can only be resolved through politics. And so I bring that to the fore to say, because so many people bring up Namibia as an example of a very astute use of the law. Here it is. Namibia waged a multi-year legal battle where they incrementally scaffolded a legal argument at the ICJ in order to demonstrate firstly and foremost the illegitimacy of South Africa as a mandatory power and a governing power in Namibia and South Africa. And then scaffolding on top of that other rights of their right to self-determination and so on and so forth. But it’s not because of this robust jurisprudence that the Namibians ultimately gain independence. That’s necessary.
That was strategic. That helped build a language to use. It helped cultivate international support. But ultimately it wasn’t a legal decision. South Africans don’t leave Namibia because the court said so, they could care less. Ultimately why they leave is because you have Cuban forces who are fighting alongside, who are in Angola that the US wants out of Angola. This becomes a proxy for the US and the Soviet Union and Cuba being involved, and part of that negotiation of withdrawal includes withdrawal from Namibia. So there are other things happening where this influences the United States and shifts its position on apartheid as well. But the Namibians, as you point out in and as I point out in the book, are also very astute. They never enter into a South African sphere of influence. They’re offered the same thing that Palestinians are offered in the form of black homelands and autonomous governance.
They reject that. They never rescind their right and to use armed force, which is enshrined as a result of the non-aligned movement, enshrined as a right for people living under alien occupation, racism and domination. So that matters too. Now, I say all that to say to the credit of the Palestinians that this environment in which Namibia is maneuvering or Namibians are maneuvering, excuse me, doesn’t exist by the time the Palestinians are entering into Oslo. In fact, we’re seeing Namibian and South African independence. Mandela has been released. We’re seeing the fall of apartheid. We see the fall of the Soviet Union. We see the emergence of a unipolar world. So this balance of power that really did enable a different kind of liberation struggle for Namibians is not available to the Palestinians at the time. And so we can sit here retrospectively and say, “Well, nothing could have been worse than what they’ve done now.”
But all of this is conjecture, obviously. I’m less concerned about the trap that Palestinians enter into based on this balance of power based on the political considerations. I’m more concerned that they haven’t shifted course and policy when it was clear. If you didn’t know the day of like Abdel-Shafi and Said than others, you certainly knew by 2000 when the Camp David agreement collapses. Now it’s over. [inaudible 00:51:44] is besieged and killed. That’s it. There’s no excuse. Because I want to give some benefit of the doubt that they thought they couldn’t get anything better. Fine. But by 2000, you knew that this was a dead end. So there’s absolutely no explanation why Palestinians would stay in that arrangement since 2000 through 2023, a quarter of a century, knowing full well, there’s no way out.
Chris Hedges:
Well, Palestinian Street. The average Palestinian has walked away from it. They walked away from it a long time ago.
Noura Erakat:
Even in this moment, the Palestinian liberation struggle’s not being led by an official Palestinian leadership, which makes this moment even more profound, that we’re Palestinian Diaspora, Palestinians on the ground. Everybody has been coordinating and working without a centralized governance system, certainly without any means and funding, and yet has been able to mobilize in a decentralized fashion.
The Boycott National Committee establishes itself in 2005, launches an international boycott divestment in sanctions movement. This is civil society. It has nothing to do with the Palestinian leadership. The way that Palestinians bring back a condemnation of Zionism, which we see first in the Durban Conference in 2001. The review conference of the decade against racism happens in Durban, South Africa in 2001, where Palestinians raise the banner and say, “Israel’s an apartheid regime, and Zionism is racism once again.” Palestinians have never relinquished that front, and we even see it in the realm of knowledge production where scholars have reconstructed very robustly, not only making clear that Israel is a settler colonial project, but that there’s an entire realm of Palestinian indigenous studies of tradition, of economy, of belonging, of family, all sorts of tradition of land use, of sea technology that could be studied, which brings us into 2024.
The reason we remain alive as a people is because the people have insisted that we are here.
Chris Hedges:
I want to close by talking about the resistance. That was more than a hundred days of saturation, bombing of Gaza, destruction of every form of infrastructure that can sustain existence from wells to hospitals, to bakeries to schools, horrific numbers of dead. I was in Sarajevo during the war, which was awful, three to 400 shells a day, four to five dead a day, two dozen wounded a day. I only say that as a comparison to Gaza, where hundreds of people are being wounded and killed a day just to point out the scale. And yet, US intelligence estimates that only 20 to 30% of resistance or fighters, Hamas fighters, have been killed. It’s becoming clear that if Israel does not achieve its goal, which I don’t see how it will of eradicating Hamas, and Hamas and the resistance survives, which I feel it will then in any way, the Palestinians win.
And however horrific Gaza becomes other than the Yemenis, the Houthis, nobody is intervening to halt this genocide despite all the legal bodies we have at the UN and everywhere else. But talk about the resistance and whether I know how I knew one of the founders of Hamas, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi (1947-2004) was in his house with him and his family. His wife was just killed on October 19th. And not by the way, the demonized image of a leader of Hamas. He was a pediatrician, highly educated, graduated first in his class from the University of Alexandria, very soft-spoken, brilliant figure, assassinated in 2004 along with one of his sons. Let’s talk about the resistance. And so whether you embrace the ideology of Hamas or not, for me, is irrelevant. I think it’s been amazingly successful.
Noura Erakat:
Well, I want to nuance this in many ways. I want to nuance this by having a lot of mixed feelings about strategy and moving forward. And I want to emphasize here, I think, and I understand, I understand this idea of that if they’re not defeated, they win, which is a tenant of asymmetric warfare and guerilla combat. But I can’t do that with ease, given the magnitude of loss and given just how painful it’s been.
Images that I saw last night are still ravaging me inside of what are we going to tell these kids who have suffered so much? 355,000 children because of dehydration are at risk of permanent, cognitive, under development and stunting, right? So it’s hard for me, Chris, as much as if they’re not defeated, obviously I don’t want them to be defeated. And what people don’t understand when they say that is because surrender doesn’t bring us back to an ordinary life, which is normally what war looks like. You fight, you fight, you fight, you fight, and then one party surrenders because then you just go back to ordinary life. Palestinians don’t go back to an ordinary life. So surrender is not an option. At the same time, I want to take time to mourn. Palestinians have not had time to mourn. There is such deep devastation that’s generational, that’s traumatic, that’s social, that’s political that I want to honor and hold here. And it’s very painful. It’s just very, very painful.
And I don’t know what we do. I don’t know what we do because not only are we holding onto that pain, but now we have in Israel a society that is not just quasi okay with an apartheid racist regime. They have literally become avid supporters of genocide as a matter of rights. They’re fascists, society, media, children are taunting their elders, their principal for expressing empathy for Palestinians. For me, I paused to say, what is the victory here when now we have to deal with a society? What is the exit plan? How do you defeat fascism in a world where it’s being nurtured by Germany and the United States and Britain and Canada? They’re applauding them. And so where is the accountability here? So I just countenance the language of victory, to be honest, and I know that puts me at odds and probably deflates a lot of people who want to hear something else, and I just want to ground this in something else of what it means that Israel cannot decimate Hamas military.
They cannot. There is no military solution. There is no military solution. They cannot decimate Hamas. They haven’t. Hamas is still firing rockets from the middle of Gaza City. As you point out, they’ve not even decimated half of their militants in the Gaza Strip. They’ve not turned the Palestinians against Hamas, which was part of their military objective. If anything, they’ve made Hamas more popular and robust, not only amongst Palestinians, across the air world and the world in general. And they’re not any closer to retrieving their captive, their captive military personnel or rescuing their civilian hostages, which they were only able to retrieve and return through diplomatic negotiations. Someone has to ask, how can you justify the 11th most significant military in the world? Be trust by US intelligence, with advanced weapons technology that has had no red lines for over a hundred days, that has not even come close to achieving any of its military objectives, but has certainly destroyed Palestinian life, conditions of life that’s promising devastation into the future.
We have to agree that anybody who’s now supporting this is outright supporting a terroristic program that’s basically targeting Palestinian civilians, as put by Professor [inaudible 01:01:51], Palestinian civilians are clearly the military objectives. Hamas is the collateral damage.
So I think that we have to use this to agree that there is no way out, but that the road ahead is what we absolutely need to keep our eyes on. For me, victory is liberation. Victory is a world where Palestinians are recognized as having human life that is sacred and worthy of protection and deserving of self-defense, which Palestinians have asserted over and over and refused to relinquish. I cannot believe this is in controversy.
And so insofar as the cessation, for me, first and foremost, the cessation of hostilities is necessary just to end the genocide. And then insofar as it demonstrates there’s no military solution and exposes that Zionism is predicated on just a genocidal program that’s an ongoing Nakba in their own words, Avi Dichter (b. 1952) said it clearly, “This is Gaza.” Gaza Nakba 2023. They’ve equated their peace and security to genocide and ethnic cleansing. In so far as it illuminates that in order to get us to the threshold that it’s not controversial, that it’s not controversial, that Palestinians deserve life.
Chris Hedges:
Thank you. That was Noura Erakat, human rights attorney and assistant professor at Rutgers University. I want to thank the Real News Network and his production team, Cameron Granadino, Adam Coley, David Hebden, and Kayla Rivara. You can find me at chrishedges.substack.com.
This article first appeared on The Real News Network and is republished here under a Creative Commons license.
U.S. is sending fighter jets to boost military presence in Middle East as tensions soar
World Aug 2, 2024 6:52 PM EDT
WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. Defense Department will move a fighter jet squadron to the Middle East and maintain an aircraft carrier in the region, the Pentagon said Friday, as President Joe Biden made good on his promise to beef up the American military presence to help defend Israel from possible attacks by Iran and its proxies and safeguard U.S. troops.
In a statement, the department said Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin also ordered additional ballistic missile defense-capable cruisers and destroyers to the European and Middle East regions and is taking steps to send more land-based ballistic missile defense weapons there.
The shifts come as U.S. leaders worry about escalating violence in the Middle East in response to recent attacks by Israel on Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, which triggered threats of retaliation.
WATCH: Killings of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders escalate fears regional war could ignite
Biden in a call Thursday afternoon with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed new U.S. military deployments to protect against possible attacks from ballistic missiles and drones, according to the White House. In April, U.S. forces intercepted dozens of missiles and drones fired by Iran against Israel and helped down nearly all of them.
The assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on Wednesday and senior Hezbollah commander Fouad Shukur in Beirut on Tuesday risk escalating the fighting into an all-out regional war, with Iran also threatening to respond after the attack on its territory. Israel has vowed to kill Hamas leaders over the group’s Oct. 7 attack, which sparked the war.
Austin is ordering the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier strike group to the Middle East to replace the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group, which is in the Gulf of Oman but scheduled to come home later this summer. That decision suggests the Pentagon has decided to keep a carrier consistently in the region as a deterrent against Iran at least until next year.
The Pentagon did not say where the fighter jet squadron was coming from or where it would be based in the Middle East. A number of allies in the region are often willing to base U.S. military forces but don’t want it made public.
The White House in a statement said Biden “reaffirmed his commitment to Israel’s security against all threats from Iran, including its proxy terrorist groups Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis.”
Earlier Friday, Sabrina Singh, Pentagon spokeswoman, told reporters that moves were in the works. She said Austin “will be directing multiple” force movements to provide additional support to Israel and increase protection for U.S. troops in the region.
Military and defense officials have been considering a wide array of options, from additional ships and fighter aircraft squadrons to added air defense systems or unmanned assets. In many cases the U.S. does not provide details because host nations are very sensitive about the presence of additional U.S. forces and don’t want those movements made public.
It’s unclear what new ships would move to the Middle East.
The U.S. has had a consistent warship presence there and in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, including two Navy destroyers, the USS Roosevelt and the USS Bulkeley, as well as the USS Wasp and the USS New York. The Wasp and the New York are part of the amphibious ready group and carry a Marine expeditionary unit that could be used if any evacuation of U.S. personnel is required.
In addition, a U.S. official said that two U.S Navy destroyers that are currently in the Middle East will be heading north up the Red Sea toward the Mediterranean Sea. At least one of those could linger in the Mediterranean if needed. The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss troop movements.
Following a lay over at Gibraltar, HMS Diamond has rearmed her Sea Ceptor anti-air missiles, refuelled, restocked and conducted maintenance and this morning heads out to sea again. She is expected to be deployed back in the Red Sea to protect shipping from Houthi anti-ship and cruise missile attacks.
During her last deployment, HMS Diamond intercepted and downed nine Houthi drones.
Pretty exciting ‼️
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke for the first time on Thursday about the airstrike overnight on Houthi targets in Yemen.
According to Netanyahu, "We did this in response to the Houthis' repetitive attacks on civilian targets in Israel. Last night, they attacked a school in Ramat Gan.
"They don't attack just us, they attack the entire world. They attack the international shipping and trade routes. So when Israel operates against the Houthis, it works for the entire international community. The Americans understand this well, and so do many others."
He further stated: "After Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime in Syria, the Houthis are almost the only arm that the Iranian axis of evil has left. They are learning and they will learn that those who hurt Israel - pay a very heavy price."
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עומר מירון/ לע״מ, סאונד: יחזקאל קנדיל/ לע״מ
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New details on the bombings in Yemen
The main objective of the IDF airstrikes was to shut down all three ports controlled by the Houthis.
The Air Force attacked targets in the port of Hodeidah and the capital Sana'a, approximately 2,000 km from Israel. The Houthis have launched about 200 ballistic missiles and 170 drones towards Israel since the war began. Most were intercepted, but some managed to penetrate Israeli airspace. In July, a drone from Yemen caused the death of Evgeny Freder in Tel Aviv.
The first wave of the attack began at 3:15 AM in the coastal area of Yemen, with the second following at 4:30 AM in Sana'a. Fourteen fighter jets, covering more than 1,700 km, participated, targeting the ports of Ras Issa, Hodeidah, and the Al-Salif port. In total, eight tugboats were attacked. In Sana'a, fuel tanks, oil, and a power station were targeted.
Israeli Naval Strikes Target Yemen's Hodeidah Port Amid Rising Tensions.
The Israeli navy conducted strikes on Yemen's Hodeidah port as part of an ongoing campaign against the Houthis. Israel urged evacuations from Houthi ports, responding to ongoing missile threats. Iran-backed groups continue resistance in the region, influencing wider geopolitical dynamics.
Devdiscourse News Desk | Updated: 10-06-2025 11:05 IST | Created: 10-06-2025 11:05 IST
Israeli Naval Strikes Target Yemen's Hodeidah Port Amid Rising Tensions
This image is AI-generated and does not depict any real-life event or location. It is a fictional representation created for illustrative purposes only.
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On Tuesday, the Israeli navy launched attacks on Yemen's Hodeidah port, intensifying a campaign that traditionally involves airstrikes, according to Israeli army radio reports.
Houthi-controlled Al Masirah TV reported that the strikes targeted the docks at Al Hodeidah port, although there were no immediate reports of casualties. The strikes follow the Israeli military's call for evacuations at various Houthi-controlled ports.
Since the onset of the Gaza war in October 2023, the Houthis, aligned with Iran, have targeted Israel and Red Sea shipping in support of the Palestinians, prompting Israeli retaliation and increasing tensions across the region.
The T-34 is a Soviet medium tank from World War II. When introduced, its 76.2 mm (3 in) tank gun was more powerful than its contemporaries, and its 60-degree sloped armour provided good protection against anti-tank weapons. The T-34 had a profound effect on the conflict on the Eastern Front, and had a long-lasting impact on tank design. The tank was praised by multiple German generals when encountered during Operation Barbarossa, although its armour and armament were surpassed later in the war. Though, its main strength was its cost and production time, meaning that German panzer forces would often fight against Soviet tank forces several times their size. The T-34 is also a critical part of the mechanized divisions that form the backbone of the Deep Battle Strategy.
The T-34 was the mainstay of the Soviet Red Army armoured forces throughout the war. Its general specifications remained nearly unchanged until early 1944, when it received a firepower upgrade with the introduction of the greatly improved T-34-85 variant. Its production method was continuously refined and rationalized to meet the needs of the Eastern Front, making the T-34 quicker and cheaper to produce. The Soviets ultimately built over 80,000 T-34s of all variants, allowing steadily greater numbers to be fielded despite the loss of tens of thousands in combat against the German Wehrmacht.
Replacing many light and medium tanks in Red Army service, it was the most-produced tank of the war, as well as the second most-produced tank of all time (after its successor, the T-54/T-55 series). With 44,900 lost during the war, it also suffered the most tank losses ever. Its development led directly to the T-44, then the T-54 and T-55 series of tanks, which in turn evolved into the later T-62, that form the armoured core of many modern armies. T-34 variants were widely exported after World War II, and as recently as 2010 more than 130 were still in service.
Development and production
Origins
In 1939, the most numerous Soviet tank models were the T-26 infantry tank and the BT series of fast tanks. The T-26 was slow-moving, designed to keep pace with infantry on the ground. The BT tanks were cavalry tanks: fast-moving and light, designed for manoeuver warfare. Both were Soviet developments of foreign designs from the early 1930s: the T-26 was based on the British Vickers 6-Ton, and the BT tanks were based on a design from American engineer J. Walter Christie.
In 1937, the Red Army had assigned engineer Mikhail Koshkin to lead a new team to design a replacement for the BT tanks at the Kharkiv Komintern Locomotive Plant (KhPZ). The prototype tank, designated A-20, had a modified BA-20 engine and was specified with 20 mm (0.8 in) of armour, a 45 mm (1.77 in) gun, the production model used a Model V-2-34 engine, a less-flammable diesel fuel in a V12 configuration designed by Konstantin Chelpan. It also had an 8×6-wheel convertible drive similar to the BT tank's 8×2, which allowed it to run on wheels without caterpillar tracks. This feature had greatly saved on maintenance and repair of the unreliable tank tracks of the early 1930s, and allowed tanks to exceed 85 kilometres per hour (53 mph) on roads, but gave no advantage in combat and its complexity made it difficult to maintain. By 1937–38, track design had improved and the designers considered it a waste of space, weight, and maintenance resources, despite the road speed advantage. The A-20 also incorporated previous research (BT-IS and BT-SW-2 projects) into sloped armour: its all-round sloped armour plates were more likely to deflect rounds than perpendicular armour.
During the Battle of Lake Khasan in July 1938 and the Battles of Khalkhin Gol in 1939, an undeclared border war with Japan on the frontier with occupied Manchuria, the Soviets deployed numerous tanks against the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). Although the IJA Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks had diesel engines, the Red Army's T-26 and BT tanks used petrol engines which, while common in tank designs of the time, often burst into flames when hit by IJA tank-killer teams using Molotov cocktails. Poor-quality welds in the Soviet armour plates left small gaps between them, and flaming petrol from the Molotov cocktails easily seeped into the fighting and engine compartment; portions of the armour plating that had been assembled with rivets also proved to be vulnerable. The Soviet tanks were also easily destroyed by the Japanese Type 95 tank's 37 mm gunfire, despite the low velocity of that gun, or "at any other slightest provocation". The use of riveted armour led to a problem whereby the impact of enemy shells, even if they failed to disable the tank or kill the crew on their own, would cause the rivets to break off and become projectiles inside the tank.
After these battles, Koshkin convinced Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to let him develop a second prototype, a more heavily armed and armoured "universal tank" that reflected the lessons learned and could replace both the T-26 and the BT tanks. Koshkin named the second prototype A-32, after its 32 mm (1.3 in) of frontal armour. It had an L-10 76.2 mm (3 in) gun, and the same Model V-2-34 diesel. Both were tested in field trials at Kubinka in 1939, with the heavier A-32 proving to be as mobile as the A-20. A still heavier version of the A-32, with 45 mm (1.77 in) of front armour, wider tracks, and a newer L-11 76.2 mm gun, was approved for production as the T-34. Koshkin chose the name after the year 1934, when he began to formulate his ideas about the new tank, and to commemorate that year's decree expanding the armoured force and appointing Sergo Ordzhonikidze to head tank production.
Valuable lessons from Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol regarding armour protection, mobility, quality welding, and main guns were incorporated into the new T-34 tank, which represented a substantial improvement over the BT and T-26 tanks in all four areas. Koshkin's team completed two prototype T-34s in January 1940. In April and May, they underwent a grueling 2,000-kilometre (1,200 mi) drive from Kharkiv to Moscow for a demonstration for the Kremlin leaders, to the Mannerheim Line in Finland, and back to Kharkiv via Minsk and Kiev. Some drivetrain shortcomings were identified and corrected.
