decison photos on Flickr

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It was a rather decent day today in Dublin, so I decided to go on a walk, despite the fact that my day started at 0400. And I have to say, it was a good decison, I've managed to caputre a couple good street shots.

Toothless...me???? Oh God!! by Adalberto Mangini

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May 31st, 2011 -

Sadly this week we had to make a hard and traumatic decison for our Ms. Jackye.

She was suffering from a very strong form of jaws since several weeks and she couldn't eat anymore because of the lancinanting pain.

After trying to treat the infection with antibiotics without good results, we finally had to decide to submit her to the hated operation.

All moral and premolar teeth have been removed. Now she only owns her canines and the small incisors and she is completely dazed and disoriented... She doesn't understand what happened to her . Eating is still very difficult to her but we hope that in few weeks she will be able to learn how to eat what she loves more: tuna kibbles!

Jackye, you will always have the most beautiful smile to us. We love you even more than before our sweet girl!

June 10, 2011

We wish to thank all our great Flickr friends for all gentle thoughts, comments and suggestions, We carefully read all of them and take into consideration all what can be useful for trying to letting her feel less depressed and help her in improving her attempts to eat.

Thanks again friends, Jackye knows she has a great family here!

June 16th, 2011

One good news, one bad news:

Jackye starts to eat again her usual food (not much but it takes time to learn..) and her mouth looks good. The infection seems to be stopped and the vet said no need to remove the rest of her teeth.

The bad news is that in the first two weeks after the operation she couldn't eat so we tried to give to her some different food which would push her to eat. Since the beginning, all of our cats were used to eating only two types of brands of food (I do not mean to advertise name of the producers, it wouldn't be correct) and mainly solid food. Only one can of humid food devided for all of them in the morning.

Well, the result of changing the food is that Jackye had a strong allergic reaction and her body is now completely devastated and covered with terrible open sores and crusts.

Because of her thick fur, We could not notice it immediately but only after about ten days.

We immediately understood it was the food and not a reaction to the antibiotics.

So we stopped it and now she needs to wear a baby t-shirt so that she will not try to lick the wounds which in some points of her body became like holes ( the vet had to shave a good part of her body to let breathe the wounds)

Now we started again to treat her with antibiotic to try to solve this problem in the fastest way.

We really hope this hard period will soon end for our sweet girl. Incredible how she never complains to all what we are doing to her. We really think she is able to understand we are doing all this because we love her.

Thanks again to you all for the kind support and gentle thoughts to our sweetest girl.

View On Black

Decisons, decisions...Eastern or Richmond? by Phil Marion

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1:72 Bell P-76A 'Airaconda', BuNo. 43-04308 of the 344th Fighter Squadron (343rd Fighter Group); Adak Airfield, Aleutian Islands (Alaska), early 1944 (Whif/Kitbashing) by Dizzyfugu

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+++ DISCLAIMER +++

Nothing you see here is real, even though the conversion or the presented background story might be based historical facts. BEWARE!

Some background:

Bell's P-76 had its roots in the P-39 Airacobra, one of the principal American fighter aircraft in service when the United States entered World War II.

The Airacobra had an innovative layout, with the engine installed in the center fuselage, behind the pilot, and driving a tractor propeller via a long shaft. It was also the first fighter fitted with a tricycle undercarriage.

Although its mid-engine placement was innovative, the P-39 design was handicapped by the absence of an efficient turbo-supercharger, limiting it to low-altitude work. As such it was rejected by the RAF for use over western Europe and passed over to the USSR where performance at high altitude was less important.

Bell permanently tried to improve the aircraft. Trials of a laminar flow wing (in the XP-39E) and several alternative engines were unsuccessful, so the basic concept was taken into two directions: The mid-engine, gun-through-hub concept was developed further in the overall larger Bell XP-63 Kingcobra, and a radical re-design of the whole aircraft around its basic structure and its power unit, which became the XP-76.

The basic concept was simple: the proven Allison V-1710 engine was to be retained, but the rest of the aircraft was to be lightened and "minimized" wherever possible in order to improve its performance - a similar way Grumman went with the F8F Bearcat.

Anyway, Bell's construction team did not find much options, at least without compromising other factors like rigidity or armament. In a almost desperate move the decison was made to change the aircraft's layout altogether - making the P-39 a pusher aircraft! The Allison V-1710 allowed a simple switch from a pull to a push arrangement, and with a canard layout lots of weight could be saved: the tail section was competely deleted, and the heavy extension shaft and the respective gears for the front propeller became obsolete, too.

Wind tunnel tests confirmed the basic idea, even though the new layout called for several major innovations and new constructions which postponed development and service introduction considerably until late 1943.
These innovation comprised, for instance, the first (moderately) swept wings on an USAAF aircraft, due to CG and atability reasons. Unlike the very similar but bigger Curtiss XP-55 Ascender the XP-76 "Airaconda" had a very good performance, compared to the standard P-39. It was more agile, had a better rate of climb and retained the powerful 37mm cannon, which was highly effective against large air targets as well as ground targets. The gun was complemented by foud 0.5" machine guns, all grouped into the aircraft's nose.

By January 1944 the first service machines, designated P-76A, were delivered to homeland defence units for evaluation, especially against the P-39 as well as the P-40. Anyway, pilots distrusted the very different aircraft. The high tricycle landing caused frequent problems, especially on soggy ground, and several accidents with propeller contacts during exagerrated take-offs did not build the P-76's reputation - even the though the aircraft was basically good and a true step forward from the P-39. But to no avail: no ally would take it, neither Great Britain (having the disappointing P-39 still in mind) nor the Soviet Union.

The P-76's career was short, though. The machines were too late for the Aleutian Campaign, and none saw real combat action. Furthermore, more capable aircraft had entered the scene in the meantime, like the P-47 and the P-51, so the P-76 was primarily used for combat training on the USA mainland.

Only about 80 of this unique aircraft were built, before production switched to the more conventional P-63 Kingcobra.

