Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25PD Foxbat
In 1967, the United States learned of the existence of the Ye-155, an experimental Soviet fighter that had reached speeds of nearly Mach 3 and altitudes of 115,000 feet. Intelligence on the aircraft indicated a heavy fighter with superb maneuverability, excellent radar, and speed unmatched by anything in the Western inventory. In response, the US Navy accelerated the program that would lead to the F-14 Tomcat, while the USAF began the FSX study that would become the F-15 Eagle. Even this was feared would not be enough against the production Ye-155, what was known as the MiG-25 and given the reporting name of Foxbat. It was not until September 1976, when a MiG-25 pilot, Viktor Belenko, defected to Japan with his aircraft that the West learned the truth: the MiG-25 was not a super-plane at all.
In reality, the MiG-25 itself was designed in the state of near-panic that characterized the F-15’s development. Soviet intelligence had learned of the development of the SR-71 by the United States, which could fly at speeds and altitude that made it untouchable by Soviet defenses—which were at the time just able to stop U-2 overflights. To make matters worse, the Americans were developing a bomber, the XB-70 Valkyrie, with nearly the same speed and altitude capability of the SR-71, except this aircraft would be carrying nuclear weapons. The Soviet air defense network (PVO-Strany) needed a fighter to stop the XB-70, and fast.
Mikoyan-Gurevich had already been working on designs to counter the U-2, and were experimenting with various wing and engine configurations, as high altitude, speed, and twin engines were requirements. Ironically, Mikoyan-Gurevich might have found their best inspiration in an American design, the A-5 Vigilante carrier-based nuclear bomber, which was a sleek two-engined design optimized for high speed. Using high-mounted wings for lift and building the aircraft around its two gigantic Tumansky R-15 turbojets, the most powerful the Soviet Union could produce, the MiG-25 began to take shape.
The biggest obstacle was not engine power, however, but what those engines could do: the MiG-25 would easily be able to get over Mach 2.5, at which time the airframe would begin to experience considerable heat friction. The solution was titanium, which was light, strong, and heat-resistant; while the Soviet Union had plenty of titanium, it had no means of working it. Instead, the MiG-25 would be mostly made of nickel steel, which was strong and heat-resistant, but heavy. As a result, while the MiG-25 would have few peers in raw speed, it could not maneuver. This was not seen as a problem in an aircraft designed for straight-line interception of B-70s. It came as a surprise when the XB-70 was cancelled by the Americans, but the MiG-25 remained in development: it would be an improvement over the much slower and less advanced Su-9 and Tu-128 interceptors currently in use, and might prove capable of intercepting the SR-71. Certainly the V-VS could use a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft as well.
The powerful radar of the Foxbat was also noticed by the West as well, and it was equally surprising when Belenko’s aircraft was examined: unlike Western radars, which used solid-state technology, the MiG-25’s used outdated vacuum tubes. This, however, had been done deliberately by Mikoyan-Gurevich. Vaccum tubes were less expensive to produce, more tolerant of heat and cold, and easy to replace by unskilled mechanics. They also produced enormous power, capable of burning through ECM jamming: the Soviets correctly anticipated that any attack on the Soviet Union by the USAF’s B-52s would be preceded by heavy jamming; during Operation Linebacker II, North Vietnam’s MiG-21 radars had been blinded by B-52 defensive suites. The MiG-25’s sole armament was its four missiles—no gun was mounted as it was not figured to be needed at high speeds.
The MiG-25R reconnaissance version entered service in 1969, and this further impressed the West by being invulnerable to interception in flights over Iran and Israel in the early 1970s; neither air forces’ F-4s could hope to attack it, and one Soviet-flown Egyptian MiG-25R was tracked over Israel at Mach 3.2. What was not known was that the pilot had destroyed both engines in the process and barely returned to base. The MiG-25P interceptor entered service in 1971. The Soviets noticed the West’s panic over the MiG-25 and enthusiastically fed it, promoting the Foxbat as being far more capable than it really was; this came as a surprise to Belenko and other MiG-25 pilots, who regarded their machines as difficult to fly, poorly maintained “lead sleds.”
