DSC_8174
The Duran: U.S. and Japan prepare for conflict with China, citing this Financial Times article, "US military deepens ties with Japan and Philippines to prepare for China threat" and quoting U.S. Lt General James Biermann.
www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/is-japan-getting-ready-for-a...
Is Japan Getting Ready for a War with China? It Looks Like It
Throughout history, there has been no love lost between China and Japan. While the island nation of Japan has been influenced throughout its history by China, modern relations have been strained due to past conflicts. Today, China’s and Japan’s economies are respectively the world’s second and third-largest by nominal gross domestic product (GDP), and in recent years the two have become close business partners since relations were normalized in 1972.
Yet, Tokyo sees Beijing as its biggest security challenge, and as a result, the Japanese government has announced it would sharply increase military spending, The Wall Street Journal reported on Friday. This would mark Japan’s largest post-World War II shift away from pacifism.
Point of Contention
Among the sources of contention is actually an uninhabited group of Tokyo-controlled, Beijing-claimed East China Sea islands called Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. According to Japan, the islands, which had previously hosted a Japanese seafood factory, are part of its territory, both historically and by international law.
However, Beijing maintains that the islands were stolen in 1895, and should have been returned to mainland control at the end of World War II.
Though the actual islands may have little value, the region’s waters are rich fishing grounds while undersea oil deposits have been discovered. The 1972 normalization communiqué did not address the issue, and the dispute only intensified in 2012 after Tokyo nationalized the islands.
Arms Buildup
Japan will undertake its biggest arms buildup since the war, in an effort to deter China from war in East Asia. It was in a 2019 defense white paper that Tokyo had identified Beijing as its chief adversary – noting that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was undergoing a rapid modernization that had the potential to pose a serious security threat.
In addition, Japan has monitored China’s saber-rattling to return self-ruling Taiwan to mainland control, and by force if necessary. The concerns have only intensified since Russia invaded Ukraine, which has weakened public opposition in Japan to the rearming. The next Communist Party delegation to gather in Beijing is scheduled for 2027 when Chinese leaders will determine where its own modernization stands. It is already being seen as a potentially noteworthy milestone for Beijing as it will mark the centennial of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army.
Clearly, Tokyo plans to be ready to stand up to any Chinese aggression that could occur – as well as any from North Korea or Russia. The strategy document reaffirmed concerns about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its recent string of missile launches.
However, it placed North Korea below China on the current threat list, reversing the order from a previous strategy released in 2013. Tokyo’s spending plans commit Japan to 43 trillion yen (approximately $312 billion), in defense outlays over the next five years, starting in the next fiscal year that will begin in April. Japan would spend about 2% of its GDP on defense, which put it in line with spending targets shared by the U.S.’s European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Around $3.7 billion is reportedly earmarked just for missile systems, including the American Tomahawk, which would enable the Japanese military to target an adversary’s facilities if an attack appeared imminent. The message that Japan will likely want to send is that it would be far too costly to attack the island nation, thus pursuing a peace through strength strategy.
A Senior Editor for 1945, Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,000 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.
Below is U.S. Ambassador Kennedy's concerns about handing administrative control of DiaoYu Islands, aka Senkaku Islands, to Japan while negotiating with Taiwan on textile "voluntary" quotas. Also attached below are several conversations among U.S. politicians on the Islands. (GRC = Government of the Republic of China)
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d133
(c) Offer certain concessions to Taiwan. Ambassador Kennedy feels the impasse can be broken without causing disastrous side effects for either our industry or the Taiwan Government. While the Chinese have stressed the importance of certain military items (F–4's for example) Ambassador Kennedy is convinced that the “only” way to resolve the issues is to withhold turning the Senkaku Islands over to Japanese administrative control under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.3
4. Ambassador Kennedy's argument on the Senkaku follows:
“This is a major issue in Taiwan with both domestic and international implications. If the U.S. were to maintain administrative control, it would give the GRC a tremendous public boost since they have expressed themselves so forcefully on the issues. Further, it would be a very direct indication of our continued interest in and support for the GRC—and it would be done at Japan's expense, a point that is vital to our ability to proceed effectively with textile negotiations in Hong Kong and Korea and subsequently in Japan. Announcement of such a decision allows the GRC to save face both at home (it takes the Vice Premier off the hook) and abroad. Taiwan could accept the current textile package in face of Hong Kong and Korean pressure.
