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STSprog-fut_v_c_o_AKP (NASA-S-69-4058, NASA HQ MH69-6479 eq)

“DC-3 booster/orbiter stage separation at 70km altitude. The DC-3 version depicted here is the original Manned Spacecraft Center concept. The staging velocity of most Phase A designs was quite high (3290m/s) in order to achieve the lowest possible booster & orbiter mass. But this also increased the complexity of the booster which had to carry an advanced thermal protection system plus jet engines to return to base. North American estimated the system would weigh 2030t at liftoff. A fleet of six vehicles could have supported a launch rate of 50 flights per year.”

 

Above associated with the image, at/per:

 

www.pmview.com/spaceodysseytwo/spacelvs/sld022.htm

 

Specifically:

 

sites.google.com/site/spaceodysseytwo/stg1969/2stsnar0.jpg

Credit: PMView Pro website

 

Beautiful & iconic - in my world - depiction by NASA artist, Raymond Bruneau.

 

See also:

 

www.quora.com/Is-it-true-NASAs-Space-Shuttle-design-was-p...

Credit: Quora website

 

Apparently, this design was officially referred to as MSC-001:

 

www.astronautix.com/s/shuttledc-3.html

Credit: Astronautix website

 

forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=9004.0

Credit: NASASpaceFlight.com website

 

Confirming the above two, per the best & most trusted source imaginable, along with other wonderfully enlightening information:

 

“…During Phase A, engineers found the lifting body concept to be the most poorly suited to space shuttle applications, primarily because the shape did not lend itself to efficient packaging and installation of a large payload bay, propellant tanks, and major subsystems. The complex double curvature of the body resulted in a vehicle that would be difficult to fabricate, and further, the body could not easily be divided into subassemblies to simplify manufacturing. In addition, the lifting body’s large base are yielded a relatively poor subsonic lift-to-drag ratio (L/D), resulting in a less attractive cruise capability. Although lifting bodies continued to be studied throughout Phase B, the concept was a dark horse, at best.

At the same time, stowed-wing designs were found to have many attractive features, including low burnout weight and the high hypersonic L/D needed to meet the maximum cross-range requirements. In addition, the stowed approach permitted the wing to be optimized for the low-speed flight regime, simplifying landing. Its drawbacks included a high vehicle-weight-to-projected-planform-area ratio, which would result in higher average base temperature to either straight- or delta-wing concepts. In addition, the mechanisms needed to operate the wing and transmit the flight loads to the primary structure resulted in significantly increased design and manufacturing complexity. The maintenance required between flights was expected to be high, and insufficient data existed to reliably determine potential failure modes, which were thought to be numerous.

Maxime A. Faget, having moved from Langley to MSC in Houston, TX, was not a proponent of lifting reentry. Instead, Faget held to the idea of a high-drag blunt body. He designed a straight-wing space shuttle design popularly called the DC-3 (more officially, the MSC-0001), which operated as a blunt body. Faget proposed to enter the atmosphere at an extremely high angle of attack with the broad lower surface facing the direction of flight, creating a large shock wave that would carry most of the heat around the vehicle instead of into it. The vehicle would maintain this attitude until it got below 40,000 feet and about 200 mph, when the nose would come down, and it would begin diving to pick up sufficient speed to fly toward the landing site, touching down at about 140 mph. Since the only flying the vehicle would perform was at very low speeds during the landing phase, the wing design could be selected solely on the basis of optimizing it for subsonic cruise and landing; hence the simple straight wing proposed by Faget. The design did have one major failing (at least in the eyes of the Air Force): Since it did not truly fly during reentry, it had almost no cross range…”

 

Credit:

Roger D. Launius, Dennis R. Jenkins

“Coming Home: Reentry and Recovery from Space: NASA SP-2011-593”

 

Finally, at the always excellent Aerospace Projects Review website:

 

www.aerospaceprojectsreview.com/blog/?p=1254

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Uploaded on November 18, 2021
Taken on November 18, 2021