Dr. A. Q. Khan: The Larger Picture of Developing Pakistan's Nuclear Technology by Dr Ghulam Nabi Kazi
The history of Pakistan and India seems like a fairy tale. Parting as friends in August 1947, they passed into downright enmity very soon thereafter. In 1948 the tribal lashkars sent to get Kashmir could not get to Srinagar because they stopped to plunder a cathedral near Baramulla. In 1965, the Indian General boasted he would have whiskey in Lahore Gymkhana that evening. He had to settle for rotten beer in Delhi because his troops stopped for breakfast and couldn’t take Lahore. Here was Pakistan fighting with an adversary ten times its size – it is still six times despite Bangladesh breaking away - with virtually no really superior technology on their side. As a country with sworn enmity towards the communists – despite good relations with China - and a formidable neighbor to contend with, Pakistan needed some major resource to fall back upon when its sovereignty was threatened.
In end-1971 we lost half our country and 56% of our population. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who clandestinely held the portfolio of atomic energy in Ayub Khan’s cabinet but could not get the necessary resources to match his ambitions, was now heading the country with absolute powers as of 20 December 1971. He immediately convened a meeting of the top scientists of the country exactly a month later in Multan and made it clear he wanted a nuclear bomb at all costs. He was convinced that as long as Dr I. H. Usmani, an Indian Civil Service officer of the 1942 batch, remained as Chairman Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission nothing tangible would come about, he tucked him away as a Secretary of a ministry and retired him under Section 13 (1) of the Civil Servants Act in August 1973 along with a host of his peer ICS officers as these retirements were considered ‘in the public interest’ by the Competent Authority (read Bhutto). As the public interest was never adequately defined, the section was struck down by two superior courts during the early 1980s, although Gen. Zia also made use of this clause.
Anyway, to revert to the original discussion, Munir Ahmed Khan was appointed to the post of Chairman PAEC on the same day of the Multan meeting on 20 January 1972. He was the first non-PhD to hold the post and his credentials at the IAEA were not so impressive, yet he got the job and Bhutto found out much later that he was duping him. His main technical support was derived from his scientific adviser Prof. A. Salam, however, when the latter’s sect was declared non-Muslim in 1974, he lost interest and preferred to settle abroad and went on to secure the Nobel Prize in 1979. It is said that it is extremely hard, almost impossible, for a Muslim to get the prize so unwittingly Bhutto may have done his old friend a favor. However, neither Bhutto nor Salam could have imagined what lay in store for them in 1974. While Bhutto would be hanged after a 2-year long farcical trial five years later in 1979, Salam’s tombstone would be desecrated. The first lost his life due to his nuclear ambitions, the second suffered in life and out of it due to his faith. Nevertheless, even from his death cell Bhutto never uttered a word about Kahuta, lamenting that by abandoning the French plant, the people of Pakistan had been ‘left defenseless under the threatening cloud of a nuclear sky’.
Munir Ahmed Khan continued to convince Bhutto he was developing a nuclear bomb. Both Salam and Munir had suggested Pakistan acquiring a French nuclear reprocessing plant, however, it would not have got the country anywhere close to having a bomb even in 20 years, and Bhutto may have known this but kept it as a smokescreen. To complicate things further, Bhutto had supported Syria and Egypt militarily during the 1973 War and talking in terms of an integrated defense of the Islamic World and asking why the Muslim civilization should be deprived of the nuclear capability when all other religions possessed it. Ironically when Kissinger was harsh with Bhutto in 1976, he apparently knew nothing about Kahuta and was concerned only with the French deal and threatened the latter of being made ‘a horrible example’ after the Democrats came to power. His prediction was on the mark. Governor Carter had had a sharp verbal duel with Ambassador Iqbal Akhund and would make sure Bhutto was eliminated after he came to power. For the sake of the record though, he sent not one, but two clemency appeals to Ziaul Haq to spare Bhutto’s life. However, both Carter and Zia knew what the logical outcome of the thwarted judicial process was leading to.