General characteristics:

Crew: One

Length: 26 ft 10 1/2 in (8.2 m)

Wingspan: 31 ft 3 in (9,54 m)

Height: 13 ft (3.96 m)

Wing area: 190 sq ft (17.71 m²)

Empty weight: 4.900lb (2.225 kg)

Loaded weight: 6.530 lb (2.965 kg)

Max. takeoff weight: 7.709 lb (3.500 kg)

Powerplant:

1× Allison V-1710-47R liquid-cooled V12 engine, 1,325 hp (955 kW),

driving a four-blade pusehr propeller

Performance:

Maximum speed: 390 mph at 19,300 ft (628 km/h)

Range: 635 mi (1,020 km)

Service ceiling: 35,000 ft (10,700 m)

Rate of climb: 3,750 ft/min (19 m/s)

Wing loading: 34.6 lb/sq ft (169 kg/m²)

Power/mass: 0.16 hp/lb (0.27 kW/kg)

Time to climb: 15,000 in 4.5 min at 160 mph (260 km/h).

Armament:

1x 1.5 cal. (37 mm) M4 cannon in the nose with 30 rounds of HE-T ammunition

4x .50 cal. (12.7 mm) Browning M2 machine guns, nose-mounted with 200 RPG

Up to 1.000 lb or ordnance, including a drop tank or (rarely used) a single 1.000 lb bomb on

a centerline pylon; alternatively two 500 lb (230 kg) bombs under the wings or six unguided

HVAR missiles.

The kit and its assembly:

This shinden-esque whif aircraft was spawned by a series of P-39 CG illustrations - modified skins for a flight simulator which depicted the Airacobra as a pusher with a canard layout. This looked very interesting, and since I had a Hobby Boss P-39Q in the stash with no real plan until now, I gave the inspiration green light and turned on the saw.

The CGs already showed some inplausibilities, though - all perspectives were carefully taken from a shallow side perspective, hiding problematic areas! So, soon it became clear that my build could not be a 1:1 copy of the virtual art, because that would either not be possible, or simply look poor in hardware form.

As consequence, the simple P-39 pusher conversion idea turned into a major kitbash and body sculpting job, that somehow looked more and more like a diminuitive Kyushu J7W Shinden!?

What went into the thing:

● Central fuselage with engine, cockpit and front end of a Hobby Boss P-39

● Wings from a revell Me 262

● Horizontal stabilizers from an Italeri Fw 190

● The twin fins are stabilizers from the Me 262, too

● The propeller comes from the MPM P-47H kit

● Landing gear was scratched from the spares box

A lucky find were the Me 262 wings: they perfectly fit in depth onto the Airacobra's fuselage, and they added the "modern" look I was looking for. The original wings were simply to straight and deep, proportions would hardly work. Unfortunatly this meant that the cutouts on the wings for the Me 262's engine nacelles had to be filled, and that the landing gear wells had to be improvised, too. The wings roots had to be re.sculpted, too, since the Me 262 wings are much thinner than the P-39's.

Another problem was the fuselage's relative length - with the tail cut off, it's just too short in order to take canards on the nose - that was already recognizable in the CGs where the front fuselage had been stretched.

I did the same, with two measures: Firstly, a 10mm plug was inserted in front of the cockpit - a massive lump of putty that was sanded into shape. Furthermore, just glueing the spinner onto the nose would not yield a proper look. So I added a P-38 nose (Airfix kit) that was reduced in height and re-scuplted the lower fuselage, adding depth. As a consequence, the front wheel well moved forward and had to be re-shaped, too. Lots of messy putty work!

A third dubious section was the propeller, or better its interesction with the fuselage. Again, the CGs did not yield any potential solution. Since pusher props call for ground clearance I decided to fix the propeller axis so high that the spinner would be flush with the aircraft's spine - the pointed XP-47H propeller (It's one massive piece, with lots of flash...) was perfect and finally found a good and unexpected use. As per usual I built a metal axis construction with a styrene tube adapter inside the fuselage for the propeller, so that it can spin freely.

In order to shape a more or less elegant transition from the oval P-39 fuselage to the round spinner I added another plug, about 5mm long and again sculpted from putty.

With that in place the overall proprotions became clearer. Next step was to clip the Me 262 wings, so that the span would match the fuselage length, and I had to devise a way to mount fins. The CG just used the P-39's stabilizers, vertically placed on the wings' trailing edge. But, again, this does not work well in hardware form. These "fins" are much too tall, and just mounting them in that place looks rather awkward.

My solution was then to add small carrier booms - actually these a massive, modern 500 lb bombs without fins, placed on the trailing edges and protruding. This makes a more plausible and stable-looking base for fins, IMHO, and after several options (including P-51 and P-47 stabilizers)I used trimmed Me 262 stabilizers. Their sweeped leading edge matches the wings' shape just well - and the Fw 190 stabilizers which were glued to the nose as canards also look in-style, and overall more modern than the P-39's rounded wing shapes.

Slowly the P-76 took more and more shape, and I was surprised how much it started to resemble the Kyushu Shinden, which was a bigger aircraft, though.

Painting and markings:

A weird aircraft needs IMHO a rather subtle paint scheme, so I settled for a standard USAAF livery with overall Olive Drab upper sides, some Medium Green blotches on all wing surfaces and Neutral Grey undersides.

As basic colors I used Modelmaster's ANA 613 for the upper surfaces and FS 36231 (instead of the true Neutral Grey FS 36173) for the lower sides; the green blotches are frequently quoted as FS 34096, but this is IMHO too "green", the tone has a rather blue-ish hue. So I went for a more a yellow-ish tone and settled for Humbrol 102 (Army Green). All tones were later lightened and weathered through dry-painting (also highlighting some panels) and a black ink wash - both tones somewhat came closer to each other through this treatment, but I think this happened on real world aircraft, too?

The only colorful highlight is a yellow nose.

All interior surfaces were painted in zinc chromate primer: on top of an olive green base (Humbrol 159) some dry-painting with Modelmaster's Zinc Chromate Green was added.

Markings were puzzled together from various sources. The red-rimmed Stars-And-Bars were AFAIK still in use in late 1943, and they add some contrast to the otherwise simple aircraft. The white stripes were used as ID markings in the Aleutian theatre - another small individual note. Otherwise, P-40's of the 344th FS/343rd FG were used as benchmarks.

In the end, and interesting experiment that shows that CG ideas must not translate well into model kit hardware form. Nevertheless, the P-76 looks interesting - at some times I thought it would look rather German or like an aircraft from Captain America or the 'The Sky Crawlers' anime movie?

