Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero
In 1937, the Imperial Japanese Navy issued a requirement for a replacement for the Mitsubishi A5M then entering service. The IJN wanted a carrier-capable fighter with a top speed of 300 mph, an endurance of eight hours, cannon armament, good maneuverability, with a wingspan less than 40 feet—the width of elevators on Japanese aircraft carriers. All of this had to be done with an existing powerplant.
Nakajima promptly declared that the IJN was asking the impossible and did not bother trying to submit a design. Mitsubishi’s chief designer, Jiro Horikoshi, felt differently and began working on a prototype. Using the Nakajima Sakae 12 as the powerplant, he lightened his design as much as physically possible, leaving off crew armor and self-sealing fuel tanks, and using a special kind of light but brittle duralumin in its construction. Though it delayed production, the wing and fuselage were constructed as a single piece for better durability. Using flush riveting also made for an aerodynamically clean design; it had a stall speed below that of any contemporary fighter at 70 mph. Its wide tracked landing gear also made it fairly simple to recover on both carriers and land on unimproved airstrips. Horikoshi had delivered, and the IJN accepted the new fighter into service in July 1940 as the A6M Rei-sen (Type 0), referring to the Imperial calendar date used by the Emperor of Japan; 1940 was Imperial year 2400. Both friend and foe would refer to the A6M simply as the Zero.
The Zero had its first combat encounter with Chinese Polikarpov I-16s in September 1940, a fighter that was the equal of the A5Ms and Ki-27s then in Japanese service, yet 13 Zeroes were easily able to handle 27 I-16s, shooting all of them down without loss in three minutes. Claire Chennault, the American advisor to the Chinese Nationalists, sent reports of this amazing new fighter to the United States, but he was ignored. The Allies would therefore learn of the Zero’s prowess first-hand on 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor. Making matters worse for the Allies was that the Zeroes they encountered were flown by IJN pilots, who were among the best in the world. Teaming elite pilots with a supremely maneuverable fighter was a deadly combination that seemed unstoppable in 1942, when Zeroes over New Guinea sustained a kill ratio of 12 to 1 over Allied opponents.
Even at this dark stage of the war for the Allies, however, their pilots were learning the Zero’s weaknesses. Hirokoshi’s sacrifices had given the Japanese an excellent and very long-ranged fighter (A6Ms regularly made the round trip between Rabaul and Guadalcanal in 1942), but it had come at a price. P-40 and F4F Wildcat pilots in China and the Pacific learned that the Zero, lacking any sort of armor or self-sealing fuel tanks, was very prone to catching fire and exploding with only a few hits. They also learned that the best defense against a Zero was to dive away from it, as Japanese pilots could not keep up with either the P-40 or the F4F in a dive, as it would tear their fragile fighter apart. While trying to dogfight a Zero was suicide, Allied pilots could use the vertical to their advantage. Japanese pilots also learned that the rifle-caliber 7.7mm machine guns in the Zero’s cowl were ineffective against armored Allied fighters, and the 20mm cannon often had poor fusing on the shells. The Allies gave the Zero the reporting name “Zeke,” while later models were codenamed “Hamp” and floatplane A6M2-Ns were codenamed “Rufe,” but most pilots continued to call it the Zero.
As World War II continued, the Allies began drawing on those lessons in fighter design, helped immensely when an intact A6M2 was captured in the Aleutians in summer 1942. First to arrive was the F4U Corsair, which still could not turn with the Zero but was faster and better in a climb; the second was the F6F Hellcat, which was also faster and better in the vertical, and could stay with the Zero in a sustained turn. The Allies also benefited from the Japanese losing so many experienced pilots in battles such as Midway and the Guadalcanal campaign: the IJN’s pilot replacement program was too selective, and could not replace the heavy losses of 1942 and 1943. Japanese industry was also slow to come up with a replacement for the A6M. As a result, by late 1943, the Zero menace had been reduced drastically. While the Zero was still deadly in the hands of a good pilot, these pilots were increasingly scarce by 1945.
Though Mitsubishi kept upgrading the Zero throughout World War II, the design simply was too specialized to do much with. By 1945, it was being used mainly as a kamikaze suicide aircraft, flown by half-trained former college students. While the kamikazes did a great deal of damage and killed thousands of Allied sailors, it was a desperation tactic that only lengthened a war that Japan had already lost. The Zero had exacted a price, however: it was responsible for the loss of 1550 Allied aircraft, a conservative estimate.
By war’s end, 10, 939 A6Ms had been built and Mitsubishi was working on a replacement, the similar A7M Reppu. Of these, the aircraft that survived the war were mostly scrapped and few preserved, and no flyable aircraft were left; directors attempting to make World War II movies were forced to convert a number of T-6 Texan trainers to look something like Zeroes. A few have since been restored to flying condition. Today, about 17 Zeroes remain, though some are being recovered from wartime wreck sites and restored to museum display.
This Zero is an earlier A6M2 Model 21 type, built under license by Nakajima, and as such would have been identical to the A6M2s used in the Pearl Harbor attack. The light gray finish and black cowling were typical Imperial Japanese Navy colors. AI-3-102, the Zero's tail number, and the single white stripe on the fuselage indicate an aircraft off the IJNS Zuiho (which did not participate in the Pearl Harbor operation), but this Zero was found as a wreck at Kavieng, New Guinea. It was recovered and restored for display at the National Museum of the USAF in 2004.
Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero
In 1937, the Imperial Japanese Navy issued a requirement for a replacement for the Mitsubishi A5M then entering service. The IJN wanted a carrier-capable fighter with a top speed of 300 mph, an endurance of eight hours, cannon armament, good maneuverability, with a wingspan less than 40 feet—the width of elevators on Japanese aircraft carriers. All of this had to be done with an existing powerplant.
Nakajima promptly declared that the IJN was asking the impossible and did not bother trying to submit a design. Mitsubishi’s chief designer, Jiro Horikoshi, felt differently and began working on a prototype. Using the Nakajima Sakae 12 as the powerplant, he lightened his design as much as physically possible, leaving off crew armor and self-sealing fuel tanks, and using a special kind of light but brittle duralumin in its construction. Though it delayed production, the wing and fuselage were constructed as a single piece for better durability. Using flush riveting also made for an aerodynamically clean design; it had a stall speed below that of any contemporary fighter at 70 mph. Its wide tracked landing gear also made it fairly simple to recover on both carriers and land on unimproved airstrips. Horikoshi had delivered, and the IJN accepted the new fighter into service in July 1940 as the A6M Rei-sen (Type 0), referring to the Imperial calendar date used by the Emperor of Japan; 1940 was Imperial year 2400. Both friend and foe would refer to the A6M simply as the Zero.
The Zero had its first combat encounter with Chinese Polikarpov I-16s in September 1940, a fighter that was the equal of the A5Ms and Ki-27s then in Japanese service, yet 13 Zeroes were easily able to handle 27 I-16s, shooting all of them down without loss in three minutes. Claire Chennault, the American advisor to the Chinese Nationalists, sent reports of this amazing new fighter to the United States, but he was ignored. The Allies would therefore learn of the Zero’s prowess first-hand on 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor. Making matters worse for the Allies was that the Zeroes they encountered were flown by IJN pilots, who were among the best in the world. Teaming elite pilots with a supremely maneuverable fighter was a deadly combination that seemed unstoppable in 1942, when Zeroes over New Guinea sustained a kill ratio of 12 to 1 over Allied opponents.
Even at this dark stage of the war for the Allies, however, their pilots were learning the Zero’s weaknesses. Hirokoshi’s sacrifices had given the Japanese an excellent and very long-ranged fighter (A6Ms regularly made the round trip between Rabaul and Guadalcanal in 1942), but it had come at a price. P-40 and F4F Wildcat pilots in China and the Pacific learned that the Zero, lacking any sort of armor or self-sealing fuel tanks, was very prone to catching fire and exploding with only a few hits. They also learned that the best defense against a Zero was to dive away from it, as Japanese pilots could not keep up with either the P-40 or the F4F in a dive, as it would tear their fragile fighter apart. While trying to dogfight a Zero was suicide, Allied pilots could use the vertical to their advantage. Japanese pilots also learned that the rifle-caliber 7.7mm machine guns in the Zero’s cowl were ineffective against armored Allied fighters, and the 20mm cannon often had poor fusing on the shells. The Allies gave the Zero the reporting name “Zeke,” while later models were codenamed “Hamp” and floatplane A6M2-Ns were codenamed “Rufe,” but most pilots continued to call it the Zero.
As World War II continued, the Allies began drawing on those lessons in fighter design, helped immensely when an intact A6M2 was captured in the Aleutians in summer 1942. First to arrive was the F4U Corsair, which still could not turn with the Zero but was faster and better in a climb; the second was the F6F Hellcat, which was also faster and better in the vertical, and could stay with the Zero in a sustained turn. The Allies also benefited from the Japanese losing so many experienced pilots in battles such as Midway and the Guadalcanal campaign: the IJN’s pilot replacement program was too selective, and could not replace the heavy losses of 1942 and 1943. Japanese industry was also slow to come up with a replacement for the A6M. As a result, by late 1943, the Zero menace had been reduced drastically. While the Zero was still deadly in the hands of a good pilot, these pilots were increasingly scarce by 1945.
Though Mitsubishi kept upgrading the Zero throughout World War II, the design simply was too specialized to do much with. By 1945, it was being used mainly as a kamikaze suicide aircraft, flown by half-trained former college students. While the kamikazes did a great deal of damage and killed thousands of Allied sailors, it was a desperation tactic that only lengthened a war that Japan had already lost. The Zero had exacted a price, however: it was responsible for the loss of 1550 Allied aircraft, a conservative estimate.
By war’s end, 10, 939 A6Ms had been built and Mitsubishi was working on a replacement, the similar A7M Reppu. Of these, the aircraft that survived the war were mostly scrapped and few preserved, and no flyable aircraft were left; directors attempting to make World War II movies were forced to convert a number of T-6 Texan trainers to look something like Zeroes. A few have since been restored to flying condition. Today, about 17 Zeroes remain, though some are being recovered from wartime wreck sites and restored to museum display.
This Zero is an earlier A6M2 Model 21 type, built under license by Nakajima, and as such would have been identical to the A6M2s used in the Pearl Harbor attack. The light gray finish and black cowling were typical Imperial Japanese Navy colors. AI-3-102, the Zero's tail number, and the single white stripe on the fuselage indicate an aircraft off the IJNS Zuiho (which did not participate in the Pearl Harbor operation), but this Zero was found as a wreck at Kavieng, New Guinea. It was recovered and restored for display at the National Museum of the USAF in 2004.