Going back in time, regardless of how history passes judgment on Bhutto he was intensely patriotic, and he took India’s nuclear blast of 18 May 1974 as a personal affront. He had returned from Simla as a proud leader of a proud nation and conducted the negotiations on an equal footing despite the traumatic events of end-1971. Now as the prisoners of war were returning, he could not digest this show of might from Nehru’s daughter.
Now it is quite well known, how an equally patriotic scientist/ metallurgist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan wrote to Bhutto about his capabilities in the aftermath of the blast. Bhutto had him checked out and placed him in the PAEC two rungs below Munir Ahmed Khan. While Bhutto thought everything was hunky-dory, actually it was not. AQK was in fact getting frustrated by his dubious bosses who kept telling ZAB they were making a nuclear bomb but were actually doing nothing concrete in that direction. However, things were coming to a head as on 25th July 1976 Dr. Khan in a 2-page letter to the Prime Minister that I posted the other day informing him that he was constrained to leave the country and gave an exact description of the situation prevailing at that time.
On reading the letter Bhutto was devastated, and immediately summoned Dr Khan to Lahore. When he reached there, ZAB was closeted with Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi and his military secretary Brig (later Major General) Imtiaz. He told the good doctor not to worry as he would fix everything in a few days.
Maulana Kausar Niazi notes in his memoirs “Last Day of Premier Bhutto”: The same evening he summoned me to the P.M.’s House. Explaining the entire situation he said, “Maulana, I don’t want to miss such a golden chance. This man (Dr. Qadeer) is far too valuable; find some way out.” I suggested that he take the Secretary General Finance, A.G.N. Kazi, Foreign Secretary, Agha Shahi, Aziz Ahmed and Ghulam Ishaq Khan into confidence and introduce Dr. Qadeer to them. And so this was done. Mr. Bhutto was extremely annoyed for he felt that he had been made to cut a sorry figure before the entire nation.
According to Dr Khan himself, the very next day he was asked to meet the Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi in his office. When he arrived there, AGN Kazi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Agha Shahi were all there. After introductions, Mr. Kazi asked him whether he would like to head the PAEC, to which Dr Khan replied in the negative. He felt the PAEC was too much in the public eye and foreign powers would soon come to know of his project. He wanted a standalone project and full powers on how to run the same. All the three gentlemen concurred with him. He also requested the services of an army officer to help with the civil works as he wanted a state-of-the-art facility and not something built by PWD.
The very next day all those present that day at Shahi’s office met with the Prime Minister, where the Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ziaul Haq was also called to participate. Bhutto’s orders were quite clear: Give him whatever he asks for! Dr. Khan requested for the services of an army officer. While emerging out of the meeting Gen. Zia asked Dr Khan which rank of officer would he need. He asked for a brigadier. The next morning Brig (later Lt. Gen.) Zahid Ali Akbar Khan reported to him for duty but told him he knew nothing about what he was supposed to do. When Dr. Khan told him he was overjoyed and said that was an assignment after his heart.
Writing an obituary in The News with the caption ‘The indomitable AGN Kazi’ in October 2016, Dr Khan recalled: The next day we had a meeting in Bhutto Sahib’s office. He formed a coordination board with A G N Kazi as chairman and Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Agha Shahi as members. The board was given the powers of a PM. Gen Zia was also there as COAS and he agreed to give me a team of civil engineers. This team was headed by a brigadier, a dashing, handsome go-getter. They never let me down. Next the problem of determining the powers I needed to rush through the programme was tackled by the brigadier and me. I made four copies of the suggestions and presented it to the board at Kazi Sahib’s office. After glancing at the very first page, G I Khan remarked that I was asking for powers only the PM had. At that Kazi Sahib said: “Ishaq, if you want another PWD, discuss it, otherwise give the powers Dr Khan is asking for. We are there to oversee everything.” With that the matter was closed. It was this approval that enabled our programme to succeed. Kazi Sahib was a thorough gentleman – soft spoken and very competent. He could instantly grasp the gist of a problem. I was allowed to see him without any prior appointment. I was ably supported by Agha Shahi, who asked his DG Administration – a very competent officer – to issue me a diplomatic passport and to take care of our foreign travel.
