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I composed this image while on a driving and hiking trip through Iceland. It is of a small fishing village in Iceland's Eastern Fjord region. I think it's the village of Seyoisfjorour, but I'm not certain. Iceland offers endless visual feasts to its visitors, sights like this being just one example. For those interested, additional information on Iceland's fishing industry is provided below.
From the settlement of Iceland in the late 9th century until the 20th century, Iceland‘s economy rested on farming and fisheries. Since the 14th Century, fish products have been Iceland‘s most important export.
In the last decades of the 19th century, fishing in Iceland utilized open rowing boats that only could sail a few miles from the shoreline. The fishing season was from late January until early May, thus Iceland’s southern and western parts became the predominant fishing regions.
At the end of the 19th Century, people started to move from the country to the seaside, establishing small villages concurrent when the fisheries became the main industry, and fishermen became a specialized profession.
The introduction of motorized vessels at the beginning of the 20th century revolutionized Icelandic fisheries. As the fishing capacity grew, so did the total catch. Iceland acquired a modern fishing fleet in only two decades, technically second to none in Northern Europe.
The overall catch for demersal species, which are those species that live on or near the bottom of lakes or sea, has experienced significant progression and increased value in the catch over the last century. In 1905 there was a catch of 62,500 tons; 80,400 tons in 1920; and 216,700 tons in 1930. In 2021 the overall catch amounted to 1,158,000 tons, and of that, 473,000 tons was the demersal species.
The export value of marine products in 2021 was a total of ISK 296 billion (ISK refers to the Icelandic Kronur), or 38.8% of the total export. The seafood industry contributes 11% to the GDP directly and 25% if an account is taken of the indirect effects of the ocean catch.
It is interesting to note that approximately 5% of Iceland’s workforce is employed directly in the fishing industry.
A breakthrough in herring fisheries came in the early 20th century with the more effective purse-seine and drift nets. A seine is a large fishing net that hangs vertically in the water, having floats at the upper edge and sinkers at the lower. A purse-seine is a much larger seine used by two boats, whereby the net is drawn around a school of fish and then closed at the bottom by means of a line passing through rings that are attached along the lower edge of the net. As a result, distant “herring towns” and villages rose to prominence. Siglufjörður in North Iceland presents a prime example of how herring fisheries affected urban development in Iceland.
Herring fisheries experienced less activity following the Second World War but hit new heights in the early 1960s. Successful developments in the herring industry, with heavy investments in fishing and processing capacity, as well as improved infrastructure, triggered a dramatic collapse of the herring stock in 1968. This imposed serious economic consequences for Iceland. These events provided vital lessons learned when Iceland devised their new fishery management system.
After the herring crash, the herring fleet in the 1970s turned to developing capelin, or caplin, a small forage fish of the smelt family. With a highly focused research and development programme, and targeted marketing, even more capelin catch was processed for human consumption. The fish was whole frozen with roe-filled females, as well as separated roes. These were produced for the Japanese market for making various delicacies, including capelin roe caviar.
Iceland’s fishing boundaries changed over the years. In 1952 Iceland unilaterally claimed a four-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and then further extended it to 12 nautical miles in 1958. The Icelandic government announced in early 1972 its decision to further extend the EEZ to 50 nautical miles. On 15 October 1975 the Icelandic government announced its decision to extend the EEZ to 200 nautical miles.
It could be termed that ‘all hell broke loose’ when this announcement occurred. It was primarily Britain that sternly refused to acknowledge the 200 nautical mile limit and called upon her navy to protect British fishing vessels while trawling in Icelandic waters. The dispute reached international levels before a resolution was achieved in Oslo, Norway in May 1976. The 200 nautical mile limit became internationally adopted during the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The fishing industry remains one of the main pillars of the Icelandic economy. Marine products continue as a leading export item. Through sustainable harvest and protection of the marine ecosystem, Iceland has created one of the world's most modern and competitive seafood industries. The extensive research of stocks and managing catch sizes with the setting of quotas has ensured a responsible fishing industry exists and respects the sustainability of the ocean’s natural resources.
PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 21, 2020) Multinational navy ships and a submarine steam in formation during a group sail off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020, August 21. "Like-minded nations come together in RIMPAC in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific where all nations enjoy unfettered access to the seas and airways in accordance with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) upon which all nations’ economies depend,” said Adm. John C. Aquilino, Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet. Ten nations, 22 ships, 1 submarine, and more than 5,300 personnel are participating in Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) from August 17 to 31 at sea in the waters surrounding Hawaii. RIMPAC is a biennial exercise designed to foster and sustain cooperative relationships, critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The exercise is a unique training platform designed to enhance interoperability and strategic maritime partnerships. RIMPAC 2020 is the 27th exercise in the series that began in 1971. (Royal Canadian Navy photo by MS Dan Bard)
Kamera: Olympus Pen D3
Linse: F.Zuiko f1.7 / 32mm
Film: Kodak 5222 @ ISO 400
Kjemi: Fomadon Excel (stock / 25 min. @ 20°C)
Wikipedia: Gaza Genocide
- London, UK, 28 July 2025 — The Hind Rajab Foundation has today filed a formal criminal complaint with the UK Metropolitan Police War Crimes Unit regarding the Israeli military assault on the British-flagged humanitarian vessel Handala in international waters on the night of 26–27 July 2025
The complaint, lodged under the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 and the International Criminal Court Act 2001, urges UK authorities to open an immediate investigation into grave breaches of international law and war crimes committed by Israeli forces.
The assault was carried out by the Shayetet 13 naval commando unit, under the command structure of the Israeli Navy, whose Commander-in-Chief is Vice Admiral David Saar Salama (b. 1969). The complaint also targets officials within the Israeli military and government who may have authorized, planned, or facilitated the operation. The Hind Rajab Foundation is calling for these individuals to be identified, investigated, and—where evidence permits—prosecuted or arrested under UK jurisdiction.
At the time of the raid, the Handala was sailing approximately 49 nautical miles off the coast of Gaza, carrying 21 unarmed civilians, including:
* Chloé Fiona Ludden, a British humanitarian volunteer
* Emma Fourreau (b. 1999), Member of the European Parliament (France)
* Gabrielle Cathala (b. 1992), Member of the French National Assembly
* Jacob Berger, a Jewish-American activist
* Journalists, lawyers, and aid workers from 12 countries
All were detained without legal basis and forcibly taken to Israel.
The ship’s humanitarian cargo—baby formula, medical supplies, and food—was confiscated, and communications were cut immediately after Israeli forces boaed the vessel.
The Handala is a British-flagged vessel, and as such, constitutes an extension of UK sovereign jurisdiction. The seizure of the ship and arrest of its passengers in international waters constitutes an assault on British legal territory, a violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention. It also directly defies the binding orders of the International Court of Justice, issued in early 2024, which require the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza.
The Hind Rajab Foundation is requesting the following from UK authorities:
1. Immediate opening of a criminal investigation into the operation;
2. Identification and questioning of all 21 passengers, especially UK nationals;
3. Legal action against Vice Admiral David Saar Salama (b. 1969), Shayetet 13 commanders, and any political or military officials responsible;
4. Placement of suspects on watchlists and preparation of arrest warrants for any who may enter the UK;
5. Coordination with Interpol, the International Criminal Court, and UN mechanisms to ensure international accountability.
This case follows the pattern of previous illegal interceptions, including the recent attack on the Madleen and the 2010 Mavi Marmara raid. The Handala incident is not isolated—it is part of a systematic campaign to criminalize humanitarian aid and suppress civilian solidarity with Gaza under the guise of military enforcement.
The Hind Rajab Foundation will not relent.
We are committed to exposing and confronting every act of illegality and brutality carried out under the cloak of state power. The attack on the Handala is an attack not only on aid workers and civilians—but on international law, human dignity, and the very principle of accountability.
Justice must be done. The perpetrators must face consequences.
- Source - Hind Rajab Foundation: HRF Files Criminal Complaint in the UK Over Israeli Attack on Handala (Publ. 28 July 2025)
- NICOSIA, Cyprus, 25 July 2025 – The Hind Rajab Foundation has filed a formal criminal complaint with the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus demanding the immediate arrest of Tameer Mulla, an Arab Druze Israeli soldier currently on Cypriot soil, for his direct involvement in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts potentially amounting to genocide during Israel’s onslaught in the Gaza Strip between 2023 and 2025.
Tameer Mulla served in the 101st Paratroopers Battalion of the 35th Paratroopers Brigade of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), a frontline unit that played a central role in the destruction of Palestinian cities, hospitals, and refugee camps. Mulla entered Cyprus on 18 July 2025 and is believed to still be in the country. The complaint includes overwhelming documentation of Mulla’s personal participation in grave violations of international law. These include:
1. Deliberate Attacks on Civilian InfrastructureArticle 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Rome Statute.
2. Systematic Forced Evacuation of Protected Persons
On 26 February 2024, Mulla personally oversaw and documented the forced evacuation of civilians from Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis. The hospital, besieged for weeks, housed over 10,000 displaced persons, 450 patients, and 300 medical staff.
Under threat of snipers, shelling, and a complete communications blackout, civilians—including children, the elderly, and wounded patients—were removed in a coercive and humiliating operation. This constitutes the war crime of unlawful transfer of protected persons under Article 8(2)(a)(vii) of the Rome Statute.
3. Attacks on Educational Institutions
Mulla was present at and documented the destruction of the Jabalia Elementary Boys School in May 2024. Footage shows the school facility in ruins, likely destroyed during or immediately after an IDF operation in the area. His presence at the scene and glorification of the attack raises strong grounds to prosecute for attacks on buildings dedicated to education, in violation of Article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute.
4. Glorification and Incitement
Mulla posted numerous videos, stories, and reels mocking the destruction of Palestinian civilian infrastructure. These include:
* Sarcastic videos inside looted or destroyed homes, barbershops, and electronics stores;
* A montage likening his role in Gaza to a video game, including footage of live fire and explosives;
* A Netflix-style graphic listing the Palestinian cities he helped destroy: Al-Zeitoun, Gaza City, Rimal, Shuja’iyya, Khan Yunis, Deir al-Balah, Jabalia.
This public glorification of war crimes and devastation reflects clear intent, ideological motivation, and a lack of remorse, strengthening the case for prosecution under both Cypriot and international law.
Cyprus is bound under universal jurisdiction, its own Penal Code, and international treaties to prosecute individuals on its territory accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes—even when committed abroad.
The Hind Rajab Foundation demands that the Republic of Cyprus act immediately to:
* Arrest Tameer Mulla without delay;
* Prevent his departure from the country;
* Initiate a full criminal investigation and prosecution;
* Cooperate with international bodies to ensure justice is served.
The people of Gaza are not invisible. Those who destroy hospitals, homes, and lives with impunity must be held to account.
- Source - Hind Rajab Foundation: Hind Rajab Foundation Files War Crimes Complaint in Cyprus Against IDF Paratrooper (Publ. 25 July 2025)
Boom, Belgium, 21 July 2025 — In what may become a turning point in the global pursuit of accountability, Belgian federal police have arrested and interrogated two Israeli soldiers credibly accused of war crimes in Gaza. The action came in response to an urgent legal complaint filed by the Hind Rajab Foundation and the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) earlier this week.
The suspects were identified and arrested with a clear show of force at the Tomorrowland festival in Boom. After being taken into custody, they were formally interrogated and released. The Belgian Federal Prosecutor’s Office has confirmed that a criminal investigation is now underway.
This development is a significant step forward. It signals that Belgium has recognized its jurisdiction under international law and is treating the allegations with the seriousness they deserve. At a time when far too many governments remain silent, this action sends a clear message: credible evidence of international crimes must be met with legal response — not political indifference.
We do not claim that justice has been served — not yet. But we believe something important has begun. For the first time in Europe, Israeli suspects linked to crimes in Gaza have been subjected to formal arrest and questioning. This would not have been possible without the strength of the law and the will to apply it.
To the victims and survivors in Gaza: we see you, we hear you, and we carry your demands for justice forward.
To those who believed impunity was permanent: this moment shows that it is not.
And to states watching around the world: universal jurisdiction is not just a principle — it is an obligation.
The Hind Rajab Foundation and GLAN welcome this breakthrough with determination and humility. We will continue to support the ongoing proceedings and call on Belgian authorities to pursue the investigation fully and independently.
Justice must not stop here — and we are committed to seeing it through.
- Source - Hind Rajab Foundation: BREAKTHROUGH: Belgian Authorities Arrest and Interrogate Israeli War Crimes Suspects Following Complaint by Hind Rajab Foundation and GLAN (Publ. 21 July 2025)
- Brussels, Boom, 19 July 2025 - Two individuals responsible for grave international crimes—including war crimes and genocide committed in the Gaza Strip—are currently on Belgian soil, attending the Tomorrowland music festival in Boom. The Hind Rajab Foundation, in association with GLAN, has submitted urgent legal complaints to the Federal Prosecutor, calling for their immediate arrest and prosecution under Belgium’s universal jurisdiction laws.
These individuals are not fringe actors or incidental participants. They are directly implicated in some of the most egregious crimes committed during Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Gaza, including:
* Indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas, homes, and hospitals;
* The use of torture and human shields;
* Mass arbitrary detention and forced displacement of civilians;
* And the deliberate infliction of conditions calculated to destroy the Palestinian population, consistent with genocide under Article 6 of the Rome Statute and the Genocide Convention.
Givati Brigade Flag Waved
A group of young Israeli men were yesterday seen at Tomorrowland while waving the flag of the Israeli Givati Brigade — a unit extensively documented for its role in the systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure in Gaza and for carrying out mass atrocities against the Palestinian population.
The Givati flag, publicly displayed in the heart of Belgium, is not just a military symbol. It has become, for millions, a symbol of impunity, destruction, and ethnic cleansing. Its appearance in Boom raises urgent political questions: Why are those involved in grave international crimes able to walk freely, celebrate in public, and glorify their actions without consequence?
The situation is not isolated. Just days ago, in Dirkputstraat in Boom, a Palestinian flag was forcibly torn down from a private residence by a group of young Israeli men of military age, in an act the resident described as deeply intimidating. The symbolism is stark: while war crimes suspects display their military insignia freely, the symbols of their victims are attacked.
This convergence—of impunity, intimidation, and silence—demands a clear response from Belgian society and its legal institutions.
A Legal Obligation, Not a Political Option
Belgium is bound by international law to investigate and prosecute individuals suspected of genocide and war crimes when they are present on its territory. These obligations arise from:
* The Genocide Convention (1948),
* The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ratified by Belgium in 2000),
* And the Belgian Penal Code, which incorporates universal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
A State Party is legally required to prosecute or extradite genocide suspects the moment they are found on its soil—regardless of nationality or rank.
