Oostwold Airshow 2015 - Classic Wings PBY Catalina (1)

Chronicles of PBY-5A Buno 2459; The top-scoring allied antisubmarine aircraft of WW.II

 

On November 15th 1941 PBY-5A Catalina Buno 2459 (c/n 300) rolls of the production line. It is one of a series of 33 for the U.S. Navy ordered in December 1939. Who would have thought at that time this Catalina would sink three submarines, damage one more, fight fires in Chilli and Canada and doing roundflights with passengers in the Netherlands, would still be flying almost 69 years later! The story of this Catalina truly is remarkable.

 

Buno. 2459’s first mentioning in the war diary of VP-73 is on December 23rd 1941. Three planes drawn from VP-83 are test flown at NAS Norfolk, Virginia and put on board seaplane tender USS Albemarle (AV-5) at NOB Norfolk for shipment to Iceland that day. One of these planes was Buno 2459 (73-P-9). The USS Albemarle departed on the 28th and transported one division of VP-73 (Second Division). Commanding officer was David W. Shafer. While on route to Iceland via Quonset Point, Rhode Island and Argentia, Newfoundland it picked two more Catalina’s of VP-83 at Quonset Point making a total of five Catalinas. After arriving at Hvalfjord, Iceland the five Catalina’s were flown to Fleet Air Base at Reykjavik between the 12th and the 16th of January.

The five PBY-5A Catalina’s replaced the PBY-5 of VP-73's Iceland division. This was done because winter operations at Iceland and Argentia were considered "extremely hazardous" as concluded in a study made by the Bureau of Aeronautics. On the 15th of January three PBY-5's of VP-73 at anchor in Skerjafjördur (seaplane anchorage adjacent to Reykjavik airfield) were lost during a storm with wind of 90 kts, gusting to 120 kts. The four PBY-5As that were already at the airfield were tied down but it took all hands and all available lines and weights to secure the planes.

 

Coastal Command

In January flight operations were curtailed because of the bad weather and familiarisation flights to check out pilots commenced not until the 21th. On February 1st Buno. 2459 starts an operational life common to many a Catalina: hours of boredom with a few moments of sheer terror. During February and March Buno 2459 made 20 operational flights. Six were on escort flights, two on ice-reconnaissance flights, one on antisubmarine patrol and eleven on the socalled “Hvalfjord Sweeps”, antisubmarine sweeps of the approaches to the naval anchorage at Hvalfjord. The ice-reconnaissance flights to Greenland (of which Buno 2459 flew its first on March 9th) were flown regularly by Iceland-based aircraft to establish the position of ice on the Denmark Strait, the stretch of ocean between Iceland and Greenland. A vast number of ships sailed through the Strait to reach the North Russian ports, including the infamous PQ/QP convoys bringing much needed war supplies to the hard-pressed Russians.

Although flight operations were badly affected by the bad weather in April, Buno 2459 was forced back twice because of zero visibility and icing, Buno 2459 made fifteen operational flights. During May a new duty was included into the operations of VP-73. The North Atlantic ferry route was inaugurated to handle the massive flow of air traffic from the United States to the European war theatre. Reykjavik was one of the sagging posts on this route and from this month on VP-73 would provide planes on stand-by for rescue operations. Also eight PBY-5As of VP-73's First Division arrived in Iceland.

During an ice-reconnaissance flight to Jan Mayen island on the 23rd of June, a flight of close to twelve hours, Buno 2459 sighted a German Heinkel He 111 north of Iceland. The enemy was not engaged with gunfire.

In July 1942 The Germans renewed their campaign against the transatlantic convoys and VP73 was to become heavily engaged in many of the ensuing battles. During the month of August the PBYs of VP-73 made nine attacks on U-boats. Buno 2459 attacked twice and sank its first. On August 9, shortly before noon, Lt.(jg) Henry C. Colee, Jr. took off in Buno 2459 to conduct an A/S sweep South West of Iceland. At 1706 hrs a U-boat was sighted three miles dead ahead. The U-boat's conning tower was all that was visible and it submerged immediately. Lt.(jg) Colee started Buno 2459's first attack and arrived one minute after the U-boat had disappeared and dropped six depth charges set to explode at a depth of 50 feet, in a stick 68 seconds after the U-boat submerged. All the bombs exploded but it was estimated that they caused no damage as the U-boat would have reached a safe depth. This was VP-73's fifth U-boat attack and Lt.(jg) Colee's second.