After the military takeover in July 1977, Gen. Ziaul Haq gave personal supervision to the project. Mr. Kazi who remained Advisor and Secretary General Finance offered Ghulam Ishaq Khan now Secretary General in Chief and Advisor Coordination to chair the board, who asked him to continue on. However, Mr. Kazi urged him to be chair as was commensurate with his status and he finally agreed. It goes to the credit of both successive presidents General Zia and Ghulam Ishaq Khan who sustained the project under great stress and enormous pressure. Although the General was aided by the attention been drawn away to the Afghan war, Ishaq Khan who was President from 1988-1993, with Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, was under greater pressure to roll back the project.
However, during Zia’s tenure by 1984 it was whispered that we had the nuclear capability, and this position was later confirmed by Dr A Q Khan. He had finally rid the nation of most of its insecurities relating to ties with its adversaries. It is also clear now that during his ‘cricket diplomacy’ in India, this message was conveyed by Gen Zia to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi bringing about a swift change in the latter’s demeanor towards the former. Pakistan’s worst apprehensions had been set at rest! The real demonstration of our might came much later in 1998, leaving no further room for doubt.
All of us know that Dr. Khan had to go through substantial embarrassment and hardships during the last 16-17 years of his life. I have neither the knowledge nor the inclination to comment on that phase of his life following 2004, when a prime minister remarked he had saved the country by his 'confession'. Ever since Dr. A Q Khan embarked on the project he knew the perils to which he was subjecting himself and must have been grateful he didn’t suffer the fate of either Mr. Bhutto or Gen. Zia. Suffice it to say that he received a state funeral with the state missing. The grieved people came out in thousands braving the torrential rains to bid him adieu.
Everything said and done, we salute you Sir and pray that the Creator may exalt your status in the Hereafter!
Attached are pictures of the main architects of the original program from Dr A Q Khan’s personal archives.
Copyright: Dr Ghulam Nabi Kazi
Dr. A. Q. Khan: The Larger Picture of Developing Pakistan's Nuclear Technology by Dr Ghulam Nabi Kazi
The history of Pakistan and India seems like a fairy tale. Parting as friends in August 1947, they passed into downright enmity very soon thereafter. In 1948 the tribal lashkars sent to get Kashmir could not get to Srinagar because they stopped to plunder a cathedral near Baramulla. In 1965, the Indian General boasted he would have whiskey in Lahore Gymkhana that evening. He had to settle for rotten beer in Delhi because his troops stopped for breakfast and couldn’t take Lahore. Here was Pakistan fighting with an adversary ten times its size – it is still six times despite Bangladesh breaking away - with virtually no really superior technology on their side. As a country with sworn enmity towards the communists – despite good relations with China - and a formidable neighbor to contend with, Pakistan needed some major resource to fall back upon when its sovereignty was threatened.
In end-1971 we lost half our country and 56% of our population. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who clandestinely held the portfolio of atomic energy in Ayub Khan’s cabinet but could not get the necessary resources to match his ambitions, was now heading the country with absolute powers as of 20 December 1971. He immediately convened a meeting of the top scientists of the country exactly a month later in Multan and made it clear he wanted a nuclear bomb at all costs. He was convinced that as long as Dr I. H. Usmani, an Indian Civil Service officer of the 1942 batch, remained as Chairman Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission nothing tangible would come about, he tucked him away as a Secretary of a ministry and retired him under Section 13 (1) of the Civil Servants Act in August 1973 along with a host of his peer ICS officers as these retirements were considered ‘in the public interest’ by the Competent Authority (read Bhutto). As the public interest was never adequately defined, the section was struck down by two superior courts during the early 1980s, although Gen. Zia also made use of this clause.