The evidence presented by the Hind Rajab Foundation is clear, credible, and legally sound. The individuals currently in Belgium are accused of acts that:
* Destroyed entire neighborhoods in Gaza under the guise of “security”;
* And deliberately targeted Gaza’s capacity to survive—its water systems, agriculture, housing, and medical infrastructure.
«These actions were not incidental. They were executed with intent—to destroy a people, to erase a future» said HRF's Chairman Dyab Abou Jahjah (b. 1971). «If Belgium allows these individuals to leave unchallenged, it will be complicit in granting impunity to the perpetrators of genocide» he added.
Belgium Must Act Now
Tomorrowland, a global stage of culture and celebration, must not become an unwitting sanctuary for war criminals. Belgium has long prided itself on supporting international justice. That legacy is on the line.
We therefore urge:
* The immediate arrest of the individuals named in the complaints;
* The opening of formal investigations and prosecutions;
* And measures to prevent any departure from Belgian territory, including the seizure of travel documents and devices.
There is still time to act. But that time is quickly running out.
- Source - Hind Rajab Foundation: War Criminals Walk Free at Tomorrowland: HRF Files Urgent Complaints (Publ. 19 July 2025)
- Lisbon / Brussels, 14 July 2025 - The Hind Rajab Foundation has filed a formal legal complaint in Portugal against Israeli sniper Dani Adonya Adega for his role in the Israeli genocidal campaign in Gaza, which involved grave violations of international law, including targeted killings of civilians during a ceasefire and the appropriation of civilian property for military use.
The complaint was submitted by Portuguese human rights lawyer Carmo Afonso, and is based on extensive documentation gathered by the Foundation’s legal and investigative teams over the past months. The Hind Rajab Foundation has verified Adega’s presence in Lisbon, Portugal, where he was photographed and geolocated in July 2025.
Adega, a sniper affiliated with the 8114th Battalion of the Israeli army, served in Gaza under the 252nd Division, commanded by Brigadier General Yehuda Vach. This division has been widely condemned for establishing the Netzarim Corridor "kill zone», a deadly passage through central Gaza where civilians—many of them children—were systematically shot on sight by sniper teams and armored patrols.
Adega himself publicly boasted about lethal sniper activity, posting an image on social media with the caption:
“4 rounds, 0 misses 🎯🔥”
The post was made during a declared ceasefire in early 2025, at a time when Palestinian armed groups had suspended operations. During that ceasefire alone, over 170 Palestinian civilians were killed, with sniper fire accounting for many of the documented deaths. Adega’s social media posts show him operating from inside civilian buildings in Gaza, smiling and posing in uniform while armed with a sniper rifle, often in destroyed residential areas.
«This is not only a matter of justice for Gaza—this is a test for Portugal,» said a spokesperson for the Hind Rajab Foundation. «Adega is not hiding. He is walking freely in a European capital after boasting about sniper kills committed during a ceasefire. Portugal must act.»
Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, Portugal has the legal authority—and obligation—to detain suspected war criminals found on its territory. The Hind Rajab Foundation is calling on Portuguese authorities to immediately arrest Dani Adonya Adega and initiate criminal proceedings in line with international law.
This complaint is part of the Foundation’s broader campaign to hold Israeli military personnel accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the 2023–2025 Gaza onslaught. The Hind Rajab Foundation reiterates its unshakable commitment to pursuing all individuals involved in war crimes against the Palestinian people—wherever they may be, and regardless of rank or nationality.
This case is not an isolated one. Our legal pipeline is full, with dozens of ongoing investigations and complaints being prepared for submission across multiple jurisdictions.
Impunity will no longer be the norm. Justice is coming.
- Source - Hind Rajab Foundation - No Safe Haven for War Criminals: HRF Pursues Israeli Sniper Dani Adega in Portugal (Publ. 14 July 2025)
- Brussels, 19 June 2025 - The Hind Rajab Foundation (HRF) has today filed an urgent and damning complaint with the European Investment Bank’s Complaints Mechanism (EIB‑CM), demanding an immediate end to the Bank’s blatant complicity in Israel’s crimes against the Palestinian people.
Despite the binding International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling of 19 July 2024, which orders all States and international organisations to “prevent trade or investment relations that assist in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel,” the EIB continues to funnel over €1 billion in European public funds to Israeli companies blacklisted by the United Nations for their direct role in illegal settlement expansion and apartheid policies.
This betrayal occurs as EU leaders meet today and tomorrow to review the Association Agreement with Israel — the main treaty governing the EU’s political and economic ties with a state that stands accused of grave breaches of international law, including genocide, apartheid and ethnic cleansing.
The EIB is financing Israel’s land theft, ethnic cleansing, and apartheid — with European taxpayers’ money,” said Dyab Abou Jahjah (b. 1971), The Foundation's Chairman. “This is not oversight, this is complicity. As Europe claims to champion human rights, its own bank bankrolls the bulldozers and bulldozes the law.”
EIB Money, Israeli Crimes
The Hind Rajab Foundation’s complaint exposes how four flagship EIB operations enable blacklisted actors to build and sustain the settlements that shred Palestinian lives and land:
* €500 million channeled through Bank Leumi, notorious for underwriting settlement housing, industrial zones, and local councils in stolen Palestinian territory.
* €250 million for the Tel Aviv Light Rail Green Line, awarded to Electra, which expands settler connectivity and cements de facto annexation.
* Further “green transition” and “financial inclusion” facilities worth €250 million and €96 million, again handed to Bank Leumi, a bank that signs decades-long pledge agreements with illegal settlement municipalities.
These funds directly prop up a regime of forced evictions, land grabs, and settler violence. According to the UN, 2025 has seen a surge in attacks and mass displacement — yet the EIB continues to supply the financial oxygen that sustains the apartheid system.
A Moment of Reckoning for the EU
This complaint lands at a critical moment: the EU is right now reviewing its Association Agreement with Israel, which binds the relationship to respect for human rights and international law. The Hind Rajab Foundation warns that the EU’s credibility is at stake: it cannot pretend to uphold international law while its own financial arm empowers Israel’s colonization machine.
“Either Europe enforces the ICJ ruling and halts this complicity, or it admits its treaties and human rights talk are worthless when it comes to Palestinian lives,” said Abou Jahjah.
Demands
The Hind Rajab Foundation demands:
1. Immediate suspension of all EIB funding to UN-blacklisted Israeli companies and settlement-related projects.
2. A full independent compliance review, not the EIB’s cosmetic box-ticking, but a real audit with public disclosure.
3. EU leaders, in their Association Agreement review this week, must condition any further cooperation on verifiable compliance with international law, and sanction financial actors who fuel Israel’s illegal settlements. This must logically lead to a direct halt of all the effects of the association agreement.
No More Excuses — Stop Funding Apartheid Now
It is no longer acceptable for European leaders to preach about human rights while signing blank cheques for banks and corporations that profit from stolen land and shattered lives.
Every euro that flows through the EIB into Israel’s occupation machine is a betrayal of the Palestinian people and a stain on Europe’s conscience. There is only one honest choice: Stop the money, end the complicity, and stand on the right side of history.
- Source - Hind Rajab Foundation: Hind Rajab Foundation Files Complaint At The European Investment Bank for Complicity in Israel’s War Crimes — As EU Reviews Association Agreement with Israel (Publ. 19 June 2025)
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strait_of_Dover
The Strait of Dover or Dover Strait, historically known as the Dover Narrows (French: pas de Calais [pɑ d(ə)‿kalɛ], "Strait of Calais"; Dutch: Nauw van Kales [nʌu̯ vɑn kaːˈlɛː] or Straat van Dover), is the strait at the narrowest part of the English Channel, marking the boundary between the Channel and North Sea, separating Great Britain from continental Europe. The shortest distance across the strait, 33.3 kilometres (20.7 miles; 18.0 nautical miles), is from the South Foreland, northeast of Dover in the English county of Kent, to Cap Gris Nez, a cape near to Calais in the French département of Pas-de-Calais. Between these points lies the most popular route for cross-channel swimmers.[1] The entire strait is within the territorial waters of France and the United Kingdom, but a right of transit passage under the UNCLOS exists allowing unrestricted shipping.[2][3][4]
On a clear day, it is possible to see the opposite coastline of England from France and vice versa with the naked eye, with the most famous and obvious sight being the white cliffs of Dover from the French coastline and shoreline buildings on both coastlines, as well as lights on either coastline at night, as in Matthew Arnold's poem "Dover Beach".
Shipping traffic
Most maritime traffic between the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea and Baltic Sea passes through the Strait of Dover, rather than taking the longer and more dangerous route around the north of Scotland. The strait is the busiest international seaway in the world, used by over 400 commercial vessels daily.[3] This has made traffic safety a critical issue, with HM Coastguard and the Maritime Gendarmerie maintaining a 24-hour watch over the strait and enforcing a strict regime of shipping lanes.[5]
In addition to the intensive east–west traffic, the strait is crossed from north to south by ferries linking Dover to Calais and Dunkirk.[3] Until 1994 these provided the only route across it for land transport. The Channel Tunnel now provides an alternative route, crossing beneath the strait at an average depth of 45 m (148 ft) below the seabed.
The town of Dover gives its name to one of the sea areas of the British Shipping Forecast.
Geological formation
Map showing the hypothetical extent of Doggerland (c. 10,000 BCE), which provided a land bridge between Great Britain and continental Europe
The strait is believed to have been created by the erosion of a land bridge that linked the Weald in Great Britain to the Boulonnais in the Pas de Calais. The predominant geology on both the British and French sides and on the seafloor is chalk. Although somewhat resistant to erosion, erosion of both coasts has created the famous white cliffs of Dover in the UK and the Cap Blanc Nez in France. The Channel Tunnel was bored through solid chalk.
The Rhine (as the Urstrom) flowed northwards into the North Sea as the sea level fell during the start of the first of the Pleistocene Ice Ages. The ice created a dam from Scandinavia to Scotland, and the Rhine, combined with the Thames and drainage from much of north Europe, created a vast lake behind the dam, which eventually spilled over the Weald into the English Channel. This overflow channel became the Strait of Dover about 425,000 years ago. A narrow deep channel along the middle of the strait was the bed of the Rhine in the last Ice Age. A geological deposit in East Anglia marks the old preglacial northward course of the Rhine.
A 2007 study[6][7] concluded the English Channel was formed by erosion caused by two major floods. The first was about 425,000 years ago, when an ice-dammed lake in the southern North Sea overflowed and broke the Weald-Artois chalk range in a catastrophic erosion and flood event. Afterwards, the Thames and Scheldt flowed through the gap into the English Channel, but the Meuse and Rhine still flowed northwards. In a second flood about 225,000 years ago the Meuse and Rhine were ice-dammed into a lake that broke catastrophically through a high weak barrier (perhaps chalk, or an end-moraine left by the ice sheet). Both floods cut massive flood channels in the dry bed of the English Channel, somewhat like the Channeled Scablands or the Wabash River in the USA. A further update in 2017, attributed a series of previously described underwater holes in the Channel floor -"100m deep" and in places "several kilometres in diameter" to lake water plunging over a rock ridge causing isolated depressions or plunge pools.[8] The melting ice and rising sea levels submerged Doggerland, the area linking Britain to France 6,500–6,200 BCE.
The Lobourg strait, a major feature of the strait's seafloor, runs its 6 km (4 mi) wide slash on a NNE–SSW axis. Nearer to the French coast than to the English coast, it runs along the Varne sandbank where it plunges to 68 m (223 ft) at its deepest, and along the latter's south-east neighbour the Ridge bank (French name "Colbart"[9]) with a maximum depth of 62 m (203 ft).[10]
Marine wildlife
The submarine depth of the strait varies between 68 m (223 ft) at the Lobourg strait and 20 m (66 ft) at the highest banks. It presents a succession of rocky areas relatively deserted by ships wanting to spare their nets, and of sandy flats and sub-aqueous dunes. The strong currents of the Channel are slowed down around the rocky areas of the strait, with formation of countercurrents and calmer zones where many species can find shelter.[11] In these calmer zones, the water is clearer than in the rest of the strait; thus algae can grow despite the 30 m (98 ft) average depth and help increase diversity in the local species – some of which are endemic to the strait. Moreover, this is a transition zone for the species of the Atlantic Ocean and those of the southern part of the North Sea.
This mix of various environments promotes a wide variety of wildlife.[12]
The Ridens de Boulogne, a 10–20 m (33–66 ft) deep[13] rocky high ground partially covered with sand located 15 nmi (28 km; 17 mi) to the west of Boulogne, boasts the highest production of maerl in the strait.[13]
A 682 km2 (263 sq mi) area of the strait is classified as a Natura 2000 protection zone listed under the name Ridens et dunes hydrauliques du Pas de Calais (Ridens and sub-aqueous dunes of the Dover Strait). This area includes the sub-aqueous dunes of Varne, Colbart, Vergoyer and Bassurelle, the Ridens de Boulogne, and the Lobourg channel which provides calmer and clearer waters due to its depth reaching 68 m (223 ft).[14]
Unusual crossings
Many crossings other than in conventional vessels have been attempted, including by pedalo, jetpack, bathtub, amphibious vehicle and more commonly by swimming. French law bans many of these while English law does not, so most such crossings originate in England.[citation needed]
Ice
In the late 17th century during the "Little Ice Age" there are reports of severe winter ice in the Strait of Dover, including a case in 1684 of only a league of open water remaining between Dover and Calais.[15]; see [1] for another report of severe ice in the English Channel.
Kamera: Olympus Pen D3
Linse: F.Zuiko f1.7 / 32mm
Film: Kodak 5222 @ ISO 400
Kjemi: Fomadon Excel (stock / 25 min. @ 20°C)
Wikipedia: Gaza Genocide
Brussels, 28 June 2025 - On 8 February 2025, the Hind Rajab Foundation submitted a formal complaint to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) against Brigadier General Yehuda Vach. Today, the Foundation has formally updated the case with new evidence and legal analysis, transmitting a detailed annex to the ICC and expanding its requests for prosecution.
Yehuda Vach is not merely another Israeli military officer. He is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s most loyal and lethal asset in Gaza—the man entrusted to carry out the will of a government that has embraced openly genocidal policies against the Palestinian people.
The initial filing of the HRF focused on Vach’s command responsibility in the establishment and enforcement of an unlawful “kill zone” in the Netzarim Corridor, Gaza. This zone was characterized by the deliberate targeting of civilians—particularly children—by sniper teams and mobile armored patrols operating with impunity under Vach’s orders.
The complaint was based on powers of attorney obtained from the families of two Palestinian children who were summarily executed by Vach’s troops. The evidence included geolocated video footage, survivor testimonies, intercepted communications, and corroborated patterns of conduct by the division under his control.
Since the submission of this complaint, the Foundation has gathered substantial new evidence establishing Brigadier General Vach’s direct and indirect responsibility for a series of additional atrocities, including:
* The demolition of the Turkish–Palestinian Friendship Hospital on 21 March 2025, constituting a serious violation of Article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute.