Initial production
Resistance from the military command and concerns about high production cost were finally overcome by anxieties about the poor performance of Soviet tanks in the Winter War in Finland, and the effectiveness of German tanks during the Battle of France. The first production T-34s were completed in September 1940, completely replacing the production of the T-26, the BT series and the multi-turreted T-28 medium tank at the KhPZ plant. Koshkin died of pneumonia (exacerbated by the drive from Kharkiv to Moscow) at the end of that month, and the T-34's drivetrain developer, Alexander Morozov, was appointed Chief Designer.
The T-34 posed new challenges for the Soviet industry. It had heavier armour than any medium tank produced to date, and there were problems with defective armour plates. Only company commanders' tanks could be fitted with radios (originally the 71-TK-3 radio set), due to their expense and short supply – the rest of the tank crews in each company signalled with flags. The L-11 gun did not live up to expectations, so the Grabin Design Bureau at Gorky Factory N.92 designed the superior 76.2 mm F-34 gun. No bureaucrat would approve production of the new gun, but Gorky and KhPZ started producing it anyway; official permission came from the State Defense Committee only after troops praised the weapon's performance in combat against the Germans.
Production of this first T-34 series – the Model 1940 – totalled only about 400, before production was switched to the Model 1941, with the F-34 gun, 9-RS radio set (also installed on the SU-100), and even thicker armour.
Mass production
Subassemblies for the T-34 originated at several plants: Kharkiv Diesel Factory N.75 supplied the model V-2-34 engine, Leningrad Kirovsky Factory (formerly the Putilov works) made the original L-11 gun, and the Dinamo Factory in Moscow produced electrical components. Tanks were initially built at Plant N.183, in early 1941 at the Stalingrad Tractor Factory (STZ), and starting in July at Krasnoye Sormovo Factory N.112 in Gorky.
Total Soviet tank production
TypeNumber
Light tanks14,508
T-3435,119
T-34-8529,430
KV and KV-854,581
IS-3,854
SU-7612,671
SU-852,050
SU-1001,675
SU-1221,148
SU-1524,779
After Germany's surprise invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 (Operation Barbarossa), the Wehrmacht's rapid advances forced the evacuation and relocation of Soviet tank factories eastwards to the Ural Mountains, an undertaking of immense scale and haste that presented enormous logistic difficulties and was extremely punishing to the workers involved. Alexander Morozov personally supervised the evacuation of all skilled engineers and laborers, machinery and stock from KhPZ to re-establish the factory at the site of the Dzerzhinsky Ural Railcar Factory in Nizhny Tagil, renamed Stalin Ural Tank Factory N.183. The Kirovsky Factory, evacuated just weeks before the Germans surrounded Leningrad, moved with the Kharkiv Diesel Factory to the Stalin Tractor Factory in Chelyabinsk, soon to be nicknamed Tankograd ("Tank City"). The workers and machinery from Leningrad's Voroshilov Tank Factory N.174 were incorporated into the Ural Factory and the new Omsk Factory N.174. The Ordzhonikidze Ural Heavy Machine Tool Works (UZTM) in Sverdlovsk absorbed workers and machines from several small machine shops in the path of German forces.
While these factories were being rapidly moved, the industrial complex surrounding the Dzerzhinsky Tractor Factory in Stalingrad continued to work double shifts throughout the period of withdrawal (September 1941 to September 1942) to make up for production lost, and produced 40% of all T-34s during the period. As the factory became surrounded by heavy fighting in the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942, the situation there grew desperate: manufacturing innovations were necessitated by material shortages, and stories persist of unpainted T-34 tanks driven out of the factory directly to the battlefields around it. Stalingrad kept up production until September 1942.
Soviet designers were aware of design deficiencies in the tank, but most of the desired remedies would have slowed tank production and so were not implemented: the only changes allowed on the production lines through to 1944 were those to make production simpler and cheaper. New methods were developed for automated welding and hardening the armour plate, including innovations by Prof. Evgeny Paton. The design of the 76.2 mm F-34 gun Model 1941 was reduced from an initial 861 parts to 614. The initial narrow, cramped turrets, both the cast one and the one welded of rolled armour plates bent to shape, were since 1942 gradually replaced with the somewhat less cramped hexagonal one; as it was mostly cast with only a few, simple flat armour plates welded in (roof etc.), this turret was actually faster to produce. Limited rubber supplies led to the adoption of all-steel, internally sprung road wheels, and a new clutch was added to an improved five-speed transmission and engine, improving reliability.
Over two years, the unit production cost of the T-34 was reduced from 269,500 Rbls in 1941, to 193,000 Rbls, and then to 135,000 Rbls.
In 1943, T-34 production had reached an average of 1,300 per month; this was the equivalent of three full-strength tank divisions. By the end of 1945, over 57,300 T-34s had been built: 34,780 T-34 tanks in multiple variants with 76.2 mm guns in 1940–44, and another 22,609 of the revised T-34-85 model in 1944–45. The single largest producer was Factory N.183 (UTZ), building 28,952 T-34s and T-34-85s from 1941 to 1945. The second-largest was Krasnoye Sormovo Factory N.112 in Gorky, with 12,604 in the same period.
At the start of the German-Soviet war, T-34s comprised about four percent of the Soviet tank arsenal, but by the end it made up at least 55% of tank production (based on figures from; Zheltov lists even larger numbers.
Following the end of the war, a further 2,701 T-34s were built prior to the end of Soviet production. Under licence, production was restarted in Poland (1951–55) and Czechoslovakia (1951–58), where 1,380 and 3,185 T-34-85s were made, respectively, by 1956. Altogether, as many as 84,070 T-34s are thought to have been built, plus 13,170 self-propelled guns built on T-34 chassis. It was the most-produced tank of the Second World War, and the second most-produced tank of all time, after its successor, the T-54/55 series.
Design
The T-34 had well-sloped armour, a relatively powerful engine and wide tracks. The initial T-34 version had a powerful 76.2 mm gun, and is often called the T-34/76 (originally a World War II German designation, never used by the Red Army). In 1944, a second major version began production, the T-34-85, with a larger 85 mm gun intended to deal with newer German tanks.
Comparisons can be drawn between the T-34 and the U.S. M4 Sherman tank. Both tanks were the backbone of the armoured units in their respective armies, both nations distributed these tanks to their allies, who also used them as the mainstay of their own armoured formations, and both were upgraded extensively and fitted with more powerful guns. Both were designed for mobility and ease of manufacture and maintenance, sacrificing some performance for these goals. Both chassis were used as the foundation for a variety of support vehicles, such as armour recovery vehicles, tank destroyers, and self-propelled artillery. Both were an approximately even match for the standard German medium tank, the Panzer IV, though each of these three tanks had particular advantages and weaknesses compared with the other two. Neither the T-34 nor the M4 was a match for Germany's heavier tanks, the Panther (technically a medium tank) or the Tiger I; the Soviets used the IS-2 heavy tank and the U.S. used the M26 Pershing as the heavy tanks of their forces instead.
Armour
The heavily sloped armour design made the tank better protected than the armour thickness alone would indicate. The shape also saved weight by reducing the thickness required to achieve equal protection. A few tanks also had appliqué armour of varying thickness welded onto the hull and turret. Tanks thus modified were called s ekranami (Russian: с экранами, "with screens").
The USSR donated two combat-used Model 1941 T-34s to the United States for testing purposes in late 1942. The examinations, performed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, revealed problems with overall armour build quality, especially of the plate joins and welds, as well as the use of soft steel combined with shallow surface tempering. Leak issues were noted: "In a heavy rain lots of water flows through chinks/cracks, which leads to the disabling of the electrical equipment and even the ammunition". Earlier models of the T-34, until the Model 1942, had cast turrets whose armour was softer than that of the other parts of the tank, and offered poor resistance even to 37 mm anti-aircraft shells. Early T-34s also suffered from poor quality welds, leading to instances of shells which would not have penetrated the tank under normal circumstances to penetrate anyway. They also suffered from rushed manufacturing, leading to inconsistent protection.
In addition, close examination of the T-34 at the Aberdeen Testing Ground showed that a variety of alloys were used in different portions of the armour on the T-34. "Mn-Si-Mo steels were employed for the thinner rolled armour sections, Cr-Mo steels for the thicker rolled armour sections, Mn-Si-Ni-Cr-Mo steels were employed for both rolled and cast steel components from 2" to 5" in thickness, and Ni-Cr-Mo steels were employed for some of the moderately thick cast armour sections". The armour was heat-treated in order to prevent penetration by armour-piercing shells, but this also caused it to be structurally weak, as the armor was very hard and thus brittle, resulting in strikes by high explosive shells causing spalling.
Despite these deficiencies, the T-34's armour proved problematic for the Germans in the initial stages of the war on the Eastern Front. In one wartime account, a single T-34 came under heavy fire upon encountering one of the most common German anti-tank guns at that stage of the war: "Remarkably enough, one determined 37 mm gun crew reported firing 23 times against a single T-34 tank, only managing to jam the tank’s turret ring." Similarly, a German report of May 1942 noted the ineffectiveness of their 50 mm gun as well, noting that "Combating the T-34 with the 5 cm KwK tank gun is possible only at short ranges from the flank or rear, where it is important to achieve a hit as perpendicular to the surface as possible." However, a Military Commissariat Report of the 10th Tank Division, dated 2 August 1941 reported that within 300–400 m the 37 mm Pak 36's armour-piercing shot could defeat the frontal armour. According to an examination of damaged T-34 tanks in several repair workshops in August to September 1942, collected by the People's Commissariat for Tank Industry in January 1943, 54.3% of all T-34 losses were caused by the German long-barreled 5 cm KwK 39 gun.
As the war went on, the T-34 gradually lost some of its initial advantages. The Germans responded to the T-34 by fielding large numbers of improved anti-tank weapons such as the towed 7.5 cm Pak 40 anti-tank gun, while hits from 88 mm-armed Tigers, anti-aircraft guns and 8.8 cm Pak 43 anti-tank guns usually proved lethal. In 1942 the German Panzer IVs were refitted with the 7.5 cm KwK 40 due to the inadequate anti-tank performance of previous German tank designs against the T-34. The upgunned Panzer IV posed a serious threat to the T-34-76, being able to penetrate the frontal turret of a T-34-76 at a range of 1,200 m (3,900 ft) at any angle.