Anyway, to revert to the original discussion, Munir Ahmed Khan was appointed to the post of Chairman PAEC on the same day of the Multan meeting on 20 January 1972. He was the first non-PhD to hold the post and his credentials at the IAEA were not so impressive, yet he got the job and Bhutto found out much later that he was duping him. His main technical support was derived from his scientific adviser Prof. A. Salam, however, when the latter’s sect was declared non-Muslim in 1974, he lost interest and preferred to settle abroad and went on to secure the Nobel Prize in 1979. It is said that it is extremely hard, almost impossible, for a Muslim to get the prize so unwittingly Bhutto may have done his old friend a favor. However, neither Bhutto nor Salam could have imagined what lay in store for them in 1974. While Bhutto would be hanged after a 2-year long farcical trial five years later in 1979, Salam’s tombstone would be desecrated. The first lost his life due to his nuclear ambitions, the second suffered in life and out of it due to his faith. Nevertheless, even from his death cell Bhutto never uttered a word about Kahuta, lamenting that by abandoning the French plant, the people of Pakistan had been ‘left defenseless under the threatening cloud of a nuclear sky’.
Munir Ahmed Khan continued to convince Bhutto he was developing a nuclear bomb. Both Salam and Munir had suggested Pakistan acquiring a French nuclear reprocessing plant, however, it would not have got the country anywhere close to having a bomb even in 20 years, and Bhutto may have known this but kept it as a smokescreen. To complicate things further, Bhutto had supported Syria and Egypt militarily during the 1973 War and talking in terms of an integrated defense of the Islamic World and asking why the Muslim civilization should be deprived of the nuclear capability when all other religions possessed it. Ironically when Kissinger was harsh with Bhutto in 1976, he apparently knew nothing about Kahuta and was concerned only with the French deal and threatened the latter of being made ‘a horrible example’ after the Democrats came to power. His prediction was on the mark. Governor Carter had had a sharp verbal duel with Ambassador Iqbal Akhund and would make sure Bhutto was eliminated after he came to power. For the sake of the record though, he sent not one, but two clemency appeals to Ziaul Haq to spare Bhutto’s life. However, both Carter and Zia knew what the logical outcome of the thwarted judicial process was leading to.
Going back in time, regardless of how history passes judgment on Bhutto he was intensely patriotic, and he took India’s nuclear blast of 18 May 1974 as a personal affront. He had returned from Simla as a proud leader of a proud nation and conducted the negotiations on an equal footing despite the traumatic events of end-1971. Now as the prisoners of war were returning, he could not digest this show of might from Nehru’s daughter.
Now it is quite well known, how an equally patriotic scientist/ metallurgist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan wrote to Bhutto about his capabilities in the aftermath of the blast. Bhutto had him checked out and placed him in the PAEC two rungs below Munir Ahmed Khan. While Bhutto thought everything was hunky-dory, actually it was not. AQK was in fact getting frustrated by his dubious bosses who kept telling ZAB they were making a nuclear bomb but were actually doing nothing concrete in that direction. However, things were coming to a head as on 25th July 1976 Dr. Khan in a 2-page letter to the Prime Minister that I posted the other day informing him that he was constrained to leave the country and gave an exact description of the situation prevailing at that time.
On reading the letter Bhutto was devastated, and immediately summoned Dr Khan to Lahore. When he reached there, ZAB was closeted with Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi and his military secretary Brig (later Major General) Imtiaz. He told the good doctor not to worry as he would fix everything in a few days.
Maulana Kausar Niazi notes in his memoirs “Last Day of Premier Bhutto”: The same evening he summoned me to the P.M.’s House. Explaining the entire situation he said, “Maulana, I don’t want to miss such a golden chance. This man (Dr. Qadeer) is far too valuable; find some way out.” I suggested that he take the Secretary General Finance, A.G.N. Kazi, Foreign Secretary, Agha Shahi, Aziz Ahmed and Ghulam Ishaq Khan into confidence and introduce Dr. Qadeer to them. And so this was done. Mr. Bhutto was extremely annoyed for he felt that he had been made to cut a sorry figure before the entire nation.