* The Rafah paramedic massacre on 23 March 2025, during which IDF forces under Vach’s command executed 15 humanitarian personnel, including members of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, United Nations staff, and civil defense medics—clear violations of the protections afforded under international law to humanitarian actors.
* The systematic killing of civilians at humanitarian aid distribution points in May and June 2025, where hundreds of Palestinians were fatally shot while queuing for food. Testimonies from IDF personnel and open-source video documentation demonstrate that these attacks were not the result of battlefield confusion, but the product of operational orders to treat civilians in these zones as combatants.
Together, these actions form a consistent pattern of conduct, substantiating Brig. Gen. Vach’s role as a central operational architect of the Gaza campaign’s most serious violations of the laws of war. His directives—widely quoted among troops as asserting that “there are no innocents in Gaza”—reflect not merely criminal dereliction but active participation in a policy of collective punishment and extermination.
It must also be emphasized that Brig. Gen. Vach has operated with the full political protection of Israel’s civilian leadership. His actions align directly with the strategic objectives and rhetoric of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (b. 1949), and his field role in implementing such policy renders him Netanyahu’s primary enforcer of state criminality in Gaza.
And he is not acting alone. His brothers, Colonel Golan Vach and Captain Elishav Vach, are also deeply implicated in war crimes and abuses. The three brothers form a militarized faction operating with political protection from Netanyahu’s office. Together, they have built what human rights observers now call Israel’s “first family of genocide.”
Legal Implications and Call to Action
In light of the cumulative and expanding body of evidence, the Hind Rajab Foundation today submitted an updated annex to its complaint and formally called on the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC to:
1. Initiate the necessary procedures for the issuance of arrest warrants against Brigadier General Yehuda Vach, Colonel Golan Vach, and Captain Elishav Vach, in accordance with Articles 58 and 25 of the Rome Statute.
2. Recognize these individuals as central figures in the field implementation of a broader state-sponsored policy of systematic and widespread attacks against the civilian population of Gaza, as defined under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
3. Consider their actions within the framework of genocidal intent, pursuant to Article 6 of the Rome Statute and customary international law.
Yehuda Vach is not just another war criminal—he is Benjamin Netanyahu’s executioner in Gaza.
The Hind Rajab Foundation is compiling the full criminal file of Yehuda Vach and his brothers--every name, every order, every victim. Our team is preparing further filings before national jurisdictions.
- Source - Hind Rajab Foundation: HRF Files New Elements In The Case Against Yehuda Vach: The Executioner of Gaza (Publ. 28 June 2025)
Brussels, 26 June 2025 - The Hind Rajab Foundation expresses deep concern over the confirmed presence of Colonel Moshe Tetro, former head of the Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA) for the Gaza Strip, in the EUCOM building on Rue de la Loi in Brussels, where he is currently serving as Israel’s military attaché to Belgium. Tetro is one of the architects of Gaza’s starvation and hospital assaults.
Colonel Tetro is the subject of a detailed complaint submitted by our Foundation to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). He is accused of individual criminal responsibility for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, under Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Rome Statute.
As head of the CLA, Colonel Tetro played a central role in implementing policies that:
* Systematically deprived the civilian population of Gaza of access to food, water, fuel, and medical supplies, contributing directly to a man-made famine now classified as catastrophic by multiple UN agencies;
* Facilitated and coordinated military attacks on medical facilities, including Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis and Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, in violation of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I.
These actions fall within the same factual and legal context outlined in the ICC arrest warrants against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, particularly with respect to the weaponization of starvation and attacks on protected civilian infrastructure.
Despite this, Colonel Tetro is currently enjoying diplomatic immunity as part of his official assignment in Belgium. This raises serious concerns regarding Belgium’s adherence to its obligations under international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions, and customary international law related to non-cooperation with individuals accused of core international crimes.
Moreover, this development must be viewed in conjunction with recent reports confirming that Belgium has allowed the transfer of F-35 fighter jet parts to Israel via Liège Airport, thereby facilitating Israel’s continued use of military force against the civilian population in Gaza. These actions, taken together, significantly aggravate the legal and moral responsibility of the current Belgian government, which risks complicity in the commission of international crimes.
In light of the above, the Hind Rajab Foundation reiterates its formal demands:
1. That the International Criminal Court issue an arrest warrant for Colonel Moshe Tetro, in line with its current jurisprudence and mandate under the Rome Statute;
2. That the Government of Belgium immediately revoke Colonel Tetro’s diplomatic accreditation and declare him persona non grata, pursuant to Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Failure to act decisively in this matter would not only constitute a breach of Belgium’s international obligations, but would also place the Belgian state in the position of harbouring an individual credibly accused of genocide and war crimes.
History will judge the choices made today. Continued political protection for individuals implicated in mass atrocity crimes risks permanently associating the Belgian state with one of the gravest humanitarian crises of the 21st century.
We urge Belgian authorities, European institutions, and civil society to act in accordance with international law and to uphold the principles of justice, accountability, and human dignity.
- Source - Hind Rajab Foundation: HRF Condemns Ongoing Impunity for Moshe Tetro: Urges ICC to Prosecute and Belgium to Revoke Accreditation (Publ. 26 June 2025)
Lima, Peru, 11 June 2025 - The Republic of Peru has formally assigned the genocide case filed by the HRF against an Israeli soldier to its Human Rights Prosecutor’s Office, transitioning the case from jurisdictional review to the preliminary investigative phase.
This procedural step confirms that the Peruvian Public Ministry is now examining the evidence submitted, rather than assessing whether it has the authority to proceed. In practical terms, the case has entered the early stages of criminal investigation, under the framework of Peru’s obligations under the Rome Statute and international humanitarian law.
The complaint—submitted by human rights lawyer Julio César Arbizu González on behalf of the Hind Rajab Foundation—concerns the actions of a combat engineering soldier in the Israeli Defense Forces. The individual is alleged to have taken part in the destruction of civilian neighborhoods and infrastructure in Gaza, as part of broader military operations conducted by the Combat Engineering Corps, a unit repeatedly linked to mass demolitions and targeted attacks on protected civilian objects.
“This development signals a clear shift: Peru is now reviewing the substance of the case,” said Dyab Abou Jahjah (b. 1971), Chairman of the Hind Rajab Foundation. “This is not about theoretical jurisdiction—it is about the facts, the evidence, and accountability for the crimes committed in Gaza.”
By assigning the case to its specialized human rights prosecution unit, Peru has taken an important step toward ensuring that allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity are given appropriate legal scrutiny. The move reflects growing recognition that the scale and nature of the destruction in Gaza requires legal response—not only political commentary.
The Hind Rajab Foundation has compiled hundreds of case files targeting members of the Israeli Combat Engineering Corps, and is currently submitting these in multiple jurisdictions. The Peruvian case is among the first to reach this stage of official prosecutorial examination.
This step does not resolve the case, but it demonstrates that legal systems can be engaged, and that claims concerning grave violations of international law in Gaza are beginning to receive the attention they warrant.
- Source - Hind Rajab Foundation: Peru Opens the Door to Prosecution: Genocide Case Against Isreli Soldier Moves into Human Rights Investigation Phase (Publ. 11 June 2025)
The Hague, 10 June 2025 – The Hind Rajab Foundation (HRF) has officially filed a legal complaint with the Dutch Public Prosecution Service against Lavi Lazarovitz, a serving Major in the Israeli Air Force (IAF), who is currently in the Netherlands as part of the "CyberArk World Tour" organized by the Israeli cybersecurity firm CyberArk.
While azarovitz appears publicly in the Netherlands as a tech executive, he is also an active-duty officer in the Israeli Air Force IAF—a military branch that played a central and devastating role in the recent genocide committed against the Palestinian population of Gaza.
Lazarovitz appeared in uniform in a CyberArk promotional video filmed during the peak of the Israeli bombardment of Gaza. The video was shot from HaKirya, the military headquarters of the Israeli army in Tel Aviv, a key command center for Israel’s aerial warfare operations. His presence in uniform at such a site during a period of systematic and large-scale murderous bombardment, implicates him directly with IAF activities and warrants a serious investigation.
The Israeli Air Force’s Role in the Gaza Genocide
According to reports by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the United Nations, and other reputable sources, the Israeli Air Force was directly responsible for:
* The mass bombing of residential areas, killing entire families in their homes;
* Targeting hospitals, schools, refugee camps, and United Nations facilities;
* Systematic attacks on humanitarian workers, medical convoys, and evacuees;
* Destruction of vital civilian infrastructure, contributing to the collapse of Gaza’s health system and mass displacement.
These actions are widely considered violations of international humanitarian law, and numerous legal experts and UN bodies have raised alarms over the potential commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide.
Why Should Lazarovitz Be Held and Interrogated
As an officer in the IAF, Lavi Lazarovitz is not a neutral civilian participant in global tech events. His rank, the timing of his public appearances in uniform, and the context of his presence in military command structures during the genocide, establish reasonable grounds to believe that he may have:
* Participated in or supported aerial military operations;
* Provided technical or operational assistance from within the IAF;
* Held command responsibility or acted in coordination with units involved in the bombing campaign.
Allowing such individuals to freely travel and speak at public institutions in the Netherlands risks turning the country into a safe haven for those potentially involved in international crimes.
The Hind Rajab Foundation’s Call to the Dutch Authorities
The HRF has submitted a detailed complaint urging Dutch prosecutors to:
* Launch a preliminary investigation into Lazarovitz’s potential role in war crimes;
* Confirm and document his presence on Dutch territory;
* Consider travel restrictions or other appropriate legal measures;
* Urge institutions hosting Lazarovitz to suspend his public participation pending legal review.
This action is part of the Foundation’s broader legal strategy to hold perpetrators of war crimes accountable, in cooperation with legal teams across multiple jurisdictions and under the principle of universal jurisdiction as enshrined in Dutch and international law.
- Hind Rajab Foundation: Israeli Air Force Officer in the Netherlands: HRF Files Legal Complaint Against Lavi Lazarovitz for Role in Gaza Genocide (Publ. 10 June 2025)
Brussels / London, 9 June 2025 — The Hind Rajab Foundation has formally filed a war crimes complaint with the Metropolitan Police War Crimes Unit (Counter Terrorism Command, SO15) concerning the Israeli naval raid on the British-flagged humanitarian vessel Madleen, which took place in international waters on 8–9 June 2025. The complaint targets the Shayetet 13 unit that executed the attack and Vice Admiral David Saar Salama (b. 1969) who is the commander in chief of the Israeli Navy.
The Madleen, sailing as part of the Freedom Flotilla Coalition, was carrying medical supplies, food, and baby formula to civilians in Gaza. The ship, legally considered an extension of UK territory, was over 60 nautical miles off the coast when it was intercepted and boarded by Israel's elite Shayetet 13 naval commandos. Shayetet 13 operates under the Israeli Navy, commanded by Vice Admiral David Saar Salama (b. 1969), and is known for its maritime interdiction operations.
The Hind Rajab Foundation strongly calls on the United Kingdom to fulfil its legal responsibilities and immediately intervene to secure the unconditional release of the abducted activists who remain unlawfully detained in Israel. Their freedom is a matter of urgent humanitarian and legal concern.
Criminal Complaint Filed Under UK and International Law
The complaint, filed under the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, the International Criminal Court Act 2001, and Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (on torture), accuses Israeli forces of grave breaches of international humanitarian law, war crimes, and violations of UK jurisdiction.
Key allegations include:
* The unlawful use of chemical irritants from drones;
* Forcible detention and incommunicado confinement of 12 unarmed civilians;
* Denial of legal and consular access;
* Confiscation of humanitarian aid and personal belongings;
* Degrading and inhuman treatment.
Among the passengers were high-profile activists and humanitarians, including Greta Thunberg (b. 2003) and MEP Rima Hassan (b. 1992). Eyewitnesses report that passengers were physically assaulted, exposed to choking white substances sprayed from drones, and denied communication with the outside world.
Parallels to the 2010 Mavi Marmara Incident
The filing draws clear legal parallels to the 2010 Mavi Marmara raid, referencing the UN Human Rights Council report (A/HRC/15/21) that found Israel's conduct during that operation unlawful. The same legal framework applies to the Madleen: unlawful military action in international waters, against a civilian ship conducting humanitarian operations, resulting in arbitrary detention, confiscation of property, and interference with humanitarian relief.
Violation of Binding ICJ Orders and Maritime Law
The complaint underscores that the Madleen was operating in compliance with three binding International Court of Justice orders (January, March and May 2024) requiring unimpeded humanitarian access to Gaza. Israel's blockade enforcement against the ship violates:
* Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention;
* Rules 55 and 56 of the ICRC Customary IHL;
* Article 92 of UNCLOS on exclusive flag state jurisdiction;
* And peremptory norms (jus cogens) of international law.
Legal Basis for UK Jurisdiction
As a UK-flagged vessel, the Madleen is under British criminal jurisdiction even outside territorial waters. Crimes committed aboard the vessel are deemed to have occurred on British territory. The UK has an international legal obligation to investigate grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, torture, and war crimes, particularly when they occur within its legal jurisdiction.
Hind Rajab Foundation's Call for Action
The Foundation has requested that UK authorities:
1. Open a criminal investigation against the Israeli naval and political officials responsible;
2. Interview and collect testimony from the Madleen passengers;
3. Refer the case to the CPS for legal action and arrest warrants;
4. Monitor suspects who may enter UK territory;
5. Coordinate with Interpol, the ICC, and relevant UN Special Rapporteurs.
Next Steps
The Hind Rajab Foundation is currently compiling supporting documentation, including passenger testimonies, media coverage, video evidence, and expert legal analyses. These will be submitted to support the UK investigation.
This filing is part of the Foundation’s broader mission to end impunity for war crimes and uphold international law, especially in the context of the ongoing siege of Gaza. The Madleen case marks a watershed moment in holding perpetrators accountable for attacks on humanitarian missions.
- Source - Hind Rajab Foundation: HRF Files UK Complaint Against Israeli Elite Unit Shayetet 13 Over Raid on Freedom Flotilla Vessel Madleen (Publ. 9 June 2025)
PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 21, 2020) - Multinational navy ships and a submarine steam in formation during a group sail off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020, August 21. "Like-minded nations come together in RIMPAC in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific where all nations enjoy unfettered access to the seas and airways in accordance with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) upon which all nations’ economies depend,†said Adm. John C. Aquilino, Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet. Ten nations, 22 ships, 1 submarine, and more than 5,300 personnel are participating in Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) from August 17 to 31 at sea in the waters surrounding Hawaii. RIMPAC is a biennial exercise designed to foster and sustain cooperative relationships, critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The exercise is a unique training platform designed to enhance interoperability and strategic maritime partnerships. RIMPAC 2020 is the 27th exercise in the series that began in 1971. (Royal Canadian Navy photo by MS Dan Bard) 200821-N-NO842-3001
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Vienamese-led protest on Leipziger Strasse for "Peace and Justice in the South China Sea". Was not aware there was a conflict but have read up on it:
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve both island and maritime claims among several sovereign states within the region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The interests of different nations include acquiring fishing areas around the archipelagos; the potential exploitation of suspected crude oil and natural gas under the waters of various parts of the South China Sea; and the strategic control of important shipping lanes.