A Wa Pruef 1 report estimated that, with the target angled 30° sideward, a Panther tank could penetrate the turret of a T-34-85 from the front at ranges up to 2000 m, the mantlet at 1200 m, and the frontal hull armour at 300 m. According to the Pantherfibel (the Panther tank manual for its crew), the T-34's glacis could be penetrated from 800 m and the mantlet from 1500 m at 30° sideward angle.
A Waffenamt-Prüfwesen 1 report estimated that with the T-34 angled 30 degrees sidewards and APCBC round, the Tiger I's 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56 would have to close in to 100 m (110 yd) to achieve a penetration in the T-34's glacis, and could penetrate the frontal turret of a T-34-85 at 1,400 m, the mantlet at 400 m, and the nose at 300 m Ground trials by employees of NIBT Polygon in May 1943 reported that the 88 mm KwK 36 gun could pierce the T-34 frontal hull from 1,500 meters at 90 degrees and cause a disastrous burst effect inside the tank. The examined hull showed cracks, spalling, and delamination due to the poor quality of the armour. It was recommended to increase and improve the quality of welds and armour.
Analysis of destroyed T-34 tanks in the Korean War found that the 76 and 90 mm armour-piercing rounds of the M41 Walker Bulldog and M46 Patton could penetrate the T-34 at most angles from 800 yd (730 m). The maximum range at which the tanks could penetrate the T-34 could not be determined due to a lack of data at higher combat ranges.
In late 1950 a T-34-85 tank was captured by the UN security force in the Korean War. An evaluation of the tank was conducted by the USA which found that the sloped armour of the T-34 was desirable for deflecting shells. They also concluded that the armour was deemed as satisfactory as armour strength was comparable to US armour of similar hardness and that the quality of the material used was "high-grade". Similarly, casting was seen as high quality although casting defects were found in the side armour of the tank that negatively affected armour strength. The abundance of gaps in the joints of the armour was seen as an undesirable feature of the tank due to the risk of injury from "entry of bullet splash and shell fragments".
Firepower
The 76.2 mm (3.00 in) F-34 gun, fitted on the vast majority of T-34s produced through to the beginning of 1944, was able to penetrate any early German tank's armour at normal combat ranges. When firing APCR shells, it could pierce 92 mm (3.6 in) at 500 m (1,600 ft) and 60 mm (2.4 in) of armour at 1,000 m (3,300 ft) The best German tanks of 1941, the Panzer III and Panzer IV, had no more than 50 or 60 mm (2.0 or 2.4 in) of flat frontal armour. However by 1942 the Germans had increased the hull armour on the Panzer IV to 80 mm (3.1 in) which provided good protection at normal combat distances. The F-34 also fired an adequate high explosive round.
The gun sights and range finding for the F-34 main gun (either the TMFD-7 or the PT4-7) were rather crude, especially compared to those of their German adversaries, affecting accuracy and the ability to engage at long ranges.[68] As a result of the T-34's two-man turret, weak optics and poor vision devices, the Germans noted:
T-34s operated in a disorganized fashion with little coordination or else tended to clump together like a hen with its chicks. Individual tank commanders lacked situational awareness due to the poor provision of vision devices and preoccupation with gunnery duties. A tank platoon would seldom be capable of engaging three separate targets but would tend to focus on a single target selected by the platoon leader. As a result, T-34 platoons lost the greater firepower of three independently operating tanks.
The Germans also noted that the T-34 was very slow to find and engage targets, while their own tanks could typically get off three rounds for every one fired by the T-34. As the war progressed the Germans created heavier tank designs like the Tiger I or Panther which were both immune to the 76mm gun of the T-34 when fired upon from the front. This meant that they could only be penetrated from the sides at ranges of a few hundred metres. Due to low anti-tank performance, the T-34 was upgraded to the T-34-85 model. This model, with its 85 mm (3.35 in) ZiS gun, provided greatly increased firepower compared to the previous T-34's 76.2mm gun. The 85 mm gun could penetrate the turret front of a Tiger I tank from 500 m (550 yd) and the driver's front plate from 300 m (330 yd) at the side angle of 30 degrees, and the larger turret enabled the addition of another crew member, allowing the roles of commander and gunner to be separated and increasing the rate of fire and overall effectiveness. The D-5T was capable of penetrating the Tiger I's upper hull armour at 1,000 metres. When firing on the frontal armour of the Panther at an angle of 30 degrees sidewards, the T-34-85 could not penetrate its turret at 500 m (550 yd). This meant that the T-34 would have to resort to using tungsten rounds or firing on the weaker sides of the Panther to destroy it.
The greater length of the 85 mm gun barrel – 4.645 m (15 ft 2.9 in) – made it necessary for crews to be careful not to plough it into the ground on bumpy roads or in combat. Tank commander A.K. Rodkin commented: "the tank could have dug the ground with it in the smallest ditch [filling the barrel with dirt]. If you fired it after that, the barrel would open up at the end like the petals of a flower", destroying the barrel. Standard practice when moving the T-34-85 cross-country in non-combat situations was to fully elevate the gun, or reverse the turret.
During the Korean War, the USA captured a T-34-85. US engineering analysis and testing concluded that the T-34-85 could penetrate 4.1 in (100 mm) at 1,000 yd (910 m), performing similarly to the HVAP rounds of the M41. The Americans also concluded the maximum range of the gun was 2–3 km (1.2–1.9 mi), but the effective range was only up to 1,900 m (1.2 mi).
Mobility
The T-34 was powered by a Model V-2-34 38.8 L V12 Diesel engine of 500 hp (370 kW),[d] giving a top speed of 53 km/h (33 mph). It used the coil-spring Christie suspension of the earlier BT-series tanks, using a "slack track" tread system with a rear-mounted drive sprocket and no system of return rollers for the upper run of track, but dispensed with the heavy and ineffective convertible drive. T-34 tanks equipped with the 4-speed gearbox could only use 4th gear on road, being limited to 3rd on terrain. In the first batch of T-34s, shifting from 2nd to 3rd required a force of 46-112 kg. In September 1941, however, changes were made which lowered the effort to under 31 kg by changing the 3rd gear ratio, which lowered top speed in 3rd gear from 29 km/h to 25 km/h, but made shifting easier. Using the 5-speed gearbox allowed the T-34 to use 4th gear on terrain, with which it could reach 30 km/h.
The T-34-76's ground pressure was around 0.72 kg/cm². Its wide tracks allowed for superior performance on dirt roads and off-road when compared to contemporary tanks. There were, however, still examples of T-34s getting stuck in mud. For example, in 1944 February 4, the 21st Guards Tank Brigade with 32 T-34, was ordered to proceed by road to Tolstoye Rogi, a journey of approximately 80 kilometers. Of the 32 tanks, no less than 19 got stuck in the mud or suffered mechanical breakdowns.
Ergonomics
The original 76mm armed T-34 suffered from the unsatisfactory ergonomic layout of its crew compartment compared to the later 85mm variant. The two-man turret crew arrangement required the commander to aim and fire the gun, an arrangement common to most Soviet tanks of the day. The two-man turret was "cramped and inefficient" and was inferior to the three-man (commander, gunner, and loader) turret crews of German Panzer III and Panzer IV tanks. The Germans noted the T-34 was very slow to find and engage targets while the Panzers could typically get off three rounds for every one fired by the T-34.
Early in the war, the commander fought at a further disadvantage; the forward-opening hatch and the lack of a turret cupola forced him to observe the battlefield through a single vision slit and traversable periscope.[81] German commanders liked to fight "heads-up", with their seat raised and having a full field of view – in the T-34 this was impossible. Soviet veterans condemned the turret hatches of the early models. Nicknamed pirozhok ("stuffed bun") because of its characteristic shape, it was heavy and hard to open. The complaints of the crews urged the design group led by Alexander Morozov to switch in August 1942 to using two hatches in the turret.
The loader also had a difficult job due to the lack of a turret basket (a rotating floor that moves as the turret turns); the same fault was present on all German tanks prior to the Panzer IV. The floor under the T-34's turret was made up of ammunition stored in small metal boxes, covered by a rubber mat. There were nine ready rounds of ammunition stowed in racks on the sides of the fighting compartment. Once these rounds had been used, the crew had to pull additional ammunition out of the floor boxes, leaving the floor littered with open bins and matting and reducing their performance.
The main weakness [of the two-man turret of a T-34 Model 1941] is that it is very tight. The Americans couldn't understand how our tankers could fit inside during a winter when they wear sheepskin jackets. The electrical mechanism for rotating the turret is very bad. The motor is weak, very overloaded and sparks horribly, as a result of which the device regulating the speed of the rotation burns out, and the teeth of the cogwheels break into pieces. They recommend replacing it with a hydraulic or simply manual system. Due to not having a turret basket the crew was [sic] could be injured by getting caught in the drive mechanism, this could leave them out of combat for a while, the lack of a turret basket also caused general discomfort to the crew, having to manually turn.
Most of the problems created by the cramped T-34/76 turret, known before the war, were corrected with the provision of a bigger cast three-man turret[86] on the T-34-85 in 1944.
General reliability
The T-34's wide track and good suspension gave it excellent cross-country performance. Early in the tank's life, however, this advantage was greatly reduced by the numerous teething troubles the design displayed: a long road trip could be a lethal exercise for a T-34 tank at the start of the war. When in June 1941, the 8th Mechanised Corps under Dmitry Ryabyshev marched 500 km towards Dubno, the corps lost half of its vehicles. A.V. Bodnar, who was in combat in 1941–42, recalled:
From the point of view of operating them, the German armoured machines were almost perfect, they broke down less often. For the Germans, covering 200 km was nothing, but with T-34s something would have been lost, something would have broken down. The technological equipment of their machines was better, the combat gear was worse.
The T-34 gearbox had four forward and one reverse gear, replaced by a five-speed box on the last of the 1943 model of the T-34.
The tracks of early models were the most frequently repaired part. A.V. Maryevski later remembered:
The caterpillars used to break apart even without a bullet or shell hits. When earth got stuck between the road wheels, the caterpillar, especially during a turn – strained to such an extent that the pins and tracks themselves couldn't hold out.
The USSR donated two combat-used Model 1941 T-34s to the United States for testing purposes in late 1942. The examinations, performed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, highlighted these early faults, which were in turn acknowledged in a 1942 Soviet report on the results of the testing:
The Christie's suspension was tested a long time ago by the Americans and unconditionally rejected. On our tanks, as a result of the poor steel on the springs, it very quickly fatigues and as a result clearance is noticeably reduced. The deficiencies in our tracks from their viewpoint result from the lightness of their construction. They can easily be damaged by small-caliber and mortar rounds. The pins are extremely poorly tempered and made of poor steel. As a result, they quickly wear and the track often breaks.