 

The British Task Force SN-73 passed Iceland 250 miles to the Southeast on the 20 August. Lt.(jg) Robert B. Hopgood took off in Buno 2459 from Reykjavik a few minutes before 3 a.m. to cover the Task Force. Shortly before dawn while flying in low visibility under a low cloud base at 500 feet he happened upon U464. U464 (commanded by Kapitänleutnant Harms) was a valuable type XIV Milchkuh Utanker. A type XIV Milchkuh could carry enough fuel-oil to replenish twelve type VIIC boats for four weeks. U464 had departed Kiel on 4 August and was on its maiden voyage to replenish U-boats in the Atlantic.

At first tbe fully surfaced U-boat was believed to be one of the task force's destroyers and a recognition signal was fired from the plane's blisters.

 

The initial sighted was made at a range of one and a half miles dead ahead. But when the plane came in closer the object was recognised as being a U-boat. Lt.(jg) Hopgood went straight for an attack, releasing five 250lb. depth charges directly across the U-boat's beam in what appears to have been a perfect straddle. The plane carried six depth charges but one failed to release. The explosion lifted the U-boat almost clear of the water and it was evidently badly damaged.

Following the attack Hopgood made several strafing runs firing his .30 and .50-caliber machine guns to which the enemy replied with accurate antiaircraft gunfire forcing the plane to withdraw to safe distance (after the plane returned to base 25 small shrapnel holes were discovered in its wings). For the next forty-five minutes Hopgood circled the disabled U-boat, but lost sight of it when a rain squall closed in on the area. He started searching for the convoy with which he remained until 0715 hrs. While searching for U464 again Hopgood first came across an oil-slick and then sighted an Icelandic fishing vessel (Skaftfellingur) with U464 alongside. The U-boat was heavily listing to one side and its crew were in process of boarding the fishing vessel. The plane made a low pass and was fired upon by the U-boat's crew. In fear of hitting the fishing vessel the gunfire was not returned. Hopgood returned to the convoy he'd been assigned to and summoned one of its destroyers (HMS Castletown) to the scene. While flying back and forth between the destroyer and the U-boat directing the destroyer to the scene he found the U-boat gone, presumably scuttled by its crew. Shortly afterwards the destroyer arrived and took 52 German prisoners on board (two German sailors were killed).

A rather interesting angle to this victory came later when the squadron learned from the British that the depth charge inflicting the mortal wound to U464 was one that had fallen harmlessly on the deck end was held in place by the deck grating. Apparently a 'green' seaman simply rolled the deadly bomb over the side. When it reached the depth for which its hydrostatic fuses were set to detonate the explosion it went off causing lethal damage to boat. Every submariner should have known that the only way to save the boat would have been to roll the bomb onto a raft or lifeboat and set it adrift.

Another interesting sideline to Hopgood's attack on U464 gave birth to a since-famous U.S. Navy phrase: "Sank sub, open club'. The Fleet Air Base and air detachment in Iceland were commanded by Captain (later Rear Admiral) Daniel V. Gallery, jr., a tough and uncompromising naval officer. Gallery was utterly distressed with VP-73's failure to sink U boats. The squadron had delivered some seven attacks on U-boats over the past few weeks, all of which were “muffed” in his opinion. He possibly felt that the poor performance of his crews was caused by too many late nights spent in the Officers Club, so he ordered the club closed until the squadron sank a U-boat. Captain Gallery also pointed out the requirements for obtaining confirmation of the sinking of the U-boat. "What it amounts to", he told the crews, "is that in order to obtain confirmation of the sinking of a German U-boat, you fellows have to bring in the sub skippers pants as proof. Following Hopgood's attack all ears at Coastal Command headquarters were glued to the radio listening to Hopgood's reports of the dramatic development taking place out at sea. The reports were all framed in very officies language and coded, of course. Then at the end when the destroyer had taken the Germans off the Icelandic fishing vessel, Hopgood's final report came in to Gallery in plain English, no code, saying: “Sank sub, open club”. And they sure did, they damn near blew the roof of the joint. Hopgood further requested that as soon as the U-boat skipper was given dry cloths, his pants be forwarded to Captain Gallery. The salt-encrusted trousers served as a valance over the mirror in VP-73s officers club bar for the remainder of the squadron's tour.

