Ecological, "I see I" Self

Rastafarians refer to themselves as "I and I" (Simpson, 1985). Lovlie (1982) argues that the self can only be apprehended dialectically as relationship between an inner and outer part of the self.

 

But this self-relationship does not necessarily imply objectification.

 

Infants from about 3 months and onwards spend a lot of time relating to themselves. They spend 20% of their time awake touching their mouths and face (Korner and Kraemer, see Rochat, 1998). By a very early age they differentiate between a "single touch" of self on object and a "double touch" of self on self (Rochat, & Hespos, 1997, see Rochat, 1998). Infants love kicking mobiles, and other things above their crib, enjoying their own ability to effect changes on the world. They watch themselves wave their arms and legs. By this means Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) argue, infants gain their earliest sense of visio-proprioceptive self.

 

Rochat (1998) further argues that this earliest sense of self is, contra children's interest in mirror reflections from the age of of about 2, non objectified. The infants, like mini Rastapharians, "I see I move," not "I see me/myself move." Rochat argues that this first "ecological self" is non objectified from consideration of the results of the following experiment for example.

 

Infants of 3 to 5 months are shown closed circuit videos of their own legs wearing cute stripy socks, on a bed which makes noises (to encourage movement), on two television screens in front of them. On the right hand screen (in red) they are shown the ego-centric view that they are used to, and could see if they were to look down. On the left hand screen (in blue) they are shown closed circuit video images of their legs manipulated in various ways, as follows.

 

A: Their own legs from the point of view of an observer.

B: Their own legs from their own point of view but left right reversed.

C: Their legs from the point of view of an observer, left-right reversed.

 

Rochat examined the extent to which the infants enjoyed watching their own legs move in each of the two screens using another camera recording the direction of their gaze. The results (as represented schematically, non-quantitatively in the graph) show that the infants preferred the observers view in A. This might suggest that they are objectify themselves and enjoying seeing themselves from the point of view of an observer. However, the same preference for the non-ego view is demonstrated in B, where the infants are shown a view from their own view point left-right reversed. But on the contrary, the infants preference for the observer's view point disappears when that is left-right reversed, bring it back into line with the ego centric, first person view. Rochat argues that it is the novel reversal of visio-proprioception in A and B -- their leg movements are backwards vis a vis their will --- and not objectification that arouses infant interest, since objectified feet are not especially interesting if they move in the usual way. Rochat writes,

 

"What characterizes infants' self-exploration when, for example, they watch themselves kicking in front of a TV, is the direct experience of visual-proprioceptive correspondences, not the reflection that it might be themselves live on the screen. If they prefer to look at a spatially incongruent view of their legs, it is because is violates the familiar visual-proprioceptive calibration of the body. For infants to recognize that it is their own legs they look at would take an additional reflective step, a step towards an objectification of the self. " (Rochat, 1998, p.108)

 

Thusly infants develop what Philippe Rochat calls an "ecological self," or an "I-self," which has a visual aspect as a self-person body view, but is not objectified in that it is not seen as an other, and neither requires, nor suggest the internalisation of another's point of view. Prior to the economic self of Smith and Mead, the I-self is a purer enjoyment of embodiment. Then later, it is infants who have already developed an I-Self that then come to enjoy, and eventually identify with the self as me. The dialectic evolves and differentiates in at two stages. There may be subsequent stages (Lacan, 2002) as adults move between objectification in images and words.

 

My conclusion, however, is that, even after our enjoyment of and identification with objectified self representations, I believe (from consideration of mythology and David Bowie, and personal experience) the "ecological" (Rochat, 1998) "I see I self" remains. It is this ecological first person persona that motivates and allows us to think that we are the little people, "Ants", that we see in mirrors, and whisper to ourselves.

 

Image adapted from figures 1 and 2 in Rochat, 1998, p.102

 

Notes

I realise that I have Rochat's book "Others in Mind." Wow.

 

Bibliography

Lacan, J. (2002). The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience. In B. Fink (Trans.), Ecrits (pp. 75–81). WW Norton & Company. (Original work published 1949)

Lewis, M., & Brooks-Gunn, J. (1979). Social Cognition and the Acquisition of Self. Boston, MA: Springer US. Retrieved from link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-4684-3566-5

Løvlie, A.-L. (1982). The self, yours, mine, or ours?: a dialectic view. A Scandinavian University Press Publication.

Mead, G. H. (1967). Mind, self, and society: From the standpoint of a social behaviorist (Vol. 1). The University of Chicago Press.

Rochat, P. (1998). Self-perception and action in infancy. Experimental Brain Research, 123(1–2), 102–109. doi.org/10.1007/s002210050550

Simpson, G. E. (1985). Religion and justice: some reflections on the Rastafari movement. Phylon (1960-), 46(4), 286–291. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/274868

Smith, A. (2002). Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_MoralSentiments_p.pdf# (Original work published 1770)

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