Mini-Midi-Pants - the Big Decison of 1970 by BreakTime

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KMZ Start SLR, c. 1962 by pete.naylor

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The 'Krasnogorsk Mechanical Factory', better known as 'KMZ' for brevity, is situated on the fringes of Moscow and has been churning out cameras and lenses in amazing numbers since the 1940s. On the 35mm front alone, how's almost 850,000 Zorki-1 copies of the Leica 11 from 1949 to 1956 sound, just to give an idea of KMZ production of one model?. Unfortunately perhaps, KMZ's prolific production was not matched by a similar capacity for innovation. OK, so they stuck a pentaprism housing on a Zorki-1 and gave us the Zenit SLR in 1951, but despite even higher production figures than the original Zorki-1, it didn't go through all that much development. Its limited shutter speed range was a particularly vexing point with Russian professional photogs.

The noise they made must have eventually reached the ears of the KMZ management suits because in 1958 KMZ suprised everybody and came up with something special - the 'Start'. Wow! An F2 58mm 6-element Helios with breech mount, cloth FP shutter with B, 1 - 1/1,000 sec speeds on a single dial, plus self-timer, with I/C pentaprism/WLF? This was heady stuff back in 58, folks!

It clearly had some features begged, borrowed or stolen from other top-level 35mm SLRs, especially the Exakta, but none had been seen together on any camera at that time. Here's a few:

a. Exakta-style external 'APD' automatic diaphragm;

b. Exakta-style internal blade to cut film (watch your fingers too);

c. Miranda-style slotted fit I/C pentaprism/WLF;

d. Single-shutter speed dial;

e. Right-Side Thumb film wind lever;

f. Standard central split-image RF focussing.

The F2 Helios is a clone of the Zeiss Biotar, and a very good one too. Reputedly the very best performing lenses tested as they came off the production line were used for the 'Start', with lesser ones going on Zenits. As you can see from both L and R pics, the multi-coating sheen on the front element is almost ultra-violet like in intensity - I've never seen anything like it on any other lens. However, KMZ upstaged Exakta by having the Helios with automatic full aperture advance via the lever wind, rather than via the separate cocking lever underneath which remained a bugbear on the Exakta until the appearance of the Pancolar.

There were some initial teething problems with the Start's shutter, but KMZ sorted those out. What they didn't sort out, was the range of accessory lenses and other stuff that a professional-level 35mm SLR needs. Instead, Start buyers got an adaptor to fit M39 Zenit lenses and stuff, which makes you wonder why they fitted its Helios with its Praktina-style breech mount in the first place. You'd have to suspect that fairly early on its life, a policy decison was made not to offer all the promised good gear. Nevertheless, some 75,000 Starts were made between 1958 and 1964, most being local market models with 'Start' in cyrillic script like mine. A few were made for export with 'Start' in latin script. In 1963 a revised 'Start-2' with a linked metered prism setup was revealed to the Soviet media, but only a few models were ever made.

My camera is a late 1962 model, easily fathomed because KMZ body s/nos from that era start with the year of manufacture. At one stage I thought it might just have a connection with Cuba and the Missile Crisis, because I got it on Ebay US from a guy in Miami. (Hello - Miami, Cuban emigres, Russian missile technicians short of a quid, etc, etc ............) However, my double-guessing doesn't bear water when you consider the Missile Crisis was all over in October 62 and this 'Start' didn't leave KMZ until late 62. Mind you, the camera's ERC does have the cyrillic initials 'MIR' etched on its back .... Missile Inspection Repairer? Nah, more likely 'Moscow Internal Revenue'; according to a Doubting Thomas friend of mine ........

at the end of the rainbow we need some advice!!! by Sally

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we've had an anthrax scare, many many pastures have dead cattle and a few dead horses, made a 60 mile cirlcle and checked all of ours yesterday and are getting mixed opinions on whether it's safe to vacinate horses or not... so right now we've chosen to wait and see, such a hard decison do any of you know what we should be doing???

0009 Union Trenches at Cold Harbor at Richmond Battlefield by Norm Robbie

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The Battle of Cold Harbor was fought from May 31,1864 to June 12,1864 (with the most signficant fighting occurring on June 3,1864).It was one of the final battles of Union Lieutenant General Ulysses S.Grant's Overland Campaign during the American Civil War,and is remembered as one of American history's bloodest,most lopsideed battles.Thousands of Union soldiers were killed or wounded in a hopeless frontal assault against the fortified positions og General Robert E. Lee's Army.

On May 31,1864 as General Grant's once again swung around the right flank of General Lee's army,Union cavalry seized the crossroads of Old Cold Harbor,about 10 miles northeast of the Confederate capital of Richmond,Virginia,holding it against Confederate attacks until the Union infantry arrvied.Both General Grant and General Lee,whose armies had suffered enormous casualties in the Overland Campaign,receivced reinforcements.One the evening of June 1,1864,the Union VI Army Corps and XVIII Army Corps arrived and assaulted the Confederate works to the west of the crossroads with some success.

On June 2,1864,the remainder of both armies arrived and the Confederate built an elaborate series of fortifications 7 miles long.At dawn on June 3,1864,three Union Army Corps attacked the Confederate works on the southern end of the line and were easily repulsed with heavy casualties.Attempts to assault on the northern end of line and to resume the assaulted on the southern were unsuccessful.

General Grant said of the battle in his memoirs "i have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made....No advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained." The armies confronted each other on these lines until the night of June 12,1864,when General Grant again advanced by his left flank,marhing to James River.

General Grant's Overland Campaign was one of a series of simultaneous offensives the newly appointed general in chief launched against the Confederacy.By late May 1864,only two of these continued to advance: Major General William T.Sherman's Atlanta Campaign and the Overland Campaign,in which General Grant accompanied and directly supervised the Army of the Potomac and its commander,Major General George G.Meade.General Grant's campaign objective was not the Confederate capital of Richmond,but the destruction of General Lee's army.President Abraham Lincoln had long advocated this strategy for his generals recognizing that the city would certainly fall after the loss of its principal defensive army.General Grant ordered General Meade, "Wherever General Lee goes,ther you will go also." Altough he hoped for a quick,decisive battle,Geberal Grant was prepard to fight a war of attrition.Both Union and Confederate casualties could be high,but the Union had greater resources to replace lost soldiers and equipment.