“In addition, such an act would, in my opinion, provide a very badly needed shock effect on the Japanese. It would indicate that U.S. acquiescence in all matters requested by the Japanese could no longer be taken for granted.
“I can fully appreciate the opposition which such a proposal will generate in certain quarters of our government. But I feel that this can and must be done. We accepted stewardship of these Islands after World War II. Neither historically nor geographically are they a part of the Ryukyus Chain containing Okinawa. Consequently, the GRC suffers a great loss of face if we allow Japan to gain administrative control of them. Since possession of the Islands is still in dispute, there is every reason for the United States to maintain administrative control until such time as the dispute is settled. Taiwan feels very strongly that once Japan had administrative control there is absolutely no possibility of their ever relinquishing that control. By no means am I suggesting that we hand the islands over to Taiwan. Rather, I am strongly recommending the wisdom of preserving the status quo rather than allowing Japan to assume administrative control with the great loss of face this entails for Taiwan.
“I know of no other action sufficiently important or sufficiently dramatic to resolve our textile problems specifically as well as to pave the way for resolution of several general international trade difficulties. The stakes involved are very high which I fully realize. I realize, too, that only the President can make such a decision. Therefore, I urge you in the strongest possible terms to present to him all the potential benefits and ramifications of my recommendations.”
5. Henry Kissinger is looking into the background of the Senkaku Islands dispute and will be able to report to you at our meeting this afternoon on what would be involved in not turning over the Senkaku Islands to Japan at this point.
3 See Documents 113, 114, and 115.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976
Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 113
He then raised this issue of the Senkaku Islands.6
6 Japanese-American negotiations over Okinawa sparked renewed Chinese interest in the Senkaku Islands (Taioyutai or Daioyutai in Chinese). Chow gave a 4-page aidemémoire to Green on September 16, 1970, outlining the ROC's objections to Japanese sovereignty over these islands. (National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 61, Subject Files, Petroleum–Senkakus, January–September 1970) Shoesmith summarized reports of student demonstrations in Taipei against Japanese control of the Senkaku Islands and noted: “The Embassy believes that the initiative for the demonstrations has come from the students rather than the government. But the latter probably has given tacit approval out of reluctance to oppose the fruits of youthful patriotism and its own dissatisfaction over our China policy and oil exploration moratorium.” (Memorandum from Shoesmith t. Green, April 17; ibid., Lot 75 D 76, Petroleum–Senkakus, January–March 1971) There were also student protests in the United States and Hong Kong. The White House tape of the April 12 meeting indicates that Chow emphasized that the final disposition of the Senkakus should be kept open, and that this issue was a measure of the ROC's ability to protect itself. He emphasized the symbolic importance of the islands. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 12, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 477–3)
______________
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976
Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 114
Ambassador Chow said that in the measures the U.S. was taking which affected his country, the understanding if not the support of the Chinese people was needed. He described the strong sentiments which various Chinese groups had with regard to a number of issues, particularly the question of the status of Senkaku Islets. The demonstration which had taken place in Washington on April 10 was a case in point—those demonstrating had been scientists, engineers, and professional people and not just students. The demonstration had come on all of a sudden because these people had become excited, and was symbolic of what they and the country would stand for. Ambassador Chow declared that he had been asked by President Chiang to take up the Senkaku question with the President and Dr. Kissinger.
Dr. Kissinger stated that he was looking into the Senkaku matter, and asked Mr. Holdridge to forward a report to him on the issues involved by April 13.3
Ambassador Chow, in commenting further on the Senkakus, remarked that even when the Japanese had occupied Taiwan and the Ryukyus, legal matters involving the Senkakus had been handled by courts on Taiwan, and the fishing boats which went to the Senkakus had been from Taiwan. From the Japanese point of view, they didn't care how the Senkakus were administered. For the Chinese though, the issue of nationalism was deeply involved.