Belenko’s defection did not end Foxbat production; in fact, PVO-Strany accelerated production of improved versions. The MiG-25PD, which entered service in 1978, used the same solid-state radar of the MiG-23, with an infrared backup. Production also continued on the reconnaissance versions, namely the MiG-25RBS with side-looking radar. Surprisingly, the MiG-25BM was developed as a “Wild Weasel” SEAD aircraft in 1988, though it was never used operationally. MiG-25RBS aircraft became the backbone of Soviet reconnaissance units, and were exported as well along with their interceptor brethren.
Exporting the Foxbat to Syria and Iraq brought the MiG-25 into combat with the aircraft designed to stop it for the first time: the F-14 and F-15. Iranian F-14s shot down as many as twenty MiG-25s during the Iran-Iraq War, while Israeli F-15s accounted for four Syrians and American F-15s two Iraqis in 1982 and 1991 respectively; a third was claimed by a USAF F-16 in 1992, the first ever kill with an AIM-120 AMRAAM. However, of Iraqi aircraft, the MiG-25 may have been the most successful: an Iraqi Foxbat pilot may have scored eight kills over Iranian F-4s and F-14s during the Iran-Iraq War, while LCDR Scott Speicher was shot down and killed by a MiG-25 on the first night of Operation Desert Storm, the only Coalition aircraft lost in air-to-air combat.
The age and difficulty maintaining the MiG-25 led to its eventual retirement, though MiG-25RBS are still found in surprising numbers in Russian service, while Algeria maintains a large Foxbat fleet. India also used Foxbats until they were retired in 2006. In Russian service, the interceptor MiG-25s were replaced by the far superior two-seat MiG-31 Foxhound beginning in 1993. 1190 Foxbats were produced, and a few can be found in museums around the world.
This aircraft, Bort 31, was assigned to the 513th Fighter Regiment at Chuguyevka in eastern Siberia, and it was the Foxbat Viktor Belenko flew to Hakodate, Japan, where he defected on 6 September 1976. It was later disassembled and returned to the Soviet Union. It carries the standard early PVO-Strany scheme of overall light blue; later Foxbats were painted overall light gray or left bare metal. It carries as armament four R-40 (AA-6 Acrid) missiles—two radar guided and two heat-seeking.
Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25PD Foxbat
In 1967, the United States learned of the existence of the Ye-155, an experimental Soviet fighter that had reached speeds of nearly Mach 3 and altitudes of 115,000 feet. Intelligence on the aircraft indicated a heavy fighter with superb maneuverability, excellent radar, and speed unmatched by anything in the Western inventory. In response, the US Navy accelerated the program that would lead to the F-14 Tomcat, while the USAF began the FSX study that would become the F-15 Eagle. Even this was feared would not be enough against the production Ye-155, what was known as the MiG-25 and given the reporting name of Foxbat. It was not until September 1976, when a MiG-25 pilot, Viktor Belenko, defected to Japan with his aircraft that the West learned the truth: the MiG-25 was not a super-plane at all.
In reality, the MiG-25 itself was designed in the state of near-panic that characterized the F-15’s development. Soviet intelligence had learned of the development of the SR-71 by the United States, which could fly at speeds and altitude that made it untouchable by Soviet defenses—which were at the time just able to stop U-2 overflights. To make matters worse, the Americans were developing a bomber, the XB-70 Valkyrie, with nearly the same speed and altitude capability of the SR-71, except this aircraft would be carrying nuclear weapons. The Soviet air defense network (PVO-Strany) needed a fighter to stop the XB-70, and fast.
Mikoyan-Gurevich had already been working on designs to counter the U-2, and were experimenting with various wing and engine configurations, as high altitude, speed, and twin engines were requirements. Ironically, Mikoyan-Gurevich might have found their best inspiration in an American design, the A-5 Vigilante carrier-based nuclear bomber, which was a sleek two-engined design optimized for high speed. Using high-mounted wings for lift and building the aircraft around its two gigantic Tumansky R-15 turbojets, the most powerful the Soviet Union could produce, the MiG-25 began to take shape.