On May 5,1864,after General Grant's army crossed the Rapidan River and enter the Wilderness of Spotsylvana,it was attacked by General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.Although General Lee was outnumberd,about 60,000 to 100,000,his men fought firecely and the dense foliage provided a terrain advantage.After two days of fighting and almost 29,000 casualties the result were inconclusive and neither army was able to obtain an advatage.General Lee had stopped General Grant,but had not turned him back,General Grant had not destroyed General Lee's army.Under simlar circumstances,previous Union commanders had chosen to withdraw behind the Rappahannock River but General Grant instead order General Meade to move around General Lee's right flank and seize the important crossroads at Spotsylvania Court House to the southeast,hoping that by interposing his army between General Lee and Richmond,he could lure the Confederates into another battle on a more favorable field.

Elements of General Lee's army beat the Union Army to critical crossroads of Spotsylvania Court House and began entrenching.General Meade was dissatisfied with Major General Philip H. Sheridan's Union Cavalry's performance and released it from its reconnaissance and screening duties for the main body of the army to pursue and defeat the Confederate Cavalry under Major General J.E.B. Sttuart.General Sheridan's men mortally wounded General Staurt in the tactically incoclusive Battle of Yellow Tavern (May 11,1864) and then continued their raid toward Richmond,leaving General Grant and General Meade without the "eye and ears" of their cavalry.

Near Spotsylvania Court House,fighting occurred on and off from May 8,1864 through May 21,1864,as General Grant tried various schems to break the Confederate line.On May 8,1864, Union Major General Gouverneur K.Warren and Major General John Sedgwick unsuccessfully attempted to dislodge the Confederates under Major General Richard H.Anderson from Laurel Hill,a position that was blocking them from Spotsylvania Court House.On May 10,1864,General Grant ordered attack across the Confederate line of earthworks,which by now extended over 4 miles (6.5 km),including a prominent salient known as the Mule Shoe.Although the Union troops failed again ta Laurel Hill,and innovative assault attempt by Colonel Emory Upton against the Mule Shoe showed promise.

General Grant used Colonel Upton's assault technique on much lager scale on May 12,1864 when he ordered the 15,000 men Major General Winfield S.Hancock's Corps to assault the Mule Shoe.General Hancock was initially successful,but the Confederate leadership railed and repulsed his incursion.Attacks by Major General Horatio G.Wright on the western edge of the Mule Shoe,which became known as the "Bloody Angle" involved almost 24 hours of desperate hand-to-hand fighting,some of the most intense of the Civil War.Supporting attacks by General Warren and by Major general Ambrose E.Burnside were unsucceful.In the end,the battle was tactically inconclusive,but with almost 32,000 casualties on both side,it was the costliest battle of the campaign.General Grant planned to end the stalemate by once again shifting around General Lee's right flank to the southeast,toward Richmond.

General Grant objective following Spotsylvania was the North Anna river,about 25 miles (40 km)south.He sent General Hancock's Corps ahead of his army,hopp that General Lee would attack it,luring him into the open.General lee did not take the bait and beat General Grant to the North Anna River.On May 23,1864,General Warren's V Corps crossed the river at Jericho Mills,fighting off an attack by Ambrose P.Hill's corps,while General Hancock's II Army Corps captured the bridge on the Telegraph Road.General Lee then devised an ingenious plan,which represented a significant potential threar to General Grant: a five-mile (8km) line that formed an inverted "V" shape with its apex on the river at Ox Ford,the only defensible crossing in the area.By moving south of the river,General Lee hoped that General Grant would assume that he was retreating,leaving only a token force to prevent a crossing at Ox Ford.If General Grant pursued,the pointed wedge of the inverted V Army Corps would split his army and General Lee could concentrate on interior lines of defeat one wing; the other Union wing would have to cross the North Anna twice to support the attacked wing.

General Grant almost fell into General Lee's trap.He assaulted the tip of the apex at Ox Ford and the right wing of the V Army Corps,but General Lee,who was incapacitated in his tent by diarrha,could not coordinate the attack he planned to make,losing a goldern opportunity.General Grant finally realized the situation he faced with a divided army and ordered his mento stop advancing and to build earthworks of their own.However,the Union general remained optimistic.He wass convinced that General Lee had demostrated the weekness of his army by not attacking when he had the uper hand.He wrote to the Army 's chief of staff,Major General Henry W.Halleck:"General Lee's army is reall whipped ... I may be mistaken but I feel; that our success over General Lee's army is already assured."

As he did after the Wideness and Spotsylvania,General Grant planned another wide swing around General Lee's flank,marching east of the Pamunkey River to sceen his movements from the Confederates.His army disengaged on May 27,1864 and crossed the river.General Lee moved his army swiftly in response,heading for Atlee's Station on the Virginia Central Railroad,a point only 9 miles north of Richmond.There his menwould be well-positioned behind a stream known as Totopotomoy Creek todefeat against General Grant if he moved against the railroads or Richmond.General Lee was not certain of general Grant's specific plans,however,if General Grant was not intending to cross the Pamukey in foce at Hanovertown,the Union Army could outflank him and head directly to Richmond.General Lee ordered cavalry under Major General Wade Hampton to make a reconnaissance in force,break though the Union Cavalry sceen,and find the Union Infantry.

On may 28,1864 General Hampton's troopers encountered Union Cavalry under Brigadier General David McMurtrie Gregg in the Battle of Haw's Shop.Fighting predominately dismounted an utilizing earthworks for protection,neither side achived an advantage.The battle was inconclusive,but it was one of the bloodiest cavalry engagements of the war.General Hampton held up the Union Cavalry for seven hours,prevented it from achieving its reconnaissance objectives,and had provided valuable intelligence to General Lee about disposition of General Grant's Army.

After General Grant's infantry had crossed to the south of the Pamunkey,General Lee was opportunity on May 30,1864 to attack General Warren's advancing V Army Corps with his Second Corps,now commanded by Lieutenant General Jubal A.Early.General Early's division under Major General Robert E.Rodes and Major general Stephen Dodson Ramseur dove the Union troops back in the Battle of Bethesda Church,but General Ramseur's advance was stopped by a fierce stand of infantry and artillery fire.On the same day,a small cavalry engagement a Matadequin Creek (the Battle of Old Church) drove an outnumbered Confederate Cavalry brigade to the crossroads of Old Cold Harbor,verifying to General Lee that General Grant intended to move toward that vital intersection beyond General Lee's right flank,attempting to avoid another stalemate on the Totopotomoy Creek line.

