3 August 2014 will remain the day the life of the yazedis has changed. Up to 200,000 yazedis people have been displaced from their homes in Sinjar City and the surrounding towns and villages when ISIS arrived by surprise .

The islamist group asked the residents to convert or die...Hundreds of Yazidis were executed as they refused. Most of the people left the village on time, fleeing on foot in the mountains, without nothing and most of the time without water or food , under a 50 degrees temperature. They walked for 7 days, including the babies and the elders. Many were killed, wounded or captured on the way. Now thousands are in Duhok in Kurdistan, and towns like Zoar when they have found a shelter for the winter. Some still have contacts thanks to the mobile phones with the relatives captured or trapped in Sinjar, but many do not have any news of their relatives and fear the worst...Until now, the town od Sinjar is seized by ISIS, where hundreds of Yazidis remain stranded months after fleeing their homes.But Kurdish peshmergas have regained lot of the ground lost to ISIS with the help of the U.S. air strikes. Sinjar is a strategic place as it would put the peshmergas on three sides of Mosul, the largest city under ISIS rule in northern Iraq.

 

© Eric Lafforgue

www.ericlafforgue.com

Retrato de un señor mayor en la ciudad marroquí de Fez

Lockheed C-130 Hercules

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_C-130_Hercules

 

C-130 Hercules

Straight-wing, four-engine turboprop-driven aircraft overflying water

USAF C-130E

Role Military transport aircraft

National origin: United States

Manufacturer: Lockheed

Lockheed Martin

First flight 23 August 1954

Status: In-service

Primary usersUnited States Air Force

United States Marine Corps

Royal Air Force

Royal Canadian Air Force

Produced1954–present

Number built: Over 2,500 as of 2015[1]

Unit cost

C-130E $11.9 million[2]

C-130H $30.1 million[3]

VariantsAC-130 Spectre/Spooky

Lockheed DC-130

Lockheed EC-130

Lockheed HC-130

Lockheed Martin KC-130

Lockheed LC-130

Lockheed MC-130

Lockheed WC-130

Lockheed L-100 Hercules

Developed into: Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules

The Lockheed C-130 Hercules is a four-engine turboprop military transport aircraft designed and built originally by Lockheed, now Lockheed Martin. Capable of using unprepared runways for takeoffs and landings, the C-130 was originally designed as a troop, medivac, and cargo transport aircraft. The versatile airframe has found uses in a variety of other roles, including as a gunship (AC-130), for airborne assault, search and rescue, scientific research support, weather reconnaissance, aerial refueling, maritime patrol, and aerial firefighting. It is now the main tactical airlifter for many military forces worldwide. Over forty models and variants of the Hercules, including a civilian one marketed as Lockheed L-100, operate in more than sixty nations.

 

The C-130 entered service with the U.S. in the 1950s, followed by Australia and others. During its years of service, the Hercules family has participated in numerous military, civilian and humanitarian aid operations. In 2007, the C-130 became the fifth aircraft—after the English Electric Canberra, B-52 Stratofortress, Tu-95, and KC-135 Stratotanker—to mark 50 years of continuous service with its original primary customer, in this case, the United States Air Force. The C-130 Hercules is the longest continuously produced military aircraft at over 60 years, with the updated C-130J Super Hercules being produced today.[4]

 

Contents [hide]

1Design and development

1.1Background and requirements

1.2Design phase

1.3Improved versions

1.4More improvements

1.5Later models

1.6Next generation

1.7Upgrades and changes

1.8Replacement

2Operational history

2.1Military

2.2Civilian

3Variants

4Operators

5Accidents

6Aircraft on display

6.1Australia

6.2Canada

6.3Colombia

6.4Indonesia

6.5Norway

6.6Saudi Arabia

6.7United Kingdom

6.8United States

7Specifications (C-130H)

8See also

9References

10External links

Design and development[edit]

 

This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2014)

Background and requirements[edit]

The Korean War, which began in June 1950, showed that World War II-era piston-engine transports—Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcars, Douglas C-47 Skytrains, and Curtiss C-46 Commandos—were inadequate for modern warfare. Thus, on 2 February 1951, the United States Air Force issued a General Operating Requirement (GOR) for a new transport to Boeing, Douglas, Fairchild, Lockheed, Martin, Chase Aircraft, North American, Northrop, and Airlifts Inc. The new transport would have a capacity of 92 passengers, 72 combat troops or 64 paratroopers in a cargo compartment that was approximately 41 feet (12 m) long, 9 feet (2.7 m) high, and 10 feet (3.0 m) wide. Unlike transports derived from passenger airliners, it was to be designed from the ground-up as a combat transport with loading from a hinged loading ramp at the rear of the fuselage.

 

A key feature was the introduction of the Allison T56 turboprop powerplant, first developed specifically for the C-130. At the time, the turboprop was a new application of turbine engines that used exhaust gases to turn a propeller, which offered greater range at propeller-driven speeds compared to pure turbojets, which were faster but consumed more fuel. As was the case on helicopters of that era, such as the UH-1 Huey, turboshafts produced much more power for their weight than piston engines. Lockheed would subsequently use the same engines and technology in the Lockheed L-188 Electra. That aircraft failed financially in its civilian configuration but was successfully adapted into the Lockheed P-3 Orion maritime patrol and submarine attack aircraft where the efficiency and endurance of turboprops excelled.

 

Design phase[edit]

The Hercules resembled a larger four-engine brother to the C-123 Provider with a similar wing and cargo ramp layout that evolved from the Chase XCG-20 Avitruc, which in turn, was first designed and flown as a cargo glider in 1947.[5] The Boeing C-97 Stratofreighter also had a rear ramp, which made it possible to drive vehicles onto the plane (also possible with a forward ramp on a C-124). The ramp on the Hercules was also used to airdrop cargo, which included low-altitude extraction for Sheridan tanks and even dropping large improvised "daisy cutter" bombs.

 

The new Lockheed cargo plane design possessed a range of 1,100 nmi (1,270 mi; 2,040 km), takeoff capability from short and unprepared strips, and the ability to fly with one engine shut down. Fairchild, North American, Martin, and Northrop declined to participate. The remaining five companies tendered a total of ten designs: Lockheed two, Boeing one, Chase three, Douglas three, and Airlifts Inc. one. The contest was a close affair between the lighter of the two Lockheed (preliminary project designation L-206) proposals and a four-turboprop Douglas design.

 

The Lockheed design team was led by Willis Hawkins, starting with a 130-page proposal for the Lockheed L-206.[6] Hall Hibbard, Lockheed vice president and chief engineer, saw the proposal and directed it to Kelly Johnson, who did not care for the low-speed, unarmed aircraft, and remarked, "If you sign that letter, you will destroy the Lockheed Company."[6] Both Hibbard and Johnson signed the proposal and the company won the contract for the now-designated Model 82 on 2 July 1951.[7]

 

The first flight of the YC-130 prototype was made on 23 August 1954 from the Lockheed plant in Burbank, California. The aircraft, serial number 53-3397, was the second prototype, but the first of the two to fly. The YC-130 was piloted by Stanley Beltz and Roy Wimmer on its 61-minute flight to Edwards Air Force Base; Jack Real and Dick Stanton served as flight engineers. Kelly Johnson flew chase in a Lockheed P2V Neptune.[8]

 

After the two prototypes were completed, production began in Marietta, Georgia, where over 2,300 C-130s have been built through 2009.[9]

 

The initial production model, the C-130A, was powered by Allison T56-A-9 turboprops with three-blade propellers and originally equipped with the blunt nose of the prototypes. Deliveries began in December 1956, continuing until the introduction of the C-130B model in 1959. Some A-models were equipped with skis and re-designated C-130D. As the C-130A became operational with Tactical Air Command (TAC), the C-130's lack of range became apparent and additional fuel capacity was added in the form of external pylon-mounted tanks at the end of the wings.

 

Improved versions[edit]

 

A Michigan Air National Guard C-130E dispatches its flares during a low-level training mission

The C-130B model was developed to complement the A-models that had previously been delivered, and incorporated new features, particularly increased fuel capacity in the form of auxiliary tanks built into the center wing section and an AC electrical system. Four-bladed Hamilton Standard propellers replaced the Aeroproducts three-blade propellers that distinguished the earlier A-models. The C-130B had ailerons with increased boost—3,000 psi (21 MPa) versus 2,050 psi (14 MPa)—as well as uprated engines and four-blade propellers that were standard until the J-model's introduction.

 

An electronic reconnaissance variant of the C-130B was designated C-130B-II. A total of 13 aircraft were converted. The C-130B-II was distinguished by its false external wing fuel tanks, which were disguised signals intelligence (SIGINT) receiver antennas. These pods were slightly larger than the standard wing tanks found on other C-130Bs. Most aircraft featured a swept blade antenna on the upper fuselage, as well as extra wire antennas between the vertical fin and upper fuselage not found on other C-130s. Radio call numbers on the tail of these aircraft were regularly changed so as to confuse observers and disguise their true mission.

 

The extended-range C-130E model entered service in 1962 after it was developed as an interim long-range transport for the Military Air Transport Service. Essentially a B-model, the new designation was the result of the installation of 1,360 US gal (5,150 L) Sargent Fletcher external fuel tanks under each wing's midsection and more powerful Allison T56-A-7A turboprops. The hydraulic boost pressure to the ailerons was reduced back to 2050 psi as a consequence of the external tanks' weight in the middle of the wingspan. The E model also featured structural improvements, avionics upgrades and a higher gross weight. Australia took delivery of 12 C130E Hercules during 1966–67 to supplement the 12 C-130A models already in service with the RAAF. Sweden and Spain fly the TP-84T version of the C-130E fitted for aerial refueling capability.

 

The KC-130 tankers, originally C-130F procured for the US Marine Corps (USMC) in 1958 (under the designation GV-1) are equipped with a removable 3,600 US gal (13,626 L) stainless steel fuel tank carried inside the cargo compartment. The two wing-mounted hose and drogue aerial refueling pods each transfer up to 300 US gal per minute (19 L per second) to two aircraft simultaneously, allowing for rapid cycle times of multiple-receiver aircraft formations, (a typical tanker formation of four aircraft in less than 30 minutes). The US Navy's C-130G has increased structural strength allowing higher gross weight operation.

 

More improvements[edit]

 

Royal Australian Air Force C-130H, 2007

The C-130H model has updated Allison T56-A-15 turboprops, a redesigned outer wing, updated avionics and other minor improvements. Later H models had a new, fatigue-life-improved, center wing that was retrofitted to many earlier H-models. For structural reasons, some models are required to land with certain amounts of fuel when carrying heavy cargo, reducing usable range.[10] The H model remains in widespread use with the United States Air Force (USAF) and many foreign air forces. Initial deliveries began in 1964 (to the RNZAF), remaining in production until 1996. An improved C-130H was introduced in 1974, with Australia purchasing 12 of type in 1978 to replace the original 12 C-130A models, which had first entered RAAF Service in 1958.