Testing at Aberdeen also revealed that engines could grind to a halt from dust and sand ingestion, as the original "Pomon" air filter was almost totally ineffective and had an insufficient air-inflow capacity, starving the combustion chambers of oxygen, lowering compression, and thereby restricting the engine from operating at full capacity. The air filter issue was later remedied by the addition of "Cyclone" filters on the Model 1943, and even more efficient "Multi-Cyclone" filters on the T-34-85.
The testing at Aberdeen revealed other problems as well. The turret drive also suffered from poor reliability. The use of poorly machined, low quality steel side friction clutches and the T-34's outdated and poorly manufactured transmission meant frequent mechanical failure occurred and that they "create an inhuman harshness for the driver". A lack of properly installed and shielded radios – if they existed at all – restricted their operational range to under 16 km (9.9 mi).
Judging by samples, Russians when producing tanks pay little attention to careful machining or the finishing and technology of small parts and components, which leads to the loss of the advantage what would otherwise accrue from what on the whole are well-designed tanks. Despite the advantages of the use of diesel, the good contours of the tanks, thick armor, good and reliable armaments, the successful design of the tracks etc., Russian tanks are significantly inferior to American tanks in their simplicity of driving, manoeuvrability, the strength of firing (reference to muzzle velocity), speed, the reliability of mechanical construction and the ease of keeping them running.
Soviet tests on newly built T-34’s showed that in April 1943 only 10.1% could complete a 330 km trial and in June ’43 this went down to 7.7%. The percentage stayed below 50% till October 1943 when it rose to 78%, in the next month it dropped to 57% and in the period December ’43 – January ’44 the average was 82%. During February 1944 tests, 79% of tanks reached 300 kilometers, and of the test batches 33% reached 1,000 kilometers. This became immediately apparent to the tank troops. The deputy commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, P. G. Dyner, commented that tanks in 1943 would reach only 75 percent of their guaranteed life span in engine hours and mileage, but in 1944 they reached 150 percent.
In 1944 June, a report written by the 2. Panzerjäger-Abteilung Company 128 (23. PzDiv.) described experiences acquired during operations with its Beutepanzer SU-85 and T-34:
Despite not having much experience yet, it can be said that the Russian battle tank is not suitable for carrying out long marches as well as high-speed marches. A maximum driving speed of 10–12 km / h has become convenient. During the marches and in order to allow the engines to cool down, it is absolutely necessary to make a stop every half hour for a minimum duration of between fifteen and twenty minutes.
Steering gears have caused problems and breakdowns on all new battle tanks. In difficult terrain, during the gears or also during the course of attacks where many changes of direction are made, the steering clutch heats up and covers with oil quickly: consequently the clutch does not engage and it is impossible to maneuver the vehicle. Once it has cooled down, the clutch should be cleaned with copious amounts of fuel.
In relation to the armament and based on the experiences acquired so far, it can be affirmed that the power of the 7.62 cm cannon is good. If the barrel is adjusted correctly it has good precision even at great distances. The same can be said of the rest of the automatic weapons of the battle tank. The weapons have good precision and reliability, although a slow rate of fire.
The Company has had the same positive experiences with the 8.5 cm assault gun. Regarding the true power of fire compared to the 7.62 cm gun, the Company is not yet able to give details. The effect of explosive projectiles ( Sprenggranaten ) at great distances and its precision is much higher than that of the 7.62 cm cannon.
The optical systems of the Russian battle tank are, in comparison with the Germans, much inferior. The German gunner has to get used to the Russian telescopic sight. Observing the impact or the trajectory of the projectile through the telescopic sight is only partially possible. The gunner of the Russian T-43 [sic] battle tank has only a panoramic optic, located in the upper left area, in front of the telescopic sight. In order for the loader to be able to observe the trajectory of the projectile in any case, the Company has additionally incorporated a second panoramic optics for this member of the crew.
In the Russian tank it is very difficult to steer the vehicle or a unit and shoot simultaneously. Coordinating fire within a company is only partially possible.
On January 29, 1945, the State Defense Committee approved a decree that extended the service life guarantee of the T-34's V-2-34 engine from 200 hours to 250 hours. A report by the 2nd Guards Tank Army in February 1945 revealed that the average engine service life of a T-34 was lower than the official warranty at 185–190 hours. For comparison, the US M4 Sherman had an average engine service life of 195–205 hours.
Operational history
Operation Barbarossa (1941)
Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, its invasion of the Soviet Union, on 22 June 1941. At the start of hostilities, the Red Army had 967 T-34 tanks and 508 KV tanks concentrated in five of their twenty-nine mechanized corps. The existence of the T-34 and KV heavy tanks proved a psychological shock to German soldiers, who had expected to face an inferior enemy. The T-34 was superior to any tank the Germans then had in service. The diary of Alfred Jodl seems to express surprise at the appearance of the T-34 in Riga, noting "the surprise at this new and thus unknown wunder-armament being unleashed against the German assault divisions". Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist, called it "the finest tank in the world" and Heinz Guderian affirmed the T-34's "vast superiority" over German tanks.
Initially, the Wehrmacht had great difficulty destroying T-34s in combat, as standard German anti-tank weaponry proved ineffective against its heavy, sloped armour. In one of the first known encounters, a T-34 crushed a 3.7 cm PaK 36, destroyed two Panzer IIs, and left a 14-kilometre (8.7 mi) long swathe of destruction in its wake before a howitzer destroyed it at close range. In another incident, a single Soviet T-34 was hit more than 30 times by a battalion-sized contingent of German 37mm and 50mm anti-tank guns, yet survived intact and drove back to its own lines a few hours later. The inability to penetrate the T-34's armour led to the Germans' standard anti-tank gun, the 37 mm PaK 36, being dubbed the Panzeranklopfgerät ("tank door knocker") because the PaK 36 crew simply revealed their presence and wasted their shells without damaging the T-34's armour. Anti-tank gunners began aiming at tank tracks, or vulnerable margins on the turret ring and gun mantlet, rather than the bow and turret armour. The Germans were forced to deploy 105 mm field guns and 88 mm anti-aircraft guns in a direct fire role to stop them.
Despite this, the Soviet corps equipped with these new tanks lost most of them within weeks. The combat statistics for 1941 show that the Soviets lost an average of over seven tanks for every German tank lost. The Soviets lost a total of 20,500 tanks in 1941 (approximately 2,300 of them T-34s, as well as over 900 heavy tanks, mostly KVs). The destruction of the Soviet tank force was accomplished not only by the glaring disparity in the tactical and operational skills of the opponents, but also by mechanical defects that afflicted Soviet armour. Besides the poor state of older tanks, the new T-34s and KVs suffered from initial mechanical and design problems, particularly with regard to clutches and transmissions. Mechanical breakdowns accounted for at least 50 percent of the tank losses in the summer fighting, and recovery or repair equipment was not to be found. The shortage of repair equipment and recovery vehicles led the early T-34 crews to enter combat carrying a spare transmission on the engine deck.
Other key factors diminishing the initial impact of T-34s on the battlefield were the poor state of leadership, tank tactics, initial lack of radios in tanks, and crew training; these factors were partially consequences of Stalin's purge of the Soviet officer corps in 1937, reducing the army's efficiency and morale. This was aggravated as the campaign progressed by the loss of many of the properly trained personnel during the Red Army's disastrous defeats early in the invasion. Typical crews went into combat with only basic military training plus 72 hours of classroom instruction; according to historian Steven Zaloga:
The weakness of mechanized corps lay not in the design of their equipment, but rather in its poor mechanical state, the inadequate training of their crews, and the abysmal quality of Soviet military leadership in the first month of the war.
Further action (1942–1943)
As the invasion progressed, German infantry began receiving increasing numbers of the 7.5 cm Pak 40 anti-tank guns, which were capable of penetrating the T-34's armour at long range. Larger numbers of the 88 mm Flak guns also arrived, which could easily defeat a T-34 at very long ranges, though their size and general unwieldiness meant that they were often difficult to move into position in the rough Soviet terrain.
At the same time, the Soviets incrementally upgraded the T-34. The Model 1942 featured increased armour on the turret and many simplified components. The Model 1943 (confusingly also introduced in 1942) had yet more armour, as well as increased fuel capacity and more ammunition storage. Also added were an improved engine air filter and a new clutch mated to an improved and more reliable five-speed transmission. Finally, the Model 1943 also had a new, slightly roomier (but still two-man) turret of a distinctive hexagonal shape that was easier to manufacture, derived from the abandoned T-34M project.
The T-34 was essential in resisting the German summer offensive in 1942, and executing the double encirclement manoeuvre that cut off the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in December 1942. The Sixth Army was surrounded, and eventually surrendered in February 1943, a campaign widely regarded as the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front.
In 1943, the Soviets formed Polish and Czechoslovak armies-in-exile, and these started to receive the T-34 Model 1943 with a hexagonal turret. Like the Soviet forces themselves, the Polish and Czechoslovak tank crews were sent into action quickly with little training, and suffered high casualties.
In July 1943, the Germans launched Operation Citadel, in the region around Kursk, their last major offensive on the Eastern Front in the Second World War. It was the debut of the German Panther tank, although the numbers employed at the resulting Battle of Kursk were small and the brunt of the burden was carried by the Panzer III, StuG III, and Panzer IV. The campaign featured the largest tank battles in history. The high-water mark of the battle was the massive armour engagement at Prokhorovka, which began on 12 July, though the vast majority of armour losses on both sides were caused by artillery and mines, rather than tanks. Over 6,000 fully tracked armoured vehicles, 4,000 combat aircraft, and 2 million men are believed to have participated in these battles.
The Soviet high command's decision to focus on one cost-effective design, cutting costs and simplifying production wherever possible while only allowing relatively minor improvements, had proven to be an astute choice for the first two years of the war. However, the battles in the summer of 1943 demonstrated that the 76.2 mm gun of the T-34 was no longer as effective as it was in 1941. Soviet tank crews struggled at longer ranges with the additional frontal armour applied to the later variants of the Panzer III and Panzer IV, and were unable to penetrate the frontal armour of the new German Panther or Tiger I tank at standard combat ranges without tungsten rounds, and had to rely on tactical skill through flanking manoeuvres and combined arms.