General Lee received notice that reinforcements were heading General Grant's way from Bermuda Hundred.The 16,000 men of Major General William F."Baldy" Smith's XVIII Army Corps were withdrawn from Major General Benjamin F.Butler's Army of the James at General Grant's request and they moving down the James River and up the York to the Pamunkey.If General Smith moved due west from White House Landin to Old Cold Harbor 3 miles (4.8 km) southeast of Bethesda Church and General Grant's left flank,the exended Federal line would be to far south for the Confederate right to contain General Smith's men arrived at White House May 30,1864 -May 31,1864.One brigade was left behind on guard duty,but about 10,000 men arrived to join General Grant's Army about 3:00 p.m. on June 1,1864.

General Lee also received reinforcements.Confederate President Jefferson F.Davis directed General Pierre G.T. Beauregard to send the division of Major General Robert F.Hoke,over 7,00 men from below the James River (the first troops of General Hoke's division arrived at Old Cold harbor on May 31,1864,but were unable to prevent the Union Cavalry from siezing the intersection.) With these additional troops,and by managing to replace many of his 20,000 casualties to that point in the campaign General Lee's Army of Northern Virinia had 59,000 men contend with General Meade's and General Grant's 108,000.But the disparity in numbers was no longer what it had been-General Grant's reinforcements were often raw recruits and heavy artillery troops,pulled from defenses of Washington D.C.,who were relatively inexperienced in infantry tactics,while most of General Lee's had been veterans moved from inactive fronts,and who soon entreched in impressive fortifications.

General Grant's Union force totaled approximately 108,000 men .They consisted of the Army of the Potomac,under Major General George G Meade,and the XVIII Army Corps temporary assignment from the Army of the James.The six corps were.

:II Army Corps under Major General Winfield s.Hancock,including the divisions of Major General David B.Birney and Brigadier General Francis C.Barlow,and Brigadier General John Gibbon.

:V Army Corps under Major General Gouverneur K.Warren,including the divisions of Brigadier General Charles Grriffin,Brigadier General Henry H.Lockwood,and Brigadier General Lysander Cutler.On June 6.1864 the corps was reorganized to the divisions of General Griffin,General Cutler and Brigadier General Romeyn B.Ayres and Brigadier General Samuel W.Crawford.

:VI Army Corps under Brigadier General Horatio G.Wright,including the divisions og Brigadier General David A.Russell,Brigadier General Thomas H.Neil,and Brigadier General James B.Ricketts.

:IX Army Corps,under Major General Ambrose E.Burnside including divisions of Major General Thomas L. Crittenden and Brigadier General Robert B.Potter,Brigadier General Orlando B.Willcox,and Brigadier General Edward Ferrero.On June 9,1864 General Crittenden was replaced by Brigadier General James H.Ledlie.

:Cavalry Corps under Major General Philip H.Sheridan,including the divisions of Brigadier General Alfred T.A. Torbert,Brigadier David McMurtrie Gregg,and Brigadier General James H.Wilson.

:XVIII Army Corps,under Major General William F. "Baldy"Smith,including the divisions of Brigadier General William T.H.Brooks,Brigadier General John H.Martindale,and Brigadier General Charles Devens.On June 4,1864 Devens was replaced by Brigadier Adebert Ames.

General Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia comprised about 59,000 men was organized into four corps and two independent divisions.

:First Corps under Major General Richard H.Anderson,including the divisions of Major General Charles W.Field,And Major General George E.Pickett,and Brigadier General Joseph B.Kershaw.

:Secord Corps,under Lieutenant General Jubal Early including the divisions of Major General Stephen D.Ramseur,Major General John B.Gordon and Major General Robert E.Rodes.

:Third Corps,under Liuetenant General Ambrose P.Hill,including the divisions of Major General Henry "Harry Heth,and Major General Cadmus M.Wilcox,and Brigadier General William Mahone.

:Cavalry Corps,without a commander following the mortal wounding of Major J.E.B. Stuart on May 11,1864,including the divisions of Major General Wade Hampton,Major General Fitzhugh Lee,Major General William H.F."Rooney"Lee.(General Hampton became the commander of the Cavalry Corps on August 11,1864.)

:Breckinridge's Division commanded by Major General John C.Beckinridge.

:Hoke's Division,commanded by Major General Robert F.Hoke.

The battle was fought in cental Virginia,in what is now Mechanicsville,over the same ground as the Battle of Gaine's Mills during the Seven Days Battle of 1862.In fact ,some accounte refer to the 1862 battle as the first Battle of Cold Harbor,and the 1864 battle as the Second Battle of Cold Harbor.Union soldiers were disturbed to discover skeletal remains from the first battle while entrenching.Despite its name,Cold Harbor was not a port city.It described tow rural crossroads name for a located in the area (Cold Harbor Tavern,owned by the Isaac Burnett family),which provded shelter (harbor but not hot meals.Old Cold Harbor stood two miles east of Gaine's Mill,New Cold Harbor a mile southeast.Both were approximately 10 miles (16 km) northeast of the Confederate capital of Richmond.The intersection was important because from there General Grant could attack either General Lee's army or the city of Richmond,and it was also the intersection though which reinforcements would arrive after sailing up the Pamunkey River.

The cavalry forced that had fought at Old Church continued to face each other on May 31,1864.General Lee sent a cavalry division under Major General Fitzhugh Lee to reinforce Brigadier Matthew C.Butler and secure the crossroads at Old Cold Harbor.Union Brigadier General Alfred T.A. Torbert increased pressure on the Confederates,General Robert E.Lee ordered General Anderson's First Corps to shift right from Totopotomoy Creek to support the cavalry.The lead brigade of General Hoke's division also reached the crossroads to join General Butler and General Fitzhugh Lee.At 4:00 p.m. General Torbert and elements of Brigadier General David McMurtrie Gregg's cavalry division drove the Confederates from the Old Cold Harbor crossroads and begain to dig in.As more of General Hoke's and General Anderson's men streamed in Union Cavalry commander Major General Philip Sheridan became concerned and orderer General Torbert to pull back toward Old Church.