 

The United States Coast Guard employs the HC-130H for long-range search and rescue, drug interdiction, illegal migrant patrols, homeland security, and logistics.

 

C-130H models produced from 1992 to 1996 were designated as C-130H3 by the USAF. The "3" denoting the third variation in design for the H series. Improvements included ring laser gyros for the INUs, GPS receivers, a partial glass cockpit (ADI and HSI instruments), a more capable APN-241 color radar, night vision device compatible instrument lighting, and an integrated radar and missile warning system. The electrical system upgrade included Generator Control Units (GCU) and Bus Switching units (BSU)to provide stable power to the more sensitive upgraded components.[citation needed]

  

Royal Air Force C-130K (C.3)

The equivalent model for export to the UK is the C-130K, known by the Royal Air Force (RAF) as the Hercules C.1. The C-130H-30 (Hercules C.3 in RAF service) is a stretched version of the original Hercules, achieved by inserting a 100 in (2.54 m) plug aft of the cockpit and an 80 in (2.03 m) plug at the rear of the fuselage. A single C-130K was purchased by the Met Office for use by its Meteorological Research Flight, where it was classified as the Hercules W.2. This aircraft was heavily modified (with its most prominent feature being the long red and white striped atmospheric probe on the nose and the move of the weather radar into a pod above the forward fuselage). This aircraft, named Snoopy, was withdrawn in 2001 and was then modified by Marshall of Cambridge Aerospace as flight-testbed for the A400M turbine engine, the TP400. The C-130K is used by the RAF Falcons for parachute drops. Three C-130K (Hercules C Mk.1P) were upgraded and sold to the Austrian Air Force in 2002.[11]

 

Later models[edit]

The MC-130E Combat Talon was developed for the USAF during the Vietnam War to support special operations missions in Southeast Asia and led to both the MC-130H Combat Talon II as well as a family of other special missions aircraft. Thirty-seven (37) of the earliest models currently operating with the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) are scheduled to be replaced by new-production MC-130J versions. The EC-130 Commando Solo is another special missions variant within AFSOC, albeit operated solely by an AFSOC-gained wing in the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, and is a psychological operations/information operations (PSYOP/IO) platform equipped as an aerial radio station and television stations able to transmit messaging over commercial frequencies. Other versions of the EC-130, most notably the EC-130H Compass Call, are also special variants but are assigned to the Air Combat Command (ACC). The AC-130 gunship was first developed during the Vietnam War to provide close air support and other ground-attack duties.

  

USAF HC-130P refuels a HH-60G Pavehawk helicopter

The HC-130 is a family of long-range search and rescue variants used by the USAF and the U.S. Coast Guard. Equipped for deep deployment of Pararescuemen (PJs), survival equipment, and (in the case of USAF versions) aerial refueling of combat rescue helicopters, HC-130s are usually the on-scene command aircraft for combat SAR missions (USAF only) and non-combat SAR (USAF and USCG). Early USAF versions were also equipped with the Fulton surface-to-air recovery system, designed to pull a person off the ground using a wire strung from a helium balloon. The John Wayne movie The Green Berets features its use. The Fulton system was later removed when aerial refueling of helicopters proved safer and more versatile. The movie The Perfect Storm depicts a real-life SAR mission involving aerial refueling of a New York Air National Guard HH-60G by a New York Air National Guard HC-130P.

 

The C-130R and C-130T are U.S. Navy and USMC models, both equipped with underwing external fuel tanks. The USN C-130T is similar but has additional avionics improvements. In both models, aircraft are equipped with Allison T56-A-16 engines. The USMC versions are designated KC-130R or KC-130T when equipped with underwing refueling pods and pylons and are fully night vision system compatible.

 

The RC-130 is a reconnaissance version. A single example is used by the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, the aircraft having originally been sold to the former Imperial Iranian Air Force.

 

The Lockheed L-100 (L-382) is a civilian variant, equivalent to a C-130E model without military equipment. The L-100 also has two stretched versions.

 

Next generation[edit]

Main article: Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules

In the 1970s, Lockheed proposed a C-130 variant with turbofan engines rather than turboprops, but the U.S. Air Force preferred the takeoff performance of the existing aircraft. In the 1980s, the C-130 was intended to be replaced by the Advanced Medium STOL Transport project. The project was canceled and the C-130 has remained in production.

 

Building on lessons learned, Lockheed Martin modified a commercial variant of the C-130 into a High Technology Test Bed (HTTB). This test aircraft set numerous short takeoff and landing performance records and significantly expanded the database for future derivatives of the C-130.[12] Modifications made to the HTTB included extended chord ailerons, a long chord rudder, fast-acting double-slotted trailing edge flaps, a high-camber wing leading-edge extension, a larger dorsal fin and dorsal fins, the addition of three spoiler panels to each wing upper surface, a long-stroke main and nose landing gear system, and changes to the flight controls and a change from direct mechanical linkages assisted by hydraulic boost, to fully powered controls, in which the mechanical linkages from the flight station controls operated only the hydraulic control valves of the appropriate boost unit.[13] The HTTB first flew on 19 June 1984, with civil registration of N130X. After demonstrating many new technologies, some of which were applied to the C-130J, the HTTB was lost in a fatal accident on 3 February 1993, at Dobbins Air Reserve Base, in Marietta, Georgia.[14] The crash was attributed to disengagement of the rudder fly-by-wire flight control system, resulting in a total loss of rudder control capability while conducting ground minimum control speed tests (Vmcg). The disengagement was a result of the inadequate design of the rudder's integrated actuator package by its manufacturer; the operator's insufficient system safety review failed to consider the consequences of the inadequate design to all operating regimes. A factor that contributed to the accident was the flight crew's lack of engineering flight test training.[15]

 

In the 1990s, the improved C-130J Super Hercules was developed by Lockheed (later Lockheed Martin). This model is the newest version and the only model in production. Externally similar to the classic Hercules in general appearance, the J model has new turboprop engines, six-bladed propellers, digital avionics, and other new systems.[16]

 

Upgrades and changes[edit]

In 2000, Boeing was awarded a US$1.4 billion contract to develop an Avionics Modernization Program kit for the C-130. The program was beset with delays and cost overruns until project restructuring in 2007.[17] On 2 September 2009, Bloomberg News reported that the planned Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) upgrade to the older C-130s would be dropped to provide more funds for the F-35, CV-22 and airborne tanker replacement programs.[18] However, in June 2010, the Department of Defense approved funding for the initial production of the AMP upgrade kits.[19][20] Under the terms of this agreement, the USAF has cleared Boeing to begin low-rate initial production (LRIP) for the C-130 AMP. A total of 198 aircraft are expected to feature the AMP upgrade. The current cost per aircraft is US$14 million although Boeing expects that this price will drop to US$7 million for the 69th aircraft.[17]

 

An engine enhancement program saving fuel and providing lower temperatures in the T56 engine has been approved, and the US Air Force expects to save $2 billion and extend the fleet life.[21]

 

Replacement[edit]

In October 2010, the Air Force released a capabilities request for information (CRFI) for the development of a new airlifter to replace the C-130. The new aircraft is to carry a 190 percent greater payload and assume the mission of mounted vertical maneuver (MVM). The greater payload and mission would enable it to carry medium-weight armored vehicles and drop them off at locations without long runways. Various options are being considered, including new or upgraded fixed-wing designs, rotorcraft, tilt-rotors, or even an airship. The development could start in 2014, and become operational by 2024. The C-130 fleet of around 450 planes would be replaced by only 250 aircraft.[22] The Air Force had attempted to replace the C-130 in the 1970s through the Advanced Medium STOL Transport project, which resulted in the C-17 Globemaster III that instead replaced the C-141 Starlifter.[23] The Air Force Research Laboratory funded Lockheed and Boeing demonstrators for the Speed Agile concept, which had the goal of making a STOL aircraft that can take off and land at speeds as low as 70 km (130 km/h; 81 mph) on airfields less than 2,000 ft (610 m) long and cruise at Mach 0.8-plus. Boeing's design used upper-surface blowing from embedded engines on the inboard wing and blown flaps for circulation control on the outboard wing. Lockheed's design also used blown flaps outboard, but inboard used patented reversing ejector nozzles. Boeing's design completed over 2,000 hours of wind tunnel tests in late 2009. It was a 5 percent-scale model of a narrowbody design with a 55,000 lb (25,000 kg) payload. When the AFRL increased the payload requirement to 65,000 lb (29,000 kg), they tested a 5% scale model of a widebody design with a 303,000 lb (137,000 kg) take-off gross weight and an "A400M-size" 158 in (4.0 m) wide cargo box. It would be powered by four IAE V2533 turbofans.[24] In August 2011, the AFRL released pictures of the Lockheed Speed Agile concept demonstrator. A 23% scale model went through wind tunnel tests to demonstrate its hybrid-powered lift, which combines a low drag airframe with simple mechanical assembly to reduce weight and better aerodynamics. The model had four engines, including two Williams FJ44 turbofans.[23][25] On 26 March 2013, Boeing was granted a patent for its swept-wing powered lift aircraft.[26]

 

As of January 2014, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, and the Air Force Research Lab are in the early stages of defining requirements for the C-X next generation airlifter program to replace both the C-130 and C-17. An aircraft would be produced from the early 2030s to the 2040s. If requirements are decided for operating in contested airspace, Air Force procurement of C-130s would end by the end of the decade to not have them serviceable by the 2030s and operated when they can't perform in that environment. The development of the airlifter depends heavily on the Army's "tactical and operational maneuver" plans. Two different cargo planes could still be created to separately perform tactical and strategic missions, but which course to pursue is to be decided before C-17s need to be retired.[27]

 

Operational history[edit]

 

This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2014)

Military[edit]

 

USMC KC-130F Hercules performing takeoffs and landings aboard the aircraft carrier Forrestal in 1963. The aircraft is now displayed at the National Museum of Naval Aviation.

The first production aircraft, C-130As were first delivered beginning in 1956 to the 463d Troop Carrier Wing at Ardmore AFB, Oklahoma and the 314th Troop Carrier Wing at Sewart AFB, Tennessee. Six additional squadrons were assigned to the 322d Air Division in Europe and the 315th Air Division in the Far East. Additional aircraft were modified for electronics intelligence work and assigned to Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany while modified RC-130As were assigned to the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) photo-mapping division.

 

In 1958, a U.S. reconnaissance C-130A-II of the 7406th Support Squadron was shot down over Armenia by MiG-17s.[28]

 

Australia became the first non-American force to operate the C-130A Hercules with 12 examples being delivered from late 1958. These aircraft were fitted with AeroProducts three-blade, 15-foot diameter propellers. The Royal Canadian Air Force became another early user with the delivery of four B-models (Canadian designation C-130 Mk I) in October / November 1960.[29]

 

In 1963, a Hercules achieved and still holds the record for the largest and heaviest aircraft to land on an aircraft carrier.[30] During October and November that year, a USMC KC-130F (BuNo 149798), loaned to the U.S. Naval Air Test Center, made 29 touch-and-go landings, 21 unarrested full-stop landings and 21 unassisted take-offs on Forrestal at a number of different weights.[31] The pilot, LT (later RADM) James H. Flatley III, USN, was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for his role in this test series. The tests were highly successful, but the idea was considered too risky for routine "Carrier Onboard Delivery" (COD) operations. Instead, the Grumman C-2 Greyhound was developed as a dedicated COD aircraft. The Hercules used in the test, most recently in service with Marine Aerial Refueler Squadron 352 (VMGR-352) until 2005, is now part of the collection of the National Museum of Naval Aviation at NAS Pensacola, Florida.