T-34-85
After improved German Panzer IVs with the high-velocity 7.5cm (2.95 in) KwK 40 gun were encountered in combat in 1942, a project to design an entirely new Soviet tank was begun, with the goals of increasing armour adding modern features like a torsion-bar suspension and a three-man turret. The new tank, the T-43, was intended to be a universal model to replace both the T-34 and the KV-1 heavy tank. However, the T-43 prototype's armour, though heavier, was not capable against German 88 mm guns, while its mobility was found to be inferior to the T-34. Finally, although the T-43 shared over 70% of its components with the T-34, manufacturing it would still have required a significant slow-down in production. Consequently, the T-43 was cancelled.
Not only were the weapons of German tanks improving, so was their armour. Soviet firing tests against a captured Tiger I heavy tank in April 1943 showed that the T-34's 76 mm gun could not penetrate the front of the Tiger I at all, and the side only at very close range. A Soviet 85 mm anti-aircraft gun, the M1939 (52-K), was found capable of doing the job, and so derivatives of it were developed for tanks. One of the resulting guns used on the original T-34 85 model (the D-5T) was capable of penetrating the Tiger I's upper hull armour at 1,000 metres. It was still not enough to match the Tiger, which could destroy the T-34 from a distance of 1,500 to 2,000 m (4,900 to 6,600 ft), but it was a noticeable improvement.
With the T-43 canceled, the Soviet command made the decision to retool the factories to produce an improved version of the T-34. Its turret ring was enlarged from 1,425 mm (56 in) to 1,600 mm (63 in), allowing a larger turret to be fitted supporting the larger 85 mm gun. The prototype T-43's turret design was hurriedly adopted by Vyacheslav Kerichev at the Krasnoye Sormovo Factory to fit the T-34. This was a larger three-man turret, with radio (previously in the hull) and observation cupola in the roof. Now the tank commander needed only to command (aided by cupola and radio systems), leaving the operation of the gun to the gunner and the loader. The turret was bigger and less sloped than the original T-34 turret, making it a bigger target (due to the three-man crew and bigger gun), but with thicker 90 mm armour, making it more resistant to enemy fire. The shells were 50% heavier (9 kg) and were much better in the anti-armour role, and reasonable in a general purpose role, though only 55–60 could be carried, instead of 90–100 of the earlier shells. The resulting new tank, the T-34-85, was seen as a compromise between advocates for the T-43 and others who wanted to continue to build as many 76 mm-armed T-34s as possible without interruption.
Production of the T-34-85 began in January 1944 at Factory No. 112, first using the D-5T 85 mm gun. Parallel to the production of the T-34-85 with the D-5T gun, production of the T-34-85 using the S-53 gun (later to be modified and redesignated as the ZIS-S-53 gun) began in February 1944 at Factory No. 112. The improved T-34-85 became the standard Soviet medium tank, with an uninterrupted production run until the end of the war. A T-34-85 initially cost about 30 percent more to produce than a Model 1943, at 164,000 Rbls; by 1945 this had been reduced to 142,000 Rbls during the course of World War II the cost of a T-34 tank had almost halved, from 270,000 Rbls in 1941, while its top speed remained about the same, and its main gun's armour penetration and turret frontal armour thickness both nearly doubled.
The T-34-85 gave the Red Army a tank with better armour and mobility than the German Panzer IV tank and StuG III assault gun. While it could not match the armour or weapons of the heavier Panther and Tiger tanks, its improved firepower made it much more effective than earlier models, and overall it was more cost-effective than the heaviest German tanks. In comparison with the T-34-85 program, the Germans instead chose an upgrade path based on the introduction of completely new, expensive, heavier, and more complex tanks, greatly slowing the growth of their tank production and helping the Soviets to maintain a substantial numerical superiority in tanks. By May 1944, T-34-85 production had reached 1,200 tanks per month. In the entire war, production figures for all Panther types reached no more than 6,557, and for all Tiger types (including the Tiger I and Tiger II) 2,027. Production figures for the T-34-85 alone reached 22,559.
On 12 January 1945, a column of Tiger IIs and other tanks from 424th Heavy Panzer Battalion were involved in a short-range engagement with T-34-85 tanks near the village of Lisow. Forty T-34-85 tanks commanded by Colonel N. Zhukov were attacked by the 424th Heavy Panzer battalion, which had been reinforced by 13 Panthers. The Germans permanently lost five Tiger IIs, seven Tiger Is and five Panthers for the loss of four T-34-85 tanks burnt out.
German use of T-34s
The German army often employed as much captured materiel as possible and T-34s were not an exception. Large numbers of T-34s were captured in fighting on the Eastern Front though few were T-34-85s. These were designated by the Germans as Panzerkampfwagen T-34 747. From late 1941, captured T-34s were transported to a German workshop for repairs and modification to German requirements. In 1943 a local tank factory in Kharkiv was used for this purpose. These were sometimes modified to German standards by the installation of a German commander's cupola and radio equipment.
The first captured T-34s entered German service during the summer of 1941. In order to prevent recognition mistakes, large-dimension crosses or even swastikas were painted on the tanks, including on top of the turret, in order to prevent attack by Axis aircraft. Badly damaged tanks were either dug in as pillboxes or were used for testing and training purposes.
After the end of World War II, East Germany continued to utilize the T-34.
Manchurian campaign (August 1945)
Just after midnight on 9 August 1945, though the terrain was believed by the Japanese to be impassable by armoured formations, the Soviet Union invaded Japanese-occupied Manchuria. Red Army combined-arms forces achieved complete surprise and used a powerful, deep-penetrating attack in a classic double encirclement pattern, spearheaded by the T-34-85. The opposing Japanese forces had been reduced as elite units had been drawn off to other fronts and the remaining forces were in the middle of a redeployment. The Japanese tanks remaining to face them were all held in the rear and not used in combat; the Japanese had weak support from IJAAF forces, engineering, and communications. Japanese forces were overwhelmed, though some put up resistance. The Japanese emperor transmitted a surrender order on 14 August, but the Kwantung Army was not given a formal cease-fire until 17 August.
Korean War (1950–1953)
A full North Korean People's Army (KPA) brigade equipped with about 120 Soviet-supplied T-34-85s spearheaded the invasion of South Korea in June 1950. The WWII-era 2.36-inch bazookas initially used by the US troops in South Korea were useless against the KPA's T-34 tanks, as were the 75 mm main guns of the M24 Chaffee light tank. However, following the introduction of heavier and more capable armour into the war by US and UN forces, such as the American M4 Sherman, M26 Pershing and M46 Patton tanks, as well as the British Comet and Centurion tanks, the KPA began to suffer more T-34 tank losses in combat from enemy armour, aside from further losses due to numerous US/UN airstrikes and increasingly-effective anti-tank firepower for US/UN infantry on the ground, such as the then-new 3.5-inch M20 "Super Bazooka" (replacing the earlier 2.36-inch model). By the time the NKPA were forced to withdraw from the south, about 239 T-34s and 74 SU-76 assault guns had been lost or abandoned. After October 1950, NKPA armour was rarely encountered. Despite China's entry into the conflict in the following month, no major armour deployments were carried out by them, as the Chinese focus was on massed infantry attacks rather than large-scale armour assaults. Several T-34-85s and a few IS-2 tanks were fielded, primarily dispersed amongst their infantry, thus making armoured engagements with US and UN forces rare from then on.
A Chinese T-34 tank No. 215 from 4th Tank Regiment, 2nd Tank Division, allegedly destroyed four enemy tanks and damaged another M46 Patton tank during its fight from 6 to 8 July 1953. It also destroyed 26 bunkers,9 artillery pieces, and a truck. That tank is now preserved in the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution.
In summary, a 1954 US military survey concluded that there were, in all, 119 tanks vs. tank actions involving US Army and US Marine units against North Korean and Chinese forces during the Korean War, with 97 T-34-85 tanks knocked out and another 18 considered probable. American losses were somewhat greater.
Angolan Civil War (1975–1988)
One of the last modern conflicts which saw the extensive combat deployment of the T-34-85 was the Angolan Civil War. In 1975, the Soviet Union shipped eighty T-34-85s to Angola as part of its support for the ongoing Cuban military intervention there. Cuban crewmen instructed FAPLA personnel in their operation; other FAPLA drivers and gunners accompanied Cuban crews in an apprentice role.
FAPLA began deploying T-34-85s against the UNITA and FNLA forces on June 9, 1975. The appearance of FAPLA and Cuban tanks prompted South Africa to reinforce UNITA with a single squadron of Eland-90 armoured cars.
Other regions and countries
In early 1991, the Yugoslav People's Army possessed 250 T-34-85s, none of which were in active service. During the breakup of Yugoslavia, the T-34-85s were inherited by the national armies of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro and continued to see action during the Yugoslav Wars. Some were also acquired from Yugoslav reserve stocks by Serbian separatist armies, namely the Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina (SVK) and the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS). Most of these tanks were in poor condition at the beginning of the conflict and some were soon rendered unserviceable, likely through inadequate maintenance and lack of spares.
On 3 May 1995, a VRS T-34-85 attacked an UNPROFOR outpost manned by the 21st Regiment of the Royal Engineers in Maglaj, Bosnia, injuring six British peacekeepers, with at least one of them sustaining a permanent disability. A number of T-34s being stored by the VRS at a base in Zvornik were temporarily confiscated by UNPROFOR as part of a local disarmament programme the following year.
Middle East
Czechoslovak-produced T-34-85s were used by Egypt in the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1956 and 1967 (Six-Day War) in the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt went on to build the T-34-100, a local and unique conversion that was made up of a Soviet BS-3 100 mm heavy field-artillery gun mounted within a heavily modified turret, as well as the T-34-122 mounting the D-30 gun. In 1956, they were used as regular tanks to support Egyptian infantry, the tank was still in use by the Yom Kippur War in October 1973.
The Syrian Army also received T-34-85s from the Soviet Union and they took part in the many artillery duels with Israeli tanks in November 1964 and in the Six-Day War of 1967.
Warsaw Pact
T-34-85s equipped many of the armies of Eastern European countries (later forming the Warsaw Pact) and the armies of other Soviet client-states elsewhere. East German, Hungarian and Soviet T-34-85s served in the suppression of the East German uprising of 17 June 1953 as well as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
Afghanistan
T-34-85s were sporadically available in Afghanistan. During the Soviet–Afghan War, most of the T-34s were fielded by the Sarandoy internal security forces. Some were also kept in service with the Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
China
After the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Soviet Union sent many T-34-85s to the PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA). Factory 617 had the ability to produce every part of the T-34-85, and during decades of service many modifications were made that visibly distinguish the PRC T-34-85 from the original specification, but no T-34-85 was actually made in China. The production plan of the T-34-85 in China was ended soon after the PRC received T-54A main battle tanks from the Soviet Union and began to build the Type 59 tank, a licensed production version of the T-54A.
