TURKISH AIRLINES 737-800 TC-JGE(cn1065)
Istanbul Ataturk airport ....June 2007.First flight 24/01/2002.On Wednesday 25/02/2009 1,5 km (0.9 mls) S of Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS) .Turkish Airlines Flight TK1951, a Boeing 737-800, departed Istanbul-Atatürk International Airport (IST) for a flight to Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS), The Netherlands. The flight crew consisted of three pilots: a line training captain who occupied the left seat, a first officer under line training in the right seat and an additional first officer who occupied the flight deck jump seat. The first officer under line training was the pilot flying. The en route part of the flight was uneventful.
The flight was descending for Schiphol and passed overhead Flevoland at about 8500 ft. At that time the aural landing gear warning sounded.
The aircraft continued and was then directed by Air Traffic Control towards runway 18R for an ILS approach and landing. The crew performed the approach with one of the two autopilot and autothrottle engaged. The standard procedure for runway 18R prescribes that the aircraft is lined up at least 8 NM from the runway threshold at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glidepath is then approached and intercepted from below. Lining up at a distance between 5 and 8 NM is allowed when permitted by ATC.
Flight 1951 was vectored for a line up at approximately 6 NM at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glide slope was now approached from above.
The landing gear was selected down and flaps 15 were set. While descending through 1950 feet, the radio altimeter value suddenly changed to -8 feet. And again the aural landing gear warning sounded.
Once the localizer was intercepted the crew selected, by means of the vertical speed mode of the auto pilot, a descent speed of 1400 feet per minute to intercept the glide path. The autothrottle system entered the retard mode, and the thrust levers were moved to the idle position and remained in retard mode. Normally this mode is automatically engaged during landing flare just prior to touchdown.
The glide path was intercepted at approximately 1330 feet and the aircraft was now also at the correct altitude for the approach of runway 18R. The aircraft speed had during the time the aircraft was in vertical speed modus increased to 169 knots, and decreased again when the aircraft followed the glide path.
At approximately 900 feet, the flaps were selected to 40 by the crew and the speed continued to decrease. At approximately 770 feet, the crew set the selected airspeed to 144 knots. At that moment the actual airspeed was 144 knots. The autothrottle system should have maintained the speed selected by the crew but, with the thrust levers at idle, speed continued to decay. Because the auto pilot wanted to maintain the glide scope, the automatic flight system, in response, commanded increasing nose up pitch and applied nose up stabiliser trim.
The stick shakers activated at approximately 460 feet, warning the crew that the angle of attack (AOA) was too high. The data of the digital flight data recorder show that the thrust levers were immediately advanced but moved back to idle. When the thrust levers returned to idle, the autothrottle was disengaged. Whether these actions were performed by the crew or automatically is still under investigation. At that moment, the speed was approximately 110 knots, the pitch angle was approximately 11° Aircraft Nose Up (ANU) and the recorded AOA was approximately 20°.
At 420 feet the autopilot was disengaged by the crew and attempts were made to recover the correct flight position by pitching the aircraft. At 310 feet a nose down angle was reached of 8° beneath horizon. Almost simultaneously the thrust levers were advanced to their most forward position after which the aircraft ascended somewhat and the nose position increased.
According to the last recorded data of the digital flight data recorder the aircraft was in a 22° ANU and 10° Left Wing Down (LWD) position at the moment of impact.
The airplane impacted farmland. The horizontal stabilizer and both main landing gear legs were separated from the aircraft and located near the initial impact point. The left and right engines had detached from the aircraft.
The aft fuselage, with vertical stabilizer, was broken circumferentially forward of the aft passenger doors and had sustained significant damage. The fuselage had ruptured at the right side forward of the wings. The forward fuselage section, which contained the cockpit and seat rows 1 to 7, had been significantly disrupted. The rear fuselage section was broken circumferentially around row 28.The aircraft was written off....fatalities 9.