__________
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976
Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 115
115. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, April 13, 1971.
SUBJECT
The Chinese Claim to the Senkaku Islets
You asked for information on the Chinese claim to the Senkaku Islets. The most recent summary of this was contained in a Note Verbale sent the State Department by the Chinese Embassy on March 15 (Tab A).2 Its main points are as follows:
—As early as the 15th century Chinese historical records considered the Senkakus as the boundary separating Taiwan from the independent kingdom of the Ryukyus.
—The geological structure of the Senkaku Islets is similar to that of other islets associated with Taiwan. The Senkakus are closer to Taiwan than to the Ryukyus and are separated from the Ryukyus by the Okinawa Trough at the end of the Continental Shelf, which is 2,000 meters in depth.
—Taiwanese fisherman have traditionally fished in the area of the Senkakus and called at these islets.
—The Japanese Government did not include the Senkakus in Okinawa Prefecture until after China's cession of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan after the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895.
—For regional security considerations the GRC has hitherto not challenged the U.S. military occupation of the Senkakus under Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, according to international law temporary military occupation of an area does not affect the ultimate determination of its sovereignty.
—In view of the expected termination of the U.S. occupation of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972, the U.S. is requested to respect the GRC's sovereign rights over the Senkaku Islets and restore them to the GRC when this termination takes place.
Comment. As you can imagine, the Japanese Government has a comparable list of apparently offsetting arguments and maintains simply that the Senkakus remain Japanese. State's position is that in occupying the Ryukyus and the Senkakus in 1945, and in proposing to return them to Japan in 1972, the U.S. passes no judgement as to conflicting claims over any portion of them, which should be settled directly by the parties concerned.3
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on April 23.
2 Attached but not printed.
3 Kissinger's handwritten comment in the margin reads: “But that is nonsense since it gives islands to Japan. How can we get a more neutral position?”
__________
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d134
Nixon, Kissinger, and Peterson met at Camp David from 3:25 to 4:10 p.m. on June 7. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) According to a draft telegram to Rogers by U. Alexis Johnson: “Henry Kissinger stepped into the breach with material that I supplied him, and last night [June 7] obtained the President's decision that we would not change our position on the Senkakus. However, this points up the heat that GRC is bringing to bear on us and in turn in some degree probably reflects the heat that GRC is feeling on a subject which it neglected for so long.” (Ibid., RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Nodis Chrono 1971) Kissinger and Johnson discussed the Senkaku Island issue by telephone on the morning of June 7. Johnson stated: “The principle that we are applying is that we receive the islands from Japan for administration and are returning them to Japan without prejudice to the rights—no position between the two governments on it.” (Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Johnson, June 7, 10:35 a.m.; ibid., Telcons, May–June 1971)
On June 7 Kennedy told Chiang Ching-Kuo of the decision on the Senkaku Islands. Chiang asked that the U.S. Government categorically state at the time of the signing of the Okinawa reversion agreement that the final status of the islands had not been determined and should be settled by all parties involved. (Backchannel message from Kennedy to Peterson, June 9; ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, Textile Negotiations (cables)) In a June 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Johnson noted that Rogers had raised this issue with Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi at their meeting in Paris on June 9. (Ibid., RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Kissinger, Henry, 1971) On June 12 Peterson informed Kennedy, who was in Seoul, that Rogers had approached Aichi, “strongly urging GOJ to discuss issue with GRC prior to signature of Okinawa Agreement on June 17.” He also noted that a Department of State spokesman would announce on June 17 that a return of “administrative rights” to Japan of the Senkaku Islands “can in no way prejudice the underlying claims of the Republic of China.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, Textile Negotiations (cables)) On June 15 Peterson cabled Kennedy, in Seoul, stating that Aichi had met with the ROC Ambassador in Tokyo to discuss the Senkaku issue. (Ibid.) On July 12 Chiang Ching-Kuo complained to McConaughy that “the Japanese so far have refused to talk in any meaningful way on the subject.” (Telegram 3388 from Taipei, July 12; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT)
...