The South China Sea is dubbed by China as the "second Persian Sea." The state-owned China Offshore Exploration Corp. planned to spend 200 billion RMB (US$30 billion) in the next 20 years to exploit oil in the region, with the estimated production of 25 million metric tons of crude oil and natural gas per annum, at a depth of 2000 meters within the next five years.
The abundant fishing opportunities within the region are another point of dispute. In 1988, the South China Sea is believed to have accounted for 8% of world fishing catches, a figure that has grown since then. There have been many clashes in the Philippines with foreign fishing vessels (including China) in disputed areas. China's claims fishing grounds located in territorial waters of other nations (Wikipedia)
Tagessschau 19.10.15: "Die komplizierte Situation im Südchinesischen Meer ist durch jüngste chinesische Aktivitäten noch schwieriger geworden. China schüttet in der Inselgruppe der Spratlys eine Reihe von Korallenriffen zu künstlichen Inseln auf, die auch militärisch genutzt werden sollen. Auf mehreren dieser Inseln wurden Start- und Landebahnen errichtet. Auch andere Staaten - wie die Philippinen, Vietnam und Malaysia - erheben Ansprüche in dem Seegebiet, in dem große Vorkommen von Erdgas und Öl vermutet werden.
Völkerrechtlich entstehen aus den chinesischen Aufschüttungen keinerlei neue Ansprüche. Im Seerechtsübereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea) ist festgelegt, dass nur natürlich entstandene Territorien Ansprüche generieren. Aufgeschüttetes und erweitertes Land hat hingegen laut internationalem Recht keine Auswirkungen." www.tagesschau.de/ausland/spratly-usa-101.html
PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 21, 2020) - Multinational navy ships and a submarine steam in formation during a group sail off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020, August 21. "Like-minded nations come together in RIMPAC in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific where all nations enjoy unfettered access to the seas and airways in accordance with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) upon which all nations’ economies depend,” said Adm. John C. Aquilino, Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet. Ten nations, 22 ships, 1 submarine, and more than 5,300 personnel are participating in Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) from August 17 to 31 at sea in the waters surrounding Hawaii. RIMPAC is a biennial exercise designed to foster and sustain cooperative relationships, critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The exercise is a unique training platform designed to enhance interoperability and strategic maritime partnerships. RIMPAC 2020 is the 27th exercise in the series that began in 1971. (Royal Canadian Navy photo by MS Dan Bard) 200821-N-NO842-3027
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Rockall is an uninhabitable granite islet situated in the North Atlantic Ocean. The United Kingdom claims that Rockall lies within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and is part of its territory, but this claim is not recognised by Ireland. It and the nearby skerries of Hasselwood Rock and Helen's Reef are the only emergent parts of the Rockall Plateau. The rock was formed by magmatism as part of the North Atlantic Igneous Province during the Paleogene.
Rockall's approximate distances from the closest islands in each direction are as follows: It is 301.3 kilometres (187.2 statute miles; 162.7 nautical miles) west of Soay, Scotland; 423.2 km (263.0 mi; 228.5 nmi) northwest of Tory Island, Ireland; and 700 kilometres (430 statute miles; 380 nautical miles) south of Iceland. The nearest permanently inhabited place is North Uist, an island in the Outer Hebrides of Scotland, 370 kilometres (230 mi; 200 nmi) to the east.
The United Kingdom claimed Rockall in 1955 and incorporated it as a part of Scotland in 1972. The UK does not make a claim to extended EEZ based on Rockall, as it has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which says that "rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf". However, such features are entitled to a territorial sea extending 12 nautical miles (22 kilometres). Ireland's position is that Rockall does not even generate a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea for the United Kingdom owing to the UK's uncertain title to Rockall. Ireland does not recognize the UK's claim, although it has never sought to claim sovereignty of Rockall for itself. The consistent position of successive Irish governments has been that Rockall and similar rocks and skerries have no significance for establishing legal claims to mineral rights in the adjacent seabed or to fishing rights in the surrounding seas.
This image is excerpted from a U.S. GAO report:
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-22-104234
Combating Illegal Fishing: Clear Authority Could Enhance U.S. Efforts to Partner with Other Nations at Sea
The primary policy-making organ of the Authority is the Assembly, comprising all members (that is, all of the countries that have signed UNCLOS, which includes all of the Pacific ACP States). Executive authority is vested in a 36-member council, elected according to a four-year cycle. The council is also the primary legislative organ of the Authority. To ensure a balance of interests, the council is divided into five chambers, representing: • major consumers of the metals derived from seabed minerals; • major investors in seabed mining; • major net exporters of the metals derived from seabed minerals; • special interests (including small island developing states, states with large populations, and land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states); and • a chamber elected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. The council has two subsidiary bodies made up of experts elected in their personal capacity: a Legal and Technical Commission and an Economic Planning Commission. Under the 1994 Agreement, the functions of the Economic Planning Commission are to be carried out by the Legal and Technical Commission until such time as commercial seabed mining begins. The primary functions of the Legal and Technical Commission are to formulate the rules, regulations, and procedures for prospecting, exploration, and exploitation, to review the performance of contractors with the Authority, and to advise the council on matters related to protection of the marine environment from the harmful impacts of mining.
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This photo has been graciously provided to be used in the GRID-Arendal resources library by: GRID-Arendal
Event to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (28 November 2022)
Nhận lời mời của Đại tướng Phùng Quang Thanh, Bộ trưởng Bộ Quốc phòng nước ta, Thượng tướng Lương Quang Liệt, Bộ trưởng Bộ Quốc phòng Trung Quốc, dẫn đầu Đoàn đại biểu quân sự cấp cao nước CHND Trung Hoa sang thăm hữu nghị chính thức Việt Nam và dự Hội nghị Bộ trưởng Quốc phòng các nước ASEAN mở rộng (ADMM+) đầu tiên, đã đến Hà Nội. Chiều 10-10, Lễ đón chính thức Thượng tướng Lương Quang Liệt và Đoàn đại biểu Quân sự cấp cao Trung Quốc được tổ chức trọng thể tại Trụ sở Bộ Quốc phòng. Dự lễ có Đại tướng Phùng Quang Thanh, Bộ trưởng Bộ Quốc phòng cùng các tướng lĩnh, sĩ quan cấp cao Quân đội nhân dân Việt Nam.
Sau lễ đón, Đoàn đại biểu quân sự cấp cao nước ta do Đại tướng Phùng Quang Thanh làm trưởng đoàn đã hội đàm với Đoàn đại biểu quân sự cấp cao Trung Quốc do Thượng tướng Lương Quang Liệt làm trưởng đoàn. Đại tướng Phùng Quang Thanh nhiệt liệt chào mừng Thượng tướng Lương Quang Liệt và Đoàn đại biểu quân sự cấp cao Trung Quốc sang thăm hữu nghị chính thức Việt Nam; cho rằng chuyến thăm của đoàn một lần nữa khẳng định mối quan hệ hữu nghị, truyền thống giữa quân đội và nhân dân hai nước Việt Nam – Trung Quốc. Bộ trưởng Phùng Quang Thanh bày tỏ vui mừng được đón Thượng tướng Lương Quang Liệt thăm chính thức và dự Hội nghị ADMM+ đúng dịp Thủ đô Hà Nội đón Đại lễ 1000 năm Thăng Long – Hà Nội. Bộ trưởng Phùng Quang Thanh đánh giá cao vai trò và uy tín của Trung Quốc, mong muốn phía Trung Quốc sẽ đóng góp tích cực để ADMM+ lần đầu tiên được tổ chức tại Việt Nam thành công tốt đẹp.
Đại tướng Phùng Quang Thanh đón Thượng tướng Lương Quang Liệt.
Thượng tướng Lương Quang Liệt cảm ơn sự đón tiếp chu đáo, trọng thị, đầy tình hữu nghị của phía Việt Nam dành cho Đoàn; bày tỏ vui mừng trước những thành tựu trong sự nghiệp xây dựng đất nước, củng cố quốc phòng-an ninh mà nhân dân Việt Nam đạt được trong những năm qua; tin tưởng chuyến thăm của đoàn sẽ thu được nhiều kết quả tốt đẹp, góp phần củng cố, tăng cường các mối quan hệ hợp tác song phương trong lĩnh vực quân sự, quốc phòng giữa quân đội hai nước tiếp tục phát triển.
Hai bên đã thông báo cho nhau tình hình phát triển kinh tế-xã hội, kinh nghiệm xây dựng lực lượng vũ trang của mỗi nước; trao đổi, thống nhất các biện pháp thúc đẩy phát triển hơn nữa các mối quan hệ hợp tác trên các lĩnh vực trao đổi đoàn, đào tạo, tuần tra chung trên biển, vì mục tiêu hòa bình, ổn định, phát triển thịnh vượng trong khu vực và trên thế giới.
Sau cuộc hội đàm, Bộ trưởng Phùng Quang Thanh cho phóng viên Báo Quân đội nhân dân biết, về vấn đề biển Đông, Bộ trưởng Lương Quang Liệt cho rằng, cần phải được giải quyết thông qua đàm phán hòa bình, không để tình hình trở nên bất lợi cho Trung Quốc và Việt Nam. Các tranh chấp cần phải giải quyết kiên trì bằng chính trị, ngoại giao và hiệp thương.
Bộ trưởng Phùng Quang Thanh khẳng định, trong quan hệ của hai nước còn vấn đề lớn là tồn tại tranh chấp chủ quyền trên biển Đông, nhưng phải giải quyết bằng đàm phán hòa bình, luật pháp quốc tế, Công ước Luật biển năm 1982 của LHQ (UNCLOS) và bằng tinh thần Tuyên bố ứng xử của các bên trên biển Đông (DOC). Bộ trưởng Phùng Quang Thanh tin tưởng hai nước sẽ từng bước sẽ giải quyết được vấn đề này.
“Giải quyết vấn đề biên giới trên bộ khó như thế nhưng chúng ta đã kiên trì đàm phán và cuối cùng hai bên đã đi đến hoàn thành công tác phân giới cắm mốc và bây giờ trở thành biên giới hòa bình hữu nghị. Hay vấn đề Vịnh Bắc Bộ cũng đã được giải quyết và bây giờ hai bên đang tiến hành đàm phán cấp chuyên viên để thống nhất những nguyên tắc đàm phán về các vấn đề trên biển Đông”- Bộ trưởng Phùng Quang Thanh nói.
Theo Bộ trưởng Phùng Quang Thanh, cần phải có thời gian để giải quyết vấn đề này, cần phải giữ được hòa bình, ổn định, không để các nước khác lợi dụng gây chia rẽ quan hệ Việt Nam – Trung Quốc.
Tối cùng ngày, Đại tướng Phùng Quang Thanh tổ chức chiêu đãi trọng thể chào mừng Thượng tướng Lương Quang Liệt cùng các thành viên Đoàn.
Tin, ảnh: NGỌC HƯNG – NGUYỄN HÒA
phungquangthanh.com/2010/10/dai-tuong-phung-quang-thanh-h...
Seminar on legal issues relating to maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS), including matters arising from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)(17 April 2023), held during the second session of the Joint MSC-LEG-FAL MASS Working Group.
03 April 2019 – The Philippines and China convened the Fourth Meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on 02-03 April 2019 in Manila. The Philippine delegation was led by Foreign Affairs Assistant Secretary Meynardo LB. Montealegre of the Office of Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Chinese delegation was led by Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou. As in the Third Meeting of the BCM in October 2018, the Fourth BCM comprised equivalent officials from the respective foreign ministries and relevant agencies.
Recalling the Joint Statement between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China on 21 November 2018, wherein both sides agreed to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities in the South China Sea that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, and noted the importance of confidence-building measures to increase mutual trust and confidence, both sides affirmed the importance of the BCM as a venue for enhanced and regular dialogue. Both sides also noted the significance of the BCM as a platform for pursuing measures to increase mutual trust and confidence. In this regard, both sides acknowledged that the BCM, as a forum for raising differences with a view to address them, preventing and properly managing incidents at sea, and enhancing maritime dialogue and cooperation, can play a significant role in the stable and steady development of bilateral relations.
In a frank yet cordial and constructive manner, both sides raised specific issues and recent developments and actions in the South China Sea which have raised concerns to either side, and proposed ways to address them in a cooperative manner. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate and to continue to find ways forward to strengthen mutual trust and confidence.
Both sides reiterated that while the contentious issues in the South China Sea should not be ignored, they are not the sum total of the Philippines-China relations and should not exclude mutually beneficial cooperation in other fields. Both sides also reaffirmed the importance of maintaining and promoting regional peace and stability, freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea. Both sides reiterated their commitment to address disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Both sides likewise agreed that their bilateral relations should serve the interests of the Filipino and Chinese peoples and contribute to peace, stability, and development in the region.
Both sides had a productive exchange of views on ways to enhance maritime cooperation in areas such as on recent developments in the South China Sea carrying political and security implications, maritime search and rescue, maritime safety, marine environmental protection/marine scientific research, and fisheries in relevant Working Group meetings under the framework of the BCM. Without prejudice to their respective positions on sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction, both sides exchanged views on oil and gas development.
The two sides also recognized the importance of other complementary multilateral platforms, including ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations, ASEAN Regional Forum, and East Asia Summit, in promoting peace and stability in the region. Both sides reiterated their commitments to full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and agreed to maintain the positive momentum of the negotiations towards the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, based on consensus.
Both sides considered the meeting fruitful and productive. The Fifth Meeting of the BCM will be held in China in the second half of 2019, with the exact date and place to be determined and mutually agreed upon through diplomatic channels. END
Photo by Clark Galang
03 April 2019 – The Philippines and China convened the Fourth Meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on 02-03 April 2019 in Manila. The Philippine delegation was led by Foreign Affairs Assistant Secretary Meynardo LB. Montealegre of the Office of Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Chinese delegation was led by Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou. As in the Third Meeting of the BCM in October 2018, the Fourth BCM comprised equivalent officials from the respective foreign ministries and relevant agencies.
Recalling the Joint Statement between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China on 21 November 2018, wherein both sides agreed to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities in the South China Sea that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, and noted the importance of confidence-building measures to increase mutual trust and confidence, both sides affirmed the importance of the BCM as a venue for enhanced and regular dialogue. Both sides also noted the significance of the BCM as a platform for pursuing measures to increase mutual trust and confidence. In this regard, both sides acknowledged that the BCM, as a forum for raising differences with a view to address them, preventing and properly managing incidents at sea, and enhancing maritime dialogue and cooperation, can play a significant role in the stable and steady development of bilateral relations.