The biggest obstacle was not engine power, however, but what those engines could do: the MiG-25 would easily be able to get over Mach 2.5, at which time the airframe would begin to experience considerable heat friction. The solution was titanium, which was light, strong, and heat-resistant; while the Soviet Union had plenty of titanium, it had no means of working it. Instead, the MiG-25 would be mostly made of nickel steel, which was strong and heat-resistant, but heavy. As a result, while the MiG-25 would have few peers in raw speed, it could not maneuver. This was not seen as a problem in an aircraft designed for straight-line interception of B-70s. It came as a surprise when the XB-70 was cancelled by the Americans, but the MiG-25 remained in development: it would be an improvement over the much slower and less advanced Su-9 and Tu-128 interceptors currently in use, and might prove capable of intercepting the SR-71. Certainly the V-VS could use a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft as well.
The powerful radar of the Foxbat was also noticed by the West as well, and it was equally surprising when Belenko’s aircraft was examined: unlike Western radars, which used solid-state technology, the MiG-25’s used outdated vacuum tubes. This, however, had been done deliberately by Mikoyan-Gurevich. Vaccum tubes were less expensive to produce, more tolerant of heat and cold, and easy to replace by unskilled mechanics. They also produced enormous power, capable of burning through ECM jamming: the Soviets correctly anticipated that any attack on the Soviet Union by the USAF’s B-52s would be preceded by heavy jamming; during Operation Linebacker II, North Vietnam’s MiG-21 radars had been blinded by B-52 defensive suites. The MiG-25’s sole armament was its four missiles—no gun was mounted as it was not figured to be needed at high speeds.
The MiG-25R reconnaissance version entered service in 1969, and this further impressed the West by being invulnerable to interception in flights over Iran and Israel in the early 1970s; neither air forces’ F-4s could hope to attack it, and one Soviet-flown Egyptian MiG-25R was tracked over Israel at Mach 3.2. What was not known was that the pilot had destroyed both engines in the process and barely returned to base. The MiG-25P interceptor entered service in 1971. The Soviets noticed the West’s panic over the MiG-25 and enthusiastically fed it, promoting the Foxbat as being far more capable than it really was; this came as a surprise to Belenko and other MiG-25 pilots, who regarded their machines as difficult to fly, poorly maintained “lead sleds.”
Belenko’s defection did not end Foxbat production; in fact, PVO-Strany accelerated production of improved versions. The MiG-25PD, which entered service in 1978, used the same solid-state radar of the MiG-23, with an infrared backup. Production also continued on the reconnaissance versions, namely the MiG-25RBS with side-looking radar. Surprisingly, the MiG-25BM was developed as a “Wild Weasel” SEAD aircraft in 1988, though it was never used operationally. MiG-25RBS aircraft became the backbone of Soviet reconnaissance units, and were exported as well along with their interceptor brethren.
Exporting the Foxbat to Syria and Iraq brought the MiG-25 into combat with the aircraft designed to stop it for the first time: the F-14 and F-15. Iranian F-14s shot down as many as twenty MiG-25s during the Iran-Iraq War, while Israeli F-15s accounted for four Syrians and American F-15s two Iraqis in 1982 and 1991 respectively; a third was claimed by a USAF F-16 in 1992, the first ever kill with an AIM-120 AMRAAM. However, of Iraqi aircraft, the MiG-25 may have been the most successful: an Iraqi Foxbat pilot may have scored eight kills over Iranian F-4s and F-14s during the Iran-Iraq War, while LCDR Scott Speicher was shot down and killed by a MiG-25 on the first night of Operation Desert Storm, the only Coalition aircraft lost in air-to-air combat.
The age and difficulty maintaining the MiG-25 led to its eventual retirement, though MiG-25RBS are still found in surprising numbers in Russian service, while Algeria maintains a large Foxbat fleet. India also used Foxbats until they were retired in 2006. In Russian service, the interceptor MiG-25s were replaced by the far superior two-seat MiG-31 Foxhound beginning in 1993. 1190 Foxbats were produced, and a few can be found in museums around the world.
This aircraft, Bort 31, was assigned to the 513th Fighter Regiment at Chuguyevka in eastern Siberia, and it was the Foxbat Viktor Belenko flew to Hakodate, Japan, where he defected on 6 September 1976. It was later disassembled and returned to the Soviet Union. It carries the standard early PVO-Strany scheme of overall light blue; later Foxbats were painted overall light gray or left bare metal. It carries as armament four R-40 (AA-6 Acrid) missiles—two radar guided and two heat-seeking.