 

In 1964, C-130 crews from the 6315th Operations Group at Naha Air Base, Okinawa commenced forward air control (FAC; "Flare") missions over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos supporting USAF strike aircraft. In April 1965 the mission was expanded to North Vietnam where C-130 crews led formations of B-57 bombers on night reconnaissance/strike missions against communist supply routes leading to South Vietnam. In early 1966 Project Blind Bat/Lamplighter was established at Ubon RTAFB, Thailand. After the move to Ubon the mission became a four-engine FAC mission with the C-130 crew searching for targets then calling in strike aircraft. Another little-known C-130 mission flown by Naha-based crews was Operation Commando Scarf, which involved the delivery of chemicals onto sections of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos that were designed to produce mud and landslides in hopes of making the truck routes impassable.[citation needed]

 

In November 1964, on the other side of the globe, C-130Es from the 464th Troop Carrier Wing but loaned to 322d Air Division in France, flew one of the most dramatic missions in history in the former Belgian Congo. After communist Simba rebels took white residents of the city of Stanleyville hostage, the U.S. and Belgium developed a joint rescue mission that used the C-130s to airlift and then drop and air-land a force of Belgian paratroopers to rescue the hostages. Two missions were flown, one over Stanleyville and another over Paulis during Thanksgiving weeks.[32] The headline-making mission resulted in the first award of the prestigious MacKay Trophy to C-130 crews.

 

In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, as a desperate measure, the transport No. 6 Squadron of the Pakistan Air Force modified its entire small fleet of C-130Bs for use as heavy bombers, capable of carrying up to 20,000 lb (9,072 kg) of bombs on pallets. These improvised bombers were used to hit Indian targets such as bridges, heavy artillery positions, tank formations, and troop concentrations.[33][34] Some C-130s even flew with anti-aircraft guns fitted on their ramp, apparently shooting down some 17 aircraft and damaging 16 others.[35]

  

The C-130 Hercules was used in the Battle of Kham Duc in 1968, when the North Vietnamese Army forced U.S.-led forces to abandon the Kham Duc Special Forces Camp.

In October 1968, a C-130Bs from the 463rd Tactical Airlift Wing dropped a pair of M-121 10,000 pound bombs that had been developed for the massive B-36 bomber but had never been used. The U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force resurrected the huge weapons as a means of clearing landing zones for helicopters and in early 1969 the 463rd commenced Commando Vault missions. Although the stated purpose of COMMANDO VAULT was to clear LZs, they were also used on enemy base camps and other targets.[citation needed]

 

During the late 1960s, the U.S. was eager to get information on Chinese nuclear capabilities. After the failure of the Black Cat Squadron to plant operating sensor pods near the Lop Nur Nuclear Weapons Test Base using a Lockheed U-2, the CIA developed a plan, named Heavy Tea, to deploy two battery-powered sensor pallets near the base. To deploy the pallets, a Black Bat Squadron crew was trained in the U.S. to fly the C-130 Hercules. The crew of 12, led by Col Sun Pei Zhen, took off from Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base in an unmarked U.S. Air Force C-130E on 17 May 1969. Flying for six and a half hours at low altitude in the dark, they arrived over the target and the sensor pallets were dropped by parachute near Anxi in Gansu province. After another six and a half hours of low altitude flight, they arrived back at Takhli. The sensors worked and uploaded data to a U.S. intelligence satellite for six months before their batteries wore out. The Chinese conducted two nuclear tests, on 22 September 1969 and 29 September 1969, during the operating life of the sensor pallets. Another mission to the area was planned as Operation Golden Whip, but was called off in 1970.[36] It is most likely that the aircraft used on this mission was either C-130E serial number 64-0506 or 64-0507 (cn 382-3990 and 382-3991). These two aircraft were delivered to Air America in 1964.[37] After being returned to the U.S. Air Force sometime between 1966 and 1970, they were assigned the serial numbers of C-130s that had been destroyed in accidents. 64-0506 is now flying as 62-1843, a C-130E that crashed in Vietnam on 20 December 1965 and 64-0507 is now flying as 63-7785, a C-130E that had crashed in Vietnam on 17 June 1966.[38]

 

The A-model continued in service through the Vietnam War, where the aircraft assigned to the four squadrons at Naha AB, Okinawa and one at Tachikawa Air Base, Japan performed yeoman's service, including operating highly classified special operations missions such as the BLIND BAT FAC/Flare mission and FACT SHEET leaflet mission over Laos and North Vietnam. The A-model was also provided to the South Vietnamese Air Force as part of the Vietnamization program at the end of the war, and equipped three squadrons based at Tan Son Nhut AFB. The last operator in the world is the Honduran Air Force, which is still flying one of five A model Hercules (FAH 558, c/n 3042) as of October 2009.[39] As the Vietnam War wound down, the 463rd Troop Carrier/Tactical Airlift Wing B-models and A-models of the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing were transferred back to the United States where most were assigned to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units.

  

U.S. Marines disembark from C-130 transports at the Da Nang Airbase on 8 March 1965

Another prominent role for the B model was with the United States Marine Corps, where Hercules initially designated as GV-1s replaced C-119s. After Air Force C-130Ds proved the type's usefulness in Antarctica, the U.S. Navy purchased a number of B-models equipped with skis that were designated as LC-130s. C-130B-II electronic reconnaissance aircraft were operated under the SUN VALLEY program name primarily from Yokota Air Base, Japan. All reverted to standard C-130B cargo aircraft after their replacement in the reconnaissance role by other aircraft.

 

The C-130 was also used in the 1976 Entebbe raid in which Israeli commando forces carried a surprise assault to rescue 103 passengers of an airliner hijacked by Palestinian and German terrorists at Entebbe Airport, Uganda. The rescue force — 200 soldiers, jeeps, and a black Mercedes-Benz (intended to resemble Ugandan Dictator Idi Amin's vehicle of state) — was flown over 2,200 nmi (4,074 km; 2,532 mi) almost entirely at an altitude of less than 100 ft (30 m) from Israel to Entebbe by four Israeli Air Force (IAF) Hercules aircraft without mid-air refueling (on the way back, the planes refueled in Nairobi, Kenya).

 

During the Falklands War (Spanish: Guerra de las Malvinas) of 1982, Argentine Air Force C-130s undertook highly dangerous, daily re-supply night flights as blockade runners to the Argentine garrison on the Falkland Islands. They also performed daylight maritime survey flights. One was lost during the war. Argentina also operated two KC-130 tankers during the war, and these refueled both the Douglas A-4 Skyhawks and Navy Dassault-Breguet Super Étendards; some C-130s were modified to operate as bombers with bomb-racks under their wings. The British also used RAF C-130s to support their logistical operations.

  

USMC C-130T Fat Albert performing a rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO)

During the Gulf War of 1991 (Operation Desert Storm), the C-130 Hercules was used operationally by the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps, along with the air forces of Australia, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and the UK. The MC-130 Combat Talon variant also made the first attacks using the largest conventional bombs in the world, the BLU-82 "Daisy Cutter" and GBU-43/B "Massive Ordnance Air Blast" bomb, (MOAB). Daisy Cutters were used to clear landing zones and to eliminate minefields. The weight and size of the weapons make it impossible or impractical to load them on conventional bombers. The GBU-43/B MOAB is a successor to the BLU-82 and can perform the same function, as well as perform strike functions against hardened targets in a low air threat environment.

 

Since 1992, two successive C-130 aircraft named Fat Albert have served as the support aircraft for the U.S. Navy Blue Angels flight demonstration team. Fat Albert I was a TC-130G (151891),[40] while Fat Albert II is a C-130T (164763).[41] Although Fat Albert supports a Navy squadron, it is operated by the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and its crew consists solely of USMC personnel. At some air shows featuring the team, Fat Albert takes part, performing flyovers. Until 2009, it also demonstrated its rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO) capabilities; these ended due to dwindling supplies of rockets.[42]

 

The AC-130 also holds the record for the longest sustained flight by a C-130. From 22 to 24 October 1997, two AC-130U gunships flew 36 hours nonstop from Hurlburt Field Florida to Taegu (Daegu), South Korea while being refueled seven times by KC-135 tanker aircraft. This record flight shattered the previous record longest flight by over 10 hours while the two gunships took on 410,000 lb (190,000 kg) of fuel. The gunship has been used in every major U.S. combat operation since Vietnam, except for Operation El Dorado Canyon, the 1986 attack on Libya.[43]

  

C-130 Hercules performs a tactical landing on a dirt strip

During the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the ongoing support of the International Security Assistance Force (Operation Enduring Freedom), the C-130 Hercules has been used operationally by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, the UK and the United States.

 

During the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom), the C-130 Hercules was used operationally by Australia, the UK and the United States. After the initial invasion, C-130 operators as part of the Multinational force in Iraq used their C-130s to support their forces in Iraq.

 

Since 2004, the Pakistan Air Force has employed C-130s in the War in North-West Pakistan. Some variants had forward-looking infrared (FLIR Systems Star Safire III EO/IR) sensor balls, to enable close tracking of Islamist militants.[44]

 

Civilian[edit]

 

A C-130E fitted with a MAFFS-1 dropping fire retardant

The U.S. Forest Service developed the Modular Airborne FireFighting System for the C-130 in the 1970s, which allows regular aircraft to be temporarily converted to an air tanker for fighting wildfires.[45] In the late 1980s, 22 retired USAF C-130As were removed from storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base and transferred to the U.S. Forest Service who then sold them to six private companies to be converted into air tankers (see U.S. Forest Service air tanker scandal). After one of these aircraft crashed due to wing separation in flight as a result of fatigue stress cracking, the entire fleet of C-130A air tankers was permanently grounded in 2004 (see 2002 airtanker crashes). C-130s have been used to spread chemical dispersants onto the massive oil slick in the Gulf Coast in 2010.[46]

 

A recent development of a C-130–based airtanker is the Retardant Aerial Delivery System developed by Coulson Aviation USA . The system consists of a C-130H/Q retrofitted with an in-floor discharge system, combined with a removable 3,500- or 4,000-gallon water tank. The combined system is FAA certified.[47]

 

Variants[edit]

 

This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2014)

 

C-130H Hercules flight deck

 

A U.S. JC-130 aircraft retrieving a reconnaissance satellite film capsule under parachute.