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DSC_8174
The Duran: U.S. and Japan prepare for conflict with China, citing this Financial Times article, "US military deepens ties with Japan and Philippines to prepare for China threat" and quoting U.S. Lt General James Biermann.
www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/is-japan-getting-ready-for-a...
Is Japan Getting Ready for a War with China? It Looks Like It
Throughout history, there has been no love lost between China and Japan. While the island nation of Japan has been influenced throughout its history by China, modern relations have been strained due to past conflicts. Today, China’s and Japan’s economies are respectively the world’s second and third-largest by nominal gross domestic product (GDP), and in recent years the two have become close business partners since relations were normalized in 1972.
Yet, Tokyo sees Beijing as its biggest security challenge, and as a result, the Japanese government has announced it would sharply increase military spending, The Wall Street Journal reported on Friday. This would mark Japan’s largest post-World War II shift away from pacifism.
Point of Contention
Among the sources of contention is actually an uninhabited group of Tokyo-controlled, Beijing-claimed East China Sea islands called Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. According to Japan, the islands, which had previously hosted a Japanese seafood factory, are part of its territory, both historically and by international law.
However, Beijing maintains that the islands were stolen in 1895, and should have been returned to mainland control at the end of World War II.
Though the actual islands may have little value, the region’s waters are rich fishing grounds while undersea oil deposits have been discovered. The 1972 normalization communiqué did not address the issue, and the dispute only intensified in 2012 after Tokyo nationalized the islands.
Arms Buildup
Japan will undertake its biggest arms buildup since the war, in an effort to deter China from war in East Asia. It was in a 2019 defense white paper that Tokyo had identified Beijing as its chief adversary – noting that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was undergoing a rapid modernization that had the potential to pose a serious security threat.
In addition, Japan has monitored China’s saber-rattling to return self-ruling Taiwan to mainland control, and by force if necessary. The concerns have only intensified since Russia invaded Ukraine, which has weakened public opposition in Japan to the rearming. The next Communist Party delegation to gather in Beijing is scheduled for 2027 when Chinese leaders will determine where its own modernization stands. It is already being seen as a potentially noteworthy milestone for Beijing as it will mark the centennial of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army.
Clearly, Tokyo plans to be ready to stand up to any Chinese aggression that could occur – as well as any from North Korea or Russia. The strategy document reaffirmed concerns about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its recent string of missile launches.
However, it placed North Korea below China on the current threat list, reversing the order from a previous strategy released in 2013. Tokyo’s spending plans commit Japan to 43 trillion yen (approximately $312 billion), in defense outlays over the next five years, starting in the next fiscal year that will begin in April. Japan would spend about 2% of its GDP on defense, which put it in line with spending targets shared by the U.S.’s European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Around $3.7 billion is reportedly earmarked just for missile systems, including the American Tomahawk, which would enable the Japanese military to target an adversary’s facilities if an attack appeared imminent. The message that Japan will likely want to send is that it would be far too costly to attack the island nation, thus pursuing a peace through strength strategy.
A Senior Editor for 1945, Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,000 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.
Below is U.S. Ambassador Kennedy's concerns about handing administrative control of DiaoYu Islands, aka Senkaku Islands, to Japan while negotiating with Taiwan on textile "voluntary" quotas. Also attached below are several conversations among U.S. politicians on the Islands. (GRC = Government of the Republic of China)
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d133
(c) Offer certain concessions to Taiwan. Ambassador Kennedy feels the impasse can be broken without causing disastrous side effects for either our industry or the Taiwan Government. While the Chinese have stressed the importance of certain military items (F–4's for example) Ambassador Kennedy is convinced that the “only” way to resolve the issues is to withhold turning the Senkaku Islands over to Japanese administrative control under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.3
4. Ambassador Kennedy's argument on the Senkaku follows:
“This is a major issue in Taiwan with both domestic and international implications. If the U.S. were to maintain administrative control, it would give the GRC a tremendous public boost since they have expressed themselves so forcefully on the issues. Further, it would be a very direct indication of our continued interest in and support for the GRC—and it would be done at Japan's expense, a point that is vital to our ability to proceed effectively with textile negotiations in Hong Kong and Korea and subsequently in Japan. Announcement of such a decision allows the GRC to save face both at home (it takes the Vice Premier off the hook) and abroad. Taiwan could accept the current textile package in face of Hong Kong and Korean pressure.