General Grant contiuned his interest in Old Cold Harbor as an avenue for General Smith's arrival and ordered general Wrights's VI Army Corps to move in that direction from his right flank on Totopotomoy Creek.and he ordered General Sheridan to return to the crossroads and secure it "at all hazards"General Torbert returned at 1:00 a.m. and was relived to find that the Confederates had failed to notice his previous withdrawal.

General Robert E.Lee's plan for June 1,1864 was to use his newal concentrated infantry against the small cavalry forces at Old Cold Harbor.But his subordinates did not coordinate correctly.General Anderson did not integrate General Hoke's division with his attack plan and left him with the understanding that he was not to assault until the First Corps' attack was well underway,because the union defenders were disorganized as well General Wright's VI Army Corps had not moved out until after midnight and was on a 15 miles ( 24km) march.General Smith's XVIII Army Corps had mistakenly been sent to New Castle Ferry on the Pamunkey River,several miles away,and did not reach Old Colde Harbor in time to assist General Torbert.

General Anderson led his attack with the brigade formely commanded by veteran Brigadier General Joseph B.Kershaw,which was now under a less expericened South Carolina politician,Colonel Lawrence M.Keitt.Colonel Keitt's men approached the entrenched cavalry of Brigadier General Wesley Merritt.Armed with seven-shot Spencer repeating carbines,General Merritt's men delvered heavy fire,mortally wounding Colonel Keitt and distroying his brigade's cohesion.General Hoke obayed whate he understoode to be his orders and did not join in the attack,which was quickly called back by General Anderson.

By 9:00a.m. General Wright's lead elements arived at the crossroads and began to extend and improve the entrenchments started by the cavalrymen.Although General Grant had intended for general Wright to attack immediately,hismen were exhausted from their long march and they were unsure as to the strenght of the enemy.General Wright decided to wait until after General Smiths Arrived,which occurred in the afternoon,and the XVIII Army Corps men began to entrench on the right of the VI Corps.The Union cavalrymen retired to the east.

For the upcoming attack,General Meade was concerned that the corps of General Wright and General Smith would not be sufficent,so he attempted to convicce General warren to send reinforcements.He wrote to the V Army Corps commander,"General Wright and General Smith will attack this evening.It is very desirable you should join this attack,unless in your judgment it is impracticable." General Warren decided to send the division of Brigadier General Henry H.Lockwood,which began to march at 6:00 p.m.,but no adequate recnaissance of the road network had been conducted and General Lockwood was not able to reach the impending battle in time to make a difference.General Meade was also concernd about his left flank,which was not anchored on the Chickahominy and was potentially threatened by General Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry.He ordered General Philip Sheriden to send scouting parties into the area,but General Sheridan,telling General Meade that it would be impossible to move his men before dark.

At 6:30p.m.the attack that General Grant had ordered for the morning finally.Both General Wright's and General Smith's corps move forward.General Wright's men made little progress south of the Machanicsville Road,which connected New Cold Harbor and Old Cold Harbor,recoiling from heavy fire.North of the road,Brigadier General Emory Upton's brigade of Brigadier General David A.Russell's division also encountered heavy fire from Brigadier GeneralThomas L,Clingman's brigade,"A sheet of flame,sudden as lighting red as blood, and so near that it seemed to singe the men's faces." Although General Upton tried to relly his men foward,his brigade fell back to its starting point.

To General Upton's right,the brigade of Colonel William S.Truex found a gap in the Confederate line.between the brigade of General Clingman and Brigadier General William T.Wofford,though a swampy,brush-filled revine.As General Truex's men charged though the gap.General Clingman swung two redgiments around to face them,and men brought back hundreds of Georgian prisoners with them.

While action on the soutern end of the battlefield,the three corps of General Hancock,General Burnside,and General Warren were occupying a 5 mile line that streched southeast to Bethesda Church,facing the Confederates under General Ambrose P.Hill,General Brackinridge,and General Early.At the border between the IX Army Corps and V Army Corps,the divisionof Major General Thomas L.Crittender,recently transferred fromthe West followinh his performance in the Battle of Chickamauga,occupied a dogledded position with an agle was parallel to the Shady Grove Road,separted from the V Army Corps by a marsh known as Magnolia Swamp.Two division of General Early's Corps-Major General Robert E.Rodes on the left ,Major General John B.Gordon onthe right -used this as their avenue of approach for an attack that began at 7:00p.m. General Warren later described this attack as a "feeler",and desite some initial success,aided by the poor battle management of General Crittenden, both Confederate probes were repulsed.

At this same time General Warren's division under General Lockwood had become lost wandering on unfamiliar farm roads.Despite leaving having dispatched General Lockwood explicitly,the V Army Corps commander wrote to General Meade,"in some unaccountable way (General Lockwood) took his whole division,without my knowing it,away from the left of incompetent,and too high rank leaves us no subordinate place for him.I earnestly beg that he may at once be releved of duty with this army."General Meade releved General Lockwood and replaced him with Brigadier General Samuel W.Crawford.

By dark,the fighting had petered out on both ends of the line.The Union assault had cost it 2,200 casualties,versus about 1,800 for the Confederates,but some progress had made.They almost broke the Confederate line,which was now pinned in place with Union entrechments beging dug only yards away.Several of the generals,including General Upton and General Meade were furious at General Grant for ordering an assault without proper reconnaissance.

Although the June 1,1864 attacks had been unsuccessful,General Meade believed that an attack early on June 2,1864 could succed if he was able to mass sufficient forces against an approprite location.He and General Grant decided to attack General Lee's right flank.General Anderson's men had been heavily engaged there on June 1,1864,and it seemed unlikely that they had found the time to build substantial defenses.And if the attack succeeded General Lee's right would de driven back into the Chickahominy River.General Meade ordered General Hancock's II Army Corps to shiftsoutheast from Totopotomoy Creek and assume a position to the left of General's Wright's VI Army Corps.Once General Hancock was in position,General Meade would attack on his left from Old Cold Harbor with three Union Corps in line totaling 31,00men: General Hancock's II Army Corps,General Wright'sVI Army Corps,and General Baldy Smith's XVIII Army Corps.General Meade also ordered General Warren and General Burnside to attack General Lee's left flank in the morning "at all hazards"convinced that General Lee was moving troops from his left to fortify his right.