 

C-130s from the: U.S., Canada, Australia and Israel (foreground to background)

 

RAAF C-130J-30 at Point Cook, 2006

 

Brazilian Air Force C-130 (L-382)

For civilian versions, see Lockheed L-100 Hercules.

Significant military variants of the C-130 include:

 

C-130A/B/E/F/G/H/K/T

Tactical airlifter basic models

C-130A-II Dreamboat

Early version Electronic Intelligence/Signals Intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) aircraft[48]

C-130J Super Hercules

Tactical airlifter, with new engines, avionics, and updated systems

C-130K

Designation for RAF Hercules C1/W2/C3 aircraft (C-130Js in RAF service are the Hercules C.4 and Hercules C.5)

AC-130A/E/H/J/U/W

Gunship variants

C-130D/D-6

Ski-equipped version for snow and ice operations United States Air Force / Air National Guard

CC-130E/H/J Hercules

Designation for Canadian Armed Forces / Royal Canadian Air Force Hercules aircraft. U.S. Air Force used the CC-130J designation to differentiate standard C-130Js from "stretched" C-130Js (Company designation C-130J-30s).

DC-130A/E/H

USAF and USN Drone control

EC-130

EC-130E/J Commando Solo – USAF / Air National Guard psychological operations version

EC-130E – Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC)

EC-130E Rivet Rider – Airborne psychological warfare aircraft

EC-130H Compass Call – Electronic warfare and electronic attack.[49]

EC-130V – Airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) variant used by USCG for counter-narcotics missions[50]

GC-130

Permanently Grounded "Static Display"

HC-130

HC-130B/E/H – Early model combat search and rescue

HC-130P/N Combat King – USAF aerial refueling tanker and combat search and rescue

HC-130J Combat King II – Next-generation combat search and rescue tanker

HC-130H/J – USCG long-range surveillance and search and rescue

JC-130

Temporary conversion for flight test operations

KC-130F/R/T/J

United States Marine Corps aerial refueling tanker and tactical airlifter

LC-130F/H/R

USAF / Air National Guard – Ski-equipped version for Arctic and Antarctic support operations; LC-130F previously operated by USN

MC-130

MC-130E/H Combat Talon I/II – Special operations infiltration/extraction variant

MC-130W Combat Spear/Dragon Spear – Special operations tanker/gunship[51]

MC-130P Combat Shadow – Special operations tanker

MC-130J Commando II (formerly Combat Shadow II) – Special operations tanker Air Force Special Operations Command[52]

YMC-130H – Modified aircraft under Operation Credible Sport for second Iran hostage crisis rescue attempt

NC-130

Permanent conversion for flight test operations

PC-130/C-130-MP

Maritime patrol

RC-130A/S

Surveillance aircraft for reconnaissance

SC-130J Sea Herc

Proposed maritime patrol version of the C-130J, designed for coastal surveillance and anti-submarine warfare.[53][54]

TC-130

Aircrew training

VC-130H

VIP transport

WC-130A/B/E/H/J

Weather reconnaissance ("Hurricane Hunter") version for USAF / Air Force Reserve Command's 53d Weather Reconnaissance Squadron in support of the National Weather Service's National Hurricane Center

 

إِنَّا لِلّهِ وَإِنَّـا إِلَيْهِ رَاجِعونَ

 

Al-Fatihah

 

بِسْمِ اللَّـهِ الرَّحْمَـٰنِ الرَّحِيمِ ﴿١

الْحَمْدُ لِلَّـهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ ﴿٢

الرَّحْمَـٰنِ الرَّحِيمِ ﴿٣

مَالِكِ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ ﴿٤

إِيَّاكَ نَعْبُدُ وَإِيَّاكَ نَسْتَعِينُ ﴿٥

اهْدِنَا الصِّرَاطَ الْمُسْتَقِيمَ ﴿٦

صِرَاطَ الَّذِينَ أَنْعَمْتَ عَلَيْهِمْ غَيْرِ الْمَغْضُوبِ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلَا الضَّالِّينَ ﴿٧ـ

 

اللهم اغفرله وارحمه وعافه واعف عنه وأكرم نُزُله. ووسع مُدخله. واغسله بالماء والثلج والبرد ، ونقه من الخطايا كما ينقى الثوب الأبيض من الدنس ، وأبدله داراً خيراً من داره ، وأهلاً خيراً من أهله وزوجاً خيراً من زوجه وأدخله الجنة وأعذه من عذاب القبر ومن عذاب النار

 

Ya Allah, ampunilah dia, kasihilah dia, maafkanlah dia, muliakanlah tempatnya, luaskanlah tempat masuknya, mandikanlah dia dengan air, salju dan embun. Sucikanlah dia dari segala kesalahan sebagaimana pakaian disucikan dari najis. Gantikan untuknya rumah yang lebih baik dari rumahnya, gantikan untuknya keluarga yang lebih baik dari keluarganya, gantikan untuknya isteri (pasangan) yang lebih baik dari pasangannya. Masukkanlah ke dalam surga dan lindungilah dia dari azab kubur dan azab neraka.

 

آمِيّنْ... آمِيّنْ آمِّيْنَ يَا رَبَّ الْعَالَمِيْن

  

Tok Guru Datuk Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat’s death marks the loss of one of PAS’s most iconic and influential leaders – he was a cleric who has helped shape the course of the Islamist party for over three decades, and was a politician so unlike any other politician the country has seen.

Throughout his lifetime, Nik Aziz always struck a humble figure. Despite having the most powerful position in a party that boasted about one million members, and retaining the Kelantan menteri besar post for over two decades, the religious teacher was content staying in his old kampong house and driving around in his own car-Themalaysianinsider.com

   

Islamist lawyer

----

Subscribe to my newsletter, where I post weekly commentary and reports on Egyptian politics: 3arabawy.substack.com

rich without money

fight without friends

victory without defeat enemy

magic without a spell

 

This is the attitude of a hero

 

In Javanese wayang (shadow puppets), the panakawan or panakavan (phanakavhan) are the clown servants of the hero. There are four of them – Semar (also known as Ki Lurah Semar), Petruk, Gareng and Bagong. Semar is the personification of a deity, sometimes said to be the dhanyang or guardian spirit of the island of Java. In Javanese mythology, deities can only manifest themselves as ugly or otherwise unprepossessing humans, and so Semar is always portrayed as short and fat with a pug nose and a dangling hernia.

 

His three companions are his adopted sons, given to Semar as votaries by their parents. Petruk is portrayed as tall and gangling with a long nose, Gareng as short with a club foot and Bagong as obese.

 

The panakawan always appear in the second act of a wayang performance – pathet sanga – as servants to the hero of the story regardless of who that hero is.

 

Similar characters appear in other Indonesian wayang and theatrical traditions, including those of Bali and Sunda, under different names.

 

The panakawan characters are generally much-loved by audiences who attend wayang plays in Indonesia and their appearance in the plays is usually greeted with laughter and anticipation. However, there are sometimes underlying tensions in Indonesian society between the Hindu elements of Javanese culture which the panakawan characters capture and Islamist religious puritan hardliners who oppose secular and other strains of Javanese culture. In an unusual incident in Purwakarta in West Java in September 2011, for example, four wayang statues (of Gatotkaca, Semar, Bima, and Nakula-Sadewa) were destroyed. [ wikipedia]

=====================================================

The term punakawan comes from pana which means understanding, and friend which means friend. If you are looking for Punakawan figures in the Mahabharata and Ramayana texts, do not be surprised if the Punakawan figures are not there. Punakawan is a puppet character created by a Javanese poet. According to Slamet Muljana, a historian, the Punakawan figure first appeared in the Ghatotkacasraya literary work by Empu Panuluh in the era of the Kediri Kingdom. Kediri or Kadiri (also known as Panjalu) was a Hindu Javanese Kingdom based in East Java from 1042 to around 1222. Despite the lack of archaeological remains, the age of Kediri saw much development in classical literature. Mpu Sedah's Kakawin Bharatayuddha, Mpu Panuluh's Gatotkacasraya, and Mpu Dharmaja's Smaradhana blossomed in this era. The kingdom's capital is believed to have been established in the western part of the Brantas River valley, somewhere near modern Kediri city and surrounding Kediri Regency.

 

Four figures of the clownman consisted of Semar and his three children, namely Gareng, Petruk, and Bagong. The Punakawan are shown as cheerful groups with their typical humor to melt the atmosphere. Apart from that, Punakawan also has their own character which is certainly worth exploring deeper.

 

Semar

One of the characters who is always present in the Punakawan, is told as the main character servant of the story Sahadewa from the Pandawa family. Not only as a servant, but Semar also often gives wise advice to the Pandavas. Semar is described as a patient and wise figure. Head and view of Semar facing upwards, depicting human life so that they always remember the Almighty. The cloth used as a shirt by Semar, namely Semar Parangkusumorojo fabric is an embodiment to memayuhayuning banowo or uphold justice and truth on earth. In Javanese spiritual circles, Semar is considered a symbol of the One.

 

Gareng

In the Javanese puppet story, Nala Gareng is said to be a child of Gandarwa (a genie of a genie) who was adopted by Semar. Pancalparnor is another name for Gareng which means to reject worldly temptations. Gareng has a limp leg, this teaches that always be careful in acting. In one story, Gareng was once a king, but because he was arrogant, he challenged every knight he met and in a fight, they were balanced.

 

No one wins or loses, but from that fight. Gareng's face, which was originally beautiful, became ugly. Gareng has a short stature and always bends, this indicates caution, even though he has prospered, but must remain vigilant. His eyes were crossed which indicated he did not want to see things that invited evil. His hands are curved, this illustrates not to usurp the rights of others.

 

Petruk

Petruk is described as a person who likes to joke, either through speech or behavior. He is the second child appointed by Semar. Another name is Kanthong Bolong, which means to be happy. As a clownman, he is a person who can nurture, keep secret problems, listeners, and always bring benefits to others.

 

In one story, during the construction of the Sapta Arga temple, the kingdom was left empty. Then the panda of the Kalimasada talisman is gone. The talisman was stolen by Mustakaweni. Knowing this, Bambang Irawan - Arjuna's son - along with Petruk tried to grab the talisman. Finally, the charm was successfully captured by Bambang Irawan and deposited with Petruk. But unfortunately Petruk removes the talisman. Luckily the amulet can be found again, then he apologizes to the Pandavas. Through the story, Petruk wants to remind to take into account every behavior and not be easy to believe in anyone. Then he also taught to dare to admit mistakes.

 

Bagong

Bagong is the third child appointed by Semar. Told, Bagong is a human who emerges from the shadow. One time, Gareng and Petruk asked to find friends by Semar, then Sang Hyang Tunggal said "Know that your friend is your own shadow" instantly, the figure of Bagong emerged from the shadow.