In a frank yet cordial and constructive manner, both sides raised specific issues and recent developments and actions in the South China Sea which have raised concerns to either side, and proposed ways to address them in a cooperative manner. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate and to continue to find ways forward to strengthen mutual trust and confidence.
Both sides reiterated that while the contentious issues in the South China Sea should not be ignored, they are not the sum total of the Philippines-China relations and should not exclude mutually beneficial cooperation in other fields. Both sides also reaffirmed the importance of maintaining and promoting regional peace and stability, freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea. Both sides reiterated their commitment to address disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Both sides likewise agreed that their bilateral relations should serve the interests of the Filipino and Chinese peoples and contribute to peace, stability, and development in the region.
Both sides had a productive exchange of views on ways to enhance maritime cooperation in areas such as on recent developments in the South China Sea carrying political and security implications, maritime search and rescue, maritime safety, marine environmental protection/marine scientific research, and fisheries in relevant Working Group meetings under the framework of the BCM. Without prejudice to their respective positions on sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction, both sides exchanged views on oil and gas development.
The two sides also recognized the importance of other complementary multilateral platforms, including ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations, ASEAN Regional Forum, and East Asia Summit, in promoting peace and stability in the region. Both sides reiterated their commitments to full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and agreed to maintain the positive momentum of the negotiations towards the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, based on consensus.
Both sides considered the meeting fruitful and productive. The Fifth Meeting of the BCM will be held in China in the second half of 2019, with the exact date and place to be determined and mutually agreed upon through diplomatic channels. END
Photo by Clark Galang
The Coast Guard Cutter Healy breaks ice around the Russian-flagged tanker Renda 250 miles south of Nome Jan. 6, 2012. The Healy is one of the Coast Guard’s two operating polar icebreakers. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Sara Francis)
By Anthony Russell
As Russian forces took Crimea in late February, commentators repeatedly emphasized the Ukrainian peninsula’s strategic importance as a warm-water port.
Meanwhile, the rapidly growing importance of Arctic waters is sometimes overlooked. The polar ice cap, now 40 percent smaller than it was 35 years ago (PDF), will continue to thaw in the coming decades, opening new shipping routes and access to oil and gas.
Russia possesses the world’s most Arctic shoreline, water, and operating resources. But the United States is also an Arctic nation, even if much of the American public tends to under-appreciate this special status.
With frigid international tensions and the severe impacts of climate change swirling like a perfect polar storm, the United States can’t afford to ignore the opportunities and obligations that come with being one of the world’s few Arctic nations.
Less than a decade ago, presumed cooperation and overt reliance on external assistance became popular planning factors for U.S. polar activities. Given the condition of its aged icebreaker fleet, the United States turned to leases with Sweden and Russia for icebreaker capability. This approach was considered a more efficient way to traverse polar regions.
Cooperation with Russia has long been among the greatest challenges to implementing a comprehensive U.S. Artic strategy. But the crisis in Crimea has already resulted in a significant retreat from engagement and cooperation with Russia: The United States and its allies dismissed Russia from the G-8, and NATO is reviewing the extent to which it cooperates with Russia.
These actions are warranted, given Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s borders and the troubling precedent it sets. But the West should avoid disengagement with Russia when it comes to the Arctic, a unique region that deserves special consideration.
Allowing or forcing Russian withdrawal from Arctic engagements and regulating forums could seriously weaken America’s ability to manage the increasing amount and diversity of activity in the Arctic, as well as adaptation to the impacts of climate change. Excluding Russia could even bring about Arctic militarization.
But despite chilling relations with Russia and the slow burn of climate change, the United States can prevent diplomatic frostbite in the Arctic through a number of actions:
Take a seat at the negotiating table.
The U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) outlines procedures for establishing sovereignty over the continental shelf (the sea floor directly offshore) beyond 200 nautical miles. With Russia finalizing its long-standing claim on the Arctic shelf, the United States is absent from negotiations, limiting its ability to counter Russian claims or submit its own, placing itself at a severe strategic and diplomatic disadvantage.
Sustain engagement.
The United States will assume a two-year chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015. (Secretary of State John Kerry also announced a special representative for the Arctic.) A lack of Russian participation in this body stemming from international discord would produce limited results at best.
Even more pragmatically, the Arctic is home to the only shared U.S.-Russian border. Established communication channels and operational protocols are necessary to enforce laws, avoid conflict, and protect sovereignty in this region.
Invest in icebreakers.
International regulations and agreements are critical, but they cannot rescue mariners, respond to environmental incidents, or monitor borders. Only a physical presence can accomplish these things. In the Arctic, that necessitates icebreakers. These special vessels aren’t cheap or quickly built, but America’s current inventory is in need of upgrading..
Russia’s actions against Ukraine make leasing icebreakers from Russia a non-option for the foreseeable future. This illustrates how important it is for the United States to maintain the unique capabilities required to exercise its sovereign responsibilities as an Arctic nation.
Downplay militarization.
Coincidently, the United States conducted two high-profile, Arctic military exercises in March, which included chasing a simulated Russian submarine. It is certainly in America’s strategic interest to maintain limited operational capability in the Arctic, but these initiatives must be measured to protect sovereignty without inciting an Arctic arms race.
These efforts won’t be easy—those most worthwhile rarely are—but they’re critical to ensuring a favorable and sustainable Arctic future. Perhaps the Arctic’s harsh environment offers hope for cooperation. As Law of the Sea scholar Caitlyn Antrim said, “It is easy to be friends when the elements are your common enemy.”
By Anthony Russell - CDR Russell, USCG is the 2013-2014 Coast Guard Executive Fellow to the RAND Corporation. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Coast Guard or the U.S. government.
The post Crimea, Climate Change, and U.S.-Russian Relations: A Perfect Storm appeared first on gCaptain Maritime & Offshore News.
(Please scroll down to read this letter in Vietnamese and Chinese)
(Vui lòng cuộn xuống để đọc tiếng Việt)
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Dear friends around the world,
On 2 May, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) deployed a giant billion-dollar oil rig (Haiyang Shiyou 981) to drill in a location 80 miles inside Vietnam’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ - which extends offshore from every country).
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982), to which China is also a signatory, Vietnam is the only country that has the right to exploit natural resources inside its EEZ.
China has been using the so-called "nine-dashed-line" to outline its illegal claim of the Bien Dong (South China Sea). Beijing has awarded itself with the right to exploit resources in waters that it says belong to China. So far China has not succeeded in proving the legitimacy of the nine dashed line or in providing a clarification of it. Thus China cannot justify its latest action that clearly violates international laws.
Vietnamese people, including our soldiers, love peace. We struggled nearly 40 years for peace and freedom, that’s why we cherish every moment of peace. But we will utilize everything we have in order to protect our sovereignty.
We hope that peace loving people around the world will join us in the protest against China’s provocation in order to return peace and stability to the Bien Dong (South China Sea).
Thank you very much for reading this. Best wishes for you, your family, and every people from your country.
Best regards,
For further information about UNCLOS 1982, you can see here: www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_ove...
It is totally clear that China has signed this Convention. Actually China is one of the pioneer investors:
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_his...
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Gửi bạn bè trên toàn thế giới,
Ngày 2/5, Trung Quốc ngang ngược kéo giàn khoan khổng lồ vào tọa độ 15029’N/1110 12’E nằm sâu 80 hải lý trong Vùng đặc quyền kinh tế Việt Nam.
Theo công ước Liên Hợp Quốc về luật biển quốc tế UNCLOS 1982 mà Trung Quốc cũng là thành viên, Việt Nam là nước duy nhất có quyền khai thác tài nguyên tại khu vực nằm trong vùng đặc quyền kinh tế của mình.
Trung Quốc luôn cố chấp với tuyên bố đường lưỡi bò phi pháp của mình trên Biển Đông, tự cho mình quyền khai thác trong khu vực mà họ cho rằng thuộc chủ quyền của mình, tuy nhiên cho đến nay chưa bao giờ Trung Quốc chứng minh được tính pháp lý của đường 9 đoạn này cũng như giải thích rõ ràng về cơ sở của nó. Vì vậy, Trung Quốc không có bất kì một lí do gì để bào chữa cho hành động vi phạm nghiêm trọng luật pháp quốc tế này.
Nhân dân và quân đội Việt Nam yêu chuộng hòa bình nhưng cũng sẵn sàng mọi thứ để giữ vững chủ quyền của chúng tôi. Chính vì thế, chúng tôi hi vọng nhân dân yêu chuộng hòa bình thế giới sẽ cùng chúng tôi phản đối hành động xâm lược này của Trung Quốc, trả lại cho Biển Đông sự yên bình vốn có.
Cảm ơn bạn đã dành thời gian đọc bài viết này. Xin được gửi những lời chúc tốt đẹp nhất đến với các bạn, gia đình và toàn thể dân tộc bạn.
Chân thành cảm ơn.
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致世界各国朋友,
2014年5月2号，中国横行霸道地将海洋石油981钻井平台搬到坐标为北纬15度29分58秒、东经111度12分06秒，完全属于越南专属经济区和大陆架的海域，距离越南李山岛119海里和距离越南海岸线130海里的位置展开作业，同时出动多受护卫船陪同。 中国是1982年《联合国海洋法公约》的签字国，应该按照《公约》第74和83条文办事，要尊重周边沿海国200海里专属经济区和大陆架的主张。据此《公约》，越南是在拥有的主权权利和管辖权的专属经济区和大陆架的海域上有权利开展作业活动的唯一国家。 中国一直特别固执，自己在东海地区画上非法的“牛舌线”。中国自己公布不合理的九段线的主权要求，横行霸道对几乎整个东海地区宣称主权。但是，截至目前，中国从来没有任何资料证明该“牛舌线”的合法性，同时也没有合理及正确的解释它的来历。因此，中国的上述举动是非法和完全违反了越南法律和国际法，违背了《东海各方行为宣言》精神。 越南军队和人民爱护和平，但是我们坚决采取一切必要而合适的措施来维护自己的正当权益和主权。因此，我们希望世界上爱和平人士将与越南人民携手同行，反对中国这一侵略，挑衅行为，保持东海地区原来的和平和稳定。
真心感谢。
#chinastopprovoking #peaceforeveryone #operationrestoringpeace
Senior maritime officials, legislators from the Federal Parliament and the state assemblies attend a conference jointly organized by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Integrated UNSOM-UNDP Security Sector Reform team in Mogadishu, Somalia, on 25 August 2019. The conference, organised for the Federal Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport, focused on the revision of the Maritime Code of 1959 and amended in 1988. The Shipping Code is currently under revision in order to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ratified by Somalia in 1989. The Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources.
UN Photo / Omar Abdisalan
How hypocritical is it that for the U.S. not ratifying UNCLOS, but kept patrolling overseas thousands of miles away from the U.S. purportedly performing "routine" operations to allegedly enforcing UNCLOS? In other words, countries that have ratified UNCLOS are supposed to abide by UNCLOS but the U.S. doesn't because it's not part of the treaty!
The whole encounter seemed to be a show put up by the U.S. Why was a Global News reporter on board of the Canadian ship? And why did Canada worry about what's happening thousands of miles away but not concerned about the waters in the Arctic on its own border?
www.gzeromedia.com/gzero-north/canada-caught-in-us-canada...
Canada caught in US-Canada maritime crossfire
The US and Canada say they were conducting what is known in navy parlance as a Freedom of Navigation Operation or FONOP under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which guarantees all ships the right to "innocent" passage. Yet for China, these actions are anything but innocent: FONOPs seek to provoke Beijing by sailing through disputed waters to challenge China's claims in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, one of the world's busiest maritime shipping routes.
The buzzing incident also puts a spotlight on Canadian FONOPs in this part of the world, which are becoming more frequent as relations with China get frostier. (Interestingly, Canadians like doing FONOPs with Americans in China-claimed waters but not in the Arctic, where Ottawa and Washington have a beef over who controls the Northwest Passage.)
sputnikglobe.com/20230605/us-synchronized-taiwan-strait-i...
US 'Synchronized' Taiwan Strait Incident With Shangri-La Dialogue to Pressure Beijing
The US has stepped up its provocative “freedom of navigation” operations in recent years, claiming it is enforcing a treaty, the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which Washington itself refuses to ratify. Off the coast of China, these maneuvers have led to several dangerous incidents.
Emil Cosman's comments on the incident:
en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_and_the_United_Nati...
The United States was among the nations that participated in the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place from 1974 through 1982 and resulted in the international treaty known as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United States also participated in the subsequent negotiations of modifications to the treaty from 1990 to 1994. The UNCLOS came into force in 1994. Although the United States now recognizes the UNCLOS as a codification of customary international law, it has not ratified it.
www.reuters.com/world/us-canadian-navies-stage-rare-joint...
China rebukes US, Canadian navies for Taiwan Strait transit
The U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet said the guided-missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon and Canada's HMCS Montreal conducted a "routine" transit of the strait on Saturday "through waters where high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply in accordance with international law".
"Chung-Hoon and Montreal's bilateral transit through the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the commitment of the United States and our allies and partners to a free and open Indo-Pacific," it said in a statement.
The Eastern Theatre Command of China's People's Liberation Army said its forces monitored the ships throughout and "handled" the situation in accordance with the law and regulations.
"The countries concerned deliberately create incidents in the Taiwan Strait region, deliberately provoke risks, maliciously undermine regional peace and stability, and send the wrong signal to 'Taiwan independence' forces," it said late Saturday.
Taiwan's defence ministry said the two ships sailed in a northerly direction through the strait and that it had observed nothing unusual.
While U.S. warships transit the strait around once a month, it is unusual for them to do so with those of other U.S. allies. (Doesn't that sound like sailing with a Canadian naval ship was not "routine"?)
globalnews.ca/news/9743650/china-warship-nearly-hits-us-d...
Chinese warship nearly hits U.S. destroyer in Taiwan Strait during joint Canada-U.S. mission
A Chinese warship came within 150 yards of hitting American destroyer USS Chung-Hoon, during a rare joint Canada-U.S. mission sailing through the Taiwan Strait, the latest aggressive military move from Beijing in the South China Sea. (Yet, Taiwan said nothing unusual happened, see a few paragraphs above. A video accompanying this article didn't show the U.S. ship changing course. And doesn't the word "rare" imply it's not "routine"?.)
In a statement to Global News, a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Canada said the Canadian and U.S. ships had “hyped (the sailing) up publicly,” and added that Chinese naval and air forces had been tracking and monitoring both ships “lawfully and professionally.”
english.news.cn/20230604/74a28821cbdf433bbecc7a08ec9b2468...
"American leadership" in Asia-Pacific is American hegemony in disguise
The United States is virtually stoking division, instigating confrontation and undermining peace in the region.