General Hancock's men marched almost all night and arrived too worn-out for an immediate attack that morning.General Grant agreed to let the men rest and postponed the attack until 5:00 p.m.,and then again until 4:30 a.m. on June 3,1864.But General Grant and General Meade did not give specific orders for the attack,leaving it up to the corps commanders to decide where they would hit the Confederate lines and how they would coordinate with each other.No senior commander had reconnoitered the enemy position.General Baldy Smith wrote that he was "aghast at the reception of such an order,which proved conclusively the utter absence of any military plan." He told his staff that the whole attack was "simply an order to slaughter my best troops."

General Robert E.Lee took advantage of the Uniondelays to bolster his defenses.When General Hancock departed Totopotomoy Creek,General Lee was free to shift General Breckinridge's division to his far right flank,where he would once again face General Hancock. General Breckinridge

drove a small Union force off Turkey Hill,which dominated the southern part of the battlefield.General Lee also moved troops from General Ambrose P.Hll's Third Army Corps,the division of Brigadier General William Mahone and Brigadier General Cadmus M. Wilcox,to support General Breckinridge,and stationed cavalry under General Fitzhugh Lee to guard the army's right flank.The eesult was a curving line on low ridges 7 miles (11 km) long,with the right flank anchored on Totopotomoy Creek,the right on the Chickahominy River,making any flanking moves impossible.

General Lee's engineers used their time effectively and constructed the "most ingenious defensive configuration the war had yet witnessed." Barricdes of earth and logs were erected.Artillery was posted with converging fields of fire on every avenue of approach,and stakes were driven inti the ground to aid gunners' range estimate.A newpaper correspondent wrote that the works were, "Inrticate zig-zagged lines within lings,lings protecting flanks of lines,lines built to enfilade an opposing line ... (It was)a maze and layrinth of works."Heavy skirmish lines suppressed any ability of the Union determine the strenth of exact positions of the Confederat entrenchments.

Although they did not know the details of their objectives,the Union soldiers who had surviived the frontal assat at Spotsylvania Court House seemed to be in no doubt as to what they would be up agaist in the morning.General Grant's aide,Lieutenant Colonel Horace Portor,wrote in his memoris that he saw many men writing their names on paper that they pinned inside their uniforms,so their body could be identifed.One blood-spattered diary from Union soldier found after the battle included a final entry "june 3,1864.Cold Harbor.I was killed."

On the northern end of the battlefield,General Warren's V Army Corps linked up with General Burnside's IX Army Corps near Bethesda Church.General Early's Second Corps on General Lee's left flank,pushed foward and captured several of General Warren's skirmishers.Light fighting occurred throughout the night,having little effect on the main battle to come.General Burnside at one point was advised to attack General Early's unprotected flank on Shady Grove Road,but he demurred.

At 4:30 a.m. on June 3,1864,the three Union corps began to advance through a think ground fog.Massive fire from the Confederate lines quickly casualiies,and survivors were pinned down.Although the results varied in different part of the line,the overall repulse of the Union advance resulted in most lopsided casualties since the assault on Marye's Hights at the Battle of Fredericksburg in 1862.

The most effective performance of the day was on the Union left flank,where General Hancock's corps was able to break through a portion of General Breckinridge's front line and drive those defenders out of their entrenchments in hand-to-hand fighting.Several hundred prisoners and four guns were captured.However,nearby Confederate artillery was brought to bear on the entrencments,turning them intoa death tyrap for the Federals.General Breckinridge's reserves counterattacked these men from the division of Brigadier General Francis C.Barlow and drove them off.General Hancock's other advance division,under Brigadier General John Gibbon,became disordered in swampy ground could not advance through the heavyConfederate fire,with two brigade commanders (Colonel Peter A. Porter and Colonel H. Boyd Mckeen)lost as casualties.Onc of General Gibbon's men,complaining of lack of reconnaissance,wrote, "We felt it was murder,not war,or a best a very serious mistake had been made.'

In the center,General Wright's corps was pinned down by heavy fire and made little efford to advance further,still recovering from their costly charge on June 1,1864.The normally aggressive General Emory Upton felt that further movement by his division was "impracticable."

Confederate defenders in this part of the line were unaware that a serious assault had been against their position.

On the Union right,General Smith's men advanced through unfavorable terrain and channeled into two ravines.When they emerged in front of the Confederate line,rifle and artillery fire mowed them down.A union officer wrote,"The men bent down as they pushed foward,as if trying,as they were ,to breast a tempest,and the files of men went down like rows of brocks or bricks pushed over by striking against one another." a Confederate discibed the canage of double-canister artillery fire as " deadly,bloody work."The artillery fire against General Smith's corps was heavier then might have been expected because General Warren's V Army Corps to his right was reluctant to advance and the Confederat gunners in General Warren's sector concentrated on General Smith's men instead.

The only activity on the northern end of the field was by General Burnside's IX Army Corps,facing General Jubal Early.He launched a powerful assault at 6:00 a.m. that overran the Confederate skrimishers but mistakenly thought he had pierced the first line of earthworks and halted his corp to regropup before moving on which he planned for that afternoon.

At 7:00 a.m. General advised general Meade to vigorously exploit any successful part of the assault.General Meade ordered his three corps commanders on the left to assault at once,without regard to the movements to their neighboring corps.But all had enough.General Hancock advised against the move.General Smith,calling a repetition of the attack a "wanton waste of life," refusee to advance again.General Wright's men increased their riflr fire but stayed in place.By 12:30 p.m. General Grant conceded that his army was done.He wrote to General Meade,"The opinion of the corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered,you may direct a suspension of further advance for the present." Union soldiers still pinned down before the Confederate lines began entreching using cups and bayonets to dig,sometimes including bodys of dead comrades as part of their improvised earthworks.

General Meade inexplicable bragged to his wife the next day that he was in command for the assault.But his performance had been poor.Despite order from General Grant that the Corps commanders were examine the ground their reconnaissance lax and General Meade failed to supervise them adequately,either before or during the attack.he was able to motivate only about 20,000 of his men to attack-the II Army Corps and parts of the XVIII Army Corps and IX Army Corps-failing to achieve the mass he knew he required to succed.His men paid heavily for the poorly coordinated assault.Estimates of casualties that morning are from 3,000 to 7,000 on the Union side no more then 1,500 on the Confederate.