 

Bagong's figure is described as short, fat, but his eyes and mouth are wide, which depicts his presumptuous yet honest and powerful character. He often does things in a hurry. From Baagong's hasty attitude, it actually teaches to always take into account what is to be done, so it is not like Bagong. This one puppet character also reminded that humans in the world have various characters and behaviors. Not everything is good, so everyone must be able to understand the character of others, be tolerant, and socialize well

 

from : www.goodnewsfromindonesia.id

© Jay Fine

 

"There are some who will say that Charlie Hebdo tempted the ire of Islamists one too many times, as if coldblooded murder is the price to pay for putting out a magazine. The massacre was motivated by hate. It is absurd to suggest that the way to avoid terrorist attacks is to let the terrorists dictate standards in a democracy." NY Times

 

Martyred Intellectuals Memorial is a memorial built in memory of the martyred intellectuals of Bangladesh Liberation War .

 

History :

 

During the entire duration of Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, a large number of teachers, doctors, engineers, poets and writers were systematically massacred by Pakistan Army and their local collaborators, most notably the alleged Islamist militia groups Al-Badr and Al-Shams. The largest number of assassinations took place on December 14, 1971, only two days before the surrender of Pakistan Army to the joint force of Mukti Bahini and Indian Army .

 

In memory of the martyred intellectuals, December 14 is mourned in Bangladesh as Shaheed Buddhijibi Dibosh ("Day of the Martyred Intellectuals").

 

Place : Dhaka , Bangladesh

The goat market in Nizwa, Oman.

Iranian exiles protest against the Islamist mullah regime. The Shah is seen as a symbol of democracy and freedom.

 

Frankfurt, Goetheplatz

The Shah of Persia's ride, later with the Islamist Republic of Iran...

 

scan of a 35mm-slide in my collection and not my own shot...

The Temple of Hatshepsut arose as a necropolis, consecrated to the goddess Hathor in the eleventh dynasty (2120 - 1991 BC). It was then abandoned until queen Hatshepsut took it over some five hundred years later. After the abandonment (again), it was for a period turned into a monastery, whose existence there is the reason for its being so well preserved, has given it its present Arabic name, Deir el-Bahri.

 

The temple is built into the rock itself, and consists of three terraces. It was created by the famous architect Senmut. Queen Hatshepsut is best known as the only woman who actually reigned as a pharaoh - probably to her son's annoyance. Hatshepsut took over the rule of Egypt when her husband, Thutmosis II, died. Thutmosis II was incidentally both her husband and half-brother.

 

When her son, Thutmosis III, came of age, she was so unhappy about handing over the power to him that she, together with the priests, figured out a way to avoid it. This way included wearing male clothes, as well as the false beard made of wood and leather worn by all pharaohs.

 

On November 17, 1997, Islamist militants massacred 60 foreign tourists and four Egyptians on the West Bank outside the Temple of Hatshepsut; police killed the six assailants. The attack is believed to have been financed by Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden. Deir el-Bahri, Egypt

August 21, 2005

The Breaking Point

By PETER MAASS

 

The largest oil terminal in the world, Ras Tanura, is located on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, along the Persian Gulf. From Ras Tanura's control tower, you can see the classic totems of oil's dominion -- supertankers coming and going, row upon row of storage tanks and miles and miles of pipes. Ras Tanura, which I visited in June, is the funnel through which nearly 10 percent of the world's daily supply of petroleum flows. Standing in the control tower, you are surrounded by more than 50 million barrels of oil, yet not a drop can be seen.

 

The oil is there, of course. In a technological sleight of hand, oil can be extracted from the deserts of Arabia, processed to get rid of water and gas, sent through pipelines to a terminal on the gulf, loaded onto a supertanker and shipped to a port thousands of miles away, then run through a refinery and poured into a tanker truck that delivers it to a suburban gas station, where it is pumped into an S.U.V. -- all without anyone's actually glimpsing the stuff. So long as there is enough oil to fuel the global economy, it is not only out of sight but also out of mind, at least for consumers.

 

I visited Ras Tanura because oil is no longer out of mind, thanks to record prices caused by refinery shortages and surging demand -- most notably in the United States and China -- which has strained the capacity of oil producers and especially Saudi Arabia, the largest exporter of all. Unlike the 1973 crisis, when the embargo by the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries created an artificial shortfall, today's shortage, or near-shortage, is real. If demand surges even more, or if a producer goes offline because of unrest or terrorism, there may suddenly not be enough oil to go around.

 

As Aref al-Ali, my escort from Saudi Aramco, the giant state-owned oil company, pointed out, ''One mistake at Ras Tanura today, and the price of oil will go up.'' This has turned the port into a fortress; its entrances have an array of gates and bomb barriers to prevent terrorists from cutting off the black oxygen that the modern world depends on. Yet the problem is far greater than the brief havoc that could be wrought by a speeding zealot with 50 pounds of TNT in the trunk of his car. Concerns are being voiced by some oil experts that Saudi Arabia and other producers may, in the near future, be unable to meet rising world demand. The producers are not running out of oil, not yet, but their decades-old reservoirs are not as full and geologically spry as they used to be, and they may be incapable of producing, on a daily basis, the increasing volumes of oil that the world requires. ''One thing is clear,'' warns Chevron, the second-largest American oil company, in a series of new advertisements, ''the era of easy oil is over.''

 

In the past several years, the gap between demand and supply, once considerable, has steadily narrowed, and today is almost negligible. The consequences of an actual shortfall of supply would be immense. If consumption begins to exceed production by even a small amount, the price of a barrel of oil could soar to triple-digit levels. This, in turn, could bring on a global recession, a result of exorbitant prices for transport fuels and for products that rely on petrochemicals -- which is to say, almost every product on the market. The impact on the American way of life would be profound: cars cannot be propelled by roof-borne windmills. The suburban and exurban lifestyles, hinged to two-car families and constant trips to work, school and Wal-Mart, might become unaffordable or, if gas rationing is imposed, impossible. Carpools would be the least imposing of many inconveniences; the cost of home heating would soar -- assuming, of course, that climate-controlled habitats do not become just a fond memory.

 

But will such a situation really come to pass? That depends on Saudi Arabia. To know the answer, you need to know whether the Saudis, who possess 22 percent of the world's oil reserves, can increase their country's output beyond its current limit of 10.5 million barrels a day, and even beyond the 12.5-million-barrel target it has set for 2009. (World consumption is about 84 million barrels a day.) Saudi Arabia is the sole oil superpower. No other producer possesses reserves close to its 263 billion barrels, which is almost twice as much as the runner-up, Iran, with 133 billion barrels. New fields in other countries are discovered now and then, but they tend to offer only small increments. For example, the much-contested and as-yet-unexploited reserves in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge are believed to amount to about 10 billion barrels, or just a fraction of what the Saudis possess.

 

But the truth about Saudi oil is hard to figure out. Oil reservoirs cannot be inventoried like wood in a wilderness: the oil is underground, unseen by geologists and engineers, who can, at best, make highly educated guesses about how much is underfoot and how much can be extracted in the future. And there is a further obstacle: the Saudis will not let outsiders audit their confidential data on reserves and production. Oil is an industry in which not only is the product hidden from sight but so is reliable information about it. And because we do not know when a supply-demand shortfall might arrive, we do not know when to begin preparing for it, so as to soften its impact; the economic blow may come as a sledgehammer from the darkness.

 

Of course the Saudis do have something to say about this prospect. Before journeying to the kingdom, I went to Washington to hear the Saudi oil minister, Ali al-Naimi, speak at an energy conference in the mammoth Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, not far from the White House. Naimi was the star attraction at a gathering of the American petro-political nexus. Samuel Bodman, the U.S. energy secretary, was on the dais next to him. David O'Reilly, chairman and C.E.O. of Chevron, was waiting in the wings. The moderator was an éminence grise of the oil world, James Schlesinger, a former energy secretary, defense secretary and C.I.A. director.

 

''I want to assure you here today that Saudi Arabia's reserves are plentiful, and we stand ready to increase output as the market dictates,'' said Naimi, dressed in a gray business suit and speaking with only a slight Arabic accent. He addressed skeptics who contend that Saudi reservoirs cannot be tapped for larger amounts of oil. ''I am quite bullish on technology as the key to our energy future,'' he said. ''Technological innovation will allow us to find and extract more oil around the world.'' He described the task of increasing output as just ''a question of investment'' in new wells and pipelines, and he noted that consuming nations urgently need to build new refineries to process increased supplies of crude. ''There is absolutely no lack of resources worldwide,'' he repeated.

 

His assurances did not assure. A barrel of oil cost $55 at the time of his speech; less than three months later, the price had jumped by 20 percent. The truth of the matter -- whether the world will really have enough petroleum in the years ahead -- was as well concealed as the millions of barrels of oil I couldn't see at Ras Tanura.

 

For 31 years, Matthew Simmons has prospered as the head of his own firm, Simmons & Company International, which advises energy companies on mergers and acquisitions. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a graduate of the Harvard Business School and an unpaid adviser on energy policy to the 2000 presidential campaign of George W. Bush, he would be a card-carrying member of the global oil nomenclatura, if cards were issued for such things. Yet he is one of the principal reasons the oil world is beginning to ask hard questions of itself.

 

Two years ago, Simmons went to Saudi Arabia on a government tour for business executives. The group was presented with the usual dog-and-pony show, but instead of being impressed, as most visitors tend to be, with the size and expertise of the Saudi oil industry, Simmons became perplexed. As he recalls in his somewhat heretical new book, ''Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy,'' a senior manager at Aramco told the visitors that ''fuzzy logic'' would be used to estimate the amount of oil that could be recovered. Simmons had never heard of fuzzy logic. What could be fuzzy about an oil reservoir? He suspected that Aramco, despite its promises of endless supplies, might in fact not know how much oil remained to be recovered.

 

Simmons returned home with an itch to scratch. Saudi Arabia was one of the charter members of OPEC, founded in 1960 in Baghdad to coordinate the policies of oil producers. Like every OPEC country, Saudi Arabia provides only general numbers about its output and reserves; it does not release details about how much oil is extracted from each reservoir and what methods are used to extract that oil, and it does not permit audits by outsiders. The condition of Saudi fields, and those of other OPEC nations, is a closely guarded secret. That's largely because OPEC quotas, which were first imposed in 1983 to limit the output of member countries, were based on overall reserves; the higher an OPEC member's reserves, the higher its quota. It is widely believed that most, if not all, OPEC members exaggerated the sizes of their reserves in order to have the largest possible quota -- and thus the largest possible revenue stream.

 

In the days of excess supply, bankers like Simmons did not know, or care, about the fudging; whether or not reserves were hyped, there was plenty of oil coming out of the ground. Through the 1970's, 80's and 90's, the capacity of OPEC and non-OPEC countries exceeded demand, and that's why OPEC imposed a quota system -- to keep some product off the market (although many OPEC members, seeking as much revenue as possible, quietly sold more oil than they were supposed to). Until quite recently, the only reason to fear a shortage was if a boycott, war or strike were to halt supplies. Few people imagined a time when supply would dry up because of demand alone. But a steady surge in demand in recent years -- led by China's emergence as a voracious importer of oil -- has changed that.