SINGAPORE, June 4 (Xinhua) -- America has found it more difficult than ever to cover up its hidden agenda when peddling the so-called "Indo-Pacific strategy" to Asia-Pacific countries at the just-concluded 20th Shangri-La Dialogue.
While making high-sounding claims about "promoting peace, prosperity and progress in the Asia-Pacific through the power of partnership," the United States is virtually stoking division, instigating confrontation and undermining peace in the region.
"American leadership" is in fact American hegemony in disguise.
Essentially, "American leadership" is dominated by a Cold War mentality and an "America First" doctrine regardless of the interests of its allies, mainly in the form of "coercive diplomacy."
In terms of politics and the military, it has never stopped forming blocs by coercing others into taking sides, pushing for a military arms race among Asia-Pacific countries to benefit only itself.
Economically, it has repeatedly used the U.S. dollar's global supremacy to export its own crises to emerging markets and developing countries in the region, letting the latter bear the brunt.
Moreover, to blunt China's influence in the region, the United States and its allies have been stepping up efforts to exploit the concept of "national security", aiming to weaken China's connections with non-aligned emerging economies.
Indeed, we could not agree more with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin's saying in his speech during the event that "this region's security and prosperity cannot be taken for granted." Ironically, the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific are put under threat by the United States itself.
Washington's actions in the region do not match its words. On the one hand, the United States has anchored its "Indo-Pacific strategy" in openness and respect for sovereignty. On the other hand, it rushed to muster Cold-War style groupings such as the AUKUS deal and Quad alliance.
Take the Taiwan question, which is at the very heart of China's core interests and the first red line that must not be crossed in China-U.S. relations. On various occasions, U.S. President Joe Biden and many other senior officials of his administration have publicly pledged to stay committed to the one-China policy and not to support "Taiwan independence."
But Washington is bent on stirring up tensions across the Taiwan Straits, not least by sending warships and fighter jets, boosting arms sales, ganging up with other countries to intervene in the Taiwan issue, strengthening the so-called "official exchanges" and, most recently, sailing through the Straits.
These deliberate provocations are turning the region into a dangerous flashpoint.
The U.S. and "Taiwan independence" separatists relying on external forces are indeed the real factors that exacerbate tensions and cause changes in the status quo.
Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, the United States has been sending warships and military aircraft, as well as intensifying its military presence, stoking tensions in the region.
Beijing, as always, values the development of China-U.S. military relations, and military exchanges between the two sides have not been interrupted. But if the United States appeals for communication while undermining China's interests, and calls for crisis management while continuing its provocations, any talk for the sake of talk is of little use for bilateral relations.
Peace and development have become the most valuable global public goods. The Asia-Pacific has broken through havoc caused by war and financial chaos, and achieved development in recent decades. As such, when the world is facing multiple crises rarely seen in history, people in the region understand well that a path of peaceful development, featuring solidarity and win-win cooperation, fits the interests of all.
Anna Malindog-Uy, vice president of the Manila-based think tank Asian Century Philippines Strategic Institute, pointed out that Asia-Pacific countries can promote peace and security in their own way, especially "in resolving conflicts of interest and differences."
Unlike the "Indo-Pacific strategy" full of geopolitical calculations, the China-proposed Global Security Initiative calls for a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, where no country can strengthen its own security at the expense of others.
Clearly, the Asia-Pacific cannot afford to lose peace and development to geopolitical competition or bloc confrontation. Stuck in a hegemonic mentality, the "Indo-Pacific strategy" featuring confrontation over dialogue, alliances over partnerships, and zero-sum over win-win is doomed to fail. ■
Members of the Federal Parliament of Somalia attend a workshop for the Parliamentary Group on the Implementation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in Mogadishu, Somalia on September 12, 2017. UN Photo / Omar Abdisalan
The CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies is pleased to host a Banyan Tree Leadership Forum featuring Antonio T. Carpio, Senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
The lecture will discuss China’s nine-dash line claim as the root cause of the South China Sea disputes, and show how it encroaches on the maritime zones of other coastal states. It will argue that the recent creation by China of artificial islands in the Spratlys is part of a design by China to control the South China Sea for economic and military purposes. The lecture will explain how the nine-dash line claim, and the activities by China to enforce it, violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and threaten peace, security, and stability in the region. The lecture will argue that the nine-dash line claim has no historical basis and that throughout Chinese history, the southernmost territory of China has been Hainan Island. The lecture will suggest a possible resolution of the dispute whereby China would return to the original intent of the 1947 nine-dash line, articulated by President Ma Ying-Jeou of Taiwan, as a claim to islands and their maritime zones that are recognized under international law.
Justice Carpio studied law at the University of the Philippines’ College of Law, and was admitted to the bar in 1975. He immediately went into private practice, establishing Carpio Villaraza and Cruz LLP. In 1992, Justice Carpio was appointed Chief Presidential Legal Counsel in the Office of the President of the Philippines, and on October 26, 2001, he was sworn in as a member of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Justice Carpio has received the Presidential Medal of Merit, the Outstanding Achievement in Law Award from the Ateneo de Manila Alumni Association, and an honorary Doctorate of Laws from Ateneo de Davao University.
Follow the event on Twitter@SoutheastAsiaDC ǀ@CSIS ǀ #CSISLive
Programs
CSIS Sumitro Djojohadikusumo Banyan Tree Leadership Forum, Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies
Topics
Defense and Security
Regions
Southeast Asia
St Mary, Great Henny, Essex
'Henry Galton Darwin CMG was a British lawyer and diplomat specialising in international law. He was a great-grandson of the naturalist Charles Darwin.
He served as assistant Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office 1954-1960 and again 1963-1967, at which time he was one of the three drafters of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, being flown to Moscow in July 1963 to advise Lord Hailsham on the drafting when negotiations were successful; between 1960 and 1963 he was Legal Adviser to the British Embassy in Bonn, West Germany. He was then Legal Counsellor to the UK Mission to the United Nations in Manhattan, New York 1967-1970, before returning to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 1970-1973. He then worked as Director-General Legal Secretariat European Communities Brussels 1973-1976.
He was Deputy Legal Adviser to the FCO 1976-1984, during which time in 1977 he was made a Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George. He played a major role in the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place from 1973 through 1982, and was a member of the Preparatory Commission after 1982. He was Second Legal Adviser FCO 1984-1989, when he retired.
Darwin died in London on 17 September 1992. At the time of his death he was leading a group examining legal issues connected with the former Yugoslavia.'
- Wikpedia entry for Henry Galton Darwin.
I cycled north from Twinstead, the lanes narrowing absurdly now, the road surface barely visible for the sand and clumps of grass up the middle and encroaching from the sides. I went down, down, down, and then up, up, up, and just before I fell over the edge into Suffolk I reached the track which runs up the hill to Henny church. It had seemed rather forbidding on its hill top when I had visited during a sudden snowstorm in 2012. Now it looked delightful, riding the high ridge with its typical Essex wooden spire. A delicious rural 19th Century feel inside. All the churches I'd visited on my journey across north Essex were open, and are open every day, but this is the most welcoming, going out of its way to assume that most of its users would be passing pilgrims and strangers rather than members of the congregation.
You could see all of the Suffolk town of Sudbury spread out in the river valley below from here. I headed down to the Stour and then north through Henny Street before climbing up into the hills one last time for Middleton. The pretty church here had been locked with a keyholder notice when I'd visited on a walk on Boxing Day 2006, but now it was also open, and is also clearly open every day. Here we are in the grounds of the Hall, and this is a delicious little Norman church, very much in the style of Wissington just across the Stour but without the wall paintings. A large amount of pre-ecclesiological early 19th Century glass, but overwhelmingly an early 20th Century Anglo-catholic feel, and of course this was the church of Father Clive Luget, who experienced visions of the Blessed Virgin here in the 1930s and hoped that Middleton would become the English Lourdes. Bizarre to think of that now.
Middleton is virtually a suburb of Sudbury now, so I headed down into Ballingdon and caught the 1630 train back to Ipswich from Sudbury station.
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)
The Court finds that Colombia has sovereignty over the maritime features
in dispute and draws a single maritime boundary
THE HAGUE, 19 November 2012. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, has today rendered its Judgment in the case concerning the
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia).
In its Judgment, which is final, without appeal and binding on the Parties, the Court,
(1) finds, unanimously, that the Republic of Colombia has sovereignty over the islands at
Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla;
(2) finds, by fourteen votes to one, admissible the Republic of Nicaragua’s claim contained
in its final submission I (3) requesting the Court to adjudge and declare that “[t]he appropriate form
of delimitation, within the geographical and legal framework constituted by the mainland coasts of
Nicaragua and Colombia, is a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the overlapping
entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties”;
(3) finds, unanimously, that it cannot uphold the Republic of Nicaragua’s claim contained in
its final submission I (3);
(4) decides, unanimously, that the line of the single maritime boundary delimiting the
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic
of Colombia shall follow geodetic lines connecting the points with co-ordinates:
Latitude north Longitude west
1. 13° 46' 35.7" 81° 29' 34.7"
2. 13° 31' 08.0" 81° 45' 59.4"
3. 13° 03' 15.8" 81° 46' 22.7"
4. 12° 50' 12.8" 81° 59' 22.6"
5. 12° 07' 28.8" 82° 07' 27.7"
6. 12° 00' 04.5" 81° 57' 57.8"
From point 1, the maritime boundary line shall continue due east along the parallel of
latitude (co-ordinates 13° 46' 35.7" N) until it reaches the 200-nautical-mile limit from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured. From point 6 (with co-ordinates 12° 00' 04.5" N and 81° 57' 57.8" W), located on a 12-nautical-mile envelope of
arcs around Alburquerque, the maritime boundary line shall continue along that envelope of arcs
until it reaches point 7 (with co-ordinates 12° 11' 53.5" N and 81° 38' 16.6" W) which is located on
the parallel passing through the southernmost point on the 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs around
East-Southeast Cays. The boundary line then follows that parallel until it reaches the southernmost
point of the 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs around East-Southeast Cays at point 8 (with
co-ordinates 12° 11' 53.5" N and 81° 28' 29.5" W) and continues along that envelope of arcs until
its most eastward point (point 9 with co-ordinates 12° 24' 09.3" N and 81° 14' 43.9" W). From that
point the boundary line follows the parallel of latitude (co-ordinates 12° 24' 09.3" N) until it
reaches the 200–nautical–mile limit from the baselines from which the territorial sea of Nicaragua
is measured;
(5) decides, unanimously, that the single maritime boundary around Quitasueño and Serrana
shall follow, respectively, a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs measured from QS 32 and from
low-tide elevations located within 12 nautical miles from QS 32, and a 12-nautical-mile envelope
of arcs measured from Serrana Cay and the other cays in its vicinity;
(6) rejects, unanimously, the Republic of Nicaragua’s claim contained in its final
submissions requesting the Court to declare that the Republic of Colombia is not acting in
accordance with its obligations under international law by preventing the Republic of Nicaragua
from having access to natural resources to the east of the 82nd meridian.
___________
1. Sovereignty
The Court recalls that the dispute between the Parties concerns sovereignty over maritime
features located in the Caribbean Sea, namely, the Alburquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays,
Roncador, Serrana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo. All these remain above water at high
tide and thus, as islands, they are capable of appropriation. However, as to Quitasueño, the Court
finds that it comprises only one tiny island, referred to as QS 32, and a number of low-tide
elevations (features which are above water at low tide but submerged at high tide).
The Court then notes that, under the terms of the 1928 Treaty concerning Territorial
Questions at Issue between Colombia and Nicaragua, Colombia has sovereignty not only over
San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, but also over the other islands, islets and reefs
“forming part” of the San Andrés Archipelago. Thus, in order to determine sovereignty, the Court
must first ascertain what constitutes the San Andrés Archipelago. The Court, however, concludes
that neither the 1928 Treaty nor the historical records is conclusive as to the composition of that
Archipelago.
The Court therefore proceeds to examine arguments and evidence which are not based on the
composition of the Archipelago under the 1928 Treaty. The Court finds that neither Nicaragua nor
Colombia has established that it had title to the disputed maritime features by virtue of
uti possidetis juris (a principle according to which, upon independence, new States inherit
territories and boundaries of former colonial provinces), because nothing clearly indicates whether
these features were attributed to the colonial provinces of Nicaragua or of Colombia. The Court
therefore turns to the question whether sovereignty can be established on the basis of a State’s acts
manifesting a display of authority on a given territory (effectivités). The Court finds that for many
decades Colombia continuously and consistently acted à titre de souverain in respect of the
maritime features in dispute. This exercise of sovereign authority was public and there is no
evidence that it met with any protest from Nicaragua prior to 1969, when the dispute crystallized.
Moreover, the evidence of Colombia’s acts of administration with respect to the islands is in
contrast to the absence of any evidence of acts à titre de souverain on the part of Nicaragua. The
facts thus provide very strong support for Colombia’s claim of sovereignty over the maritime
features in dispute. The Court also notes that, while not being evidence of sovereignty,
Nicaragua’s conduct with regard to the maritime features in dispute, the practice of third States and
maps afford some support to Colombia’s claim.
The Court concludes that Colombia, and not Nicaragua, has sovereignty over the islands at
Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla.
2. Admissibility of Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation of a continental shelf extending beyond
200 nautical miles
The Court notes that in its Application and Memorial, Nicaragua requested the Court to
determine the “single maritime boundary” between the continental shelf areas and exclusive
economic zones appertaining respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia in the form of a median line
between the mainland coasts of the two States. In its Reply and in its final submission I (3)
Nicaragua requested the Court to effect a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the
overlapping entitlements of the Parties ⎯ extended continental shelf of Nicaragua beyond
200 nautical miles and 200-nautical-mile continental shelf of Colombia. This is a new claim, but
this fact does not, in itself, render the claim inadmissible. This claim still concerns the delimitation
of the continental shelf, arises directly out of the Parties’ dispute and does not transform its
subject-matter. The Court concludes that the claim contained in final submission I (3) by
Nicaragua is admissible.
3. Consideration of Nicaragua’s claim for delimitation of a continental shelf extending
beyond 200 nautical miles
The Court observes that, in its recent jurisprudence, it has stated that “any claim of
continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles [by a State party to the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)] must be in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS and
reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf”. Given the object and
purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated in its Preamble, the fact that Colombia is not a party thereto
does not relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76. The Court notes that Nicaragua
submitted to the Commission only “Preliminary Information” which, by its own admission, falls
short of meeting the requirements for the Commission to be able to make a recommendation. As
the Court was not presented with any further information, it finds that, in the present proceedings,
Nicaragua has not established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to overlap
with Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia’s
mainland coast. The Court thus is not in a position to delimit the boundary between an extended
continental shelf of Nicaragua and Colombia’s continental shelf. The Court concludes that
Nicaragua’s claim contained in its final submission I (3) cannot be upheld.