At 11:00 a.m. on June 3,1864,the Confederate postmaster general John H. Reagan,arived with a delegation from Richmond.He asked general Robert E.Lee, "General,if the enemy breaks your lines,what reserve have you?" General Lee provided an animated response: "Not a regiment,and that has been my condition ever since the fighting commenced on the Rappahannock. If I shorten my lines to provide a reserve,he will turn me,if I weaken my lines to provide a reserve,he will break them."

General Grant and General Meade launched no more attacks on the Confederate defenses at Cold Harbor.Although General Grant wired Washington that he had "gained no decisive advantage" and that his "losses were not servere," he wrote in his Personal Memoirs that he regretted for the rest of his life the decision to send in his men.The two opposing armies faced each other for nine days of trench warfare,in some places only yards apart.Sharpshooters worked continously,killing many.Union Artillery bombarded the Confederate with a battery of eight Coehorn mortars; the Confederates responded by depressing the trail of 24-pound howitzer and lobbing shell over the Union positions.Although there were no mor large-scale attacks casualty figures for the entire battle were twice as large as from the June 3,1864 assaault alone.

I have always regrtted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made.I might say the same thing of the assault on the May 22,1863,at Vicksburg.At Cold Harbor no advanatage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we substained.Inded the advantages other than those of relative losses,were on the Confederate side.Before that,the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage,endurance,and soldiely qualitiesgenerally of the Army of tthe Potomac.They no longer wanter to fight them "one Confederates to five Yanks." Indeded they seemed to have giving up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field.They had come to much prefer breastworks in front of the Army of the Potomac.The charge seemed to revie their hopes temporarily;but it was of short duration.The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the rverse.When we reached the James River,however,all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to disappeared.

Every corpse I saw was as black as coal.It was not possible to remove them.they were buried where they fell ... I saw no live man lying on this ground.The wounded must have suffered horrible before death relieved them,lying the exposed to the blazing southern sun o'days and being eaten alive by beetles o'nights.

The trenches were hot,dusty and miserable,but conditions were worse between the lines,where thousands of wounded Federal soldiers suffered horribly without food,water,or medical assistance.General Grant was reluctant to ask for a formal truce that would allow him to recover his wounded because that would be an acknowledgment he had lost the battle.

He and General Lee traded notes across the lines from June 5,1864 to June 7,1864 without coming to an agreement,and when General Grant formally requested a two-hour cessation of hostilities,it was too late for most of the unfortunate wounded,who now bloated corpes.GeneralGrant was widely criticized in the Northern press for this lapse of jadement.

On June 4,1864 General Grant tightered his lines by moving General Burnside's corps behind Matadequin Creek as a reserve and moving General Warren leftward to connect with General Smith,shortening his line about 3 miles ( 4.8 km). On June 6,1864 General Early probed General Burnside's new position but could not advance throug the impassable swamps.

General Grant realized that,once again in the campaige he was in a stalemate with General Lee and additional assaults were not the anser.He planned three actions to make some headway.First,in the Shenandoah Valley,Major General David Hunter was making progress against Confederate forces,and General Grant hoped that interdirecting General Lee's supplies,the Conferate general would be foresed to dispatch reinforcements to the Valley.Second,on June 7,1864 General Grant dispatched his cavalry under General Sheridan (the divisions Brigadier General David McMurtrie Gregg,and Brigadier General Wesley Merritt) to distroy the Virginia Central Railroad near Charlottesville.Third he planned a stealthy operation to withdraw from General Lee's front and move across the James River.General Lee reached to the first two actions as General Grant had hoped.He pulled General Breckinridge's division from Cold Harbor and sent it toward Lynchburg to parry General Hunter.By June 12,1864 he followed this by assigning General Jubal Early permanent command of the Second Corps and sending them to the Valley as well.And he sent two of his three cavalry divisions in pursuit of General Sheridan,leading to the Battle of Trevillian Station.However,despit anticipating that General Grant might shift across the James River,General Lee was taken by surprise when it occurred.On June 12,1864 the Army of the Potomac finally disengaged to march southeast to cross the James River and threaten Petersburg,a crucial rail junction south of Richmond.

The Battle of Cold Harbor was the final victory won by General Lee's army during the war (part of his forces won the Battle of the Crater the following month,during the siege of Petersburg,but this did not represent a general engagement between the armies),and its most decisive in terms of casualties.The Union Army,in attempting the futilr assault,loss 10,000 to 13,000 men over twelve days.The battle brought the toll in Union casualties since the beginning of May to a total of more than 52,000,compared to 33,000 for General Lee.Although the cost was horrible,general Grant's larger army finished the campaign with lower relatitve casualties the General Lee.

Some authors (catton,Espositio,Foote,Mcpherson,

Grimsley) estimate the casualties for the major assault on June 3,1864 and all agree on approximately 7,00 total Union casualties 1,500 Confederate.For the morning assault on June 3,1864 account for olnly 3,500 to 4,000 Union killed,wounded,and missing,and estimeates that for the entire day the Union suffered about 6,00 casualties,compared to General Lee's 1,000 to 1,500.General Grants main attack on June 3,1864 was dwafed by General Lee's daily loss at Antietam,Chacellorsvill ,and Picket's Charge and comparable to Malvern Hill.

THe battle caused a rise in anti-war sentiment in the Northern stats .General Greant became known as the "fumbling butcher" for his por decisons.It also lowered the morale of his remaining troops.But the campaign had served General Grant's purpose-as ill-advised as he attack on Cold Harbor was,General Lee had lost the intiative and was forced to devote his attention to the defense of Richmond and Petersburg.He beat General Grant to Petersburg,barel,but spent the remainder of the war (save its final week) defending Richmond behind a fortified trench line.Although Southerners relized their situation was desperate,they hoped that General Lee's stubborn (and bloody) resistance would have political repercussions by causing Abraham Lincoln to lose the 1864 presidential eletion to a more peace-friendly candidate.The taking of Atlanta in September dashed these hopes,and the end of the Confederacy was just a matter of time.

During the battle,Burett's tavern was used as a hospital.Union soldier carried away all items of value,except for a crystal compote bowl saved by Mrs. Burnett.