 

This demand-driven scarcity has prompted the emergence of a cottage industry of experts who predict an impending crisis that will dwarf anything seen before. Their point is not that we are running out of oil, per se; although as much as half of the world's recoverable reserves are estimated to have been consumed, about a trillion barrels remain underground. Rather, they are concerned with what is called ''capacity'' -- the amount of oil that can be pumped to the surface on a daily basis. These experts -- still a minority in the oil world -- contend that because of the peculiarities of geology and the limits of modern technology, it will soon be impossible for the world's reservoirs to surrender enough oil to meet daily demand.

 

One of the starkest warnings came in a February report commissioned by the United States Department of Energy's National Energy Technology Laboratory. ''Because oil prices have been relatively high for the past decade, oil companies have conducted extensive exploration over that period, but their results have been disappointing,'' stated the report, assembled by Science Applications International, a research company that works on security and energy issues. ''If recent trends hold, there is little reason to expect that exploration success will dramatically improve in the future. . . . The image is one of a world moving from a long period in which reserves additions were much greater than consumption to an era in which annual additions are falling increasingly short of annual consumption. This is but one of a number of trends that suggest the world is fast approaching the inevitable peaking of conventional world oil production.''

 

The reference to ''peaking'' is not a haphazard word choice -- ''peaking'' is a term used in oil geology to define the critical point at which reservoirs can no longer produce increasing amounts of oil. (This tends to happen when reservoirs are about half-empty.) ''Peak oil'' is the point at which maximum production is reached; afterward, no matter how many wells are drilled in a country, production begins to decline. Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members may have enough oil to last for generations, but that is no longer the issue. The eventual and painful shift to different sources of energy -- the start of the post-oil age -- does not begin when the last drop of oil is sucked from under the Arabian desert. It begins when producers are unable to continue increasing their output to meet rising demand. Crunch time comes long before the last drop.

 

''The world has never faced a problem like this,'' the report for the Energy Department concluded. ''Without massive mitigation more than a decade before the fact, the problem will be pervasive and will not be temporary. Previous energy transitions (wood to coal and coal to oil) were gradual and evolutionary; oil peaking will be abrupt and revolutionary.''

 

Most experts do not share Simmons's concerns about the imminence of peak oil. One of the industry's most prominent consultants, Daniel Yergin, author of a Pulitzer Prize-winning book about petroleum, dismisses the doomsday visions. ''This is not the first time that the world has 'run out of oil,''' he wrote in a recent Washington Post opinion essay. ''It's more like the fifth. Cycles of shortage and surplus characterize the entire history of the oil industry.'' Yergin says that a number of oil projects that are under construction will increase the supply by 20 percent in five years and that technological advances will increase the amount of oil that can be recovered from existing reservoirs. (Typically, with today's technology, only about 40 percent of a reservoir's oil can be pumped to the surface.)

 

Yergin's bullish view has something in common with the views of the pessimists -- it rests on unknowns. Will the new projects that are under way yield as much oil as their financial backers hope? Will new technologies increase recovery rates as much as he expects? These questions are next to impossible to answer because coaxing oil out of the ground is an extraordinarily complex undertaking. The popular notion of reservoirs as underground lakes, from which wells extract oil like straws sucking a milkshake from a glass, is incorrect. Oil exists in drops between and inside porous rocks. A new reservoir may contain sufficient pressure to make these drops of oil flow to the surface in a gusher, but after a while -- usually within a few years and often sooner than that -- natural pressure lets up and is no longer sufficient to push oil to the surface. At that point, ''secondary'' recovery efforts are begun, like pumping water or gas into the reservoirs to increase the pressure.

 

This process is unpredictable; reservoirs are extremely temperamental. If too much oil is extracted too quickly or if the wrong types or amounts of secondary efforts are employed, the amount of oil that can be recovered from a field can be greatly reduced; this is known in the oil world as ''damaging a reservoir.'' A widely cited example is Oman: in 2001, its daily production reached more than 960,000 barrels, but then suddenly declined, despite the use of advanced technologies. Today, Oman produces 785,000 barrels of oil a day. Herman Franssen, a consultant who worked in Oman for a decade, sees that country's experience as a possible lesson in the limits of technology for other producers that try to increase or maintain high levels of output. ''They reached a million barrels a day, and then a few years later production collapsed,'' Franssen said in a phone interview. ''They used all these new technologies, but they haven't been able to stop the decline yet.''

  

The vague production and reserve data that gets published does not begin to tell the whole story of an oil field's health, production potential or even its size. For a clear-as-possible picture of a country's oil situation, you need to know what is happening in each field -- how many wells it has, how much oil each well is producing, what recovery methods are being used and how long they've been used and the trend line since the field went into production. Data of that sort are typically not released by state-owned companies like Saudi Aramco.

 

As Matthew Simmons searched for clues to the truth of the Saudi situation, he immersed himself in the minutiae of oil geology. He realized that data about Saudi fields might be found in the files of the Society of Petroleum Engineers. Oil engineers, like most professional groups, have regular conferences at which they discuss papers that delve into the work they do. The papers, which focus on particular wells that highlight a problem or a solution to a problem, are presented and debated at the conferences and published by the S.P.E. -- and then forgotten.

 

Before Simmons poked around, no one had taken the time to pull together the S.P.E. papers that involved Saudi oil fields and review them en masse. Simmons found more than 200 such papers and studied them carefully. Although the papers cover only a portion of the kingdom's wells and date back, in some cases, several decades, they constitute perhaps the best public data about the condition and prospects of Saudi reservoirs.

 

Ghawar is the treasure of the Saudi treasure chest. It is the largest oil field in the world and has produced, in the past 50 years, about 55 billion barrels of oil, which amounts to more than half of Saudi production in that period. The field currently produces more than five million barrels a day, which is about half of the kingdom's output. If Ghawar is facing problems, then so is Saudi Arabia and, indeed, the entire world.

 

Simmons found that the Saudis are using increasingly large amounts of water to force oil out of Ghawar. Most of the wells are concentrated in the northern portion of the 174-mile-long field. That might seem like good news -- when the north runs low, the Saudis need only to drill wells in the south. But in fact it is bad news, Simmons concluded, because the southern portions of Ghawar are geologically more difficult to draw oil from. ''Someday (and perhaps that day will be soon), the remarkably high well flow rates at Ghawar's northern end will fade, as reservoir pressures finally plummet,'' Simmons writes in his book. ''Then, Saudi Arabian oil output will clearly have peaked. The death of this great king'' -- meaning Ghawar -- ''leaves no field of vaguely comparable stature in the line of succession. Twilight at Ghawar is fast approaching.'' He goes on: ''The geological phenomena and natural driving forces that created the Saudi oil miracle are conspiring now in normal and predictable ways to bring it to its conclusion, in a time frame potentially far shorter than officialdom would have us believe.'' Simmons concludes, ''Saudi Arabia clearly seems to be nearing or at its peak output and cannot materially grow its oil production.''

  

Saudi officials belittle Simmons's work. Nansen Saleri, a senior Aramco official, has described Simmons as a banker ''trying to come across as a scientist.'' In a speech last year, Saleri wryly said, ''I can read 200 papers on neurology, but you wouldn't want me to operate on your relatives.'' I caught up with Simmons in June, during a trip he made to Manhattan to talk with a group of oil-shipping executives. The impression he gives is of an enthusiastic inventor sharing a discovery that took him by surprise. He has a certain wide-eyed wonder in his regard, as if a bit of mystery can be found in everything that catches his eye. And he has a rumpled aspect -- thinning hair slightly askew, shirt sleeves a fraction too long. Though he delivers a bracing message, his discourse can wander. He is a successful businessman, and it is clear that he did not achieve his position by being a man of impeccable convention. He certainly has not lost sight of the rule that people who shout ''the end is nigh'' do not tend to be favorably reviewed by historians, let alone by their peers. He notes in his book that way back in 1979, The New York Times published an investigative story by Seymour Hersh under the headline ''Saudi Oil Capacity Questioned.'' He knows that in past decades the Cassandras failed to foresee new technologies, like deep-water and horizontal drilling, that provided new sources of oil and raised the amount of oil that can be recovered from reservoirs.

 

But Simmons says that there are only so many rabbits technology can pull out of its petro-hat. He impishly notes that if the Saudis really wanted to, they could easily prove him wrong. ''If they want to satisfy people, they should issue field-by-field production reports and reserve data and have it audited,'' he told me. ''It would then take anybody less than a week to say, 'Gosh, Matt is totally wrong,' or 'Matt actually might be too optimistic.'''

 

Simmons has a lot riding on his campaign -- not only his name but also his business, which would not be rewarded if he is proved to be a fool. What, I asked, if the data show that the Saudis will be able to sustain production of not only 12.5 million barrels a day -- their target for 2009 -- but 15 million barrels, which global demand is expected to require of them in the not-too-distant future? ''The odds of them sustaining 12 million barrels a day is very low,'' Simmons replied. ''The odds of them getting to 15 million for 50 years -- there's a better chance of me having Bill Gates's net worth, and I wouldn't bet a dime on that forecast.''

 

The gathering of executives took place in a restaurant at Chelsea Piers; about 35 men sat around a set of tables as the host introduced Simmons. He rambled a bit but hit his talking points, and the executives listened raptly; at one point, the man on my right broke into a soft whistle, of the sort that means ''Holy cow.''

 

Simmons didn't let up. ''We're going to look back at history and say $55 a barrel was cheap,'' he said, recalling a TV interview in which he predicted that a barrel might hit triple digits.

 

He said that the anchor scoffed, in disbelief, ''A hundred dollars?''

 

Simmons replied, ''I wasn't talking about low triple digits.''

 

The onset of triple-digit prices might seem a blessing for the Saudis -- they would receive greater amounts of money for their increasingly scarce oil. But one popular misunderstanding about the Saudis -- and about OPEC in general -- is that high prices, no matter how high, are to their benefit.

 

Although oil costing more than $60 a barrel hasn't caused a global recession, that could still happen: it can take a while for high prices to have their ruinous impact. And the higher above $60 that prices rise, the more likely a recession will become. High oil prices are inflationary; they raise the cost of virtually everything -- from gasoline to jet fuel to plastics and fertilizers -- and that means people buy less and travel less, which means a drop-off in economic activity. So after a brief windfall for producers, oil prices would slide as recession sets in and once-voracious economies slow down, using less oil. Prices have collapsed before, and not so long ago: in 1998, oil fell to $10 a barrel after an untimely increase in OPEC production and a reduction in demand from Asia, which was suffering through a financial crash. Saudi Arabia and the other members of OPEC entered crisis mode back then; adjusted for inflation, oil was at its lowest price since the cartel's creation, threatening to feed unrest among the ranks of jobless citizens in OPEC states.