4. Maritime boundary
The Court notes that notwithstanding its decision regarding Nicaragua’s final
submission I (3), it is still called upon to effect a delimitation between the overlapping maritime
entitlements of Colombia and Nicaragua within 200 nautical miles of the Nicaraguan coast.
The Court begins by determining what the relevant coasts of the Parties are, namely, those
coasts the projections of which overlap. For Nicaragua, the relevant coast is its whole coast with
the exception of the short stretch of coast near Punta de Perlas. For Colombia, the relevant coast is considers the extent of the relevant maritime area in which the potential entitlements of the Parties
overlap. This area extends 200 nautical miles eastwards from the Nicaraguan coast. In the north
and south, the limits of the relevant area were determined in such a way so as not to encroach upon
any existing boundaries or interests of third States (see sketch-map No. 7: The relevant maritime
area as identified by the Court).
To effect the delimitation, the Court follows the three-stage methodology employed in its
case law.
First, the Court selects base points and constructs a provisional median line between the
Nicaraguan coast and the western coasts of the relevant Colombian islands, which are opposite to
the Nicaraguan coast (see sketch-map No. 8: Construction of the provisional median line).
Secondly, the Court examines the relevant circumstances which may require an adjustment
or shifting of the provisional median line to produce an equitable result. It notes that the substantial
disparity between the relevant Colombian coast and that of Nicaragua (1:8.2), as well as the need to
avoid any cut-off effect of the delimitation line vis-à-vis the Parties’ coastal projections, are such
circumstances. The Court further notes that, while legitimate security concerns will be borne in
mind in determining whether the provisional median line should be adjusted or shifted, the conduct
of the Parties, issues of access to natural resources and delimitations already effected in the area are
not relevant circumstances in the present case.
Having thus identified the relevant circumstances applicable in the present case, the Court
proceeds by way of shifting the provisional median line. In this context, the Court draws a
distinction between that part of the relevant area which lies between the Nicaraguan mainland and
the western coasts of Alburquerque Cays, San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, where the
relationship is one of opposite coasts, and the part which lies to the east of those islands, where the
relationship is more complex. In the first western part of the relevant area, the relevant
circumstances call for the provisional median line to be shifted eastwards. For this purpose, the
base points located on the Nicaraguan and Colombian islands, respectively, should have different
weights, namely, a weighting of one to each of the Colombian base points and a weighting of three
to each of the Nicaraguan base points. The weighted line, constructed on this basis, has a curved
shape with a large number of turning points (see sketch-map No. 9: Construction of the weighted
line). The Court therefore reduces the number of turning points and connects them by geodetic
lines (see sketch-map No. 10: The simplified weighted line).
The Court considers, however, that to extend that line further north and south would not lead
to an equitable result because it would still leave Colombia with a significantly larger share of the
relevant area than that accorded to Nicaragua, notwithstanding the fact that Nicaragua’s relevant
coast is more than eight times the length of Colombia’s relevant coast; and it would cut off
Nicaragua from the areas east of the principal Colombian islands into which the Nicaraguan coast
projects.
The Court considers that an equitable result is achieved by continuing the boundary line
along the parallels of latitude to 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast. In the north, this
line follows the parallel passing through the northernmost point of the 12-nautical-mile territorial
sea of Roncador. In the south, the maritime boundary will first follow the 12–nautical–mile
territorial sea of Alburquerque Cays and East-Southeast Cays and then, from the most eastward
point of the latter’s territorial sea, the parallel of latitude. As Quitasueño and Serrana would
consequently be left on the Nicaraguan side of the boundary line, the line of the maritime boundary
around each of these features follows the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea around them (see
sketch-map No. 11: Course of the maritime boundary).
Thirdly, the Court notes that the boundary line has the effect of dividing the relevant area
between the Parties in a ratio of approximately 1:3.44 in Nicaragua’s favour, while the ratio of
relevant coasts is approximately 1:8.2. The question therefore is whether, in the circumstances of
the present case, this disproportion is so great as to render the result inequitable. The Court
concludes that, taking account of all the circumstances of the present case, the result achieved by
the maritime delimitation does not entail such a disproportionality as to create an inequitable result.
5. Nicaragua’s request for a declaration
In addition to its claims regarding a maritime boundary, in its final submissions, Nicaragua
requested that the Court adjudge and declare that “Colombia is not acting in accordance with her
obligations under international law by stopping and otherwise hindering Nicaragua from accessing
and disposing of her natural resources to the east of the 82nd meridian”.
The Court observes that Nicaragua’s request for this declaration is made in the context of
proceedings regarding a maritime boundary which had not been settled prior to the decision of the
Court. The consequence of the Court’s Judgment is that the maritime boundary between Nicaragua
and Colombia throughout the relevant area has now been delimited as between the Parties. In this
regard, the Court observes that the Judgment attributes to Colombia part of the maritime spaces in
respect of which Nicaragua seeks a declaration regarding access to natural resources. In this
context, the Court considers that Nicaragua’s claim is unfounded.
Composition of the Court
The Court was composed as follows: President Tomka; Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor;
Judges Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Greenwood,
Xue, Donoghue, Sebutinde; Judges ad hoc Mensah, Cot; Registrar Couvreur.
Judge OWADA appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judge ABRAHAM
appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judges KEITH and XUE append
declarations to the Judgment of the Court; Judge DONOGHUE appends a separate opinion to the
Judgment of the Court; Judges ad hoc MENSAH and COT append declarations to the Judgment of
the Court.
*
Năm 1967, vấn đề về các tuyên bố khác nhau về lãnh hải đã được nêu ra tại Liên hợp quốc. Năm 1973, Hội nghị Liên hợp quốc lần thứ 3 về Luật biển (Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea) được tổ chức tại New York. Để cố gắng giảm khả năng các nhóm quốc gia thống trị đàm phán, hội nghị dùng một quy trình đồng thuận thay cho bỏ phiếu lấy đa số. Với hơn 160 nước tham gia, hội nghị kéo dài đến năm 1982. Kết quả là một công ước có hiệu lực từ ngày 16 tháng 11 năm 1994, một năm sau khi Guyana - nước thứ 60 ký công ước.
Nội dung công ước có một loạt điều khoản. Những điều khoản quan trọng nhất quy định về việc thiết lập các giới hạn, giao thông đường biển, trạng thái biển đảo, và các chế độ quá cảnh, các vùng đặc quyền kinh tế, quyền tài phán thềm lục địa, khai khoáng lòng biển sâu, chính sách khai thác, bảo vệ môi trường biển, nghiên cứu khoa học, và dàn xếp các tranh chấp.
Công ước đặt ra giới hạn cho nhiều khu vực, tính từ một đường cơ sở (baseline) được định nghĩa kỹ càng. (Thông thường, một đường biển cơ sở chạy theo đường bờ biển khi thủy triều xuống, nhưng khi đường bờ biển bị thụt sâu, có đảo ven bờ, hoặc đường bờ biển rất không ổn định, có thể sử dụng các đường thẳng làm đường cơ sở). Có các khu vực dưới đây:
Nội thủy
Bao phủ tất cả vùng biển và đường thủy ở bên trong đường cơ sở (phía đất liền). Tại đây, quốc gia ven biển được tự do áp đặt luật, kiểm soát việc sử dụng, và sử dụng mọi tài nguyên. Các tàu thuyền nước ngoài không có quyền đi lại tự do trong các vùng nội thủy.
Lãnh hải
Vùng nằm ngoài đường cơ sở có chiều ngang 12 hải lý. Tại đây, quốc gia ven biển được quyền tự do đặt luật, kiểm soát việc sử dụng, và sử dụng mọi tài nguyên. Các tàu thuyền nước ngoài được quyền "qua lại không gây hại" mà không cần xin phép nước chủ. Đánh cá, làm ô nhiễm, dùng vũ khí, và do thám không được xếp vào dạng "không gây hại". Nước chủ cũng có thể tạm thời cấm việc "qua lại không gây hại" này tại một số vùng trong lãnh hải của mình khi cần bảo vệ an ninh.
Vùng nước quần đảo
Công ước đưa ra định nghĩa về các quốc gia quần đảo trong phần IV, cũng như định nghĩa về việc các quốc gia này có thể vẽ đường biên giới lãnh thổ của mình như thế nào. Đường cơ sở được vẽ giữa các điểm ngoài cùng nhất của các đảo ở ngoài cùng nhất, đảm bảo rằng các điểm này phải đủ gần nhau một cách thích đáng. Mọi vùng nước bên trong đường cơ sở này sẽ là vùng nước quần đảo và được coi như là một phần của lãnh hải quốc gia đó.
Vùng tiếp giáp lãnh hải
Bên ngoài giới hạn 12 hải lý của lãnh hải là một vành đai có bề rộng 12 hải lý, đó là vùng tiếp giáp lãnh hải. Tại đây, nước chủ có thể vẫn thực thi luật pháp của mình đối với các hoạt động như buôn lậu hoặc nhập cư bất hợp pháp.
Vùng đặc quyền kinh tế
Rộng 200 hải lý tính từ đường cơ sở. Trong vùng này, quốc gia ven biển được hưởng độc quyền trong việc khai thác đối với tất cả các tài nguyên thiên nhiên. Khái niệm vùng đặc quyền kinh tế được đưa ra để ngừng các cuộc xung đột về quyền đánh cá, tuy rằng khai thác dầu mỏ cũng đã trở nên một vấn đề quan trọng. Trong vùng đặc quyền kinh tế, nước ngoài có quyền tự do đi lại bằng đường thủy và đường không, tuân theo sự kiểm soát của quốc gia ven biển. Nước ngoài cũng có thể đặt các đường ống ngầm và cáp ngầm.
Thềm lục địa
Được định nghĩa là vành đai mở rộng của lãnh thổ đất cho tới mép lục địa (continental margin), hoặc 200 hải lý tính từ đường cơ sở, chọn lấy giá trị lớn hơn. Thềm lục địa của một quốc gia có thể kéo ra ngoài 200 hải lý cho đến mép tự nhiên của lục địa, nhưng không được vượt quá 350 hải lý, không được vượt ra ngoài đường đẳng sâu 2500m một khoảng cách quá 100 hải lý. Tại đây, nước chủ có độc quyền khai thác khoáng sản và các nguyên liệu không phải sinh vật sống.
Bên cạnh các điều khoản định nghĩa các ranh giới trên biển, công ước còn thiết lập các nghĩa vụ tổng quát cho việc bảo vệ môi trường biển và bảo vệ quyền tự do nghiên cứu khoa học trên biển. Công ước cũng tạo ra một cơ chế pháp lý mới cho việc kiểm soát khai thác tài nguyên khoáng sản tại các lòng biển sâu nằm ngoài thẩm quyền quốc gia, được thực hiện qua Ủy ban đáy biển quốc tế (International Seabed Authority).
Các nước không có biển được quyền có đường ra biển mà không bị đánh thuế giao thông bởi các nước trên tuyến đường nối với biển đó.
Event to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (28 November 2022)
Maritime zones and rights under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). M = nautical miles.
For any form of publication, please include the link to this page:
This photo has been graciously provided to be used in the GRID-Arendal resources library by: GRID-Arendal
This is taken from the Unites Nations Law of the Sea - UNCLOS III:
"The continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin’s outer edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline, whichever is greater. State’s continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical miles until the natural prolongation ends. However, it may never exceed 350 nautical miles from the baseline; or it may never exceed 100 nautical miles beyond the 2,500 meter isobath (the line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters). Coastal states have the right to harvest mineral and non-living material in the subsoil of its continental shelf, to the exclusion of others. Coastal states also have exclusive control over living resources "attached" to the continental shelf, but not to creatures living in the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone."
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So folks, as you can see there is a correspondent here (fernanda..?) who is lying through his teeth..
And he has been told about this on previous occasions - for example:
www.flickr.com/groups/malvinas/discuss/72157625691936809/
Kindest regards from the Falkland Islands
(Please scroll down to read this letter in Vietnamese and Chinese)
(Vui lòng cuộn xuống để đọc tiếng Việt)
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Dear friends around the world,
On 2 May, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) deployed a giant billion-dollar oil rig (Haiyang Shiyou 981) to drill in a location 80 miles inside Vietnam’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ - which extends offshore from every country).
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982), to which China is also a signatory, Vietnam is the only country that has the right to exploit natural resources inside its EEZ.
China has been using the so-called "nine-dashed-line" to outline its illegal claim of the Bien Dong (South China Sea). Beijing has awarded itself with the right to exploit resources in waters that it says belong to China. So far China has not succeeded in proving the legitimacy of the nine dashed line or in providing a clarification of it. Thus China cannot justify its latest action that clearly violates international laws.
Vietnamese people, including our soldiers, love peace. We struggled nearly 40 years for peace and freedom, that’s why we cherish every moment of peace. But we will utilize everything we have in order to protect our sovereignty.
We hope that peace loving people around the world will join us in the protest against China’s provocation in order to return peace and stability to the Bien Dong (South China Sea).
Thank you very much for reading this. Best wishes for you, your family, and every people from your country.
Best regards,
For further information about UNCLOS 1982, you can see here: www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_ove...
It is totally clear that China has signed this Convention. Actually China is one of the pioneer investors:
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_his...
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Gửi bạn bè trên toàn thế giới,
Ngày 2/5, Trung Quốc ngang ngược kéo giàn khoan khổng lồ vào tọa độ 15029’N/1110 12’E nằm sâu 80 hải lý trong Vùng đặc quyền kinh tế Việt Nam.
Theo công ước Liên Hợp Quốc về luật biển quốc tế UNCLOS 1982 mà Trung Quốc cũng là thành viên, Việt Nam là nước duy nhất có quyền khai thác tài nguyên tại khu vực nằm trong vùng đặc quyền kinh tế của mình.
Trung Quốc luôn cố chấp với tuyên bố đường lưỡi bò phi pháp của mình trên Biển Đông, tự cho mình quyền khai thác trong khu vực mà họ cho rằng thuộc chủ quyền của mình, tuy nhiên cho đến nay chưa bao giờ Trung Quốc chứng minh được tính pháp lý của đường 9 đoạn này cũng như giải thích rõ ràng về cơ sở của nó. Vì vậy, Trung Quốc không có bất kì một lí do gì để bào chữa cho hành động vi phạm nghiêm trọng luật pháp quốc tế này.
Nhân dân và quân đội Việt Nam yêu chuộng hòa bình nhưng cũng sẵn sàng mọi thứ để giữ vững chủ quyền của chúng tôi. Chính vì thế, chúng tôi hi vọng nhân dân yêu chuộng hòa bình thế giới sẽ cùng chúng tôi phản đối hành động xâm lược này của Trung Quốc, trả lại cho Biển Đông sự yên bình vốn có.