Cuba
Cuba received 150 T-34-85 tanks as military aid from the Soviet Union in 1960. The T-34-85 was the first Soviet tank to enter service with the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), along with the IS-2. Many T-34-85 tanks first saw action in April 1961 during the Bay of Pigs Invasion with an unknown number destroyed or knocked out during the battle. In 1975, many T-34-85s were also donated by the USSR to the FAR to support its lengthy intervention in the Angolan Civil War.
A platoon of five Cuban T-34-85s saw combat in Angola against South African troops during the Battle of Cassinga. The tanks were based along with a company of Cuban mechanized infantry equipped with BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers. In May 1978, South Africa launched a major airborne raid on Cassinga with the objective of destroying a SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) base there. The Cuban forces were mobilised to stop them. As they approached Cassinga they were strafed by South African aircraft, which destroyed most of the BTR-152s and three of the T-34-85s; a fourth T-34-85 was disabled by an anti-tank mine buried in the road. The remaining tank continued to engage the withdrawing South African paratroops from a hull down position until the battle was over.
Over a hundred Cuban T-34-85s and their respective crews remained in Angola as of the mid 1980s. In September 1986, Cuban president Fidel Castro complained to General Konstantin Kurochkin, head of the Soviet military delegation to Angola, that his men could no longer be expected to fight South African armour with T-34s of "World War II vintage"; Castro insisted that the Soviets furbish the Cuban forces with a larger quantity of T-55s. By 1987 Castro's request appeared to have been granted, as Cuban tank battalions were able to deploy substantial numbers of T-54Bs, T-55s, and T-62s; the T-34-85 was no longer in service.
Cyprus
Cypriot National Guard forces equipped with some 35 T-34-85 tanks helped to support a coup by the Greek junta against President Archbishop Makarios on 15 July 1974. They also saw extensive action against Turkish forces during the Turkish invasion in July and August 1974, with two major actions at Kioneli and at Kyrenia on 20 July 1974.
Namibia
In 1984, the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) made a concerted attempt to establish its own conventional armoured battalion through its armed wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). As part of this effort, SWAPO diplomatic representatives in Europe approached the German Democratic Republic with a request for ten T-34 tanks, which were delivered. PLAN T-34s were never deployed during offensive operations against the South African military, being confined to the role of protecting strategic bases inside northern Angola.
By 1988 the PLAN T-34-85s had been stationed near Luanda, where their crews received training from Cuban instructors. In March 1989, the PLAN tanks were mobilised and moved south towards the Namibian border. South Africa accused PLAN of planning a major offensive to influence Namibia's pending general elections, but the tank crews did not cross the border and refrained from intervening in a series of renewed clashes later that year. Between 1990 and 1991, SWAPO ordered the PLAN tanks in Angola repatriated to Namibia at its own expense. Four later entered service with the new Namibian Army.
Finland
The Soviet and Finnish armies used T-34s until the 1960s; the former included the 76.2 mm-armed versions until at least 1968, when they were used in filming the sequel to the movie The Alive and the Dead. The Finnish tanks were captured directly from the Soviets or purchased from Germany's captured stocks. Many of the Т-34-85s were enhanced with Finnish or Western equipment, such as improved optics.
Vietnam
During the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese Army was equipped with many Soviet T-34-85 and these were used in the Operation Lam Son 719, the 1972 Easter Offensive and the 1975 Spring Offensive. They were later used during the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Sino-Vietnamese War. A small number are currently being used as trainers. The rest are in storage and no longer serve as active duty battle tanks.
Yemen
In 2015, both T-34-85 Model 1969 tanks and SU-100 self-propelled guns were photographed being used in Houthi takeover in Yemen. Some were even being fitted with anti-tank guided missiles.
Current active service
In 2018, there were nine countries that maintained T-34s in the inventories of their national armed forces: Cuba, Yemen, the Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam. Of these operators, Vietnam possessed the largest known surviving fleet of T-34 series tanks, with 45. Yemen possessed 30, Guinea 30, Guinea-Bissau 10, Mali 21, and Laos 30. It was unclear how many Cuban and North Korean T-34s remained in service. All the Congolese, Namibian and Malian tanks were believed to be in reserve storage or inoperable. The Laotian Army retired its T-34s in early 2019 and sold them to Russia, to be used for public displays and museum exhibits.
Successors
In 1944, pre-war development of a more advanced T-34 tank was resumed, leading to the T-44. The new tank had a turret design based on the T-34-85's, but featured a new hull with torsion-bar suspension and transversely mounted engine; it had a lower profile than the T-34-85 and was simpler to manufacture. Between 150 and 200 of these tanks were built before the end of the war. With substantial drivetrain changes, a new turret, and 100 mm gun, it became the T-54, starting production in 1947
Pretty exciting ‼️
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke for the first time on Thursday about the airstrike overnight on Houthi targets in Yemen.
According to Netanyahu, "We did this in response to the Houthis' repetitive attacks on civilian targets in Israel. Last night, they attacked a school in Ramat Gan.
"They don't attack just us, they attack the entire world. They attack the international shipping and trade routes. So when Israel operates against the Houthis, it works for the entire international community. The Americans understand this well, and so do many others."
He further stated: "After Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime in Syria, the Houthis are almost the only arm that the Iranian axis of evil has left. They are learning and they will learn that those who hurt Israel - pay a very heavy price."
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נתניהו על התקיפה בתימן
עומר מירון/ לע״מ, סאונד: יחזקאל קנדיל/ לע״מ
Related articles:
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Warhead from Houthi missile falls in Ramat Gan school
Smotrich: 'Very good things were done last night in Yemen'
New details on the bombings in Yemen
The main objective of the IDF airstrikes was to shut down all three ports controlled by the Houthis.
The Air Force attacked targets in the port of Hodeidah and the capital Sana'a, approximately 2,000 km from Israel. The Houthis have launched about 200 ballistic missiles and 170 drones towards Israel since the war began. Most were intercepted, but some managed to penetrate Israeli airspace. In July, a drone from Yemen caused the death of Evgeny Freder in Tel Aviv.
The first wave of the attack began at 3:15 AM in the coastal area of Yemen, with the second following at 4:30 AM in Sana'a. Fourteen fighter jets, covering more than 1,700 km, participated, targeting the ports of Ras Issa, Hodeidah, and the Al-Salif port. In total, eight tugboats were attacked. In Sana'a, fuel tanks, oil, and a power station were targeted.
Nikki Haley: Harris and Biden need to treat Hamas as a terrorist organization
Following the murder of hostage Hersh Goldberg-Polin, former US Ambassador to the UN urges Biden and Harris to treat Hamas like a terrorist organization instead of pressuring Israel to agree to a hostage release deal.
Elad Benari
1 minute
Sep 3, 2024 at 4:29 AM (GMT+3)
REUTERS/Mike Segar
Former US Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, on Monday urged President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris to treat Hamas like a terrorist organization instead of pressuring Israel to agree to a hostage release deal.
“Hersh Goldberg-Polin, an American citizen, was executed in Gaza. Seven Americans are still being held hostage by the same terrorists who murdered Hersh,” Haley wrote in a post on social media site X.
“It’s unacceptable. America should demand Hamas and their funders, Iran, release the hostages immediately. Harris and Biden need to acknowledge Hamas is a terrorist organization and treat them like it, rather than pressuring Israel,” she added.
In an earlier post, Haley called on Biden and Harris to sanction Iran over its support for terrorist organizations like Hamas.
Haley shared a video of Goldberg-Polin’s mother, Rachel, from his funeral and wrote, “How many more of these funerals have to happen before Kamala Harris and Joe Biden start playing hardball and put the sanctions back on Iran? Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, none of these terror groups take this administration seriously. Cut off their money so the horror stops.”
Her posts came after Biden stated that he does not think Netanyahu has done enough to secure a hostage deal, telling a reporter "no" when asked a question on that issue.
Later, the White House said in a statement following a meeting between Biden and Harris with the US hostage deal negotiation team that "President Biden expressed his devastation and outrage at the murder of the six hostages and reaffirmed the importance of holding Hamas’s leaders accountable.”
Biden has been pushing an outline for a ceasefire and hostage release deal that he first laid out in May, but Hamas has continuously rejected every proposal that has been presented to it.
On Saturday night, he commented to reporters on the efforts to achieve a ceasefire and hostage release deal, saying, "It's time this war ended…I think we're on the verge of having an agreement."
He said he was "still optimistic" about the prospects of an agreement and added that "people are continuing to meet."
Related articles:
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Nikki Haley proved her unconditional support and love for Israel
'Our victory is your victory'
Nikki Haley meets Defense Minister Gallant
"We think we can close the deal, they've all said they agree on the principles," said Biden.
Last Sunday, two Egyptian security sources told Reuters that talks over a possible ceasefire in Gaza and hostage release deal ended without agreement in Cairo.
Thanks to Putin, many of my friends now live in different parts of the world. When Putin started the war with Ukraine, a huge number of Russians left the country—myself included. I, however, ended up in Israel. Double bingo, if you know what I mean. Not long ago, I was planning to go to London, but the Houthis from Yemen launched a missile near Ben Gurion Airport, so foreign airlines stopped flying here. But I found out that there’s a flight from Haifa to Larnaca, and from there, you can fly anywhere. My friends lived in Larnaca, so I stayed overnight with them and flew to London the next morning, not forgetting to take a photo of them. Long live friendship. And I can’t help but say—I know the world now loves to hate Israel. And we get bombed every other day. If before it was Gaza and Lebanon bombing us, now it’s the Houthis. Honestly, it’s exhausting. But no matter, the people of Israel are alive.
Thanks to Putin, many of my friends now live in different parts of the world. When Putin started the war with Ukraine, a huge number of Russians left the country—myself included. I, however, ended up in Israel. Double bingo, if you know what I mean. Not long ago, I was planning to go to London, but the Houthis from Yemen launched a missile near Ben Gurion Airport, so foreign airlines stopped flying here. But I found out that there’s a flight from Haifa to Larnaca, and from there, you can fly anywhere. My friends lived in Larnaca, so I stayed overnight with them and flew to London the next morning, not forgetting to take a photo of them. Long live friendship. And I can’t help but say—I know the world now loves to hate Israel. And we get bombed every other day. If before it was Gaza and Lebanon bombing us, now it’s the Houthis. Honestly, it’s exhausting. But no matter, the people of Israel are alive.