 

''The Saudis are very happy with oil at $55 per barrel, but they're also nervous,'' a Western diplomat in Riyadh told me in May, referring to the price that prevailed then. (Like all the diplomats I spoke to, he insisted on speaking anonymously because of the sensitivities of relations with Saudi Arabia.) ''They don't know where this magic line has moved to. Is it now $65? Is it $75? Is it $80? They don't want to find out, because if you did have oil move that far north . . . the chain reaction can come back to a price collapse again.''

 

High prices can have another unfortunate effect for producers. When crude costs $10 a barrel or even $30 a barrel, alternative fuels are prohibitively expensive. For example, Canada has vast amounts of tar sands that can be rendered into heavy oil, but the cost of doing so is quite high. Yet those tar sands and other alternatives, like bioethanol, hydrogen fuel cells and liquid fuel from natural gas or coal, become economically viable as the going rate for a barrel rises past, say, $40 or more, especially if consuming governments choose to offer their own incentives or subsidies. So even if high prices don't cause a recession, the Saudis risk losing market share to rivals into whose nonfundamentalist hands Americans would much prefer to channel their energy dollars. A concerted push for greater energy conservation in the United States, which consumes one-quarter of the world's oil (mostly to fuel our cars, as gasoline), would hurt producing nations, too. Basically, any significant reduction in the demand for oil would be ruinous for OPEC members, who have little to offer the world but oil; if a substitute can be found, their future is bleak. Another Western diplomat explained the problem facing the Saudis: ''You want to have the price as high as possible without sending the consuming nations into a recession and at the same time not have the price so high that it encourages alternative technologies.''

 

From the American standpoint, one argument in favor of conservation and a switch to alternative fuels is that by limiting oil imports, the United States and its Western allies would reduce their dependence on a potentially unstable region. (In fact, in an effort to offset the risks of relying on the Saudis, America's top oil suppliers are Canada and Mexico.) In addition, sending less money to Saudi Arabia would mean less money in the hands of a regime that has spent the past few decades doling out huge amounts of its oil revenue to mosques, madrassas and other institutions that have fanned the fires of Islamic radicalism. The oil money has been dispensed not just by the Saudi royal family but by private individuals who benefited from the oil boom -- like Osama bin Laden, whose ample funds, probably eroded now, came from his father, a construction magnate. Without its oil windfall, Saudi Arabia would have had a hard time financing radical Islamists across the globe.

 

For the Saudis, the political ramifications of reduced demand for its oil would not be negligible. The royal family has amassed vast personal wealth from the country's oil revenues. If, suddenly, Saudis became aware that the royal family had also failed to protect the value of the country's treasured resource, the response could be severe. The mere admission that Saudi reserves are not as impressively inexhaustible as the royal family has claimed could lead to hard questions about why the country, and the world, had been misled. With the death earlier this month of the long-ailing King Fahd, the royal family is undergoing another period of scrutiny; the new king, Abdullah, is in his 80's, and the crown prince, his half-brother Sultan, is in his 70's, so the issue of generational change remains to be settled. As long as the country is swimming in petro-dollars -- even as it is paying off debt accrued during its lean years -- everyone is relatively happy, but that can change. One diplomat I spoke to recalled a comment from Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the larger-than-life Saudi oil minister during the 1970's: ''The Stone Age didn't end for lack of stone, and the oil age will end long before the world runs out of oil.''

  

Until now, the Saudis had an excess of production capacity that allowed them, when necessary, to flood the market to drive prices down. They did that in 1990, when the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait eliminated not only Kuwait's supply of oil but also Iraq's. The Saudis functioned, as they always had, as the central bank of oil, releasing supply to the market when it was needed and withdrawing supply to keep prices from going lower than the cartel would have liked. In other words, they controlled not only the price of oil but their own destiny as well.

 

''That is what the world has called on them to do before -- turn on the taps to produce more and get prices down,'' a senior Western diplomat in Riyadh told me recently. ''Decreasing prices used to keep out alternative fuels. I don't see how they're able to do that anymore. This is a huge change, and it is a big step in the move to whatever is coming next. That's what's really happening.''

 

Without the ability to flood the markets with oil, the Saudis are resorting to flooding the market with promises; it is a sort of petro-jawboning. That's why Ali al-Naimi, the oil minister, told his Washington audience that Saudi Arabia has embarked on a crash program to raise its capacity to 12.5 million barrels a day by 2009 and even higher in the years after that. Naimi is not unlike a factory manager who needs to promise the moon to his valuable clients, for fear of losing or alarming them. He has no choice. The moment he says anything bracing, the touchy energy markets will probably panic, pushing prices even higher and thereby hastening the onset of recession, a switch to alternative fuels or new conservation efforts -- or all three. Just a few words of honest caution could move the markets; Naimi's speeches are followed nearly as closely in the financial world as those of Alan Greenspan.

 

I journeyed to Saudi Arabia to interview Naimi and other senior officials, to get as far beyond their prepared remarks as might be possible. Although I was allowed to see Ras Tanura, my interview requests were denied. I was invited to visit Aramco's oil museum in Dhahran, but that is something a Saudi schoolchild can do on a field trip. It was a ''show but don't tell'' policy. I was able to speak about production issues only with Ibrahim al-Muhanna, the oil ministry spokesman, who reluctantly met me over coffee in the lobby of my hotel in Riyadh. He defended Saudi Arabia's refusal to share more data, noting that the Saudis are no different from most oil producers.

 

''They will not tell you,'' he said. ''Nobody will. And that is not going to change.'' Referring to the fact that Saudi Arabia is often called the central bank of oil, he added: ''If an outsider goes to the Fed and asks, 'How much money do you have?' they will tell you. If you say, 'Can I come and count it?' they will not let you. This applies to oil companies and oil countries.'' I mentioned to Muhanna that many people think his government's ''trust us'' stance is not convincing in light of the cheating that has gone on within OPEC and in the industry as a whole; even Royal Dutch/Shell, a publicly listed oil company that undergoes regular audits, has admitted that it overstated its 2002 reserves by 23 percent.

 

''There is no reason for any country or company to lie,'' Muhanna replied. ''There is a lot of oil around.'' I didn't need to ask about Simmons and his peak-oil theory; when I met Muhanna at the conference in Washington, he nearly broke off our conversation at the mention of Simmons's name. ''He does not know anything,'' Muhanna said. ''The only thing he has is a big mouth. We should not pay attention to him. Either you believe us or you don't.''

 

So whom to believe? Before leaving New York for Saudi Arabia, I was advised by several oil experts to try to interview Sadad al-Husseini, who retired last year after serving as Aramco's top executive for exploration and production. I faxed him in Dhahran and received a surprisingly quick reply; he agreed to meet me. A week later, after I arrived in Riyadh, Husseini e-mailed me, asking when I would come to Dhahran; in a follow-up phone call, he offered to pick me up at the airport. He was, it seemed, eager to talk.

 

It can be argued that in a nation devoted to oil, Husseini knows more about it than anyone else. Born in Syria, Husseini was raised in Saudi Arabia, where his father was a government official whose family took on Saudi citizenship. Husseini earned a Ph.D. in geological sciences from Brown University in 1973 and went to work in Aramco's exploration department, eventually rising to the highest position. Until his retirement last year -- said to have been caused by a top-level dispute, the nature of which is the source of many rumors -- Husseini was a member of the company's board and its management committee. He is one of the most respected and accomplished oilmen in the world.

 

After meeting me at the cavernous airport that serves Dhahran, he drove me in his luxury sedan to the villa that houses his private office. As we entered, he pointed to an armoire that displayed a dozen or so vials of black liquid. ''These are samples from oil fields I discovered,'' he explained. Upstairs, there were even more vials, and he would have possessed more than that except, as he said, laughing, ''I didn't start collecting early enough.''

 

We spoke for several hours. The message he delivered was clear: the world is heading for an oil shortage. His warning is quite different from the calming speeches that Naimi and other Saudis, along with senior American officials, deliver on an almost daily basis. Husseini explained that the need to produce more oil is coming from two directions. Most obviously, demand is rising; in recent years, global demand has increased by two million barrels a day. (Current daily consumption, remember, is about 84 million barrels a day.) Less obviously, oil producers deplete their reserves every time they pump out a barrel of oil. This means that merely to maintain their reserve base, they have to replace the oil they extract from declining fields. It's the geological equivalent of running to stay in place. Husseini acknowledged that new fields are coming online, like offshore West Africa and the Caspian basin, but he said that their output isn't big enough to offset this growing need.

 

''You look at the globe and ask, 'Where are the big increments?' and there's hardly anything but Saudi Arabia,'' he said. ''The kingdom and Ghawar field are not the problem. That misses the whole point. The problem is that you go from 79 million barrels a day in 2002 to 82.5 in 2003 to 84.5 in 2004. You're leaping by two million to three million a year, and if you have to cover declines, that's another four to five million.'' In other words, if demand and depletion patterns continue, every year the world will need to open enough fields or wells to pump an additional six to eight million barrels a day -- at least two million new barrels a day to meet the rising demand and at least four million to compensate for the declining production of existing fields. ''That's like a whole new Saudi Arabia every couple of years,'' Husseini said. ''It can't be done indefinitely. It's not sustainable.''

 

Husseini speaks patiently, like a teacher who hopes someone is listening. He is in the enviable position of knowing what he talks about while having the freedom to speak openly about it. He did not disclose precise information about Saudi reserves or production -- which remain the equivalent of state secrets -- but he felt free to speak in generalities that were forthright, even when they conflicted with the reassuring statements of current Aramco officials. When I asked why he was willing to be so frank, he said it was because he sees a shortage ahead and wants to do what he can to avert it. I assumed that he would not be particularly distressed if his rivals in the Saudi oil establishment were embarrassed by his frankness.

 

Although Matthew Simmons says it is unlikely that the Saudis will be able to produce 12.5 million barrels a day or sustain output at that level for a significant period of time, Husseini says the target is realistic; he says that Simmons is wrong to state that Saudi Arabia has reached its peak. But 12.5 million is just an interim marker, as far as consuming nations are concerned, on the way to 15 million barrels a day and beyond -- and that is the point at which Husseini says problems will arise.

 

At the conference in Washington in May, James Schlesinger, the moderator, conducted a question-and-answer session with Naimi at the conclusion of the minister's speech. One of the first questions involved peak oil: might it be true that Saudi Arabia, which has relied on the same reservoirs, and especially Ghawar, for more than five decades, is nearing the geological limit of its output?

 

Naimi wouldn't hear of it.

 

''I can assure you that we haven't peaked,'' he responded. ''If we peaked, we would not be going to 12.5 and we would not be visualizing a 15-million-barrel-per-day production capacity. . . . We can maintain 12.5 or 15 million for the next 30 to 50 years.''

 

Experts like Husseini are very concerned by the prospect of trying to produce 15 million barrels a day. Even if production can be ramped up that high, geology may not be forgiving. Fields that are overproduced can drop off, in terms of output, quite sharply and suddenly, leaving behind large amounts of oil that cannot be coaxed out with existing technology. This is called trapped oil, because the rocks or sediment around it prevent it from escaping to the surface. Unless new technologies are developed, that oil will never be extracted. In other words, the haste to recover oil can lead to less oil being recovered.