Two months after Buno 2459's successful attack VP-84 took over the tasks of VP-73. About half of squadron VP-73 was already en route to the United States when orders were received to return to Iceland and then on to North-Africa. Some of VP-73's planes were probably quite battered and in need for overhaul so seven of these were exchanged for newer planes of VP-84. One of the planes passed to VP-84 was Buno 2459 which became 84-P-7. During its last operational flight for VP-73 on 5 October Buno 2459 came to battle U582 a type VIIC U-boat. Its assignment that day was to cover convoy HX-209 400 miles south of Iceland. The convoy was being pursued by a 'Wolf Pack' of seventeen U-boats. With the 'Wolf Pack' tactics, which the Germans started in August of 1942, one submarine would locate a convoy and call in others to attack the convoy en masse.

Fifteen minutes after reaching the convoy in the morning of 5 October, the crew of Buno 2459, with Chief Aviation Pilot M. Luke in command, sighted a fully surfaced U-boat ten miles away end about fifteen miles ahead of the convoy's starboard column. Diving from 2000 to 75 feet Luke dropped four 650lb. depth charges on the still visible U-boat in a perfect straddle: two bombs failing on each side of the U-boats hull. Following the explosions the U-boat sank from sight and the only evidence of damage was a patch of oil seen on the water after the attack.

There was every reason to believe that this attack resulted in the destruction of the U-boat. But for some reason this was overlooked when U-boat attacks were assessed after the war. The credit for sinking U582 was given to a Hudson of 269 squadron of the RAF. Research by Ragnar Ragnarsson shows that the mentioned Hudson sank.

 

Another U-boat on the same day in the same area (U619). In Robert L. Carlisto's book "Cats over the Atlantic: VPB-73 In World War II" the sinking of U582 is credited to another VP-73 plane: 73-P-12 (Buno 02974) flown by Ensign William R. Huey. Again Ragnar Ragnarsson's research shows this to be incorrect. Buno 02974 attacked U257 which is confirmed by war diary of the U-boat. The U-boat narrowly escaped with heavy damage.

 

As a result of the strong air coverage by RAF Liberators and the aforementioned Hudsons and Catalinas the 'Wolf Pack' was driven off and ordered to break off at first light the next moming. The rest of her voyage HX-209 sailed unmolested having lost only one tanker to the enemy. To Admiral Dönitz, C-in-C of the U bootwaffe, the operation against HX-209 was a total failure. Only one ship sunk for the price of two destroyed U-boats and a third heavily damaged. When VP-73 left Iceland the squadron's planes had made thirty attacks on U-boats. Two submarines were sunk, both by Buno 2459.

After heavy storms and few operational flights during the winter period of 1942-1943 the weather improved in April 1943. By then the U-boats had adopted so-called 'fight-back' tactic. With this tactic, instead of diving when an aircraft was sighted, a U-boat would stay surfaced and fight back when it was not possible to reach a depth of 80 meters before the plane reached the U-boat. Because standard Catalinas are unsuited for this type of warfare some Catalinas were fitted with a fixed .30 calibre gun in the bow. The barrel of the gun protruded through the air thermometer hole. Later experiments were even made with a 20 mm canon obtained from a P-38 squadron. Two planes were fitted with the experimental installation, one being Buno 2459. As we will see later on the canon was only fired once before it jammed.