Cảm ơn bạn đã dành thời gian đọc bài viết này. Xin được gửi những lời chúc tốt đẹp nhất đến với các bạn, gia đình và toàn thể dân tộc bạn.
Chân thành cảm ơn.
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致世界各国朋友,
2014年5月2号，中国横行霸道地将海洋石油981钻井平台搬到坐标为北纬15度29分58秒、东经111度12分06秒，完全属于越南专属经济区和大陆架的海域，距离越南李山岛119海里和距离越南海岸线130海里的位置展开作业，同时出动多受护卫船陪同。 中国是1982年《联合国海洋法公约》的签字国，应该按照《公约》第74和83条文办事，要尊重周边沿海国200海里专属经济区和大陆架的主张。据此《公约》，越南是在拥有的主权权利和管辖权的专属经济区和大陆架的海域上有权利开展作业活动的唯一国家。 中国一直特别固执，自己在东海地区画上非法的“牛舌线”。中国自己公布不合理的九段线的主权要求，横行霸道对几乎整个东海地区宣称主权。但是，截至目前，中国从来没有任何资料证明该“牛舌线”的合法性，同时也没有合理及正确的解释它的来历。因此，中国的上述举动是非法和完全违反了越南法律和国际法，违背了《东海各方行为宣言》精神。 越南军队和人民爱护和平，但是我们坚决采取一切必要而合适的措施来维护自己的正当权益和主权。因此，我们希望世界上爱和平人士将与越南人民携手同行，反对中国这一侵略，挑衅行为，保持东海地区原来的和平和稳定。
真心感谢。
#chinastopprovoking #peaceforeveryone #operationrestoringpeace
The issue of varying claims of territorial waters was raised in the UN in 1967 by Arvid Pardo, of Malta, and in 1973 the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in New York. In an attempt to reduce the possibility of groups of nation-states dominating the negotiations, the conference used a consensus process rather than majority vote. With more than 160 nations participating, the conference lasted until 1982. The resulting convention came into force on November 16, 1994, one year after the sixtieth state, Guyana, ratified the treaty.
The convention introduced a number of provisions. The most significant issues covered were setting limits, navigation, archipelagic status and transit regimes, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), continental shelf jurisdiction, deep seabed mining, the exploitation regime, protection of the marine environment, scientific research, and settlement of disputes.
The convention set the limit of various areas, measured from a carefully defined baseline. (Normally, a sea baseline follows the low-water line, but when the coastline is deeply indented, has fringing islands or is highly unstable, straight baselines may be used.) The areas are as follows:
Internal waters
Covers all water and waterways on the landward side of the baseline. The coastal state is free to set laws, regulate use, and use any resource. Foreign vessels have no right of passage within internal waters.
Territorial waters
Out to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, the coastal state is free to set laws, regulate use, and use any resource. Vessels were given the right of innocent passage through any territorial waters, with strategic straits allowing the passage of military craft as transit passage, in that naval vessels are allowed to maintain postures that would be illegal in territorial waters. "Innocent passage" is defined by the convention as passing through waters in an expeditious and continuous manner, which is not “prejudicial to the peace, good order or the security” of the coastal state. Fishing, polluting, weapons practice, and spying are not “innocent", and submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag. Nations can also temporarily suspend innocent passage in specific areas of their territorial seas, if doing so is essential for the protection of its security.
Archipelagic waters
The convention set the definition of Archipelagic States in Part IV, which also defines how the state can draw its territorial borders. A baseline is drawn between the outermost points of the outermost islands, subject to these points being sufficiently close to one another. All waters inside this baseline are designated Archipelagic Waters. The state has full sovereignty over these waters (like internal waters), but foreign vessels have right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters (like territorial waters).
Contiguous zone
Beyond the 12 nautical mile limit there was a further 12 nautical miles or 24 nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines limit, the contiguous zone, in which a state could continue to enforce laws in four specific areas: pollution, taxation, customs, and immigration.
Exclusive economic zones (EEZs)
These extend from the edge of the territorial sea out to 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Within this area, the coastal nation has sole exploitation rights over all natural resources. In casual use, the term may include the territorial sea and even the continental shelf. The EEZs were introduced to halt the increasingly heated clashes over fishing rights, although oil was also becoming important. The success of an offshore oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico in 1947 was soon repeated elsewhere in the world, and by 1970 it was technically feasible to operate in waters 4000 metres deep. Foreign nations have the freedom of navigation and overflight, subject to the regulation of the coastal states. Foreign states may also lay submarine pipes and cables.
Continental shelf
The continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin’s outer edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline, whichever is greater. A state’s continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical miles until the natural prolongation ends. However, it may never exceed 350 nautical miles from the baseline; or it may never exceed 100 nautical miles beyond the 2,500 meter isobath (the line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters). Coastal states have the right to harvest mineral and non-living material in the subsoil of its continental shelf, to the exclusion of others. Coastal states also have exclusive control over living resources "attached" to the continental shelf, but not to creatures living in the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone.
Aside from its provisions defining ocean boundaries, the convention establishes general obligations for safeguarding the marine environment and protecting freedom of scientific research on the high seas, and also creates an innovative legal regime for controlling mineral resource exploitation in deep seabed areas beyond national jurisdiction, through an International Seabed Authority and the Common heritage of mankind principle.[4]
Landlocked states are given a right of access to and from the sea, without taxation of traffic through transit states.
PCG: Rear Admiral Luis M Tuason Jr PCG led the closing ceremony of the three (3) day seminar on Maritime Law Enforcement and Law of the Sea held at the National Coast Watch Center, Headquarters Philippine Coast Guard today, March 15.
The said seminar conducted by Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) aimed to enhance institutional capacity in the areas of international law on military operations and maritime law enforcement. It tackled the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and focused on regional maritime issues.
The seminar also included discussions on piracy, fisheries protection, comparisons between the law of armed conflict and maritime law enforcement, rules of engagement, and rules for the use of force.
The CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies is pleased to host a Banyan Tree Leadership Forum featuring Antonio T. Carpio, Senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
The lecture will discuss China’s nine-dash line claim as the root cause of the South China Sea disputes, and show how it encroaches on the maritime zones of other coastal states. It will argue that the recent creation by China of artificial islands in the Spratlys is part of a design by China to control the South China Sea for economic and military purposes. The lecture will explain how the nine-dash line claim, and the activities by China to enforce it, violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and threaten peace, security, and stability in the region. The lecture will argue that the nine-dash line claim has no historical basis and that throughout Chinese history, the southernmost territory of China has been Hainan Island. The lecture will suggest a possible resolution of the dispute whereby China would return to the original intent of the 1947 nine-dash line, articulated by President Ma Ying-Jeou of Taiwan, as a claim to islands and their maritime zones that are recognized under international law.
Justice Carpio studied law at the University of the Philippines’ College of Law, and was admitted to the bar in 1975. He immediately went into private practice, establishing Carpio Villaraza and Cruz LLP. In 1992, Justice Carpio was appointed Chief Presidential Legal Counsel in the Office of the President of the Philippines, and on October 26, 2001, he was sworn in as a member of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Justice Carpio has received the Presidential Medal of Merit, the Outstanding Achievement in Law Award from the Ateneo de Manila Alumni Association, and an honorary Doctorate of Laws from Ateneo de Davao University.
Follow the event on Twitter@SoutheastAsiaDC ǀ@CSIS ǀ #CSISLive
Programs
CSIS Sumitro Djojohadikusumo Banyan Tree Leadership Forum, Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies
Topics
Defense and Security
Regions
Southeast Asia
The CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies is pleased to host a Banyan Tree Leadership Forum featuring Antonio T. Carpio, Senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
The lecture will discuss China’s nine-dash line claim as the root cause of the South China Sea disputes, and show how it encroaches on the maritime zones of other coastal states. It will argue that the recent creation by China of artificial islands in the Spratlys is part of a design by China to control the South China Sea for economic and military purposes. The lecture will explain how the nine-dash line claim, and the activities by China to enforce it, violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and threaten peace, security, and stability in the region. The lecture will argue that the nine-dash line claim has no historical basis and that throughout Chinese history, the southernmost territory of China has been Hainan Island. The lecture will suggest a possible resolution of the dispute whereby China would return to the original intent of the 1947 nine-dash line, articulated by President Ma Ying-Jeou of Taiwan, as a claim to islands and their maritime zones that are recognized under international law.
Justice Carpio studied law at the University of the Philippines’ College of Law, and was admitted to the bar in 1975. He immediately went into private practice, establishing Carpio Villaraza and Cruz LLP. In 1992, Justice Carpio was appointed Chief Presidential Legal Counsel in the Office of the President of the Philippines, and on October 26, 2001, he was sworn in as a member of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Justice Carpio has received the Presidential Medal of Merit, the Outstanding Achievement in Law Award from the Ateneo de Manila Alumni Association, and an honorary Doctorate of Laws from Ateneo de Davao University.
Follow the event on Twitter@SoutheastAsiaDC ǀ@CSIS ǀ #CSISLive
Programs
CSIS Sumitro Djojohadikusumo Banyan Tree Leadership Forum, Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies
Topics
Defense and Security
Regions
Southeast Asia
PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 21, 2020) Multinational navy ships and a submarine steam in formation during a group sail off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020, August 21. “Like-minded nations come together in RIMPAC in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific where all nations enjoy unfettered access to the seas and airways in accordance with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) upon which all nations’ economies depend,” said Adm. John C. Aquilino, Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet. Ten nations, 22 ships, 1 submarine, and more than 5,300 personnel are participating in Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) from August 17 to 31 at sea in the waters surrounding Hawaii. RIMPAC is a biennial exercise designed to foster and sustain cooperative relationships, critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The exercise is a unique training platform designed to enhance interoperability and strategic maritime partnerships. RIMPAC 2020 is the 27th exercise in the series that began in 1971. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Rawad Madanat)
The CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies is pleased to host a Banyan Tree Leadership Forum featuring Antonio T. Carpio, Senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
The lecture will discuss China’s nine-dash line claim as the root cause of the South China Sea disputes, and show how it encroaches on the maritime zones of other coastal states. It will argue that the recent creation by China of artificial islands in the Spratlys is part of a design by China to control the South China Sea for economic and military purposes. The lecture will explain how the nine-dash line claim, and the activities by China to enforce it, violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and threaten peace, security, and stability in the region. The lecture will argue that the nine-dash line claim has no historical basis and that throughout Chinese history, the southernmost territory of China has been Hainan Island. The lecture will suggest a possible resolution of the dispute whereby China would return to the original intent of the 1947 nine-dash line, articulated by President Ma Ying-Jeou of Taiwan, as a claim to islands and their maritime zones that are recognized under international law.
Justice Carpio studied law at the University of the Philippines’ College of Law, and was admitted to the bar in 1975. He immediately went into private practice, establishing Carpio Villaraza and Cruz LLP. In 1992, Justice Carpio was appointed Chief Presidential Legal Counsel in the Office of the President of the Philippines, and on October 26, 2001, he was sworn in as a member of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Justice Carpio has received the Presidential Medal of Merit, the Outstanding Achievement in Law Award from the Ateneo de Manila Alumni Association, and an honorary Doctorate of Laws from Ateneo de Davao University.
Follow the event on Twitter@SoutheastAsiaDC ǀ@CSIS ǀ #CSISLive
Programs
CSIS Sumitro Djojohadikusumo Banyan Tree Leadership Forum, Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies
Topics
Defense and Security
Regions
Southeast Asia
Event to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (28 November 2022)
The CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies is pleased to host a Banyan Tree Leadership Forum featuring Antonio T. Carpio, Senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
The lecture will discuss China’s nine-dash line claim as the root cause of the South China Sea disputes, and show how it encroaches on the maritime zones of other coastal states. It will argue that the recent creation by China of artificial islands in the Spratlys is part of a design by China to control the South China Sea for economic and military purposes. The lecture will explain how the nine-dash line claim, and the activities by China to enforce it, violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and threaten peace, security, and stability in the region. The lecture will argue that the nine-dash line claim has no historical basis and that throughout Chinese history, the southernmost territory of China has been Hainan Island. The lecture will suggest a possible resolution of the dispute whereby China would return to the original intent of the 1947 nine-dash line, articulated by President Ma Ying-Jeou of Taiwan, as a claim to islands and their maritime zones that are recognized under international law.
Justice Carpio studied law at the University of the Philippines’ College of Law, and was admitted to the bar in 1975. He immediately went into private practice, establishing Carpio Villaraza and Cruz LLP. In 1992, Justice Carpio was appointed Chief Presidential Legal Counsel in the Office of the President of the Philippines, and on October 26, 2001, he was sworn in as a member of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Justice Carpio has received the Presidential Medal of Merit, the Outstanding Achievement in Law Award from the Ateneo de Manila Alumni Association, and an honorary Doctorate of Laws from Ateneo de Davao University.
Follow the event on Twitter@SoutheastAsiaDC ǀ@CSIS ǀ #CSISLive
Programs
CSIS Sumitro Djojohadikusumo Banyan Tree Leadership Forum, Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies
Topics
Defense and Security
Regions
Southeast Asia
Event to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (28 November 2022)
Event to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (28 November 2022)
The CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies is pleased to host a Banyan Tree Leadership Forum featuring Antonio T. Carpio, Senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
The lecture will discuss China’s nine-dash line claim as the root cause of the South China Sea disputes, and show how it encroaches on the maritime zones of other coastal states. It will argue that the recent creation by China of artificial islands in the Spratlys is part of a design by China to control the South China Sea for economic and military purposes. The lecture will explain how the nine-dash line claim, and the activities by China to enforce it, violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and threaten peace, security, and stability in the region. The lecture will argue that the nine-dash line claim has no historical basis and that throughout Chinese history, the southernmost territory of China has been Hainan Island. The lecture will suggest a possible resolution of the dispute whereby China would return to the original intent of the 1947 nine-dash line, articulated by President Ma Ying-Jeou of Taiwan, as a claim to islands and their maritime zones that are recognized under international law.
Justice Carpio studied law at the University of the Philippines’ College of Law, and was admitted to the bar in 1975. He immediately went into private practice, establishing Carpio Villaraza and Cruz LLP. In 1992, Justice Carpio was appointed Chief Presidential Legal Counsel in the Office of the President of the Philippines, and on October 26, 2001, he was sworn in as a member of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Justice Carpio has received the Presidential Medal of Merit, the Outstanding Achievement in Law Award from the Ateneo de Manila Alumni Association, and an honorary Doctorate of Laws from Ateneo de Davao University.
Follow the event on Twitter@SoutheastAsiaDC ǀ@CSIS ǀ #CSISLive
Programs
CSIS Sumitro Djojohadikusumo Banyan Tree Leadership Forum, Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies
Topics
Defense and Security
Regions
Southeast Asia
Event to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (28 November 2022)