PaRCha - JNU - AISA material - 2009 ID-22787
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should not have a sole motive of profit and should not confine themselves only to commercially viable sectors. The question is, if profit remains one of the motives, how can the institution avoid ills like steep fees, capitation fees etc.? As a solution for the problem of exorbitant fees in private institutions, the YCR recommends, not strict curbs on fee hikes, but merely a certain percentage of freeships for poor students a formula that has proved a dismal failure in the private sector schools in Delhi. The YCR seems to have no idea of the structural logic of private capital and private profit. Mistakenly locating the profiteering motive in family greed, it fails to see that private capital inevitably has a profit motive that militates against the humanist vision of university. .
The question of fees is a central one. Time and again, in the context of both private and govt institutions, YCR repeats that No student should be turned away
for want of funds for education. And it says primary focus should be on making education affordable. (p 38-39) This can be achieved only through making public funding and low fees the norm: but the YCR does not recommend this. Rather it proposes a differential fee structure high fees for those who can afford it and scholarships, educational loans for those who cant. The National Knowledge Commission (NKC) too recommends a differential fee structure. Such a measure cannot cater to poor students; it is nothing but a pretext to make high fees the norm, while virtuously denying the agenda of commercialisation. The best way of making education accessible to the poor is to provide education at a very low cost. If we want to avoid subsidising the rich, the best way is not through increasing fees, but through taxes: through an educational cess on people in a certain salary bracket, and an even larger cess on industry. High fees, for those who can pay means privatization by the back door: the govt is sure to decree that all but the very poorest, can pay! .
The YCR points out that the best Universities are rooted in their social milieu and good foreign universities may not be transplantable. But he contradicts himself by recommending that the top 200 foreign institutions be welcomed in India. The NKC also similarly recommends incentive for good foreign institutions and disincentive for sub-standard ones. Both YCR and the NKC evade the point that incentives for the good institutions are likely to mean that they poach on our public resources and existing institutions, rather their investing their own academic assets and resources here. .
In consonance with the YCR and NKC recommendations, the govt. is considering doing away with regulatory bodies like the UGC, the AICTE, the MCI and so on. In their place, it will establish a single, independent regulator. The YCR states that its conception of a single regulator has a different rationale than that offered by the NKC. At first glance this is true: the YCRs main argument for this recommendation is that University education should not be cubicalised or fragmented. But one fails to see how such an independent regulator will be held accountable to the humanist vision of University as outlined by the YCR. The danger is that such a regulator will be free from checks and balances, accountable and answerable to none, with less need to respond to protest mobilisations from the students or teachers. .
Interestingly, both YCR and NKC propose that the single regulator comprise of seven members. The NKC says all seven must be distinguished academics; the YCR says five of them must be academics, while one must have a background of social engagement while .
.
PaRCha - JNU - AISA material - 2009 ID-22787
.
should not have a sole motive of profit and should not confine themselves only to commercially viable sectors. The question is, if profit remains one of the motives, how can the institution avoid ills like steep fees, capitation fees etc.? As a solution for the problem of exorbitant fees in private institutions, the YCR recommends, not strict curbs on fee hikes, but merely a certain percentage of freeships for poor students a formula that has proved a dismal failure in the private sector schools in Delhi. The YCR seems to have no idea of the structural logic of private capital and private profit. Mistakenly locating the profiteering motive in family greed, it fails to see that private capital inevitably has a profit motive that militates against the humanist vision of university. .
The question of fees is a central one. Time and again, in the context of both private and govt institutions, YCR repeats that No student should be turned away
for want of funds for education. And it says primary focus should be on making education affordable. (p 38-39) This can be achieved only through making public funding and low fees the norm: but the YCR does not recommend this. Rather it proposes a differential fee structure high fees for those who can afford it and scholarships, educational loans for those who cant. The National Knowledge Commission (NKC) too recommends a differential fee structure. Such a measure cannot cater to poor students; it is nothing but a pretext to make high fees the norm, while virtuously denying the agenda of commercialisation. The best way of making education accessible to the poor is to provide education at a very low cost. If we want to avoid subsidising the rich, the best way is not through increasing fees, but through taxes: through an educational cess on people in a certain salary bracket, and an even larger cess on industry. High fees, for those who can pay means privatization by the back door: the govt is sure to decree that all but the very poorest, can pay! .
The YCR points out that the best Universities are rooted in their social milieu and good foreign universities may not be transplantable. But he contradicts himself by recommending that the top 200 foreign institutions be welcomed in India. The NKC also similarly recommends incentive for good foreign institutions and disincentive for sub-standard ones. Both YCR and the NKC evade the point that incentives for the good institutions are likely to mean that they poach on our public resources and existing institutions, rather their investing their own academic assets and resources here. .
In consonance with the YCR and NKC recommendations, the govt. is considering doing away with regulatory bodies like the UGC, the AICTE, the MCI and so on. In their place, it will establish a single, independent regulator. The YCR states that its conception of a single regulator has a different rationale than that offered by the NKC. At first glance this is true: the YCRs main argument for this recommendation is that University education should not be cubicalised or fragmented. But one fails to see how such an independent regulator will be held accountable to the humanist vision of University as outlined by the YCR. The danger is that such a regulator will be free from checks and balances, accountable and answerable to none, with less need to respond to protest mobilisations from the students or teachers. .
Interestingly, both YCR and NKC propose that the single regulator comprise of seven members. The NKC says all seven must be distinguished academics; the YCR says five of them must be academics, while one must have a background of social engagement while .
.