The effectiveness of the .30 calibre gun was demonstrated several times but its use produced a serious snag: it upset the bomb aim when used during the final stage of the run. On several occasions when the pilot's attention was focused on firing the gun rather than on the bomb run, the plane drifted from its target upsetting the bomb aim. Another problem was the Catalina's high angle of incidence which caused the gunfire to fail short when the plane dove towards its target. On April 28 Lieutenant (jg) William A. Shevlin flew Buno 2459 to cover convoys ONS5 and SC127 when a U-boat was sighted by Shevlin's copitot Ensign Albert M. Slingluff. This was probably the 1100 ton type IXC/40 long-range U528. The U-boat's lookouts apparently spotted the plane before they were sighted themselves. The boat disappeared thirty-five seconds before the plane arrived over it's swirl. Wisely, Shevlin withheld his bombs but only this time. Because, later when he returned to the spot he sighted a fully surfaced U-boat was seen off the port bow at a range of three and a half miles. Visibility was poor and the U-boat's lookouts supposedly did not notice the approaching plane until it was only a mile away. As the enemy crash-dived Shevlin dove in. He crossed the boat from port quarter to starboard bow, raking it with 200 rounds from the .30-caliber fixed bow gun. The U-boat was still only half submerged when Shevlin released the four depth charges, aiming them to strike the water just ahead of the conning tower. But, because he had been pointing the Catalina's nose at the U-boat while firing his fixed bow gun, the depth charges dropped slightiy farther ahead than intended. Nevertheless, they hit the water close by the U-boat's bow and it is difficult to imagine that the boat had escaped unscatherd. Still, evidence of the damage being all-important, this well executed attack was officially judged as a near-miss due to "insufficient evidence of damage." Before long, however, the result of Shevlin's attack became known. On 11 May 1943 U528 (Oberleutnant zur See von Rabenau), one of the boats operating against ONS5, was sunk in the Bay of Biscay by British air and naval forces. Interrogation of the boat's survivors revealed that on 28 April the boat was attacked from the air with four depth charges that exploded close by its bow. Three torpedo tubes were damaged and the boat was unable to launch its warheads. Furthermore, several air bottles were put out of action and the boat was leaking fuel. After determining the extent of damage, von Rabenau decided U528 was unfit for further operations and headed back to port for repairs.

A “simple” Air Sea Rescue (ASR) flight nearly ended Bu 2459's career on 14 June 1943. Lieutenant (jg) 'Roy' Neff took off to search for the crew of a missing PBY-5A of VP-84. He had all disposable items be removed of the aircraft to be as light as possible for a possible open sea landing. The fixed .30-caliber nose gun was left in place though.

While circling a Faeroes fishing schooner the schooner, probably thinking it was under attack by a German reconnaissance aircraft, fored its ingenieus defence mechanism - a parachute cable. This parachute cabine consisted of a steel cabine with canisters at each end containing a small parachute. When fired in the flight path of an aircraft the cable wrapped around the wing of its target and the chutes discharged from the canisters. The drag thus created was designed to yank the plane to one side with such force that it would plunge to sea out of control. Although Buno 2459 suddenly jolted violently to one side, by a stroke of good fortune one of the canisters became embedded in the starboard aileron and did not discharge its chute. It did jam the aileron and the other chute trailed beside the tailplane, its chute fully open. With full opposite rudder Lieutenant Neff kept the PBY under control despite the hard starboard pull. But something had to be done fast. Ordnanceman A.B. Grant rushed to the bow and quickly dismantled the fixed .30-caliber gun from its mount and brought it to the starboard blister. He took aim and with superb marksmanship shot the chute canisters from both ends of the cabine with a few short bursts. After a landing at the emergency landing field Höfn on Iceland's Southeast coast, where the cabine was removed, Buno 2459 returned to base.