TURKISH AIRLINES 737-800 TC-JGE(cn1065)
Istanbul Ataturk airport ....June 2007.First flight 24/01/2002.On Wednesday 25/02/2009 1,5 km (0.9 mls) S of Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS) .Turkish Airlines Flight TK1951, a Boeing 737-800, departed Istanbul-Atatürk International Airport (IST) for a flight to Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS), The Netherlands. The flight crew consisted of three pilots: a line training captain who occupied the left seat, a first officer under line training in the right seat and an additional first officer who occupied the flight deck jump seat. The first officer under line training was the pilot flying. The en route part of the flight was uneventful.
The flight was descending for Schiphol and passed overhead Flevoland at about 8500 ft. At that time the aural landing gear warning sounded.
The aircraft continued and was then directed by Air Traffic Control towards runway 18R for an ILS approach and landing. The crew performed the approach with one of the two autopilot and autothrottle engaged. The standard procedure for runway 18R prescribes that the aircraft is lined up at least 8 NM from the runway threshold at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glidepath is then approached and intercepted from below. Lining up at a distance between 5 and 8 NM is allowed when permitted by ATC.
Flight 1951 was vectored for a line up at approximately 6 NM at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glide slope was now approached from above.
The landing gear was selected down and flaps 15 were set. While descending through 1950 feet, the radio altimeter value suddenly changed to -8 feet. And again the aural landing gear warning sounded.
Once the localizer was intercepted the crew selected, by means of the vertical speed mode of the auto pilot, a descent speed of 1400 feet per minute to intercept the glide path. The autothrottle system entered the retard mode, and the thrust levers were moved to the idle position and remained in retard mode. Normally this mode is automatically engaged during landing flare just prior to touchdown.
The glide path was intercepted at approximately 1330 feet and the aircraft was now also at the correct altitude for the approach of runway 18R. The aircraft speed had during the time the aircraft was in vertical speed modus increased to 169 knots, and decreased again when the aircraft followed the glide path.
At approximately 900 feet, the flaps were selected to 40 by the crew and the speed continued to decrease. At approximately 770 feet, the crew set the selected airspeed to 144 knots. At that moment the actual airspeed was 144 knots. The autothrottle system should have maintained the speed selected by the crew but, with the thrust levers at idle, speed continued to decay. Because the auto pilot wanted to maintain the glide scope, the automatic flight system, in response, commanded increasing nose up pitch and applied nose up stabiliser trim.
The stick shakers activated at approximately 460 feet, warning the crew that the angle of attack (AOA) was too high. The data of the digital flight data recorder show that the thrust levers were immediately advanced but moved back to idle. When the thrust levers returned to idle, the autothrottle was disengaged. Whether these actions were performed by the crew or automatically is still under investigation. At that moment, the speed was approximately 110 knots, the pitch angle was approximately 11° Aircraft Nose Up (ANU) and the recorded AOA was approximately 20°.
At 420 feet the autopilot was disengaged by the crew and attempts were made to recover the correct flight position by pitching the aircraft. At 310 feet a nose down angle was reached of 8° beneath horizon. Almost simultaneously the thrust levers were advanced to their most forward position after which the aircraft ascended somewhat and the nose position increased.
According to the last recorded data of the digital flight data recorder the aircraft was in a 22° ANU and 10° Left Wing Down (LWD) position at the moment of impact.
The airplane impacted farmland. The horizontal stabilizer and both main landing gear legs were separated from the aircraft and located near the initial impact point. The left and right engines had detached from the aircraft.
The aft fuselage, with vertical stabilizer, was broken circumferentially forward of the aft passenger doors and had sustained significant damage. The fuselage had ruptured at the right side forward of the wings. The forward fuselage section, which contained the cockpit and seat rows 1 to 7, had been significantly disrupted. The rear fuselage section was broken circumferentially around row 28.The aircraft was written off....fatalities 9.