Vietnam War Bibliography: Prelude to Tragedy - edited by H. Neese & J. O'Donnell - Vietnam 1960-65
Naval Institute Press 2001,309 pgs, index, photographs, bibliography, ISBN 1-55750-491-1, hardbound
From Product description :Foreword by Richard Holbrooke. Five American and three Vietnamese participants in the early days of U.S. involvement in southeast Asia compellingly argue that the failure of American policy in Vietnam was not inevitable. The authors point out that against the advice of experts and the proven success of counterinsurgency programs in Malaya and the Philippines, senior policy makers made the fateful decision to develop the South Vietnamese Army as a mirror image of the U.S. Army rather than as a counter-guerilla force. The authors, who were involved in all levels of the counterinsurgency campaign, also cite as key factors in American policy failure: support for the coup that overthrew President Diem in 1963, bureaucratic in-fighting, and the lack of appreciation for the complexities of revolutionary warfare and the practicalities of grass-roots programs to combat it. While this devastating portrait can do nothing to change what has already transpired, it does offer significant lessons for the future and should not be ignored.
Vietnam War Bibliography: Prelude to Tragedy - edited by H. Neese & J. O'Donnell - Vietnam 1960-65
Naval Institute Press 2001,309 pgs, index, photographs, bibliography, ISBN 1-55750-491-1, hardbound
From Product description :Foreword by Richard Holbrooke. Five American and three Vietnamese participants in the early days of U.S. involvement in southeast Asia compellingly argue that the failure of American policy in Vietnam was not inevitable. The authors point out that against the advice of experts and the proven success of counterinsurgency programs in Malaya and the Philippines, senior policy makers made the fateful decision to develop the South Vietnamese Army as a mirror image of the U.S. Army rather than as a counter-guerilla force. The authors, who were involved in all levels of the counterinsurgency campaign, also cite as key factors in American policy failure: support for the coup that overthrew President Diem in 1963, bureaucratic in-fighting, and the lack of appreciation for the complexities of revolutionary warfare and the practicalities of grass-roots programs to combat it. While this devastating portrait can do nothing to change what has already transpired, it does offer significant lessons for the future and should not be ignored.