 

''You could go to 15, but that's when the questions of depletion rate, reservoir management and damaging the fields come into play,'' says Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi oil and security analyst who is regarded as being exceptionally well connected to key Saudi leaders. ''There is an understanding across the board within the kingdom, in the highest spheres, that if you're going to 15, you'll hit 15, but there will be considerable risks . . . of a steep decline curve that Aramco will not be able to do anything about.''

 

Even if the Saudis are willing to risk damaging their fields, or even if the risk is overstated, Husseini points out a practical problem. To produce and sustain 15 million barrels a day, Saudi Arabia will have to drill a lot more wells and build a lot more pipelines and processing facilities. Currently, the global oil industry suffers a deficit of qualified engineers to oversee such projects and the equipment and the raw materials -- for example, rigs and steel -- to build them. These things cannot be wished from thin air or developed quickly enough to meet the demand.

 

''If we had two dozen Texas A&M's producing a thousand new engineers a year and the industrial infrastructure in the kingdom, with the drilling rigs and power plants, we would have a better chance, but you cannot put that into place overnight,'' Husseini said. ''Capacity is not just a function of reserves. It is a function of reserves plus know-how plus a commercial economic system that is designed to increase the resource exploitation. For example, in the U.S. you have infrastructure -- there must be tens of thousands of miles of pipelines. If we, in Saudi Arabia, evolve to that level of commercial maturity, we could probably produce a heck of a lot more oil. But to get there is a very tedious, slow process.''

 

He worries that the rising global demand for oil will lead to the petroleum equivalent of running an engine at ever-increasing speeds without stopping to cool it down or change the oil. Husseini does not want to see the fragile and irreplaceable reservoirs of the Middle East become damaged through wanton overproduction.

 

''If you are ramping up production so fast and jump from high to higher to highest, and you're not having enough time to do what needs to be done, to understand what needs to be done, then you can damage reservoirs,'' he said. ''Systematic development is not just a matter of money. It's a matter of reservoir dynamics, understanding what's there, analyzing and understanding information. That's where people come in, experience comes in. These are not universally available resources.''

 

The most worrisome part of the crisis ahead revolves around a set of statistics from the Energy Information Administration, which is part of the U.S. Department of Energy. The E.I.A. forecast in 2004 that by 2020 Saudi Arabia would produce 18.2 million barrels of oil a day, and that by 2025 it would produce 22.5 million barrels a day. Those estimates were unusual, though. They were not based on secret information about Saudi capacity, but on the projected needs of energy consumers. The figures simply assumed that Saudi Arabia would be able to produce whatever the United States needed it to produce. Just last month, the E.I.A. suddenly revised those figures downward -- not because of startling new information about world demand or Saudi supply but because the figures had given so much ammunition to critics. Husseini, for example, described the 2004 forecast as unrealistic.

 

''That's not how you would manage a national, let alone an international, economy,'' he explained. ''That's the part that is scary. You draw some assumptions and then say, 'O.K., based on these assumptions, let's go forward and consume like hell and burn like hell.''' When I asked whether the kingdom could produce 20 million barrels a day -- about twice what it is producing today from fields that may be past their prime -- Husseini paused for a second or two. It wasn't clear if he was taking a moment to figure out the answer or if he needed a moment to decide if he should utter it. He finally replied with a single word: No.

 

''It's becoming unrealistic,'' he said. ''The expectations are beyond what is achievable. This is a global problem . . . that is not going to be solved by tinkering with the Saudi industry.''

  

It would be unfair to blame the Saudis alone for failing to warn of whatever shortages or catastrophes might lie ahead.

 

In the political and corporate realms of the oil world, there are few incentives to be forthright. Executives of major oil companies have been reluctant to raise alarms; the mere mention of scarce supplies could alienate the governments that hand out lucrative exploration contracts and also send a message to investors that oil companies, though wildly profitable at the moment, have a Malthusian long-term future. Fortunately, that attitude seems to be beginning to change. Chevron's ''easy oil is over'' advertising campaign is an indication that even the boosters of an oil-drenched future are not as bullish as they once were.

 

Politicians remain in the dark. During the 2004 presidential campaign, which occurred as gas prices were rising to record levels, the debate on energy policy was all but nonexistent. The Bush campaign produced an advertisement that concluded: ''Some people have wacky ideas. Like taxing gasoline more so people drive less. That's John Kerry.'' Although many environmentalists would have been delighted if Kerry had proposed that during the campaign, in fact the ad was referring to a 50-cents-a-gallon tax that Kerry supported 11 years ago as part of a package of measures to reduce the deficit. (The gas tax never made it to a vote in the Senate.) Kerry made no mention of taxing gasoline during the campaign; his proposal for doing something about high gas prices was to pressure OPEC to increase supplies.

 

Husseini, for one, doesn't buy that approach. ''Everybody is looking at the producers to pull the chestnuts out of the fire, as if it's our job to fix everybody's problems,'' he told me. ''It's not our problem to tell a democratically elected government that you have to do something about your runaway consumers. If your government can't do the job, you can't expect other governments to do it for them.'' Back in the 70's, President Carter called for the moral equivalent of war to reduce our dependence on foreign oil; he was not re-elected. Since then, few politicians have spoken of an energy crisis or suggested that major policy changes are necessary to avert one. The energy bill signed earlier this month by President Bush did not even raise fuel-efficiency standards for passenger cars. When a crisis comes -- whether in a year or 2 or 10 -- it will be all the more painful because we will have done little or nothing to prepare for it.

 

Peter Maass is a contributing writer. He is writing a book about oil.

 

Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML Help Contact Us Work for Us Back to Top

Peul herders, Bambara and Dogan farmers, itinerant traders and a colourful multiethnic host of other buyers and sellers converge at this vibrant weekly market every Monday in front of Djenné's ancient grand mosque.

 

They come from the surrounding regions and fertile flood plains of the Niger inland river delta in the Mopti region of central Mali, part of the semi-arid Sahel zone that stretches across northern Africa just south of the Sahara.

 

The iconic calabash bowls on prominent display are used to carry goods, store grains or prepare fresh fermented cow’s milk, popular among Mali's pastoral Peul communities.

 

Digital film scan, Asahi Pentax Spotmatic (SMC Pentax Zoom 45~125mm f/4), mosque rooftop pov, circa 1976.

 

~~~

Postrscript - The enchanting Arabian Nights imagery emanating out of this ancient marketplace at the time if this photo shoot (1976) is reminiscent of a seemingly bygone Sahelian era devoid of smartphones, credit cards and packaged safari tours.

 

Nowadays, nascent tourism is on hold and easy access to markets, pastures and farmlands is hampered as ethnic strife and intercommunal violence continue to erupt under a fragile Malian state.

 

In 2018, Human Rights Watch reported that the Mopti region of central Mali has become an epicentre of interethnic conflict, fuelled by a steady escalation of violence by armed Islamist groups largely allied with Al Qaeda’s advance from the north since 2015.

 

Recruitment to the militant Islamist movement from Peul pastoral herding communities has inflamed tensions within sedentary agrarian communities (Bambara, Dogon, Tellem, Bozo and others) who rely on access to agricultural lands for their livelihood.

 

Predominantly Muslim but opposing ethnic self-defence militias on both sides were formed for the protection of their own respective communities. This has contributed to a continuous cycle of violent attacks and reprisals touching villages and hamlets, pastures and farmlands and some marketplaces.

 

While communal tensions are profoundly connected to a larger ethnopolitical conflict unfolding in northern Mali, chronic insecurities around the ancient town of Djenné and in the broader central regions of Mali are exacerbated by longstanding indigenous concerns over a struggle for access to scarce natural resources - agricultural land for settled farmers versus water and grazing land for semi-nomadic Peul herdsmen.

 

Efforts at mediation in the area around Djenné and the grand mosque include a Humanitarian Agreement specifically among Bambara and Bozo farmers, Dogan "hunters" protecting farmers' interests, and Peul herders - all committed to guaranteeing the freedom of movement of people, goods and livestock in the "Circle of Djenné" situated in the Mopti region of central Mali.

 

© All rights to these photos and descriptions are reserved

 

Happy 4th of July and Happy Birthday America!

 

I guess. We'll see. As a country, we have had a very long history of doing bad things to people and slowly, surely, steadily we have gotten much worse. Our behavior towards immigrants and their families, towards refugees, toward Puerto Ricans, people from Yemen and Palestinians, Islamists, the entire LGBTQIA community, brown and black people, Native Americans, women, the poor - all of those and more and in no particular order. Our actions can simply be described as crimes against humanity. Basically if you are not white or Christian (preferably both) we, as a country, are going to vomit hate all over you. We are all complicit, we are all guilty, we are all Americans and we should all be ashamed.

 

Happy 4th.

 

Play Projects

Hagia Sophia

 

Related Twits on Turkey's

Neo-ottoman Aggressiveness & Ultra Nationalist Revisionism

 

United Nations

NATO

EURONEWS

DW News

BBC World

@guyverhofstadt

@ragipsoylu & MuratSengul

@jenanmoussaand & @OweisAk

@SkyNews & Stone_SkyNews

@SkyNews

==========================================================

 

TEXT POSTED JULY 16th, 2016

 

15 July 2016 coup d'état attempt reflects Turkey's complex socio-political reality and the multifaceted divisions within her neo-ottoman political establishment and the deep military state, as well as the division between the ultra-conservative Suni Muslim and the westernized secular parts of the Turkish society.

 

The latest developments will affect for the worse Turkey's poor democratic records and at the same time her stance on numerous hot issues like the long running undeclared (civil) war with the Kurds, the war in Syria (and the undercover collaboration with ISIS), the refugee flows to Europe, the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus (since the 1974 pre planned turkish invasion), the expansionist aggressiveness in the Aegean Sea against Greece and, among many others, her ambition of becoming a European Union member state; an ultra nationalist and coercive state of aggressive pan turkism (by military threat and demography) against "her potential subjects" ...

 

Turkey's Major Genocides, Ethnic Cleansings

and Persecutions, in ottoman & modern times

 

Constantinople Massacre 1821

Greek Genocide 1913-22

Armenian Genocide 1914-23

Assyrian Genocide 1914-24

Istanbul Pogrom 1955

Massacres against the Kurds 1930-today

 

Military Invasion & Occupation of Cyprus' north part 1973-today

 

Military Invasion, along with proxy Jihadists, of Syria 2019

Military Invasion in Syria along with rebels & al-Qaeda Islamists

Involvement in the Libyan Civil War

 

Permanent Aggressiveness and Hybrid War against Greece

with fighter jets violations in the Aegean sea airspace and

Exploitation & Trafficking of Illegal Immigrants and Fake News Propaganda

 

... typical barbarism & islamization processes of the ottoman and neo ottoman turks alike .... with the usual apathy, if not collaboration, of the big powers & world organizations, i.e. the USA, Russia, the UK, Germany, as well as the UN, NATO & the EU