Only ten days after the almost fatal incident, 24 June 1943, while flying south of Iceland Lieutenant (jg) Joseph W. Beach's copilot Lieutenant (jg) Albert M. Slingluff sighted a fully surfaced U-boat six miles slightly off the port bow. The Catalina was armed with three depth charges and a homing torpedo familiarly referred to by its users as “Fidol”. The U-boat spotted was U194 (Kapitänleutnant Hermann Hess); the first of the type IXD2 very long range Oberseekuh Ucruisers to put out of poil for an operation in the Indian Ocean. Lieutenant Beach went straight for his quarry, diving from 1600 feet. After initially not showing any reaction the U-boat suddenly brought its stem to point at the attacking plane. At the same time puffs of black smoke were seen at the conning tower, the Catalina was under fire. Beach aimed the Catalina's nose at the U-boat and pressed the firing button of the 20-mm fixed bow gun now fitted on the aircraft. As mentioned before, one round was fired before a gas jet broke. Afterwards the failure was attributed to the crew's lack of knowledge in the gun's operatie Beach unhesitatingly pressed home his attack while the U-boat's deck and conning tower were kept by the remaining .30-caliber gun. At an attitude of only 65 feet Beach crossed the U-boat stern to bow but the three depth charges failed to release. Pulling away from the attack Beach made a climbing left turn. The U-boat turned with him, keeping its stern pointed at the plane to bring the full force of its antiaircraft guns to bear. Beach circled his quarry at a distance while trying to manoeuvre the Catalina for abeam attack, but to no avail. The enemy always managed to keep his stem pointed in the plane’s direction. A remarkable feat considering that manoeuvrability was not a strong point of these large long-range boats. The second run was started from a mile and a half in face of heavy gunfire. As the Catalina passed over the U-boat stem, to bow the two starboard depth charges were released manually. Both fell short and exploded some 50 feet astern the boat. Beach came in almost immediately for the third time hoping the remaining depth charge would release. But the bomb release failed again. Kapitänleutnant Schoner had clearly had his fill and crash-dived. it was his last dive, for Beach dropped his 'Fidol' in the enemy's wake. Fifty seconds later the crew watched as the torpedo's shock wave caused a mushroom-like upheaval on the surface. The missile had found its target, but lacking the all-important visible evidence of damage the destruction of U194 could only be confirmed untit after the war.

Buno 2459 finished the war with three U-boats (U464, U582, and U194) sunk, and a fourth (U528) severely damaged.

 

During its operational assignment to VP-73 and VP-84, Buno 2459 flew a total of 195 operational missions, 92 with VP-73 and 103 with VP-84. The highest monthly tally was in May 1942 when it carried out 18 sorties for VP-73, closely followed by 17 with VP-84 in May 1943, the month the German U-boats were run out of the North Atlantic. It finished the war with three U-boats (U464, U582 and U194) sunk, and a fourth (U528) severely damaged. It is believed to be the highest score achieved by a single allied antisubmarine aircraft of any type in WW.II

 

Prior to its departure from Iceland on 1 September 1943, Buno 2459 transferred to FAW 7’s Hedron, where it remained until January 1944 when it was assigned to a unit named Atlanta Test 39. Buno 2459 was flown out of lceland to Quonset Point, R.I. by Lt. G.S. Smith on 1 September 1943, via BW-l, Greenland and Goose Bay,Labrador, arriving at Quonset Point on 3 September 1943. The total flying time from Reykjavik to Quonset Point was 20 hrs. 25 min.

The following September it was briefly assigned to the resident Operational Unit at NAS Anacostia, Washington, DC, before passing to the Naval Air Navigation Radio School at Gainsville, Georgia, in October. Towards the end of 1944, Buno 2459 spent a month or so with Assembly & Repair at Pensacola, presumably for maintenance, before transferring to the US Coast Guard in December 1944, and assigned to the Coast Guard Air Station at Elizabeth City, North Carolina, were it was taken on charge by the station's Operational Unit. It was still at Elizabeth City when stricken from the Navy's inventory on 31 October 1945.

By: Prudent Staal

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