According to Dr Khan himself, the very next day he was asked to meet the Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi in his office. When he arrived there, AGN Kazi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Agha Shahi were all there. After introductions, Mr. Kazi asked him whether he would like to head the PAEC, to which Dr Khan replied in the negative. He felt the PAEC was too much in the public eye and foreign powers would soon come to know of his project. He wanted a standalone project and full powers on how to run the same. All the three gentlemen concurred with him. He also requested the services of an army officer to help with the civil works as he wanted a state-of-the-art facility and not something built by PWD.
The very next day all those present that day at Shahi’s office met with the Prime Minister, where the Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ziaul Haq was also called to participate. Bhutto’s orders were quite clear: Give him whatever he asks for! Dr. Khan requested for the services of an army officer. While emerging out of the meeting Gen. Zia asked Dr Khan which rank of officer would he need. He asked for a brigadier. The next morning Brig (later Lt. Gen.) Zahid Ali Akbar Khan reported to him for duty but told him he knew nothing about what he was supposed to do. When Dr. Khan told him he was overjoyed and said that was an assignment after his heart.
Writing an obituary in The News with the caption ‘The indomitable AGN Kazi’ in October 2016, Dr Khan recalled: The next day we had a meeting in Bhutto Sahib’s office. He formed a coordination board with A G N Kazi as chairman and Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Agha Shahi as members. The board was given the powers of a PM. Gen Zia was also there as COAS and he agreed to give me a team of civil engineers. This team was headed by a brigadier, a dashing, handsome go-getter. They never let me down. Next the problem of determining the powers I needed to rush through the programme was tackled by the brigadier and me. I made four copies of the suggestions and presented it to the board at Kazi Sahib’s office. After glancing at the very first page, G I Khan remarked that I was asking for powers only the PM had. At that Kazi Sahib said: “Ishaq, if you want another PWD, discuss it, otherwise give the powers Dr Khan is asking for. We are there to oversee everything.” With that the matter was closed. It was this approval that enabled our programme to succeed. Kazi Sahib was a thorough gentleman – soft spoken and very competent. He could instantly grasp the gist of a problem. I was allowed to see him without any prior appointment. I was ably supported by Agha Shahi, who asked his DG Administration – a very competent officer – to issue me a diplomatic passport and to take care of our foreign travel.
After the military takeover in July 1977, Gen. Ziaul Haq gave personal supervision to the project. Mr. Kazi who remained Advisor and Secretary General Finance offered Ghulam Ishaq Khan now Secretary General in Chief and Advisor Coordination to chair the board, who asked him to continue on. However, Mr. Kazi urged him to be chair as was commensurate with his status and he finally agreed. It goes to the credit of both successive presidents General Zia and Ghulam Ishaq Khan who sustained the project under great stress and enormous pressure. Although the General was aided by the attention been drawn away to the Afghan war, Ishaq Khan who was President from 1988-1993, with Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, was under greater pressure to roll back the project.
However, during Zia’s tenure by 1984 it was whispered that we had the nuclear capability, and this position was later confirmed by Dr A Q Khan. He had finally rid the nation of most of its insecurities relating to ties with its adversaries. It is also clear now that during his ‘cricket diplomacy’ in India, this message was conveyed by Gen Zia to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi bringing about a swift change in the latter’s demeanor towards the former. Pakistan’s worst apprehensions had been set at rest! The real demonstration of our might came much later in 1998, leaving no further room for doubt.
All of us know that Dr. Khan had to go through substantial embarrassment and hardships during the last 16-17 years of his life. I have neither the knowledge nor the inclination to comment on that phase of his life following 2004, when a prime minister remarked he had saved the country by his 'confession'. Ever since Dr. A Q Khan embarked on the project he knew the perils to which he was subjecting himself and must have been grateful he didn’t suffer the fate of either Mr. Bhutto or Gen. Zia. Suffice it to say that he received a state funeral with the state missing. The grieved people came out in thousands braving the torrential rains to bid him adieu.
Everything said and done, we salute you Sir and pray that the Creator may exalt your status in the Hereafter!
Attached are pictures of the main architects of the original program from Dr A Q Khan’s personal archives.
Copyright: Dr Ghulam Nabi Kazi