“In addition, such an act would, in my opinion, provide a very badly needed shock effect on the Japanese. It would indicate that U.S. acquiescence in all matters requested by the Japanese could no longer be taken for granted.
“I can fully appreciate the opposition which such a proposal will generate in certain quarters of our government. But I feel that this can and must be done. We accepted stewardship of these Islands after World War II. Neither historically nor geographically are they a part of the Ryukyus Chain containing Okinawa. Consequently, the GRC suffers a great loss of face if we allow Japan to gain administrative control of them. Since possession of the Islands is still in dispute, there is every reason for the United States to maintain administrative control until such time as the dispute is settled. Taiwan feels very strongly that once Japan had administrative control there is absolutely no possibility of their ever relinquishing that control. By no means am I suggesting that we hand the islands over to Taiwan. Rather, I am strongly recommending the wisdom of preserving the status quo rather than allowing Japan to assume administrative control with the great loss of face this entails for Taiwan.
“I know of no other action sufficiently important or sufficiently dramatic to resolve our textile problems specifically as well as to pave the way for resolution of several general international trade difficulties. The stakes involved are very high which I fully realize. I realize, too, that only the President can make such a decision. Therefore, I urge you in the strongest possible terms to present to him all the potential benefits and ramifications of my recommendations.”
5. Henry Kissinger is looking into the background of the Senkaku Islands dispute and will be able to report to you at our meeting this afternoon on what would be involved in not turning over the Senkaku Islands to Japan at this point.
3 See Documents 113, 114, and 115.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976
Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 113
He then raised this issue of the Senkaku Islands.6
6 Japanese-American negotiations over Okinawa sparked renewed Chinese interest in the Senkaku Islands (Taioyutai or Daioyutai in Chinese). Chow gave a 4-page aidemémoire to Green on September 16, 1970, outlining the ROC's objections to Japanese sovereignty over these islands. (National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 61, Subject Files, Petroleum–Senkakus, January–September 1970) Shoesmith summarized reports of student demonstrations in Taipei against Japanese control of the Senkaku Islands and noted: “The Embassy believes that the initiative for the demonstrations has come from the students rather than the government. But the latter probably has given tacit approval out of reluctance to oppose the fruits of youthful patriotism and its own dissatisfaction over our China policy and oil exploration moratorium.” (Memorandum from Shoesmith t. Green, April 17; ibid., Lot 75 D 76, Petroleum–Senkakus, January–March 1971) There were also student protests in the United States and Hong Kong. The White House tape of the April 12 meeting indicates that Chow emphasized that the final disposition of the Senkakus should be kept open, and that this issue was a measure of the ROC's ability to protect itself. He emphasized the symbolic importance of the islands. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 12, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 477–3)
______________
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976
Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 114
Ambassador Chow said that in the measures the U.S. was taking which affected his country, the understanding if not the support of the Chinese people was needed. He described the strong sentiments which various Chinese groups had with regard to a number of issues, particularly the question of the status of Senkaku Islets. The demonstration which had taken place in Washington on April 10 was a case in point—those demonstrating had been scientists, engineers, and professional people and not just students. The demonstration had come on all of a sudden because these people had become excited, and was symbolic of what they and the country would stand for. Ambassador Chow declared that he had been asked by President Chiang to take up the Senkaku question with the President and Dr. Kissinger.
Dr. Kissinger stated that he was looking into the Senkaku matter, and asked Mr. Holdridge to forward a report to him on the issues involved by April 13.3
Ambassador Chow, in commenting further on the Senkakus, remarked that even when the Japanese had occupied Taiwan and the Ryukyus, legal matters involving the Senkakus had been handled by courts on Taiwan, and the fishing boats which went to the Senkakus had been from Taiwan. From the Japanese point of view, they didn't care how the Senkakus were administered. For the Chinese though, the issue of nationalism was deeply involved.