Israeli Naval Strikes Target Yemen's Hodeidah Port Amid Rising Tensions.
The Israeli navy conducted strikes on Yemen's Hodeidah port as part of an ongoing campaign against the Houthis. Israel urged evacuations from Houthi ports, responding to ongoing missile threats. Iran-backed groups continue resistance in the region, influencing wider geopolitical dynamics.
Devdiscourse News Desk | Updated: 10-06-2025 11:05 IST | Created: 10-06-2025 11:05 IST
Israeli Naval Strikes Target Yemen's Hodeidah Port Amid Rising Tensions
This image is AI-generated and does not depict any real-life event or location. It is a fictional representation created for illustrative purposes only.
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On Tuesday, the Israeli navy launched attacks on Yemen's Hodeidah port, intensifying a campaign that traditionally involves airstrikes, according to Israeli army radio reports.
Houthi-controlled Al Masirah TV reported that the strikes targeted the docks at Al Hodeidah port, although there were no immediate reports of casualties. The strikes follow the Israeli military's call for evacuations at various Houthi-controlled ports.
Since the onset of the Gaza war in October 2023, the Houthis, aligned with Iran, have targeted Israel and Red Sea shipping in support of the Palestinians, prompting Israeli retaliation and increasing tensions across the region.
Israeli Naval Strikes Target Yemen's Hodeidah Port Amid Rising Tensions.
The Israeli navy conducted strikes on Yemen's Hodeidah port as part of an ongoing campaign against the Houthis. Israel urged evacuations from Houthi ports, responding to ongoing missile threats. Iran-backed groups continue resistance in the region, influencing wider geopolitical dynamics.
Devdiscourse News Desk | Updated: 10-06-2025 11:05 IST | Created: 10-06-2025 11:05 IST
Israeli Naval Strikes Target Yemen's Hodeidah Port Amid Rising Tensions
This image is AI-generated and does not depict any real-life event or location. It is a fictional representation created for illustrative purposes only.
SHARE
On Tuesday, the Israeli navy launched attacks on Yemen's Hodeidah port, intensifying a campaign that traditionally involves airstrikes, according to Israeli army radio reports.
Houthi-controlled Al Masirah TV reported that the strikes targeted the docks at Al Hodeidah port, although there were no immediate reports of casualties. The strikes follow the Israeli military's call for evacuations at various Houthi-controlled ports.
Since the onset of the Gaza war in October 2023, the Houthis, aligned with Iran, have targeted Israel and Red Sea shipping in support of the Palestinians, prompting Israeli retaliation and increasing tensions across the region.
Following a lay over at Gibraltar, HMS Diamond has rearmed her Sea Ceptor anti-air missiles, refuelled, restocked and conducted maintenance and this morning heads out to sea again. She is expected to be deployed back in the Red Sea to protect shipping from Houthi anti-ship and cruise missile attacks.
During her last deployment, HMS Diamond intercepted and downed nine Houthi drones.
Israel investigating possibility Sinwar was killed in IDF airstrike.
There is currently no intelligence supporting such a report and there is a disagreement between defense officials about whether the October 7th mastermind was again just cut off from his communications or was indeed eliminated.
Israel National News
Sep 22, 2024 at 10:25 PM (GMT+3)
Israel is examining the possibility that Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar was killed as a result of an IDF airstrike on the Gaza Strip, Kan News reported.
According to the report, there is no intelligence supporting such a report, and there is a disagreement between defense officials about whether the October 7th mastermind was again just cut off from his communications or was indeed eliminated.
Last week, Al Jazeera reported that Sinwar sent a letter to the leader of the Houthi rebel group congratulating him on the missile launch at Israel.
A few days earlier, it was reported that the Hamas leader had sent a letter to Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in July after Ismail Haniyeh was eliminated.
According to Hezbollah, in his letter, Sinwar thanked Nasrallah for expressing his condolences on Haniyeh's death and emphasized that Hamas will continue to adhere to the Axis of Resistance agains
Following a lay over at Gibraltar, HMS Diamond has rearmed her Sea Ceptor anti-air missiles, refuelled, restocked and conducted maintenance and this morning heads out to sea again. She is expected to be deployed back in the Red Sea to protect shipping from Houthi anti-ship and cruise missile attacks.
During her last deployment, HMS Diamond intercepted and downed nine Houthi drones.
The streets of Aden is covered with banners and flags that are symbols of South Yemen and part of the southern secessionist movement against the Sanaa regime.
Aden was once one of the busiest harbour in the world when it was under British rule. The great natural harbour protected by a dead volcano crater and being midway between the Orient/India and Africa/Europe made it the perfect stop for ships to refuel and resupplied. After the British left in the late 1960s, Aden became the capital of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), the only communist Arab state that had ever existed.
With the collapse of the USSR it was reunited with the rest of Yemen in 1990. However, many in south Yemen and Aden today still supports a secessionist movement away from the north, despite the defeat in the brief civil war against the north in 1994 and the continuing brutal suppression by the Sanaa regime.
The future of Aden remains unclear - during my visit in 2012 Aden was besieged by the growing Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) movement that had plagued the rest of south Yemen, controlling towns and cities not far from Aden. Since the Yemeni Civil War in 2015, the Sanaa regime had been pushed out of the capital by the Houthis rebels and currently have their HQ based in Aden, protected by Saudi-Arabia and other Gulf countries.
Aden, Yemen.
The old Anglican Church is a landmark in Tawila district in Aden. Built during the British colonial era, the church was closed after the British left in the 1960s and was temporarily a police station before it was abandoned and restored. When I was there in 2012 it was being restored into a museum, which due to the ongoing civil war I would have imagined it to be abandoned once again.
Aden was once one of the busiest harbour in the world when it was under British rule. The great natural harbour protected by a dead volcano crater and being midway between the Orient/India and Africa/Europe made it the perfect stop for ships to refuel and resupplied. After the British left in the late 1960s, Aden became the capital of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), the only communist Arab state that had ever existed.
With the collapse of the USSR it was reunited with the rest of Yemen in 1990. However, many in south Yemen and Aden today still supports a secessionist movement away from the north, despite the defeat in the brief civil war against the north in 1994 and the continuing brutal suppression by the Sanaa regime.
The future of Aden remains unclear - during my visit in 2012 Aden was besieged by the growing Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) movement that had plagued the rest of south Yemen, controlling towns and cities not far from Aden. Since the Yemeni Civil War in 2015, the Sanaa regime had been pushed out of the capital by the Houthis rebels and currently have their HQ based in Aden, protected by Saudi-Arabia and other Gulf countries.
Aden, Yemen.
The Wahhabi Mind-Set: www.goharshahi.us/articles/view/the-mind-set-of-wahhabis/
What the world needs to know about 'Islamic' Terrorism.
#SaudiArabia #Wahhabism #Wahhabi #Mindset #Article #ISIS #Salafism #Salafi #philosophy #shiite #terrorism #islamicterrorism #deobandi #extremism #fanaticism #fundamentalism #puritan #ISIL #Daesh #Yemen #Hadith #Quran #ProphetMohammad #Muhammad #Mohammad #sharia #fundamental #airstrikes #alqaeda #houthi
Event arranged by Chicago Area Peace Action group.
The blue backpacks stand for each one of the children killed in the Saudi bombing attack on a school bus. They used a 500 pound bomb manufactured by Lockheed-Martin.
Thanks to Putin, many of my friends now live in different parts of the world. When Putin started the war with Ukraine, a huge number of Russians left the country—myself included. I, however, ended up in Israel. Double bingo, if you know what I mean. Not long ago, I was planning to go to London, but the Houthis from Yemen launched a missile near Ben Gurion Airport, so foreign airlines stopped flying here. But I found out that there’s a flight from Haifa to Larnaca, and from there, you can fly anywhere. My friends lived in Larnaca, so I stayed overnight with them and flew to London the next morning, not forgetting to take a photo of them. Long live friendship. And I can’t help but say—I know the world now loves to hate Israel. And we get bombed every other day. If before it was Gaza and Lebanon bombing us, now it’s the Houthis. Honestly, it’s exhausting. But no matter, the people of Israel are alive.
During Pam Bondi's Senate confirmation hearing for Attorney General, she assured the American people that "politics will not play a part" during her time at the Justice Department. Sadly, but not surprisingly, that was a lie. She is beholden to Donald Trump, and her job is to protect him from his opponents.
From The Washington Post: "[The Justice Department has] curtailed anti-corruption efforts that were sources of irritation for the president and ratcheted up immigration enforcement while cutting national security expertise and refocusing the civil rights division on culture war fights that go beyond traditional conservative causes like religious freedom.
"And they have pushed out dozens of prosecutors and FBI agents deemed insufficiently loyal, launching sweeping probes of past investigations and the veteran attorneys who led them."
In addition to the firings of "disloyal" Justice employees, the Justice Department dropped charges against New York Mayor Eric Adams for corruption, claiming that they were politically motivated and would impede Trump's efforts to curb illegal immigration. Eight prosecutors resigned in protest.
Bondi has formed a task force to investigate many of the President's adversaries, including Jack Smith, who indicted Trump for the mishandling of classified documents and for his actions to thwart a peaceful transfer of power on January 6. Trump also issued an Executive Order to investigate judges and lawyers who have opposed the President's actions. New Jersey Attorney General Matthew Platkin called this maneuver “an unprecedented and frankly outrageous attempt to threaten lawyers simply for doing their jobs.”
Bondi has suggested that the security breach in a Signal group chat regarding an attack on the Houthis in Yemen will not be investigated. Instead, she emphasized the success of the military action.
Despite the promise she made during her confirmation hearing, she has undermined the Justice Department's independence from the Executive Branch and weaponized the agency to combat years of "misdeeds against Trump and conservatives."
Everyone is a prop for Donald Trump.
See the rest of the posters from the Chamomile Tea Party! Digital high res downloads are free here (click the down arrow on the lower right side of the image). Other options are available. And join our Facebook group.
Follow the history of our country's political intransigence from 2010 to 2020 through a eight-part exhibit of these posters on Google Arts & Culture.