__________
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976
Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 115
115. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, April 13, 1971.
SUBJECT
The Chinese Claim to the Senkaku Islets
You asked for information on the Chinese claim to the Senkaku Islets. The most recent summary of this was contained in a Note Verbale sent the State Department by the Chinese Embassy on March 15 (Tab A).2 Its main points are as follows:
—As early as the 15th century Chinese historical records considered the Senkakus as the boundary separating Taiwan from the independent kingdom of the Ryukyus.
—The geological structure of the Senkaku Islets is similar to that of other islets associated with Taiwan. The Senkakus are closer to Taiwan than to the Ryukyus and are separated from the Ryukyus by the Okinawa Trough at the end of the Continental Shelf, which is 2,000 meters in depth.
—Taiwanese fisherman have traditionally fished in the area of the Senkakus and called at these islets.
—The Japanese Government did not include the Senkakus in Okinawa Prefecture until after China's cession of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan after the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895.
—For regional security considerations the GRC has hitherto not challenged the U.S. military occupation of the Senkakus under Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, according to international law temporary military occupation of an area does not affect the ultimate determination of its sovereignty.
—In view of the expected termination of the U.S. occupation of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972, the U.S. is requested to respect the GRC's sovereign rights over the Senkaku Islets and restore them to the GRC when this termination takes place.
Comment. As you can imagine, the Japanese Government has a comparable list of apparently offsetting arguments and maintains simply that the Senkakus remain Japanese. State's position is that in occupying the Ryukyus and the Senkakus in 1945, and in proposing to return them to Japan in 1972, the U.S. passes no judgement as to conflicting claims over any portion of them, which should be settled directly by the parties concerned.3
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on April 23.
2 Attached but not printed.
3 Kissinger's handwritten comment in the margin reads: “But that is nonsense since it gives islands to Japan. How can we get a more neutral position?”
__________
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d134
Nixon, Kissinger, and Peterson met at Camp David from 3:25 to 4:10 p.m. on June 7. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) According to a draft telegram to Rogers by U. Alexis Johnson: “Henry Kissinger stepped into the breach with material that I supplied him, and last night [June 7] obtained the President's decision that we would not change our position on the Senkakus. However, this points up the heat that GRC is bringing to bear on us and in turn in some degree probably reflects the heat that GRC is feeling on a subject which it neglected for so long.” (Ibid., RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Nodis Chrono 1971) Kissinger and Johnson discussed the Senkaku Island issue by telephone on the morning of June 7. Johnson stated: “The principle that we are applying is that we receive the islands from Japan for administration and are returning them to Japan without prejudice to the rights—no position between the two governments on it.” (Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Johnson, June 7, 10:35 a.m.; ibid., Telcons, May–June 1971)
On June 7 Kennedy told Chiang Ching-Kuo of the decision on the Senkaku Islands. Chiang asked that the U.S. Government categorically state at the time of the signing of the Okinawa reversion agreement that the final status of the islands had not been determined and should be settled by all parties involved. (Backchannel message from Kennedy to Peterson, June 9; ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, Textile Negotiations (cables)) In a June 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Johnson noted that Rogers had raised this issue with Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi at their meeting in Paris on June 9. (Ibid., RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Kissinger, Henry, 1971) On June 12 Peterson informed Kennedy, who was in Seoul, that Rogers had approached Aichi, “strongly urging GOJ to discuss issue with GRC prior to signature of Okinawa Agreement on June 17.” He also noted that a Department of State spokesman would announce on June 17 that a return of “administrative rights” to Japan of the Senkaku Islands “can in no way prejudice the underlying claims of the Republic of China.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Peter Peterson, Box 1, 1971, Textile Negotiations (cables)) On June 15 Peterson cabled Kennedy, in Seoul, stating that Aichi had met with the ROC Ambassador in Tokyo to discuss the Senkaku issue. (Ibid.) On July 12 Chiang Ching-Kuo complained to McConaughy that “the Japanese so far have refused to talk in any meaningful way on the subject.” (Telegram 3388 from Taipei, July 12; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT)
...
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